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ABSTRACT
DEVELOPMENT OF A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF DISTRIBUTED 
COGNITION PHENOMENA IN CONTROL CENTERS DURING CRISIS
CONDITIONS
Christopher J. West 
Old Dominion University, 2006 
Director: Rafael E. Landaeta
The purpose of this research is to develop and partially validate a 
theoretical framework describing distributed cognition phenomena occurring in 
organizational control centers functioning in crisis environments. Using a 
systems approach, the work synthesizes existing constructs relating to 
distributed cognition then supplements this knowledge with review of crisis 
management literature. The goal of this effort is the development of a framework 
for understanding the impact of crisis conditions on such phenomena occurring 
within the specified setting. An exploratory case study approach was used to 
partially validate and refine the framework by gauging its ability to interpret the 
impact of crisis conditions on control center performance.
The researcher identifies a gap in crisis management literature relating to 
the study of distributed cognition within organizational control centers. The 
prevalence of and importance of institutionalized control centers to large 
organizations expecting to experience environments requiring more rapid 
processing of information and expedient reaction than usual is recognized within 
crisis management literature. A primary purpose of such control centers is to 
facilitate distributed cognition. Frameworks describing such phenomena in more
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general organizational settings can be found within distributed cognition 
literature, organizational learning literature, and in military science. In some 
cases the specific setting of control centers is addressed but not to the extent of 
conceptually framing or applying a framework to the more specific setting.
The basic research questions explored are: (1) what are the key 
constructs and interrelationships that structurally frame distributed cognition 
phenomena within control centers? and (2) what are the structural impacts of 
crisis conditions on the phenomena in such settings?
Results of this research could, (1) aid in the implementation of new 
strategies, designs, training plans, methodologies, and technologies in crisis 
control centers for complex, technically oriented organizations, (2) improve the 
systemic design of and confidence in the assessment of mechanisms and 
subsystems designed to facilitate distributed cognition within organizations, (3) 
improve the general understanding of how distributed cognition takes place 
within organizational control centers, and (4) lead to a better understanding of the 
systemic effects crisis conditions have on the structures within control centers 
designed to facilitate distributed cognition.
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1CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The establishment, development, and institutionalization of control centers 
are natural responses by large, diverse organizations and bureaucracies to 
facilitate the expeditious comprehension of and response to fluid, dynamic, 
sometimes unexpected environments. The ability of these control centers to 
fulfill their purpose is challenged even more as crisis conditions emerge in the 
outside environment. Developing an in-depth, systemic perspective of how 
cognition occurs within the specific setting of control centers functioning during 
crisis periods, (1) could aid in the implementation of new strategies, designs, 
training plans, methodologies, and technologies in crisis control centers for 
complex, technically oriented organizations, (2) could improve the systemic 
design of and confidence in the assessment of mechanisms and subsystems 
designed to facilitate distributed cognition within organizations, (3) could improve 
the general understanding of how distributed cognition takes place within 
organizational control centers, and (4) could lead to a better understanding of the 
systemic effects crisis conditions have on the structures within control centers 
designed to facilitate distributed cognition. Additionally, (5) the framework may 
be transferable to other distributed cognition systems in a variety of 
organizational settings engaged in crisis management or response and may 
provide similar benefits accordingly. These potential benefits motivate the 
rigorous definition of the concepts involved as well as the construction of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2suggested framework to answer the central questions of this research. Table 1.1 
captures these potential benefits and will serve as a foundation for building the 
remainder of this research process.
Table 1.1: Research Benefits
Overall Research Goal: Developing an in-depth, systemic perspective of how 
cognition occurs within the specific setting of control centers functioning during 
crisis periods ___________________________________________________
Potential
Benefit
Description
PB1 Provide a basis for better development of implementation 
strategies for adapting new methodologies and 
technologies to support such centers
PB2 Provide a more comprehensive, holistic assessments of the 
performance of such centers, enhance the confidence 
placed in such assessments, and subsequently enhance 
training and practice regimes thereby enhancing control 
center performance during times of crisis
PB3 Provide for further understanding of the distributed 
cognition phenomena seen emerging from individuals and 
subsystems involved in managing, and running control 
centers
PB4 Provide a better understanding of the systemic effects crisis 
conditions have on the structures within control centers 
designed to facilitate distributed cognition
PB5 The framework may be transferable to other distributed 
cognition systems in a variety of organizational settings 
engaged in crisis management or response and may 
provide similar benefits accordingly
Crisis Environments and Control Centers
Many large organizations usually operate within environments with some 
level of predictability and develop their internal structure, processes, and 
methodologies as well as posture their resources and personnel accordingly. 
Many such organizations understand, both at leadership levels and throughout
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3their functional sub-units, that they must also be postured for more unpredictable, 
transitory sets of events significantly impacting their operations and requiring 
more intensive, extensive, and timely study and reaction than normal daily 
operations. Such sets of events constitute crisis environments that will be more 
rigorously defined later in this proposal. Crisis management is essentially defined 
as the preparation for, planning for, functioning within, and learning during and 
after such sets of events (Hermann 1963, Mitroff 1994, Coombs 1999,
Loosemore 1998, Unzucker 2002, Lagadec 1990). Over the years, especially 
since Hermann’s (1963) work, a large body of popular management literature 
and a smaller body of academic organizational research literature has developed 
around the topic of crisis management.
Much is written from an experiential basis describing specific lessons 
learned from a variety of historical crises and developing and generalizing 
conclusions for future implementation (Borins 2002, McConnell and Stark 2002, 
Nudell and Anotkoll 1998; Lagadec 1990; Mayrs and Holusha 1996, White 2001, 
Nelson and French 2002, Hooper 1999). Much is also written about the subject 
from a prescriptive, “how-to” approach in which authors lay out an organizational 
structure, hierarchy, systematic methodology, or implementation strategy for 
various technological aids designed to provide an organization with a means to 
provide oversight in a crisis situation (Johansenn et al. 2001, Loosemore 1998a, 
1998b, 2001, Lee 1999, National Research Council 1996, Schrodt 1999, Coombs 
1999, Ogrizek 1997, Mitroff 2000; Unzucker 2002).
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4Many organizations that frequently expect to experience crises of 
somewhat less predictable natures institutionalize their efforts to manage these 
crises through the establishment of what can generally be called control centers 
(Coombs 1999). Generally speaking, these control centers are usually postured 
with batteries of specialized, trained personnel, communications devices, and a 
large variety of plans, checklists, status boards, data management technologies 
and other such artifacts. Crisis management literature has focused significantly 
over recent years proposing that a primary function of institutionalized 
organizational control centers is to facilitate the collective organizational 
understanding of how to react to non-typical, fluid, dynamic environments or 
crises (Coombs 1999, Vidaillet 2001, Lagadec 1990). However, the existing 
body of knowledge within crisis management research has not yet yielded 
systemic frameworks tailored to facilitate understanding the learning processes 
that occur in the specific case of control centers. Additionally, the current body of 
knowledge has not focused on developing a similar systemic understanding of 
the impact of crisis conditions on control centers.
A systems approach is stressed here because within the crisis 
management literature detailed above, a variety of disparate constructs are 
proposed and researched but a holistic, comprehensive framework detailing the 
interrelationships of these elements is lacking. Complex problems involving a 
variety of observers’ and participants’ interpretations are suited to a systems 
approach of setting boundaries, specifying interrelationships, and understanding 
emergent phenomena (Flood and Carson 1993, Checkland 1981).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5Key to initially bounding this work’s efforts is development of what 
constitutes a crises environment. Figure 1.1 provides an overview of an initial 
literature investigation in pursuit of such a definition.
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6Figure 1.1: Definitions of Crisis_______________________________________
“a turning point for better or worse” -  Fink (1986)
“A situation characterized by surprise, high threat to important values, and short decision time.” 
Hermann, (1963).
“a major occurrence with potential negative outcome affecting an organization, company, or 
industry. As well as its publics, products, services, or good name.” Fearn-Banks (1996)
“a major unpredictable event that has potentially negative results. The event and its aftermath 
may significantly damage an organization and its employees, products, services, financial 
condition, and reputation.” -  Barton (1993).
“an event that is an unpredictable, major threat that can have a negative effect on the 
organization, industry, or stakeholders, if handled improperly.” -  Coombs (1999).
“Extreme events that cause disruption and put lives and property at risk. These require an 
immediate response and application of resources beyond regular application.” - National 
Research Council (1996).
“a Hippocratic concept: all illnesses reach a turning point. From here some are fatal, some go 
on to recovery, all others develop to another form, and take on a different constitution.” Dab 
(1993).
“a fit of uncertainty, and distress where everything is in suspense in anticipation of imminent 
resolution of the illness." Bolzinger (1982).
“Crisis: a situation in which numerous organizations are faced with critical problems, 
experience both sharp external pressure and internal tensions, and are then brutally and for an 
extended period thrust to the center stage and hurled against one another, all in a society of 
mass communication, in other words in direct contact with the certainty of being at the top of the 
news on radio and television and in the press for a long time.” Lagadec, (1990)
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7Three general themes emerge out of these definitions. First, crisis events 
are considerably more significant and negative to organizations than normal 
events in terms of their impact on organizational survival in its current state. 
Second, they may have components of surprise, unpredictability, and difficulty 
relative to the normal events organizations are ideally postured for. This notion 
can be thought of as crisis environments being composed of a level of complexity 
for which the organization is not ideally prepared. Third and finally, these authors 
all point to the internal organizational and emotional stress caused by crises.
At this point by bringing these themes together a working definition can be 
proposed: crisis environments are those (a) with potential for significant negative 
organizational outcomes and (b) of a significantly greater level of complexity than 
organizations are usually prepared for and as a result of either or both of these 
elements (c) can cause significant internal organizational stress.
A well-developed understanding of what constitutes a crisis environment is 
a necessary basis for building a framework to understand the impact of such an 
environment on organizational control centers. Given the proposition that 
facilitating more rapid conceptualization and reacting processes is a primary 
purpose of such entities, this aim itself also needs to be approached 
systemically.
The Concept of Distributed Cognition
Before describing the concept of distributed cognition, some basic, and at 
this point initial, definitions of its conceptual underpinnings, as used for purposes
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of this work, is in order. First, distinction must be made between what constitutes 
data, information, knowledge, and perhaps intelligence. Ackoff (1989) develops 
a hierarchy of these concepts: data is nothing more than raw symbols 
differentiating various states of the universe; information is data processed into a 
useful form with some level of meaning answering the basic questions “who”, 
“what”, “when,” and “where”; knowledge represents information applied to begin 
answering “how”. Ackoff goes on to define understanding as the appreciation of 
knowledge when one begins answering “why” and compares the distinction 
between knowledge and understanding to the distinction between memorizing 
and learning. Finally, Ackoff defines wisdom separately from the other four 
concepts, which are focused upon the past. Wisdom is the ability to project 
understanding for predictive purposes.
Moving on to the concepts of learning and cognition, Boisot and Canals 
(2004) describe an agent’s act of perception as the transition between outside 
stimuli and the creation of data; conceptualization as the transition between data 
and information; and finally the processing of mental representations as the act 
of using information to create knowledge. Boisot and Canals cite Clark (1997) 
and Damasio (1999) for describing the agents “tuning” of such transition “filters” 
as being driven by “cognitive” expectations. Rogers (1997) specifically describes 
cognition as the act of modifying representations.
This systematic moving up between levels of mental usefulness is echoed 
with analogous terms in the various frameworks, to be discussed later in this 
proposal, describing organizational learning and distributed cognition. For
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9purposes of this work no distinction will be made between learning and cognition 
other than the understanding that cognition tends to be the favored term within 
psychological, anthropological, and cognitive sciences while learning tends to be 
used more prevalently in organizational research and management circles. 
Furthermore learning and cognition will be accepted to constitute the whole 
iterative process of converting data to higher forms of mental usefulness and 
then moving beyond that to the point of acting and evaluating actions over time to 
further improve usefulness. The higher forms described as wisdom and 
understanding may also be used interchangeably with the notion of intelligence.
Perhaps the notion of learning occurring at more than just the level of the 
individual first arose out of psychological, sociological, and anthropological 
research circles. Dewey (1938), focusing on the means by which knowledge is 
gained, stated,
“Experience does not simply go on inside a person. We live 
from birth to death in a world of persons and things which is in large 
measure what it is because of what has been done and transmitted 
from previous human activities” (p. 39).
Other early authors similarly focused on the merits of understanding 
individual behavior through the concept that one’s knowledge, thoughts, and 
actions are rooted inside a system of existing knowledge and cultural artifacts 
and processes (Vygotsky, 1929; Wundt, 1921; Allport, 1924). Roberts’ (1964) 
suggestion that social organization reflects an architecture of cognition at the 
community level seems to capture the essence of the perspectives.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Within organizational management circles a general notion of collective
learning perhaps first began to arise when March and Simon (1958) commented
that the focus of their work is on “the flow of information within organizations that
instructs, informs, and supports decision making processes.” Weick’s work
(1979) focused on organizational psychology and embraced the organic
perspective of learning by focusing on the fact that knowledge is gained and
retained within organizational structures despite personnel turnover. Argyris and
Schon (1978) crystallize this stream of thought by describing organizational
learning as occurring when individuals,
“ ...experience a surprising mismatch between expected and actual 
results...and respond through a process of thought and further 
actions that lends them to modify their images of organization or 
their understandings of organizational phenomena and to 
restructure their activities so as to bring outcomes and expectations 
into line, thereby changing organizational theory in use. In order to 
become organizational the learning that results from organizational 
inquiry must become embedded in the images of organization held 
in its member’s minds and/or [its] epistemological artifacts (maps, 
memories, and programs) embedded in the organizational 
environment” (p. 16).
Within cognitive science, psychology, and anthropology, many authors 
(Rogers and Scaife 1997, Magnus 2004, Giere 2001) point to Hutchins’ works in 
the 1980’s and 1990’s with a variety of his partners (Hollan 1984, Pea 1996, 
Kirsch 1998, Palen 1997, and Norman 1985) as first bringing the term distributed 
cognition to the fore. These case studies, documenting the processing of mental 
representations over time by groups of individuals, are cited for their 
development of the perspective that distributed cognition is a distinct phenomena 
composed of the processes by which collectives learn about and act within their
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environment. Hutchins (1995) cites Hinton and Becker’s (1992) construction of 
models showing how two visual modules are able to share a representation of a 
visual world in such a way that through their interaction they can recover depth, 
something that neither can sense alone. The analogy is that differing 
components of a collective can work together to achieve, maintain, and adjust a 
representation of the outside environment.
Argyris and Schon’s focus on the embedding of images in organizational 
artifacts mirrors these same ideas. By bringing together their work and that of 
Hutchins and other authors, (Rogers and Scaife 1997, Magnus 2004, Giere 2001 
Pea 1996) the following three basic themes seem to be repeatedly cited:
1) As opposed to cognitive science in general, the phenomenon of 
distributed cognition is not limited to the boundary of the individual person. The 
boundary can be repeatedly redrawn around a variety of subunits or groupings of 
personnel and materials that accomplish cognition for the purposes of the 
collective group
2) Again, as opposed to general cognitive science which focuses on the 
mental representations of the environment which individuals use, maintain, and 
adjust, distributed cognition focuses not only on such representations used by 
groups but also on the interactions amongst group members, artifacts, and the 
environment as mechanisms for accomplishing cognition.
3) The boundary of events relating to cognition extends broadly over time 
not just encompassing any single chapter or single adjustment to a given set of 
mental representations of the environment. Past events, artifacts, and
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knowledge bases of personnel within subunits experiencing significant turnover 
over time may significantly influence the ability of a collective group to learn 
about its environment.
By synthesizing these themes from the literature for purposes of this work, 
distributed cognition can be defined as: the ongoing accumulation, distribution, 
and synthesis of knowledge across time, amongst personnel and systems, and at 
all levels within a bounded organization, which leads to the development, 
adjustment, and sometimes tearing down of shared mental representations of the 
outside world within which the organization is trying to pursue its goals. More 
rigorous, detailed development of the concept of distributed cognition follows in 
the literature review chapter that will (1) provide a firm basis within cognitive 
science and organizational learning literature and (2) develop a listing of authors’ 
themes and characterizations of the phenomena and (3) provide a detailed 
description of the resulting frameworks they have constructed to describe it.
Overview of Existing Distributed Cognition Conceptual Frameworks
A variety of characterizations, conceptual models, and resulting 
propositions describing distributed cognition processes have been developed 
within the literature (March 2000, Dhar 2000, Crossan et al 1995, Argyris and 
Schon 1978, Ocasio 2000, Boyd in Coram 2000). A central theme lying at the 
foundation of these frameworks is the idea that cognition is essentially the 
emergent, manifest development, adjustment, and propagation of 
representations of the outside environment across an organization as it attempts
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to use them to influence that environment (Hutchins 1995, Wright 2000, Walsh 
1995, Ocasio 2001, Waern 1999, Rogers 1997, Vidaillet 2001, Argyris 1996). 
Figure 2.1 provides a brief overview of some of the more structured conceptual 
frameworks and models.
This basic, defining element of cognition, the processing of 
representations, then serves as a foundation for the development of a variety of 
approaches to understand various aspects of the idea of distributed cognition 
within organizations. Crossan, Lane, and White’s (1999) 4-I theory of 
organizational learning identifies the key processes of intuiting, interpreting, 
integrating, and institutionalizing and focuses on their occurrence at and linking 
between the three primary institutional levels at which such learning takes place: 
the individual level, the group level, and the organizational level. Argyris and 
Schon (1978) identify 1) a surface type of learning that takes place within an 
organization as it processes data within an institutionalized perspective of reality 
and 2) a secondary, deeper learning that occurs when such perspectives are 
questioned and altered at a more basic level. Rulke and Zaheer (2000) develop 
an approach based on the dichotomy of self-knowledge, that knowledge 
contained within a single organizational unit, and resource-knowledge, the 
organizational unit knowing it doesn’t have the knowledge in question but 
knowing where it can be gained. They then cross these characterizations with 
the notions of purposive learning channels, for example, formal institutionalized 
training such as classes and relational learning channels, for example, informal 
person-person discussion of situations in order to capture the differing impacts of
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these forms of cognition within the organization. Ocasio (2001) proposes his 
SERTS (selection-enactment-retrieval-transmission- storage) model, developed 
from empirical study, as a way of understanding how information is processed in 
an organization. Lastly, the decision making process perspective of 
“observation-orientation-decision-action” processing, so called OODA loops, 
formally developed by John Boyd (in Coram 2000) is used as a recurring 
framework within military circles (Fadok 1995, Cramer 1996, Plehn 2000) and is 
very much analogous to the other frameworks discussed in describing the 
learning process. Though, developed primarily with a protagonist versus 
intelligent opponent’s or enemy’s point of view, the OODA loop process has 
application within settings where the protagonist is merely trying to come to grips 
with the pace of an external environment via looping through the OODA process 
at sufficient speed.
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Figure 1.2: Functional Frameworks from Distributed Cognition Literature
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The use of these characterizations definitely informs and frames the 
distributed cognition process and begins to approach a systems perspective. A 
more rigorous, systemically developed, holistic framework would ensure 
comprehensiveness as well as provide for a means to understand the impact of 
crisis conditions on the specific case of organizational control centers.
Filling the Literature Gap, Research Goals and Questions
The goal of this research is to use a systems approach to develop, 
validate, and adjust a conceptual framework, using constructs from distributed 
cognition literature tailored to the specific case of control centers functioning 
during periods of crisis. The validated framework could then be used as a basis 
for the development of more rigorous control center performance assessment 
criteria and the development of implementations strategies for introducing new 
technologies and procedures into control centers. The four primary motivations or 
potential benefits cited in the introduction to this chapter motivate the primary 
research questions of the proposed research and subsequently the proposed 
development of the Distributed Cognition in Crisis Control Centers (DC5) 
framework. The primary research questions that would be explored in this 
research are: (1) what are the key constructs that structurally frame the 
phenomena of distributed cognition within control centers and how are they 
interrelated? and (2) what are the structural impacts of the onset and 
development of crisis conditions on the distributed cognition systems in such 
settings?
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
17
Flowing from these general questions are more focused objective 
questions that will serve to guide the research. It should be noted, as shown in 
figure 1.3, that the development of these interim objectives was part of an 
iterative process involving the proposed literature review and the proposed DC5 
construction process itself. These interim objective questions are:
1) To develop a set of general themes and characterizations relating to 
distributed cognition and to understand how these in turn are developed into 
existing conceptual frameworks and models.
2) To determine the general themes and characterizations within crisis 
management literature relating to the impact crisis conditions have on 
organizations.
3) To develop a conceptual framework capturing the impact of crisis 
conditions on distributed cognition phenomena within control centers.
4) To develop and use an exploratory case study methodology in 
conjunction with the developed framework to determine if it aids in describing and 
understanding the functions and interactions of subsystems within a distributed 
cognition system functioning in periods of crisis.
5) To partially validate the framework by using as a means for assessing 
an initial fitness characterization of a distributed cognition system.
6) To partially validate the framework by developing a testing a training 
plan designed to improve the performance of a distributed cognition system 
functioning within a variety of crisis environments.
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Table 1.2 details the focused objectives and their interrelationship with 
both the primary research questions and the potential benefits, previously 
detailed in Table 1.1 of the research.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
19
Table 1.2: Focused Objective Questions
Overall Research Goal: Developing an in-depth, systemic perspective of how cognition occurs 
within the specific setting of control centers functioning during crisis periods.
Primary Research Question 1 (PG1): What are the key constructs that structurally frame the 
phenomena of distributed cognition within control centers and how are they interrelated? 
Primary Research Question 2 (PG2): What are the structural impacts of the onset and
development o : crisis conditions on the distributed cognition systems in such settings?
Focused
Objectives
Description Primary
Research
Questions
Addressed
Potential 
Benefits of 
Research 
Addressed 
(see Table 
1.1)
FOI To develop a set of general themes and 
characterizations relating to distributed 
cognition and to understand how these in turn 
are developed into existing conceptual 
frameworks and models.
PG1 PB1, PB2, 
PB3, PB5
F02 To determine the general themes and 
characterizations within crisis management 
literature relating to the impact crisis 
conditions have on organizations
PG2 PB1, PB2, 
PB4, PB5
F03 To develop a conceptual framework capturing 
the impact of crisis conditions on distributed 
cognition phenomena within control centers
PG1, PG2 PB1, PB2, 
PB3, PB4, 
PB5
F04 To develop and use an exploratory case 
study methodology in conjunction with the 
developed framework to determine if it aids in 
describing and understanding the functions 
and interactions of subsystems within a 
distributed cognition system functioning in 
periods of crisis.
PG1, PG2 PB3, PB4, 
PB5
F05 To partially validate the framework by using it 
to initially assess a distributed cognition 
system’s fitness characterization and 
subsequently using it to design a training plan 
to improve performance.
PG1, PG2 PB1, PB2, 
PB3, PB4
F06 To implement the training plan in F05 and 
assess the improvement in performance of 
the distributed cognition system.
PG1, PG2 PB1, PB2, 
PB3, PB4
Organization of Research Proposal
One final area of required research is examining the methodologies for 
qualitative, case study oriented methods to support the collection of information 
to validate and further adjust and develop the conceptual framework. As will be 
detailed in Chapter III of this proposal, exploratory case study methodology is 
most suited to both the research objectives as well as the data being analyzed.
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Case studies will be based on Air Force Unit Control Centers (UCC) preparing for 
Operational Readiness Inspections via iterative exercises with multiple units of 
analysis, the systemic functions of the UCCs themselves. The developed 
methodology will be applied to support the objective of discovering the 
applicability of the developed conceptual framework to training and equipping 
UCCs for formal inspection. Case data will be systematically obtained and 
analyzed through a developed case research strategy based upon the developed 
conceptual framework and resulting in the population of a case database. This 
database will compile multiple sources of evidence including transcribed event 
logs, descriptions of the UCCs during the OREs, semi-structured interviews with 
SCC personnel prior to exercises, the formal post exercise assessment reports 
themselves, and follow-up validation interviews with case participants.
Figure 3.1 is a general overview of the entire research approach including 
literature review, framework development methodology, and case validation 
research design. Within the Literature Review chapter of the anticipated 
proposal, first a general review of the development of the concept of distributed 
cognition and resulting frameworks authors have developed will be undertaken. 
Second, a general overview of crisis management literature will be provided 
focusing on capturing crisis management characteristics specific to the case of 
crisis control centers. Third, a detailed background of the type of case’s 
proposed for study will be provided. Fourth, this knowledge base will then be 
synthesized into the proposed DC5 framework.
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Within the Methodology chapter of the anticipated proposal, case study 
research design literature is reviewed to support the development of a detailed 
design for the specific purpose of validating the proposed conceptual framework 
and resulting propositions. The development and defense of the case study 
methodology will be presented. Case selection strategy as well as overarching 
guidance for case data collection protocol will be developed.
Within the Research Design chapter of the anticipated proposal, detailed 
data collection protocols and instruments will be developed to support the goals, 
objectives, of the research and the study of the selected cases
Only after the approval of the research proposal, will the actual case study 
fieldwork be undertaken. Results from fieldwork will then be reviewed and 
analyzed to support the validation and adjustment of the proposed conceptual 
framework. The resulting validated framework can then be used as a basis for 
the development of control center performance criteria and the development of 
strategic guidelines for deploying and implementing new technologies and 
procedures into control centers. Additionally, further development and 
refinement of the proposed framework providing better explanatory 
understanding of distributed cognition phenomena in crisis situations can be 
accomplished under the auspices of future research.
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Figure 1.3: Research Approach Overview
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Potential Benefits of Research to the Air Force and to the Academic Field 
of Engineering Management
The means by which control centers gather, process, present, and orient 
information into knowledge in order develop, implement, and adjust response 
alternatives is captured by the definition of distributed cognition. The central 
effort of the research is to develop a systemic, conceptual framework for 
describing these phenomena as it takes place within an SCC and then to use it 
as a structural basis for assessing and improving SCC performance. Hopefully, 
the understanding guided by use of the proposed framework will lead to 
improved performance to be confirmed when the unit being trained is formally 
inspected by the ACC/IG team and thus the framework will receive an initial form 
of validation. By developing a qualitative means of mining the data 
characterizing a squadron’s SCC before and during an ORE such propositions 
and the overall model itself can be validated and adjusted. Results could aid in 
the implementation of new strategies, methodologies, and technologies in crisis 
control centers, could improve the quality of the systemic comprehensiveness of 
and confidence in evaluation and assessment processes, and could improve in 
the general understanding of how organizational cognition takes place within 
control centers operating in crisis conditions.
The proposed research will have three primary benefits within the 
academic field of Engineering Management crossing the various components 
making up this area of study. Firstly, the application of system engineering 
approaches, central to the academic field itself, in order to comprehend, analyze, 
and frame the complex system to be investigated will demonstrate the suitability
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of such methodologies to crisis management and organizational management 
issues. Secondly, the framework produced as result of this research will 
supplement the body of knowledge relating to (a) crisis management, (b) 
business policy and strategy, (c) managerial and organizational cognition, (d) 
social issues in management, and (e) conflict management, providing a new 
framework for understanding problems relating to distributed cognition within 
large organizations in crisis situations. Finally, the large and complex nature of 
an Air Force flying wing, organizationally and technologically, operating within a 
crisis environment is typical of problems faced by Engineering Managers. As a 
result of this typicality and the proposed framework applications including the 
development of performance assessment criteria and new technology/procedure 
implementation strategy guidelines, the research is expected to have value 
crossing over to similar sized and similarly complex organization.
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Purpose, Objectives, and Organization of Literature Review
The primary purpose of this literature review will be threefold in reaching 
toward the overall goals of this research. First, academic literature relating to 
distributed cognition and organizational learning will be reviewed, critiqued, and 
synthesized in order to gain perspective on the general definitions, 
characterizations, and themes relating to these fields of study. Second, and 
similarly, crisis management literature will also be reviewed to support the 
development of an understanding of the topic and to develop specific 
characterizations of crisis environments and their impact on organizations and 
their control centers. Finally, Air Force organizational literature relating to the 
function of fielded squadron control centers will be reviewed to gain an 
understanding of official, organizational perspectives relating to these 
organizational entities.
In Chapter III, two additional minor literature reviews will be conducted to 
support the goals of this research. First, as was described in the previous 
chapter, information developed in this literature review will be synthesized using 
systems analysis methodologies to support the goal of developing a systemic, 
conceptual framework for understanding the process of distributed cognition 
within crisis control centers. A review of literature relating to systems analysis 
methodologies suited to the nature of such problems will be accomplished as will
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the actual discussion leading to the development of the suggested framework. 
Second, a review of case study analysis techniques will be accomplished in to 
support the subsequent development of a plan for validating the suggested 
framework.
Returning to the objective of this chapter, the efforts in the first area of 
focus, distributed cognition, will be accomplished by presenting a review of the 
academic literature relating to the field with the interim objectives, along the way 
to supporting the framework development of Chapter III, of: 1) developing a 
formalized working definition of distributed cognition, 2) developing a listing and 
an understanding of the themes within the literature relating to the study of 
distributed cognition, and 3) understanding existing frameworks others have used 
to support a comprehensive, holistic understanding of distributed cognition.
Crisis Management literature will be summarized to support meeting the 
interim goals of: 1) developing an overarching characterization of exactly what 
constitutes a crisis environment, which will in turn lead to 2) developing a further, 
more specific, listing of detailed characterizations of a crisis environment which 
can then, in Chapter III, be used in conjunction with the body of knowledge 
gained in the area of distributed cognition to develop the proposed conceptual 
framework.
In order to support the focused efforts on the specific case of fielded 
UCCs functioning in wartime environments, a summarization of the existing Air 
Force literature relating to the staffing, equipping, operational functions, 
assessment, and interaction with units outside, of an SCC will be undertaken with
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the interim objective of developing a further listing of specific characterizations of 
the cases to be studied.
Figure 2.1, Literature Review: Purpose, Objectives, and Organization, 
captures the organization, interim objectives, and overall purpose of this literature 
review. Figure 2.2, Literature Review Map: Coverage Areas and Gaps, captures 
the key subject matter areas of the literature review and their intersections which 
form the literature gaps this work is attempting to fill. Table 2.1, Literature 
Review Summary, at the end of the chapter will refer to Figure 2.2 as it 
summarizes the content of the literature review and specifies the researcher’s 
opinion of where gaps in the existing literature exist.
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Figure 2.1: Literature Review: Purpose, Objectives, and Organization
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Figure 2.2: Literature Review Map: Coverage Areas and Gaps
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Towards Defining Distributed Cognition: Roots of the Concept
Argyris and Schon (1996) argue that a term such as organizational 
learning require specification in each particular context in which it may appear. 
Given that the concept of distributed cognition is both central to this research 
and, as discussed, that a gap in the literature exists relating to the lack of a 
formal systems engineering application of the concept to crisis management 
control centers, a concise working definition is needed. This definition would 
serve to provide clarity and specificity to the term, distributed cognition itself, 
which flows from and is used somewhat interchangeably throughout the literature 
with other terms including distributed cognition, collective reasoning, collective 
mind, and organizational learning. Additionally, a working definition derived here 
specifically to serve the goals of this research will serve to enhance focus 
specifically on the cases, crisis management control centers, to be studied.
Perhaps the notion of learning occurring at more than just the level of the 
individual first arose out of psychological, sociological, and anthropological 
research circles. Dewey (1938), focusing on the means by which knowledge is 
gained, that is experience and education, stated,
“Experience does not simply go on inside a person. We live 
from birth to death in a world of persons and things which is in large 
measure what it is because of what has been done and transmitted 
from previous human activities” (p. 39).
Other early authors similarly focused on the merits of understanding 
individual behavior through the concept that one’s knowledge, thoughts, and 
actions are rooted inside a system of existing knowledge and cultural artifacts
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and processes (Vygotsky, 1929; Wundt, 1921; Allport, 1924). Roberts’ (1964)
suggestion that social organization reflects an architecture of cognition at the
community level seems to capture the essence of the perspectives.
Within organizational management circles a general notion of collective
learning perhaps first began to arise when March and Simon (1958) in their
seminal work within the field, Organizations, commented that the focus of their
work is on “the flow of information within organizations that instructs, informs, and
supports decision making processes.” Weick’s work (1979) focused on
organizational psychology and embraced the organic or collective perspective of
learning by focusing on the fact that knowledge is gained and retained within
organizational structures despite personnel turnover. Argyris and Schon (1978,
1996) crystallize this stream of thought by describing organizational learning as
occurring when individuals,
“...experience a surprising mismatch between expected and actual 
results...and respond through a process of thought and further 
actions that lends them to modify their images of organization or 
their understandings of organizational phenomena and to 
restructure their activities so as to bring outcomes and expectations 
into line, thereby changing organizational theory in use. In order to 
become organizational the learning that results from organizational 
inquiry must become embedded in the images of organization held 
in its member’s minds and/or [its] epistemological artifacts (maps, 
memories, and programs) embedded in the organizational 
environment” (p. 16).
While Argyris and Schon focus on an organization learning lessons, in 
both specific incremented time periods and more continuously, with broad 
strategies on how to facilitate its occurrence and then develop a means of 
understanding the depth, so-called “single loop” vs. “double loop,” of learning,
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other authors have begun to focus not just on the collective nature of learning 
phenomena and its resulting implications but on the actual basic mechanisms by 
which such organizational learning occurs. This narrower focus, arising out of 
cognitive science interests as opposed to organizational behavior circles, is upon 
the more organic, surface action of collective cognition versus the more 
generalized process of organizational learning and its benefits to the 
organization.
Amongst this group of authors, many (Rogers and Scaife 1997, Magnus 
2004, Giere 2001, Rogers 1997), point to Hutchins’ work in the 1980’s and 
1990’s as first bringing the term distributed cognition to the fore and his work in 
conjunction with other authors, Hollan (1984), Pea (1996), Weitzmann (1984), 
Kirsch (1998), Palen (1997), and Norman (1985) as laying the groundwork for 
the development of distributed cognition as a framework for understanding the 
processes which collectives use to learn about and act within their environment. 
Hutchins (2000) himself provides a most concise review of the historical 
development of the field drawing from its roots in the research of authors from 
psychological, anthropological, and organizational science. In defending the 
notion that cognition does not have to be confined within the “skin or skull” (p.1) 
of the individual and in attempting to explain the concept of distribution between 
disparate system subunits being necessary for cognition, Hutchins (1995) cites 
Hinton and Becker’s (1992) construction of models showing how two visual 
modules are able to share a representation of a visual world in such a way that 
through their interaction they can recover depth, something that neither can
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sense alone. The analogy is that differing components of a collective can work 
together to achieve, maintain, and adjust a representation of the outside 
environment.
Defining Distributed Cognition and Organizational Distributed Systems
Synthesizing the work of Hutchins (2000) and the descriptions of that work 
cited by other authors, Rogers and Scaife 1997, Magnus 2004, Giere 2001 
Hollan (1984), Pea (1996), Weitzmann (1984), Kirsch (1998), Palen (1997), and 
Norman (1985), the following three basic themes seem to be repeatedly cited:
1) As opposed to the regular science of cognition in general, the 
phenomena of distributed cognition is not limited to the boundary of the individual 
person, rather the boundary can be repeatedly redrawn around a variety of 
subunits or groupings of personnel and materials that accomplish cognition for 
the purposes of the collective group.
2) Again as opposed to the general cognitive science which focuses on 
the mental representations of the environment which individuals use, maintain, 
and adjust, distributed cognition focuses not only on representations used, 
maintained, and adjusted by groups but also on the interactions amongst group 
members, materials, and the environment as mechanisms for accomplishing 
cognition.
3) The boundary of events relating to cognition extends broadly over time 
not just encompassing any single chapter or single adjustment to mental 
representations of the environment. Past events, artifacts, and knowledge
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bases of personnel within subunits experiencing significant turnover over time 
may significantly influence the ability of a collective group to learn about its 
environment.
Before using these aspects of distributed cognition drawn from the 
literature to provide a working definition for purposes of this research, an 
explanation is in order regarding the terms distributed cognition and 
organizational cognition. While the terms are used somewhat interchangeably 
throughout the literature, the researcher generally takes organizational cognition 
to be a subset of the broader general term distributed cognition, the distinction 
being that while distributed cognition occurs on a general level across many 
boundaries of sub-units within some broader collective human grouping, 
organizational cognition describes the distributed learning occurring within a 
specific bounded sub-unit; i.e., for purposes of this research the boundary of 
interest will be drawn around the SCC organization. The researcher sees the 
distinction as minor and finds throughout the literature that the themes and 
constructs of either term are generalizable to the other themes thus while the 
terms may be used interchangeably for purposes of this work, distributed 
cognition will be preferred.
Using the cited themes of the literature, distributed cognition can be 
defined as: the ongoing collective accumulation, distribution, and synthesis of 
knowledge across time amongst personnel and systems at all levels within a 
bounded organization which leads to the development, adjustment, and 
sometimes tearing down then redevelopment of both tacit and explicit mental
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representations of the outside world within which the organization is trying to 
pursue its goals.
Even further refinement of this definition is needed for the requirements of 
this work. Specifically, defining a distributed cognition system as a system 
designed or used by organizations for the intended purpose of facilitating 
distributed cognition as described above is necessary. The importance of this 
additional step of specification will be seen in Chapter III as it is used to facilitate 
Beer’s (1984) system of interest specification in applying his Viable System 
Model to the focus of this work.
While the pursuit of a working definition of distributed cognition specific to 
purposes of this research served to introduce the concept and facilitate the initial 
literature review into the field, a more detailed review is required to provide a 
listing of authors’ themes and characterizations of the phenomena and to provide 
a description of the resulting frameworks they have constructed to describe it.
Topical Streams of Distributed Cognition Literature
An extended general review of the academic literature relating to the 
phenomena of distributed cognition and organizational learning literature, led to 
the identification of several separate themes that repeatedly arise. Initial reviews 
led to the identification, clustering and categorization of these themes while in 
depth follow-up facilitated the development of a literature map tracking the ideas 
of specific authors to the developed themes. Figure 2.3, Distributed Cognition 
Literature Tracking Map: Emergent Themes of Authors, demonstrates the
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recurrence of these themes within literature relating to distributed cognition and 
organizational learning. It should be noted that the listing of authors here is by 
no means exhaustive but rather it is somewhat of a generalized representative 
sampling of a larger set and its purpose here is to demonstrate the recurrence of 
eight dominant emergent themes to be detailed in the following order: 1) the 
complexity of the environment and the volume of information being processed by 
such systems, 2) the integration of specialized expertise’s as a key function of 
distributed cognition, 3) the occurrence and impact of errors within learning 
systems, 4) a focus on the material, process, institutional, and technological 
artifacts which develop within organizations to facilitate distributed cognition, 5) 
the various key characterizations of the context within which the organizational 
cognition is occurring that are judged to significantly impact the cognition 
process, 6) the focus on and tracking of the propagation of representations 
through an organization-the fundamental act of cognition, 7) the breaking down, 
categorization, or description of the interaction of various structural functions of 
learning organizations, and lastly, 8) the detailing of a variety of frameworks 
sharing a cyclical theme describing the processes which must be looped through 
in order for organizations to learn.
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Figure 2.3: Distributed Cognition Literature Tracking Map: Emergent 
Themes of Authors
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Complexity: The Nature of the Environmental Information Being Processed
The first recurrent theme noted in the literature, complexity of the 
environment stands apart from the other prevalent themes in that the others 
relate to the process of distributed cognition itself. The environmental complexity 
in which distributed cognition systems exist is repeatedly cited by authors as a 
motivator or cause for the development of the system itself. Cognition has to 
necessarily become a distributed act because environmental complexity 
encourages it to arise. The initial grounding requirement motivating the rise of 
distributed cognition within organizations is the complexity and challenging 
nature of the environment in which organizations are functioning. Authors 
researching distributed cognition break down this environmental characterization 
into a variety of descriptive, thematic adjectives: problematically complex, 
ambiguous, techno-centric, time constrained or dynamic, and demanding of 
parallel and dissimilar tasks.
Complex environments are a primary driver of distributed cognition within 
organizations and are repeatedly cited within distributed cognition literature. 
Hutchins (1994) describes environments requiring a “weaving” of both a variety 
of observations and a variety of knowledge bases in order to be understood. 
Artman and Garbis (1988) describe the demands of environments requiring 
different, disparate “domain” knowledge bases and information resources. Perry 
et al (1998) note the volume of detail that must be processed, tracked, and 
remembered in order to understand such environments. The difficulty of 
understanding such complexity motivates organizations to posture themselves
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and assemble systems composed of requisite knowledge bases and capability so 
that they can be understood.
If we extend complexity a step further, one must ask what indeed can be 
knowable versus what may not be knowable. March (2001) describes ambiguity 
as an “elementary problem” which organizations must overcome if they are to 
become intelligent about their environment; correlation and causality between 
events is difficult to ascertain and motivates intensive exploration of the 
environment. Dhar (2001) notes that complex environments may be 
discontinuous or non-linear; elements of the environment may have numerous 
interactions that arise and diffuse, complicating the knowability of the 
environment. Murphy et al (2001) notes that such ambiguity and diversity 
motivates the setting of goals by organizations in order to begin breaking down 
what must be understood and what can be ignored. Argyris and Schon (1996) 
note that the search for causality within ambiguous events is a central aim of 
both organizations. The ambiguity organizations perceive in operating 
environments motivates the construction of systems designed to remove such 
ambiguity.
Perhaps just an extension of the complexity of such environments, the 
concept of a techno-centricity motivating distributed cognition is repeatedly found 
within the research literature. As discussed previously when seeking to provide 
an working definition of distributed cognition, boundary setting is key to defining 
the system actually accomplishing the cognition; techno-centrism can arise both 
in the environment outside of the organization in question or, if arbitrary bounding
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occurs, the influence of technologies within an organization can necessitate the 
rise of distributed cognition. Artman and Garbis (1988) note that a techno centric 
collection of communication devices may be viewed as the boundary line itself 
between an organization and its environment, placing additional cognitive 
burdens upon the organization to understand the technologies it uses to 
accomplish such interface. Perry et al (1998) note that the complexity of the 
world in which organizations operate is enhanced by the complexity of the 
technologies existing today. Wright et al (2000) note that the capabilities 
provided by technology internal to the organization for purposes of facilitating 
distributed cognition require an understanding of their existence and capabilities 
in the outside environment first. Complex technologies existing in the 
environment in which organizations operate add to the complexity of that 
environment itself and further require organizations to adapt themselves to deal 
with such complexity.
Dynamic environments further complicate the organization’s task of 
comprehension. Dhar (2001) describes the difficulties associated with complex 
environments by noting that they are frequently and painfully either quick to 
respond or slow to respond to outside stimuli, or characterized by infrequently 
occurring phenomena, and further cites technology (computers, instrumentation, 
etc.) as a means for systemically enhancing cognitive capabilities in such 
environments. Vidaillet (2001) notes that organizations can quickly be overcome 
by events because the timely development and processing of representations in 
order to understand them cannot keep up with their pace. Wright et al (2000)
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focus on the artifacts organizations develop to be able to respond to time 
constrained events, but such cognitive artifacts themselves exist because of the 
nature of environments anticipated by organizations. The dynamic nature of 
environments in which organizations operate requires urgency in developing 
understandings and responses; distributed cognition systems are constructed to 
meet this requirement.
Time constrained and complex environments require organizations to 
accomplish different tasks simultaneously or to distribute them across the 
organization. Artman and Garbis (1988) note that time constraints require parallel 
and disparate, non-alike task lists and thus require organizations to field and 
integrate a variety of expertises. Hutchins’ (1994) discussion of intersubjectivity, 
an understanding or appreciation of another’s task to be discussed in more detail 
later in this review, as a key characterization of the internal context within which 
distributed cognition occurs assumes that a variety of different tasks are having 
to be accomplished simultaneously. Waern et al (1999) as well as Wright et al 
(2000) describe the “co-ordination”, to also be discussed in more detail later in 
this review, of representations flowing from different organizational elements as 
the primary function of distributed cognition systems; necessarily inherent in such 
descriptions is the idea that a breadth of expertise cannot be maintained within 
individual humans but must be distributed across several sub-systems in order to 
comprehend, act, and meet the demands of such an environment.
This characterization of the environment in which distributed cognition 
systems arise, flows from repeated themes cited in the literature. These themes,
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problematic complexity, ambiguity, techno-centricity, dynamic environments, and 
demands for accomplishment of parallel and dissimilar tasks, are repeatedly 
cited by authors as motivating factors leading to the development of distributed 
cognition systems. Without such requisite characteristics in environments, it is 
possible to see simplistic cognition within a single individual or simple systems as 
being all that is required of an organization, but if and as these characterizations 
begin to become true of an environment the phenomena of distributed cognition 
within organizations begins to occur. Analogous to these themes, which exist 
outside a bounded organization in its environment, are the contextual 
characterizations authors draw of the nature of events and processes within the 
organization.
Specialization and Integration
The complexity inherent in environments which leads to the rise of 
distributed cognition systems within organizations also leads to the formation of 
analogous, specialized subsystems designed to enhance the organization’s 
ability to understand and react to specific aspects of a diverse environment. As a 
result of the specialization, which develops to deal more efficiently with 
environmental complexity, organizations must also integrate the data being 
synthesized by the disparately equipped and trained specialized subsystems. 
This integration, also referred to as co-ordination within the literature (Waern 
1999, Wright 2000) of synthesized representations is where the idea of
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distributed cognition begins to separate from the mere collective sum of the 
cognitive parts of the specialized expert systems.
As stated, many of the same characterizations of environmental 
complexity from the literature described previously are also used by the same 
authors to describe the reflective development of specialization within the 
bounded distributed cognition system being studied. Rather than reciting each 
author that made these characterizations and going over them once more, 
perhaps a better way to illustrate this point is to review some of the actual studied 
specialized subsystems whose expertise, recommendations, and conclusions 
had to be organizationally integrated in order for the researcher to reach 
conclusions about the nature of the distributed cognition phenomena which was 
occurring. This review will also serve to summarize existing studies on the 
phenomena of distributed cognition in fielded situations.
In perhaps the seminal modern work, repeatedly cited throughout the 
literature, on the topic of distributed cognition, Hutchins (1980, 1990, and 1994) 
makes the essential case that cognition exists at a systemic level within the 
navigational functions of a US Navy ship at sea. Essentially, initial disparate 
measurements of various external environmental items (visible geographic 
points, celestial objects, time, satellite receptions, etc.) are made by a variety of 
specialized subsystems, tools, and personnel and are turned into representations 
further refined by other systems to produce fix, bearing, and speed. Citing the 
general recognition that human cognition is the development, maintenance, and 
adaptation of mental models or representations, Hutchins meticulously tracks
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such representations as they are born and mature through the ship’s navigation 
function.
Later in other work with Klausen (1996, 2000), Hutchins also studies the 
function of air traffic control from the perspective of an airplane cockpit again 
tracking the processing of representations and information from ground controller 
through the three officers on board and through the systems they use ultimately 
into the control surfaces of the plane. Fields et al (1999) also study air traffic 
control but focus on ground control rooms and the subsystems arrayed there to 
process representations from radar returns into instructions to aircraft. No one 
person or subsystem accomplishes the task itself, but an integration of these 
specialized parts leads to the final goal.
Thagard’s (1993), (Giere’s (2001) and Magnus’ (2004) works are focused 
primarily on making the argument that Science, in general, has evolved into a 
large distributed cognition system, the intended goal of which is the search for 
truth or causal explanation of observed phenomena. In advancing their 
argument they cite specialized scientists themselves, instrumentation, models, 
visual representations, academic journalism, academic certification processes, 
award and reward systems, in addition to other functional systems all working 
integrally together hopefully to achieve the goal of finding scientific truth. The 
fact that such specialized subsystems exist and do work through an evolved 
system of interrelationships suggests that Science is indeed a system of 
distributed cognition.
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In focusing on an objective similar to the one selected for this work,
Artman and Garbis (1988) initially and in later work with Waern (1999), study the 
integration or co-ordination of disparately developed representations through an 
urban emergency phone call center. They cite the training, jargon, rules and 
procedures, and systems available to the telephone operator receiving incoming 
calls as separate systems which the operator and higher level controllers must 
integrate to organize a response specific to the needs of the incoming call. The 
diversity, variety, and complexity of potential calls require the development of 
these specialized subsystems and their subsequent integration in order to meet 
the center’s goals.
With a goal somewhat similar to that of this work, Wright et al (2000) focus 
on developing a framework or model specifically designed for understanding 
human-computer-interaction (HCI). Central to their Resources Model are six 
abstract information structures informing the HCI process: plans, goals, 
affordances, history, action-effect, and current state. Without describing these in 
detail here or seeking to differentiate the framework that is the goal of this 
research, which will be accomplished in Chapter III, it suffices that again these 
represent sub-categorizations or specializations that a system synthesizes and 
then uses to accomplish its specific goal, in this case understanding HCI.
Other authors prefer to focus on the nature of specific subsystems 
common to distributed cognition systems and how they may specifically effect the 
overall goals of the larger system. Murphy et al (2000) focus on the relationship 
between personnel performance feedback systems within organizations and the
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development and adjustment of overall organizational goals, arguing that the 
tension between these subsystems impacts the ability of the organization to 
understand and act within its environment. Tamuz (2000) and Vidiallet (2000) 
both focus on how the institutionalized rules for categorizing aircraft accidents 
and hazardous waste accidents respectively impact the ability of their 
communities to learn from the accidents themselves. These more narrowly 
focused studies of distributed cognition phenomena concentrate on specific 
specialized subsystems that have developed within organizations overtime and 
how they impact the overall process of learning itself, but the point for purposes 
in this context is that such specialization of subsystems exists and is a pre­
requisite for distributed cognition to occur.
Specialization and the development of focused subsystems of people, 
materials, and artifacts arises because an organization is seeking to operate 
efficiently within an environment so complex that it exceeds the cognitive ability 
of collectives of mere well-rounded individuals and simple sub-systems. As a 
direct result of this specialization of subsystems, integration of their resultant 
conclusions, recommendations, responses, representations must occur for the 
organization to meet its goals. This initial process of integrating specialized 
efforts is where cognition begins to become a distributed act and not merely the 
sum of the collective learning efforts of each specialized subsystem. Merely 
integrating such representations, however does not fully describe the distributed 
nature of the cognition or learning; a further distributed step occurs when 
organizations must deal with errors made by themselves and their subsystems.
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The Impact of Errors within Distributed Cognition Systems
A topic repeatedly discussed within distributed cognition and 
organizational learning literature is that of errors and their prevention, their 
impact, and their processing within cognition systems. This focus on errors 
within distributed cognition systems can be further divided into two primary 
levels.
First, on the surface, as researchers attempt to determine what leads to 
success within cognition systems they identify numerous artifacts and contextual 
qualities found in such systems that develop over time in part to prevent, detect, 
and mitigate errors and their subsequent system impacts. A listing of such 
artifacts would include visual representational systems, computational offloading 
systems, communications systems, meetings, memory and tracking systems, 
institutionalized procedures, rules, and heuristics, purposive learning systems, 
instrumentation systems. Similarly a listing of error preventing, detecting, and 
mitigating contextual qualities descriptive of the setting within which a cognitive 
system is functioning would include, horizon of observation, redundancy in 
communications, redundancy in information storage, clarity in communications, 
intersubjectivity amongst personnel and subsystems, and experience and 
competence of personnel. As each of these individual topics is the subject of 
much focus within the literature, they will be presented in greater detail with 
distinctive citations to respective authors later in this review; the point to be made 
here is that control of errors within distributed cognition systems is a fundamental
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driver of many of the emergent qualities of distributed cognition systems. 
Environmental complexity coupled with the frailty of systems and personnel 
necessitates that error processing be planned for and structured for accordingly.
A second focus on errors is on a deeper level, in that they drive the actual 
learning or cognition occurring in organizations that is the more significant 
adjustment of representations. Dhar (2000) focuses on the distinction between 
so called Type I errors, the selection of bad alternatives, which are self correcting 
and Type II errors, the rejection of good alternatives, which are only addressed 
when participants within systems step aside and re-examine events, 
expectations, and causal relationships. Hutchins (1994) discusses the impact of 
integrating secondary, personnel on-the-job training goals into actual shipboard 
navigation systems, in which overseeing personnel quietly allow some errors as 
they occur to propagate through the system in order that junior personnel may 
see the impact of the error, learn the various points where the error can be 
detected and corrected, and gain an appreciation for why institutionalized 
structure exists. Boyd, as described by Coram (2002) noted that an iteration of 
decision or selection of alternative, within his OODA loop involved a feeding 
forward set of expectations. After deploying the selected alternative and 
observing outcomes, the orientation phase of his process involved determining 
why expectations were not reached. Argyris and Schon (1996) define errors as 
simply the tension existing between expectations and observations. Most of 
these are caught by system functions and are corrected at an almost passive 
level. Occasionally, however they are not caught until system wide impact
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begins to occur or an active, deeper learning takes place in which organizational
personnel question and adjust the structure of their system itself:
“Organizational learning occurs when individuals within an 
organization experience a problematic situation...They experience 
a surprising mismatch between expected and actual results of 
action and respond to that mismatch through a process of thought 
and further action that leads them to modify their images of 
organization...and to restructure their activities so as to bring 
outcomes and expectations in line...In order to become 
organizational the learning that results...must become embedded in 
the images of the organization held in its members minds and/or 
the epistemological artifacts...embedded in the organizational 
environment.”
Errors are a primary focus within the literature because they can inhibit the 
performance of distributed cognition systems and as a result, such systems are 
motivated to develop artifacts and contextual qualities to enhance their ability to 
detect, assess, and mitigate errors as they occur. On a deeper level, errors may 
be manifestations directly related to previous organizational actions or 
experiences that no longer agree with accumulating data, motivating a more 
fundamental reassessment of the existing environmental understanding and 
organizational structure and function which lead to the error.
The Artifacts of Distributed Cognition
A primary focus of distributed cognition literature is on proving that 
cognition is indeed occurring on a systemic level and not merely within the minds 
of collectives of individuals. The suggestion is made that the creation and 
adjustment of representations of the outside world being studied is being
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accomplished by individuals working in concert with a host of artifacts or 
subsystems which are just as integral to the process as the individuals 
themselves. The tracking of changes in representations through these artifacts 
in the form of inputs and outputs is a recurring methodological basis for research. 
An overview of categorizations of prevalent distributed cognition system artifacts 
found in the literature is provided here to provide a flavor for what may be 
considered an artifact of distributed cognition.
Visual representational systems are those that allow information to be 
directly perceived without explicit formulation and that externalize, make explicit, 
and system- orient the tacit representations existing within the minds of 
individuals (Decortis et al 2000, Wright et al 2000, Walsh 1995, Paul-Chowdhury 
2000, Fields et al 1999, Artman and Garbis 1988). Perhaps the most readily 
recognizable example of a visual representation is a geographic or system wide 
status map. Other forms include physical models of the outside environment, 
graphic displays, charts, status boards, photographs, and a variety of other types 
of displays.
Tracking and memory systems may or may not take a visual form 
providing the perception benefits detailed above but they fulfill another core 
purpose of curing the requisite attention deficit which may exist in groups of 
individuals given the variety in their environment (Decortis et al 2000, Wright et al 
2000, Hutchins 1995, Perry et al 1998, Dhar 2000, Paul-Chowdhury 2000, Fields 
et al 1999, Tamuz 2000, Argyris and Schon 1996). Examples include once 
again status boards and maps as well as event logs, computerized databases,
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checklists, maintenance histories, plans, personnel and materials listings, 
accounting records, and even reminder notes.
Computational offloading systems are those that free other systems and 
individuals to focus efforts elsewhere by absorbing the detailed, tedious, and time 
consuming tasks of accomplishing computation (Perry et al 1998, Wright et al 
2000, Ocasio 2000, Paul- Chowdhury 2000, Fields et al 2000, Hutchins 1990, 
1994, 1996, Tamuz 2000). Examples include the obvious computer software 
and calculators as well as graphing tools, data-mining tools, mathematical 
instruments, and presentation building tools.
Communications systems seem to be at the heart of a variety of 
distributed cognition studies. Their primary purpose is to enhance the process of 
gathering, and distributing data and messages into and through the system being 
studied (Perry et al 1998, Wright et al 2000, Ocasio 2000, Waern et al 1999, 
Johanssen 2001, Giere 2001, Paul- Chowdhury 2000, Fields et al 2000, Hutchins 
1990, 1996). Examples include the common telephone, as well as computer 
networks, fax machines, radios, message boards, academic journals, chat 
rooms, and even human runners.
Institutionalized processes is a catch-all of somewhat disparate artifacts 
composed of resources and procedures that become part of the structure of 
cognition systems themselves and can serve to meet several of the goals being 
described here. Examples include plans, goals, mission statements, heuristics, 
rules, categorization methodologies, clustering methodologies, simulation and 
gaming techniques, jargon, prioritization listings, and other procedures. While it
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is difficult to align these artifacts into any one particular category, the idea that 
they are a part of the structure of cognition systems is prevalent in the literature 
(Perry et al 1998, Ocasio 2000, Waern et al 1999, March 2000, Johanssen 2001, 
Giere 2001, Paul-Chowdhury 2000, Fields et al 2000, Hutchins 1996).
Purposive learning systems or training programs themselves are artifacts 
designed to improve the performance of individuals and systems within cognition 
systems. Hutchins (1996), Rulke and Zaheer (2000), and Argyris and Schon 
(1996) in particular note the positive impact of designing training goals into and 
considering training as part and parcel of cognition systems on the long-term 
performance of those systems. Such systems include classes, books, manuals, 
exercises, inspections, read-files, and academic journals.
Instrumentation systems are those which allow individuals to accurately 
and precisely measure variability that would otherwise be beyond their capability 
and in so doing amplify the system’s ability to detect and thus attempt to control 
change in the outside environment (Wright et al 2000, Hutchins 1994, 1996, 
Decortis et al, Dhar 2000, Fields et al 2000, Giere 2001, Magnus 2004). Types 
of instrumentation are numerous and sometimes specific to the environment 
being studied but include atmospheric condition monitors, sensors, tracking 
devices, and sampling and testing devices.
This listing of the types of artifacts that may be found within distributed 
cognition systems is provided here to give a flavor for exactly what these artifacts 
are. They serve the purpose of aiding the individual and systems within an 
organization to develop an understanding of the outside environment. While they
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represent physical manifestations of a cognition system attempting to achieve 
their intended purposes other non-physical qualities of such systems also 
emerge as key to enhancing distributed cognition.
Contextual Properties Impacting Cognition
In addition to identifying and describing a broad range of artifacts that may 
be found within distributed cognition systems, authors also focus on several 
emergent, contextual properties of the settings in which such systems operate 
that can significantly impact system performance. Such qualities found in this 
literature review include staff competence, leadership, intersubjectivity, horizon of 
information visibility, flexibility, and redundancy. These qualities are identified 
and defined here to provide a flavor for the contextual system properties 
researchers have found to impact system performance.
While it may seem directly obvious that the competence of the personnel 
within a distributed cognition system has a direct bearing on performance, it is 
such directness that calls for it to be defined first as an important contextual 
property. Hutchins (1996) notes that on-the-job training is woven into US Naval 
shipboard navigation systems to improve the competence of personnel. Drills, 
practices, and tests are done to train personnel and thereby improve system 
performance. Wright et al (2000) note that personnel “competency traps” seem 
to be a recurring cause of incorrect or halted representational propagation 
through cognition systems. Paul-Chowdhury (2000) notes that personnel 
motivation, reliability, absorptive capacity, and retention capacity are significant
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
54
hindrances to knowledge transfer within organizations. Rulke and Zaheer (2000) 
correlate both the self-knowledge and resource knowledge, not having expertise 
on a given subject but knowing where it may be found, of managers to the 
performance metrics of grocery stores. Staff competence is an obvious first 
choice in selecting contextual properties of cognition systems that may have a 
direct bearing on performance.
Somewhat related to staff competence but somewhat lightly addressed 
within the reviewed literature is the idea of leadership within an organization 
influencing cognition performance. Perhaps because it is a highly subjective 
term and difficult to apply quantitative measure to, and perhaps because it can 
be included under the overarching heading of staff competence, many authors do 
not directly cite it as a property influencing performance, but it does seem 
obvious that good organizational leadership would directly impact performance. 
Without explicitly mentioning the overarching concept of leadership, Hutchins 
(2000) in tracking mental representations through an airline cockpit crew, does 
describe the impact of a decisive action and communication by the Captain to the 
crew on quickly bringing system performance back to within an accepted norm. 
Boyd as described by Coram (2002) noted that in making hard decisions a leader 
had to convey their gravity to his subordinates as they acted upon them. Argyris 
and Schon (1996) cite Schein’s (1992) definition of leadership as being “the 
attitude and motivation to manage organizational culture” (p374). They propose 
that,
“A learning leader must assess the adequacy of his organization’s
culture, detect its dysfunctionality, and promote its transformation
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by...promoting [his] assumptions [regarding learning] within the 
culture of his organization...Leaders can foster a learning culture by 
envisioning it and communicating the vision...”
Quality of leadership within an organization is a contextual property that 
must be suspected of having a direct bearing on cognition system performance.
Hutchins (2000) cites Rommetvelt and Blakar (1979) and Wertsch (1985) 
in defining intersubjectivity as the ability to put oneself in another’s shoes in order 
to develop a shared understanding of a situation. His example in the case of the 
airline cockpit is that of a First Officer sensing his Captain’s sudden need for a 
specific bit of information quickly and providing it without being asked because 
the First Officer also has some experience at accomplishing the Captain’s task 
load. Similarly because the Captain knew that the First Officer had such an 
intersubjective understanding of his tasks he correctly anticipated that the help 
would be provided without asking. Other authors discuss the impact of 
intersubjectivity on system performance by noting how the capability to 
appreciate another player’s place within the system resolves errors quickly and 
distributes assistance quickly, allowing representations to be sharpened and 
actions to be coordinated (Decortis et al 2000, Vidaillet 2000). For 
intersubjectivity to play a role in influencing the propagation of representations 
through a distributed cognition system, potential sympathetic players must be in 
a position to know what is occurring to other players.
Decortis et al (2000) define a horizon of visibility as “the functional 
workspace that each participant can monitor in addition to its own task” (p.3). 
Hutchins (1994) argues that the size of this space impacts error detection and
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correction because it allows or limits monitoring by other system players. By 
making information flow visible to many players with intersubjective 
understandings of one another, representations can be molded and adjusted 
quicker and with less iteration. Fields et al (1999) refer to this concept as 
accessibility of representations and note how artifacts play a key role in 
broadening the sharing of information. Johannsen (2001) notes how monitoring 
the background chatter within a control room plays a significant role in 
constructing accurate representations. Perry et al (1998) refer to the visibility of 
other perspectives facilitating the synthesis of ideas. In addition to a spatial 
horizon of visibility a time horizon also exists; information must be processed and 
transmitted by systems in a timely manner if it is to be used by system actors 
(Artman and Garbis 1988, Hutchins 1994, Vidaillet 2000, Fields et al 1999).
Each of these authors is addressing the same idea; that is that distributed 
cognition systems must develop or have designed into them architectures which 
facilitate increasing the horizon of observation of individual system players.
Two additional contextual properties that obviously would be suspected of 
impacting system performance are redundancy and integratability. Redundancy 
in communications, information storage, computational ability, visual 
representations, observations, and in other subsystems is cited by numerous 
authors as increasing a system’s ability to detect errors and calibrate responses 
(Hutchins 1994, 1996, Decortis et al 2000, Fields et al 1999, Tamuz 2000). 
Similarly, subsystems must accept, process, and produce representations in 
such a manner that they can be used and understood by other subsystems and
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players. Integratability or flexibility is key if representations are to propagate 
accurately across subsystems and must be designed into distributed cognition 
systems (Hutchins 1994, 1996, Fields et al 1999).
A variety of contextual qualities or emergent properties of distributed 
cognition systems have a direct bearing on system performance. Staff 
competence, leadership, intersubjectivity, horizon of information visibility, 
flexibility, and redundancy were presented here to provide a flavor for the 
manifest properties repeatedly cited within the literature and for their ability to 
influence a cognitive system’s performance in fulfilling its intended purpose, 
developing, adjusting, and processing representations of the outside 
environment.
The Propagation of Representations - The Heart of Cognition
Within anthropological and psychological research into individual human 
thinking and learning, the act of cognition is routinely defined as a mapping of 
one kind of information to another through the selection and transformation of 
representations (Marr 1982, Thagard 1996, Norman 1993, Vera and Simon 1993, 
Hutchins 1995). In order for an organism to come to conclusions about its 
environment, it must develop mental representations of that environment and 
imagine what impacts its actions or the actions of others may have on that 
environment. After acting or observing others’ actions and the ensuing 
environmental changes, the organism can make judgments about causality, 
interrelationships, and the accuracy of its conceived representations then
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iteratively adjust them accordingly. This process is the fundamental act of 
cognition and learning.
Because this process traditionally has been thought to take place within 
the brain of the individual organism or human, the study of cognition, that is the 
processing of representations, has been confined to anthropological and 
psychological circles. When the ideas of collective mind and distributed thinking 
began to arise, as was discussed in the introduction to this literature review, and 
organizations came to be thought of as thinking organisms, tacit, internal, mental 
representations could be to some extent explicitly defined as they had to be to be 
transferred between humans and between subsystems. Thus the major focus of 
distributed cognition research, as has been discussed in detail previously, is in 
making explicit these mental models being used within organizations and 
tracking their development and processing over time (Wright et al 2000, Hutchins 
1994, 1996, Decortis et al, Dhar 2000, Fields et al 2000, Giere 2001, Magnus 
2004, Paul-Chowdhury 2000, Perry et al 1998, Ocasio 2000, March 2000, Rulke 
and Zaheer 2000, Waern et al 1999, Rogers 1996, Tamuz 2000, Vidaillet 2000). 
Additionally, what once was the province of anthropologists and psychologists 
also began to draw the interest of the organizational and management science. 
One might suspect some common themes to emerge from amongst this research 
into the tracking of representational propagation and indeed as has been seen 
thus far some have, but one might also expect there to be some common 
functionality to the processes whereby such representations are developed and 
processed.
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Common Structural Functions and the Emergence of Cognitive Cycles 
within Distributed Cognition Literature
The purpose of the section of this literature review on specialization is to 
describe how, in response to environmental pressures and the desire to operate 
more efficiently given those pressures, organizations are motivated to develop or 
evolve specialized subsystems which can employ their respective expert 
knowledge bases in concert against the complexity of the environment. This 
emergent organizational structure tends to be specific to the type of organization 
and type of environment, i.e. businesses develop marketing, accounting, 
production, and research divisions while cities develop transportation, law 
enforcement, tax assessment, and building code divisions. From the distributed 
cognition researcher’s perspective a goal may then be to understand how the 
work of these disparately focused subsystems is synthesized into a collective 
understanding of these environments.
Rather than looking at each organization individually, researchers have 
developed some basic frameworks for understanding distributed cognition 
systems in general by identifying functional commonalities to all such learning 
systems. The purpose of this portion of the literature review is to first summarize 
the works of other authors in identifying and describing some of the basic 
functions of distributed cognition systems and second to highlight a recurrent 
theme in many of these frameworks, that is the concept that learning involves a 
repetitive, iterative cycling through of these suggested functions in pursuit of
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developing accurate representations of outside environments. Figure 2.4, 
Functional Frameworks from Distributed Cognition Literature, presents a 
simplified outline of the functional frameworks suggested within the reviewed 
literature.
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Figure 2.4: Functional Frameworks from Distributed Cognition Literature
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March (1991, 1998, 2000) identifies the two fundamental problems of the 
organizational-environmental learning challenge as being ignorance and 
ambiguity; ignorance simply being the lack of knowledge about the environment 
and ambiguity being the lack of knowing how to change the environment. From 
this basis, he then suggests that the two fundamental functions of learning 
organizations are exploration, to gain knowledge and reduce ignorance, and 
exploitation, in deciding upon and pursuing goals by using gained knowledge 
thus removing the ambiguity of understanding the organizations place within the 
environment. March then goes on to describe the balance that organizations 
must maintain between these two functions; too much exploration and not 
enough exploitation results in little productive activity and the organization cannot 
sustain itself while the reverse results in an organization that never discovers 
new alternatives and is prone to Type II errors that eventually finds itself no 
longer adaptable to a changing environment.
Dhar (2000) reviews March’s work and extends his own two primary 
means of organizational learning: learning by doing and learning through 
interpretation. Learning by doing or experiential learning reduced to its core is 
merely initiating or repeating actions that have worked successfully in the past 
without much contemplation for why they work-an “if it works then do it again” 
mentality. Not much is really learned other than that a correlation between a 
particular action and a result exists; exploration is de-emphasized. Reduced to 
its simplistic core, learning by interpretation is simply reaching conclusions about 
interrelationships based on past historical data. In its extreme this form of
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learning is prone to errors due to small sample size and interpretations being 
applied to non-analogous environmental situations. By defining learning using 
extreme notions, Dhar is implicitly suggesting that both of his suggested forms 
complement the other.
Argyris and Schon (1978, 1996), as previously discussed, cite errors or 
the differences between expectations and outcomes as the driving force behind 
learning. If errors are to be corrected organizations must ask themselves why the 
discrepancies occurred and must make changes to prevent recurrences. They 
identify a surface type of feedback loop, single loop learning, in which the 
difference between expected outcomes and actual outcomes of previous actions 
and strategies results in changes and adaptations to the strategy being deployed. 
They then further identify a deeper form of learning feedback loop in which an 
organization questions and adjusts the underlying theory supporting the 
implemented strategy.
Argyris and Schon developed their framework from an organizational 
science perspective and before cognitive science had really developed the 
concept of distributed cognition within organizations, thus for purposes of this 
research, some effort needs to be made to interpret their perspective in the 
language of distributed cognition. A cognitive scientist would view single loop 
learning as a minor adjustment or recalibration of an accepted representation or 
a refinement of understanding how organizational actions impact the accepted 
representation. Such changes to representations developed over time would be 
in terms of minor changes in size or scale while double loop learning would be
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viewed as a major adjustment or change in the actual structure of the 
representation of the environment and its interrelationships with the organization 
itself. One further noteworthy attribute of Argyris and Schon’s explicitly defined 
organizational learning framework is that it is one of the original ones that view 
the learning process as being composed of a series of iterative feedback loops, a 
concept at the core of other frameworks.
Crossan, Lane, and White’s (1995) 4-I theory of organizational learning 
rests on their identification of four basic functions: intuiting, interpreting, 
integrating, and institutionalizing. Intuiting is the act of an individual recognizing 
patterns or possibilities in the environment. Interpreting is the act of explaining 
such ideas to oneself and/or crossing the individual’s boundary and explaining it 
to a group of other individuals. Integrating is that group developing a shared 
understanding based on the interpretations of several. Finally, institutionalizing is 
when organizations formally act on the integrated concepts of such groups. By 
focusing on the levels at which each suggested basic function is occurring, the 
authors are implicitly suggesting that learning is indeed a distributed function. 
They further suggest that these steps work in both directions as representations 
are built from the bottom-up or feeding forward as they describe it, then 
institutionalized and fed back down to individuals as they become the basis for 
implicit action.
Crossan et al then go on to suggest four basic propositions relating to their 
framework. First, a tension exists between assimilating new learning and using 
existing learning, analogous to March’s balance between exploration and
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exploitation and Argyris and Schon’s single and double loops. Second, learning 
occurs at multi-levels, personal, group, and organizational within an organization, 
i.e. organizational learning is a distributed act. Third, processes link these levels; 
again learning is an emergent, systemic, distributed act. Fourth and finally, 
cognition affects action and vice versa, suggesting an iterative relationship exists 
between the two.
Ocasio (2000) building on Weick’s (1979) work suggests his SERSTS 
model based on the following functions composing the organizational processing 
of representations: situation, enactment, retrieval, selection, transmission, and 
storage, all of which are analogous to other frameworks already described. 
Ocasio’s situation is essentially analogous to the outside environment used in 
other frameworks. Enactment, a concept borrowed from Weick is essentially the 
initial creation from scratch of different representations of a situation. Retrieval 
refers to representations not necessarily created on the fly but supplemented 
with existing representations of similar situations already developed by an 
organization; again one notes the tension between exploration and exploitation. 
Selection is the actual work of picking representations or combining them, 
analogous to Crossan et al’s integrating phase. Transmission is the act of 
propagating the representation through the various portions of an organization for 
both refinement and action. Finally, storage is analogous to the 
institutionalization of the given representation for purposes of future retrieval and 
incorporation into action strategies. Implicit in Ocasio’s model, first, is the idea 
that the cognitive action his functions compose has the purpose of leading to
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action to change the situation for the organization’s benefit and second, that 
information and representations flow through an organization to such ends in a 
continuous manner.
While developed somewhat separately from cognitive and organizational 
sciences, Boyd’s conceptual framework of OODA loops, described by Coram 
(2002), for purposes of explaining the actions of protagonists in military conflicts 
is functionally analogous to the learning frameworks already discussed. Indeed, 
Coram (2002) describes the objective of the framework as being a means “to get 
inside the mind and the decision cycle of an adversary” (p. 335). As stated 
before in this work, Boyd’s looping of information is composed of four distinct 
phases: observation, orientation, decision, and action. Figure 2.4 provides a 
detailed diagram used by Boyd himself (Coram 2002) as he briefed his concept 
throughout the US military establishment in the 70’s and 80’s.
There are three issues of particular noteworthiness in Boyd’s framework 
developed outside of other sciences dedicated to understanding the thinking 
process. First, the idea he suggests of implicit feedback from the orientation 
phase of his process to the action phase is suggestive of Argyris and Schon’s 
single loop learning, March’s exploitation, and Dhar’s experiential learning. 
Second, the feedback loop flowing from the decision phase to the observation 
phase is suggestive of Argyris and Schon’s expectations being part of strategy 
selection and being a means of measuring representation accuracy via the 
existence of errors. Finally third, Boyd attempts to capture both culture and 
context by citing their influences on the orientation phase of the process. And
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overarching all these points is again the iterative, meta-loop cited by other 
authors of the learning process.
The purpose of this review was to provide a flavor for the existing 
frameworks that can be found within the literature and to develop common 
themes that exist across these frameworks. These themes include the notions 
that cognition is an iterative, repetitive looping process, that it occurs on surface 
levels and deeper levels relating to the degree to which representations are 
adjusted, that natural tensions exist between using existing representations 
repeatedly and adjusting them or developing new ones, and that the basic 
functions of cognition consist of compiling environmental observations, searching 
for and recognizing patterns within those observations that in turn can be 
developed into conceptual representations of the environment, settling on a 
representation as the basis of developing strategies of action and expectations, 
and then implementing those strategies, observing results, and repeating the 
process.
Summary of Literature Themes and identification of Literature Gaps
The purpose of this portion of the literature review is to develop an 
understanding of the concepts of distributed cognition and organizational learning 
and to detail the recurrent themes found across the literature. By integrating the 
work of several authors, a working definition is developed particular to the nature 
of this work for a more specific concept of distributed cognition: the ongoing 
collective accumulation, distribution, and synthesis of knowledge across time
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amongst personnel and systems at all levels within a bounded organization 
which leads to the development, adjustment, and sometimes tearing down then 
redevelopment of both tacit and explicit mental representations of the outside 
world within which the organization is trying to pursue its goals.
Additionally by structured review and clustering of like issues, the following 
major themes relating to the study of distributed cognition and organizational 
learning are identified: 1) the complexity of the environment and the volume of 
information being processed by such systems, 2) the integration of specialized 
expertise’s as a key function of distributed cognition, 3) the occurrence and 
impact of errors within learning systems, 4) a focus on the material, process, 
institutional, and technological artifacts which develop within organizations to 
facilitate distributed cognition, 5) the various key characterizations of the context 
within which the organizational cognition is occurring that are judged to 
significantly impact the cognition process, 6) the focus on and tracking of the 
propagation of representations through an organization-the fundamental act of 
cognition, 7) the breaking down, categorization, or description of the interaction 
of various structural functions of learning organizations, and lastly, 8) the 
detailing of a variety of frameworks sharing a cyclical theme describing the 
processes which must be looped through in order for organizations to learn.
Given that the focus of this work is on the development of a systemic, 
conceptual framework for understanding the organizational cognition occurring in 
crisis control centers, the difficulty one would find in applying the large and 
disparately varied existing literary constructs to the specified case is indicative of
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gaps existing in organizational literature. First, construction of systemic 
functional, structural frameworks for description of cognitive functions within the 
specific case of crisis control centers is lacking. Johanssen et al (2001),
Hutchins (1994, 1996), and Waem et al (1999) all provide detailed insight into the 
function of what can be considered control centers functioning in environments of 
varying degrees of complexity and Vidaillet (2000) provides a case review 
empirically identifying themes arising out of a crisis situation in which control 
centers played a key role. The objective of these authors, however, is not to 
develop and test conceptual frameworks in such settings and furthermore their 
objectives are not to detail the impacts of crisis situations on the phenomena of 
cognition within these settings.
Second, while some systems analysis concepts are prevalent in some of 
the reviewed frameworks, Boyd’s seeming to holistically incorporate more than 
the others, it is difficult to tell how, methodologically, these frameworks are 
developed as the authors merely develop and present them based on ranging 
literature reviews as was done here or develop them empirically out of specific 
cases. A systems scientist would suspect that by formally and explicitly applying 
the techniques of system analysis to the problem of constructing such 
frameworks, a more holistic, comprehensive approach could be developed and 
confidence in its ability to provide a more complete means for understanding 
cognition phenomena in specified settings would be increased. Such an effort 
will be undertaken in Chapter III of this work for the specific case in focus, crisis
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control centers, but first a review of literature relating to the setting of that focus 
must be accomplished.
A Review of Crisis Management Literature -  Purpose and Objectives
The purpose of this portion of the literature review is to develop an 
understanding of how the onset of crisis conditions might impact cognitive 
phenomena within organizational control centers. To that end a survey of crisis 
management literature is undertaken with two objectives in mind: first, to distill an 
working definition of what constitutes a “crisis” from an organizational 
perspective, and second, to develop a listing of themes prevalent in the literature 
that characterize crises in general. Chapter III will then use a systems analysis 
methodology to integrate ideas from the two major focus areas of this literature 
review, distributed cognition and crisis management, into the proposed 
conceptual framework at the center of this work. A review of crisis management 
literature can lead one to broadly categorize works into two categories: first, 
declarative “how-to” popular management literature describing experiences and 
developing prescriptive approaches to dealing with crises situations, with a 
prevalent focus on organizational public and media relations, and second, 
literature focused on development of overarching frameworks for describing and 
rigorously understanding a crisis situation. Many of the reviewed works mention 
the need for control centers and describe cases involving organizational control 
centers during periods of crises but the general perspective is to provide 
organizational leaders with guidance and not as is the focus of this work to focus
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intently on the control centers themselves. Nevertheless, they still do provide 
fertile ground for meeting the specified objectives here.
Prescriptive Approaches to Crisis Management
The term crisis management is a bit of a “buzzword” in today’s popular 
management literature as organizations deal with the uncertainty of modern 
environments. Perhaps as a result, a variety of works exist marketed to 
managers who have to face such situations. Generally speaking, such works 
focus on descriptive story telling to illustrate knowledge gained from experience. 
A brief review of such works provides a flavor for the nature of most crisis 
management literature.
Meyers et al (1986) in the dramatically titled When It Hits the Fan describe 
nine types of modern business crises including sudden market shifts, product 
failures, cash crises, and labor relations by retelling various stories then listing 
points or lessons learned within the story. In many cases the stories are 
summed in catch phrases. For example, after citing numerous case stories 
relating to product failures the reader is instructed briefly to “redesign it or retire 
it.” Similarly, Lerbringer (1997) presents six general types of crises organizations 
may have to confront: natural, technological, confrontation, malevolence, 
management, deception, and misconduct and then describes examples of each 
citing areas where mistakes occurred and improvements could be made. 
Unzucker (2002) distills crisis response into five general areas: investigation, 
restoration of normal operations, preparation for litigation, restoration of staff and
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public confidence, and reduction of political impact; then goes on to identify the 
seven personality traits of good crisis managers: being stable under pressure 
and public exposure, being firmly anchored in company and corporate position, 
being believable as company spokesman, being able to handle ad hoc 
assignments well, being a team player, and being able to deal with uncertainty. 
Bernstein (2003) identifies eight general public relations mistakes made by 
organizations: playing ostrich or not addressing a growing crisis, waiting to 
respond to a crisis only after it has gone public, assuming a good reputation will 
speak for you, treating the media like an enemy, remaining trapped in a 
reactionary mode, over-relying on technical jargon in media communications, 
assuming the truth will triumph, and ignoring personnel’s emotions.
The point of these citations is to provide a general flavor for the approach 
most works on the subject take towards crisis management; they provide a 
review of crisis cases citing lessons learned followed by a declaration of a set of 
steps or principles that can be used by organizations responding to crises. 
Lessons learned and typologies of crisis cases are doubtless very useful in 
developing a knowledge base for organizational managers but for purposes of 
developing a holistic view of crises, they provide little more than a background on 
which to further develop more rigorous concepts.
Developing a Working Definition of a Crisis Environment
In more conceptually rigorous approaches to the subject matter of crisis 
management, a variety of authors begin by distilling out of their cases a
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generalized definition of what a crisis is and what crisis management is. Figure 
2.5, Definitions of Crisis and Crisis Management, provides a review of theses 
definitions.
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Figure 2.5: Definitions of Crisis and Crisis Management
Crisis
“a turning point for better or worse” -  Fink (1986)
“A situation characterized by surprise, high threat to important values, and short decision time.”
Hermann, (1971).
“a major occurrence with potential negative outcome affecting an organization, company, or industry.
As well as its publics, products, services, or good name.” Feam-Banks (1996)
“a major unpredictable event that has potentially negative results. The event and its aftermath may 
significantly damage an organization and its employees, products, services, financial condition, and 
reputation.” -  Barton (1993).
“an event that is an unpredictable, major threat that can have a negative effect on the organization, 
industry, or stakeholders, if  handled improperly.” -  Coombs (1999).
“Extreme events that cause disruption and put lives and property at risk. These Require an immediate 
response and application o f resources beyond regular application.” - National Research Council (1996).
Originally a medical idea: “a Hippocratic concept: all illnesses reach a turning point. From here some are 
fatal, some go on to recovery, all others develop to another form, and take on a different constitution.”
Dab (1993).
“a fit o f uncertainty, and distress where everything is in suspense in anticipation of imminent resolution of 
the illness.” Bolzinger (1982).
“Crisis: a situation in which numerous organizations are faced with critical problems, experience both 
sharp external pressure and internal tensions, and are then brutally and for an extended period thrust to the 
center stage and hurled against one another, all in a society o f  mass communication, in other words in 
direct contact with the certainty o f being at the top o f the news on radio and television and in the press for 
a long time.” Lagadec (1984)
Crisis Management
“Set o f factors designed to combat crises and lessen the actual effects o f the crises. Put another way, cm 
seeks to prevent or lessen the negative outcomes o f  a crisis and thereby protect the organization, 
stakeholders, and/or industry from damage. (Coombs 1999)
“The set of concepts, principles, analysis, and working methods, that apply specifically to the very 
particular situation known as a crisis.” (Ogrizek, Guillery 1999).
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Three general themes emerge out of these definitions. First, crisis events 
are considerably more significant and negative to organizations than normal 
events in terms of their impact on organizational survival in its current state. 
Second, they may have components of surprise, unpredictability, and difficulty 
relative to the normal events organizations are ideally postured for. In light of 
the prior discussion of a key theme from distributed cognition and organizational 
learning literature, environmental complexity, this notion can be thought of as 
crisis environments being composed of a level of complexity for which the 
organization is not ideally prepared. Third and finally, these authors all point to 
the internal organizational and emotional stress caused by crises.
Bringing these themes together an working definition can be proposed: 
crisis environments are those with potential for significantly more negative 
organizational outcomes and of a significantly greater level of complexity than 
organizations are usually prepared for and in turn cause significant internal 
organizational stress. While a definition such as this one lays the foundation for 
gaining a conceptual understanding of a crisis environment, further review is 
necessary to more completely characterize that environment.
Characterizations of the Crisis Environment -  Emergent Literature Themes 
and an Operational Specification of Complexity
In reviewing crisis management literature three general approaches of 
characterizing crisis environments emerged: developing typologies of crises, 
describing varieties of complexity associated with crises, and developing 
characterizations of various periods of the life of a crisis within an organization.
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Discussion of the first two of these themes leads to the idea that they can be 
merged into the general idea of characterizing the nature of a crisis’s complexity 
while discussion of the latter stresses the importance of understanding the 
dimension of time as it relates to conceptualizing crisis environments.
As was previously discussed, Meyer et al (1986) identified ten types of 
crises affecting business enterprises: these include crises in labor relations, 
public perception, market shifts, product failures, management succession, cash 
flow, organizational relationships, hostile takeovers, adverse international events, 
and governmental regulation. Similarly, Nudell and French (1988) propose five 
types of crises typically occurring within governmental and political circles: 
natural disasters, accidents, terrorism, criminal acts, and disruptive actions, i.e. 
strikes, boycotts, and protests. Lerbringer (1997) identifies seven slightly more 
general types of crises with which organizations may find themselves confronted: 
natural, technological, confrontation, malevolence, skewed values, deception, 
and management misconduct. Given the definition proposed earlier, each of 
these types of environmental events constitute crises for organizations because 
they meet the specified criteria, they pose significantly negative consequences 
for the organization and their complexity is of a nature for which the organization 
is not usually prepared.
These typologies spring from those underlying complexities. Natural 
disasters present a volume of requirements outside the normal range for 
governments. Technological crises may require larger or different knowledge 
bases than organizations previously had. Criminal acts may be outside the
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normal plans of organizations. Each of these types of crises represents an 
underlying degree or nature of complexity with which the organization must come 
to deal. In terms of conceptualizing crisis environments then it is this underlying 
nature of the crisis’s complexity that first drives the organization’s stress and not 
the emergent typology itself.
Some authors address this underlying nature of the complexity within 
crisis environments. The National Research Counsel (author unidentified 1996) 
cites five characteristics of crisis environments: 1) magnitude or the sheer 
volume of information, events, and demanded responses, 2) dynamic urgency or 
the short time period required for understanding and action, 3) infrequency and 
unpredictability of events, 4) credibility of sources, and 5) multidimensionality or 
the breadth of differing ways in which events impact the organization. Lerbringer 
(1997) focusing on the time dimension of crises cites suddenness, uncertainty, 
and urgency. Meyer et al (1986) cite multidimensionality, ability to control, and 
urgency.
Because complexity fills a key portion of the developed working definition 
of a crisis environment for purposes of this work, its own further operational 
specification is required. In general terms ‘‘level of complexity” can be expanded 
to encompass as Carlisle and Rebentisch (2003) suggest 1) the amount of 
novelty introduced by the environment into to the control center, 2) the demands 
of the environment on the control center in terms of the amount of dependence 
between specialized sources of knowledge required to develop successful 
responses, and 3) the demands of the environment on the control center in terms
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of the amount or type of specialization required to successfully respond. This 
characterization of complexity and its demand on organizational learning entities 
is reflective of the discussions of specialization, integration, horizon of visibility, 
and intersubjectivity discussed in the literature review. The novelty side of 
complexity itself can further be characterized by the sheer number of entities 
involved, the pace of events, and high degrees of uncertainty (Jackson, 1991; 
Beer, 1979).
In meeting the objective of this work, developing a conceptual framework 
for understanding distributed cognition phenomena within organizations, it will be 
important to define these underlying aspects of crisis environments in terms of 
the perspective of the proposed framework. For example, Boyd may view a 
crisis situation’s urgency in terms of a challenge to his organizations ability to 
observe, or sample, and orient itself to a changing environment fast enough to 
make decisions and act. Similarly, Ocasio may view crisis magnitude as a 
challenge to organization’s ability to enact a large enough representation to 
encompass the volume of detail necessary to act within such an environment. 
Also importantly, such a framework must provide a means of understanding the 
impact of crises on its systemic structure as it passes through times of normalcy, 
crisis, and return to normalcy.
Several authors approach the problem of framing crisis situations from the 
perspective of time, that is, breaking down the life of an organization functioning 
through times of crisis into separate phases. Taking the organization’s 
perspective the National Research Council (1997) identifies four main phases of
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time during a crisis: preparation, avoidance, response, and recovery. Fink, as 
cited by Coombs (1999) use a medical illness metaphor as a means to frame the 
life of an organization in a crisis situation: the prodromal period, when clues that 
a crisis exists begin to emerge; the breakout period, a triggering event with 
attendant damage; the chronic period, when lingering effects must be addressed; 
and the resolution period, when the crisis issue is no longer a concern. Mitroff 
(1994) characterizes the issue thusly; a period of signal detection, one of probing 
and prevention, one of damage containment, and one of recovery, followed by 
one of learning. Coombs (1999) attempts to simplify these ideas suggesting that 
crisis management is composed of times of prevention, preparation, 
performance, and then learning. The fact that a variety of authors choose to 
focus on the timelines of crisis situations suggests their importance to framing 
crisis problems. These characterizations of crisis situation phasing will be 
synthesized and used in Chapter III of this work to ground the proposed 
framework in the time dimension as well as to provide a means to understanding 
the impact a crisis has, as it initially develops, exists, and fades, on learning 
phenomena within organizations.
Summary of Literature Review relating to Crisis Management
Reviewing and integrating the work of several authors, the view of crisis 
environments as those “with potential for significantly more negative 
organizational outcomes and of a significantly greater level of complexity than 
organizations are usually prepared for and in turn cause significant internal
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organizational stress,” lays the foundation for developing a conceptual 
understanding for the impacts of such environments on organizational learning 
systems. Similarly such a framework must also capture the various 
characterizations of the natures of complexity within crisis environment and their 
impact on an organization. Finally, the emergent and recurrent focus within the 
literature on the time phases in the life of crisis situations suggests the 
importance of incorporating such phases into any constructed conceptual 
framework which has the purpose of providing a means of understanding the 
impact of crisis on an organization’s learning systems. Figure 2.6, Crisis 
Management Literature Review Summarization, provides a summary of the 
literature review relating to crisis management.
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Figure 2.6 - Crisis Management Literature Review Summarization
C ris is  E n v iro n m en t D efined:
Environments and events with potential for 
significantly more negative organizational 
outcomes and of a significantly greater level of 
complexity than organizations are usually 
prepared for and in turn cause significant internal 
organizational stress
Dominant Literature Themes Characterizing Crisis Environment
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Crisis Complexity
Crisis Phases
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1996).
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Failure, Management Chronic, Resolution
Succession, Cash, 
Relationships, Hostile
Suddenness, 
Uncertainty, Time
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The Purpose of Control Centers in Times of Crisis
Control centers in various forms have been the focus of many studies 
relating to distributed cognition (Johanssen et al 2001, Fields et al 1999, Artman 
and Garbis 1988), the underlying reason for which is that the primary focus of 
such centers is to serve as the central nerve-center or “brain” of larger 
organizational groups, collecting observations from the outside world, interpreting 
them, and developing responses. Indeed it can be said that the implicit purpose 
of such control centers is primarily to facilitate an organization’s distributed 
cognition (Artman and Garbis 1988). When one thinks of the existing 
organizational learning frameworks from the literature discussed thus far one can 
picture all the functions occurring in the control centers.
This commonality between the working definition of an organizational 
cognition system and a crisis control center represents an intersection of the two 
areas of focus in this literature review. Specifically it allows for the, for purposes 
of this work, definition of a crisis control center as an organization’s centralized 
establishment for facilitating distributed cognition in the event the organization 
encounters a crisis environment.
Having identified one of the two main areas of gaps in the reviewed 
literature as a lack of a systemic understanding of the impact of crisis conditions 
on distributed cognition control centers and the other being the lack of use of 
systems engineering methodologies in constructing distributed cognition 
frameworks in general, it is important to ensure that the control centers to be 
studied and to serve as the object of focus for the proposed framework are
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indeed functioning in crisis environments. Specifically, as a matter of condition in 
the proposed definition of a crisis environment it is required that such 
“environments and events” have “potential for significantly more negative 
organizational outcomes and...significantly greater level of complexity than 
organizations are usually prepared for and in turn cause significant internal 
organizational stress”. The question to be answered is “does the posturing of an 
organization in fielding a control center, sometimes complete with contingency 
plans, emergency checklists, myriads of communication systems, and other such 
artifacts constitute being ‘prepared for’ and thereby eliminate the ability to claim a 
crisis environment exists?” The answer lies primarily in the word “usually” in the 
proposed definition. The organization, not the control center, is postured for 
some sort of daily set of expected occurrences. The fact that organizations take 
steps to mitigate crisis environments does not mean crises can still not occur in 
terms of degree of complexity and in terms of the internal stress they may cause. 
A normal 911 call reporting an individual’s heart attack to a city’s emergency call 
center would not constitute a crisis for the city; however a mass casualty event, 
such as plane crash, would most certainly still qualify as a crisis even though its 
control center might have a contingency plan for such an event.
Air Force Unit Control Centers
The study of control centers functioning in such crisis environments and 
the impacts of those environments, relative to ones for which the organizations 
are usually prepared, on the distributed cognition phenomena within such control
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centers are the focus of this work. Air Force Wing Unit Control Centers 
functioning during simulated wartime operational readiness exercises and 
inspections meet the requirement of functioning in crisis conditions. The specific 
cases used validate and adjust the proposed framework will be Air Force 
Squadron Control Centers participating in operational readiness exercises 
simulating wartime conditions in preparation for formal Operational Readiness 
Inspections being conducted by the Air Force’s Air Combat Command’s 
Inspector General team.
One of the many internal functions of The United States Air Force’s Air 
Combat Command (ACC), headquartered at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia 
and comprised of 18 active duty and over 50 reserve component reporting 
installations located mostly in the continental United States, is that of its 
Inspector General’s (IG) directorate. One of the responsibilities of the IG, and his 
or her team of about 150 officer and senior enlisted personnel, is to conduct 
Operational Readiness Inspections (ORI) in order to provide senior ACC 
leadership with a measure of a subordinate unit’s capability to accomplish its 
wartime mission. ORIs, in their usual form, involve the IG team with augmenting 
inspectors traveling to the installation to be inspected and conducting round-the- 
clock, basewide-oriented, scripted scenarios for about eight days. Generally, the 
first three days of inspection, Phase I of the ORI, focus on the installation’s ability 
to mobilize, or prepare and package, personnel and equipment for expedient 
travel to a forward location. During Phase II, the remainder of the inspection and 
the focus of this research, the entire installation is simulated to be at a forward
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location from which units are conducting offensive and defensive wartime 
operations.
Over many years a rigorous set of criteria, ACC Supplement 1 to AFI 90- 
201, Operational Readiness Inspection Criteria, has developed and evolved to 
evaluate the common fighter or bomber wings within ACC (ACC 2002). The 
Phase II portion of this criteria is broken down into three major graded areas; the 
Employment and Mission Support criteria evaluate the flying mission, aircraft 
maintenance, and base functions pretty much along hierarchical organization 
lines with a few sections of criteria dedicated to evaluating systemic processes 
such as communication security and command and control; the Ability to Survive 
and Operate (ATSO) portion of the criteria breaks down and evaluates the 
emergent behavior of the wing in response to conventional and chemical attacks 
upon the base, mass casualties, and a variety of other negative occurrences 
expected to occur during wartime. Falling within the Mission Support portion of 
this criteria organization is the installation’s Civil Engineering function, usually of 
squadron strength, approximately 100 to 400 personnel and accompanying 
vehicle, equipment, and material, responsible for maintaining the base’s facilities 
and infrastructure. Civil Engineering squadrons for purposes of readiness 
exercises and inspections are composed of smaller elements, or flights, 
responsible for accomplishing engineering design, environmental management of 
base activities, resource management of materials, and general operations 
including road, airfield, and earthwork, interior and exterior electrical-systems 
work, interior and exterior water, gas, and sewage utilities work, carpentry and
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structural work, entomological work, contingency generator maintenance and 
servicing, and heating, ventilation, and air condition systems work. In total Civil 
Engineering Squadrons are large, complex organizations of diversely skilled 
experts responsible for maintaining the technologically intensive systems 
required to support a modern Air Force wing in times of war.
A central portion of the inspection criteria (see Appendix 1) related to 
evaluating a base’s Civil Engineering function in an ORI is dedicated to the 
Squadron’s Control Center (SCC), the central nerve center responsible for 
processing incoming data relating to facility and infrastructure conditions from all 
the various units on base, developing an understanding of events, developing 
solutions and presenting them to Squadron leadership for review and decision 
making, then relaying and coordinating response actions with field units. The 
SCC, housed in a fielded control center or contingency headquarters facility type 
of setting, is composed of personnel representing the various sub-organizational 
flights within a Civil Engineering Squadron. Typically each of these individuals is 
accompanied with two or more means of communication with their field 
counterparts dispersed across the base. SCC layouts themselves involve banks 
of phones, status boards, and workstations centralized around a single SCC 
director, the squadron’s senior leadership. Figure 2.7, Sample Floor Plan of an 
AF Unit Control Center, is a typical floor plan for an Engineering SCC.
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Figure 2.7: Sample Floor Plan of an AF Unit Control Center
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During the ORI, inputs in the form of scripted actions performed by actors 
(inspector personnel or assistants), input cards, or material and equipment 
placements are dropped or enacted at various locations around the base. As 
units in the field respond to inputs such as chemical agent detection, ground 
intruder alerts, mortar blasts, fires, craters and building damage, information is 
channeled to the SCC for repair efforts to be prioritized and responsive strategies 
decided upon and implemented. For the engineering function of an Air Force 
Wing, the SCC is the squadron’s crisis control center.
ORIs are high-pressure events hopefully mirroring the pressures of 
wartime. Most wings train anywhere from a year to six months for an ORI, by 
conducting in-house Operational Readiness Exercises (ORE) if they know an 
impending for ORI is scheduled. Grades for all sections of the criteria are given 
on a five-point scale (Outstanding, Excellent, Satisfactory, Marginal and 
Unsatisfactory) and superior performers and teams are specifically identified. 
Individual, squadron, functional, and overall wing success will almost definitely 
find its way into personnel appraisals. On occasion, poor performance does 
result in reassignment of personnel. At the conclusion of the ORI the inspection 
team, usually composed of 50-100 functional air force experts and led by a team 
chief with the rank of colonel, will spend two days writing its report, according to a 
rigorous specified format based on established criteria (ACC 2002). Before 
departing the installation, the IG team chief will be the primary speaker at a mass 
briefing to the base populace, usually in the base theater and televised to other 
large facilities, in which the various sub-section performance assessment ratings
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are revealed, via high-tech slideshow with music and action pictures for all to 
see, and “rolled-up” into the ratings for the major graded areas after which the 
final overall wing grade is revealed.
Air Force Wing Engineering Squadron Control Centers functioning during 
operational readiness exercises and inspections exist to facilitate the expedited 
recovery of continued function of wing facilities and infrastructure. In order to 
accomplish their mission these centers must by definition facilitate the distributed 
cognition of a host of players including personnel and subsystems responsible for 
airfield and navigation systems, back up generator systems, utility systems, 
squadron security and personnel-equipment-vehicles-materials accountability, 
tracking of chemical agent exposure, tracking of damage, and facility repair. 
Making their task even more difficult is the crisis environments in which they are 
asked to perform: environments full of potential adverse outcomes relating to 
personnel and system survival, and full of foreseen and unforeseen complexity 
sometimes exceeding the capability of the centers to fully and adequately 
process and act within.
Summary of Literature Review
Table 2.1, Summary of Literature Review uses Figure 2.2, Literature 
Coverage Areas and Gaps, introduced at the beginning of this chapter, as a 
basis for summarizing the location of gaps in the subject matter of the existing 
literature that this work is attempting to fill.
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Table 2.1: Summary of Literature Review (based on Figure 2.2, Literature 
Map)_______________ _____________________________________________
Coverage Area 1: Distributed 
Cognition Literature
Coverage Area 2: Crisis 
Management Literature
Non-Intersecting Subject 
Matter from Literature 
Review
- Literature Themes (see Fig 2.3): 
Learning Loops
Functional Breakdowns, Artifacts, 
Representations
- Existing Frameworks (see Fig. 2.4): 
March (2000), Dhar (2000), Argyris 
and Schon (1978), Crossan, Lane, 
and White (1995)
- Anecdotal Summaries 
and Prescriptive 
Approaches
- Frameworks: Crisis 
Typologies,
Characteristics of Crisis 
Complexity, Crisis 
Phases.
Gap 1: Distributed 
Cognition and Crisis 
Management
PARTIALLY FILLED
- Literature Themes (see Fig 2.3): 
Specialization, Volume/Complexity, 
Errors, Contextual Characterizations
- Existing Frameworks (See Fig. 2.4): 
Boyd (2002)
PARTIALLY FILLED 
- Characterizations 
describing uncertainty 
and unknowability
Gap 2: Distributed 
Cognition Literature 
Using Systemic 
Approaches
PARTIALLY FILLED 
- Existing Frameworks (See Fig. 2.4): 
Ocasio (2000) and Boyd (2002) to 
greater extent
No Intersection
Gap 3:
Crisis Management 
Literature Using Systemic 
Approaches
No Intersection UNFILLED
Gap 4:
Systemically Framing 
Distributed Cognition 
Phenomena in Crisis 
Environments
PARTIALLY FILLED:
Existing Frameworks (See Fig. 2.4): 
Boyd (2002) begins to approach
UNFILLED
The primary purpose of this literature review was threefold in reaching 
toward the overall goals of this research. First, academic literature relating to 
distributed cognition and organizational learning was reviewed and synthesized 
in order to gain perspective on the general definitions, characterizations, and 
themes relating to these fields of study. Second and similarly, crisis 
management literature was also reviewed to support the development of an 
understanding of the topic and to develop specific characterizations of crisis 
environments and their impact on organizations and their control centers. 
Finally, Air Force organizational literature relating to the function of fielded
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
91
squadron control centers was reviewed to gain an understanding of official, 
organizational perspectives relating to these organizational entities.
Specifically within the first area of focus, distributed cognition, review of 
the academic literature relating to the field was accomplished with the interim 
objectives, along the way to supporting the framework development of Chapter 
III, of: 1) developing a formalized working definition of organizational cognition, 2) 
developing a listing and an understanding of the themes within the literature 
relating to the study of distributed cognition, and 3) understanding existing 
frameworks others have used to support a comprehensive, holistic understanding 
of distributed cognition.
Crisis Management literature was summarized to support meeting the 
interim objectives of: 1) developing an overarching characterization of exactly 
what constitutes a crisis situation, which in turn lead to 2) developing a further, 
more specific, listing of detailed characterizations of a crisis situation which will 
then be used in conjunction with the body of knowledge gained in the area of 
organization cognition to develop the proposed conceptual framework in Chapter 
III.
The researcher identifies six main gaps in the literature reviewed thus far. 
First, addressing Gap 1 in Figure 2.2, in terms of distributed cognition literature 
little exists on attempting to capture the impacts of a crisis environment on the 
phenomena. The notion is hinted at in discussion of certain literature themes: 1) 
specialized expertise being inadequate to the task at hand, 2) volume and 
complexity and the challenges they place on cognition, 3) sources of errors made
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in learning processes and 4) contextual characterization discussed in this chapter 
which limit cognition. Boyd (Coram, 2002) begins to systemically approach ways 
to create crises to confound an opponent’s learning process. The specific goal of 
understanding crisis impacts upon distributed cognition phenomena is not the 
focused objective of the frameworks and themes existing in the literature though. 
Second, addressing Figure 2.2’s Gap 2, within crisis management literature, little 
is found that focuses on learning in general or distributed cognition specifically. 
The subject matter is approached obliquely in discussions of unknowability and 
uncertainty in the environment but not with the specific goal of looking at 
organizational cognitive processes.
Third, the construction of the existing cognitive frameworks reviewed, 
seems to be based on the authors’ raw synthesis of literature and experience. 
Boyd (Coram, 2002) and Ocasio (2000) begin to approach a systems view of the 
phenomena by capturing the interaction of constructs but they don’t set out with a 
systemic methodology in mind to develop their work. Fourth, and as a result 
Boyd’s (Coram, 2002) work also begins to approach a systems view of a crisis 
environment’s impacts on learning, but it remains difficult to actually track the 
systemic impact of differing crisis characteristics on learning phenomena. Fifth 
and alternatively, within crisis management literature, the researcher could find 
no work even reaching the point of capturing interrelationships between 
constructs to capture crisis impacts on a given set of phenomena. Sixth and 
finally, the author similarly could find no crisis management literature attempting
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to systemically frame the impact of a crisis environment on distributed cognition 
phenomena.
Separately from this discussion, in order to support the focused efforts on 
the specific case of fielded UCCs functioning in wartime environments, a 
summarization of the existing Air Force literature relating to the staffing, 
equipping, operational functions, assessment, and interaction with units outside, 
of an SCC was undertaken with the interim objective of developing an 
understanding of specific characterizations of the cases to be studied.
Not found in depth in this discussion is the researcher’s view that a 
systemic structural view of the subject matter would yield substantial benefit in 
understanding the phenomena in the setting in question. This notion is 
developed and addressed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Purpose and Organization of Chapter
The purpose of this chapter is three-fold. First, using a systems approach, 
a theoretical framework will be developed that will 1) synthesize the information 
developed in the literature review, 2) describe the systemic structure of 
distributed cognition occurring in control centers, and 3) capture the effects of 
changing crisis intensity on the distributed cognition occurring in control centers. 
Second, the appropriateness and suitability of using exploratory case study 
methodology to validate a portion of the constructed framework will be discussed 
in detail: 1) a general critique of case study methods will be presented followed 
by 2) a discussion of the challenges associated with integrating qualitative and 
quantitative data gained from case analysis to be followed then by 3) further 
discussion of the limits of statistical approaches for the given research material 
and lastly 4) discussion of the challenges for the case researcher who is close to 
the cases being studied. Finally, some discussion is presented to explain why 
the term “theoretical framework” is used to describe the central product that is 
presented in this chapter and that is to be validated using the research design in 
the next chapter. Chapter IV, Research Design, will then follow where the 
specific design of the case study protocols and database will be made explicit.
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Why a Systems Analysis Methodology is Needed
One of the main points of this work is the suggestion that the problem of 
understanding the impact crisis environments have on control centers is naturally 
suited to a systems approach. While a systems thinking approach has many 
strengths, this proposition that the focus of this work is especially suited to it, 
stems from the idea that the problem has the following four attributes 
characteristic of those for which systems analysis has a lot of promise: 1) as 
seen from the literature review the problem is inherently complex, driven by the 
complexity of the crisis environment as well as the contextual, technological, and 
specialization demands placed on control center systems: 2) successful 
distributed cognition necessarily calls for multi-disciplinarity amongst control 
center participants and sub-systems: 3) the complexity inherent in the problem as 
well as the diverse views, perspectives, and constructs of both crisis 
management and distributed cognition cited in the literature view suggest that 
any proposed theoretical framework addressing the problem must take a holistic 
approach to ensure all relevant ideas and constructs are captured and accounted 
for: 4) finally and more specifically, the focus of this work is on capturing the 
impacts of a changing crisis environment on the phenomena of distributed 
cognition occurring in control rooms, thus a systemic structural approach is 
needed to capture interrelationships between the outside environment and 
subsystem constructs. Checkland (1981) captures the strength of systems 
thinking in his definition,
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“Systems thinking is an epistemology which when applied to human 
activity is based upon the four basic ideas: emergence, hierarchy, 
communication, and control as characteristics of systems. When 
applied to natural or designed systems the crucial characteristic is 
the emergent properties of the whole” (p. 318).
The inherent complexity associated with distributed cognition systems 
cited above and in the literature review coupled with the challenge of 
understanding the impacts of complex crisis environments on such systems 
implies that a simplistic, one-track reductionist approach by itself will not work 
(Flood and Carson, 1993). The approach must be one that looks for emergent 
properties and constructs arising out of the complexity. Systems analysis 
methods are based on the understanding that knowability is inherently limited in 
analyzing complex systems and proceed accordingly to focus on emergent 
properties (Checkland, 1981).
Another key principle of a systems analysis approach to a problem is one 
of complementarity. Systems thinking recognizes that multiple perspectives of a 
problem will provide different knowledge about the problem and this knowledge 
will not be entirely independent or in congruence (Clemson, 1984). The principle 
of complementarity applies to this work in two ways: 1) the multiplicity of existing 
perspectives relating to the topics of distributed cognition and crisis management 
cited in the literature review and 2) the inherent multiplicity of views that must be 
synthesized to develop and adjust representations within distributed cognition 
systems. A theoretical framework attempting to describe such processes must 
be constructed using a method that takes such complementarities into account.
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Closely tied to the first two motivations discussed for using a systems 
approach in the work is the overarching goal of developing a holistic view of the 
situation. Systems thinking recognizes that the whole of a system is greater than 
the sum of its parts. Reductionist approaches must be accompanied by ones 
accounting for this holism (Flood and Carson, 1991). Keating (2000) suggests 
that
“the primary strength of the systemic perspective for structural 
analysis is the holistic perspective, which examines the entirety of 
the structure within its operational context. As such a holistic 
approach examines formal and informal relationships between 
entities, as well as emerging patterns” (p. 181).
In attempting to capture a description of distributed cognition in control 
centers in times of crisis an approach that accounts for both the whole of existing 
knowledge as well as describes the whole of the actual process must be used if 
the theoretical framework is to have sufficient breadth.
As will be discussed in greater detail in the next section, a key 
focus of this work is on capturing the effects of a changing crisis environment 
upon distributed cognition phenomena. Most of the constructed representations 
of distributed cognition phenomena discussed in the literature review 
acknowledge the environment in which the system they have bounded exists. 
Some address the environment as interacting with the distributed cognition 
system along a single transitional phase. While continuous interaction with 
subsystems may be implied, not much depth is provided on how such interaction 
occurs and what its emergent impacts are on the system as a whole. In order to 
gain this ability a systems analysis method must be chosen which accounts for
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understanding the structure of the system in question and the impact of a 
changing environment upon that structure.
Beer’s Viable Systems Model
The focus of this work is on developing a means for understanding the 
impact of crisis environments on distributed cognition phenomena in control 
centers. To accomplish this goal with any rigor a means of describing the 
impacts of environmental influences on the structure of the system under study 
must be achieved. As was previously discussed, the proposed structures 
analyzed in the literature review do not facilitate tracing environmental changes 
into the sub-elements or structure of the distributed cognition phenomena 
occurring in a control center. For example, a simple but sudden increase in the 
pace of events might represent the onset of or an increase in intensity of a crisis 
situation that a control center must attempt to manage. With the existing 
structures discussed in the literature review it is difficult to articulate directly how 
such an event pace increase will impact the distributed cognition system other 
than to point out that the system must simply respond faster itself. Systems 
thinking though suggests that sub-systems making up the whole distributed 
cognition system may be impacted differently or not in parallel. Subsequent 
interactions with other subsystems may feedback positively or negatively leading 
to emergent properties the existing proposed structures might not predict. The 
level of simplicity of the existing proposed structures does not inform the 
understanding of the cognitive processes in the system.
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An approach that is both focused on the systems structure and facilitates 
the understanding of outside environmental structural impacts on sub-systems is 
Beer’s (1979, 1984) Viable Systems Model (VSM). Developed by Beer based on 
an organic perspective of systems as well as the view that such system structure 
is recursively seen repeatedly at different levels of hierarchy within systems, the 
VSM is, “...flexible and robust -  both prerequisites in fast-changing 
environments” (Espejo et al, 1996). Keating states that the VSM offers “a 
comprehensive systems perspective of structure (Keating 2002) and further 
offers that it can be used as a “template against which operational structures can 
be ‘diagnosed’” (Keating 2000). Espejo et al. cites the VSMs substantial use in 
companies and non-profit organization as means for understanding organizations 
(Espejo, 1996).
As Beer’s Viable System Model serves is key to the framework central to 
this research, scholarly criticism of the VSM must be reviewed and discussed in 
terms of its practical impacts in this context. Addressing such criticism as well as 
delineating the extent to which Beer’s themes are incorporated in the framework 
follows later in this chapter after the framework is developed.
Beer identifies five basic functional or structural subsystems required if 
any system is to remain viable. Presented here and in Figure 3.3, The Viable 
System Model, as developed by Beer (1979, 1984), Espejo (1996), and Keating 
(2000), these five systems are:
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System 1 -  operations: produces the products or services that are the 
essence of the operation. The primary function of System 1 is to implement the 
organization’s will as it performs task in the outside environment. A variety of 
System 1’s or autonomous may exist within an organization focused on 
implementation a particular purposeful, sub-specialty of the organization.
System 2 -  co-ordination: the primary function of this system is to provide 
for system stability by synchronizing the System 1’s within the organization, 
preventing unnecessary oscillation between the other systems and promoting 
integrated responses and actions.
System 3 -  control/monitoring: maintains operational performance on a 
daily basis, by focusing internally on executing policy, distributing resources, and 
ensuring accountability. Beer identifies a separate function of System 3, so- 
called “System 3*” focused exclusively on monitoring the state of operations by 
routine or sporadic audits.
System 4 -  intelligence: the primary function of this system is to capture 
information about the external environment and assess it’s meaning for future 
implications. A natural tension exists between System’s 3 and 4 as they focus on 
their individual functions and generate demands upon each other.
System 5 -  policy/identity: this system is responsible for the strategic, 
broad decisions and direction associated with the very identity of the overall 
system itself. Also this system monitors and seeks to maintain balance between 
the inward focus of System 3 and the outward focus of System 4.
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=igure 3.1: The Viable System Model (adapted from Beer, 1979)
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A Methodology for Implementing VSM
In applying the ideas of the VSM to the initial development of a theoretical 
framework for understanding the structure of distributed cognition phenomena in 
control centers operating in crisis environments a systems-based methodology, 
stemming from Keating’s (2002) and Checkland’s (1981) approaches was used 
as is detailed in Figure 3.4, Viable System Model Application Methodology.
First, the actual focus area of this work, the system of interest, as has 
been described before, must be specified concisely and delineated accordingly. 
This function serves to bound the area of investigation. Second, the relevant 
environment must be specified; a key function in this work as the focus is on 
specific environmental impacts upon the system of interest. This work will be in 
two steps: 1) a generalized approach to defining a crisis environment in this 
chapter and 2) a specific delineation of the crisis environments expected to be 
observed in the selected case studies in Chapter IV. Third, the structure to be 
studied must operate within a specified context that enables and constrains the 
structure of the system of interest. In order to rigorously specify this context, 
again a general approach discussing contextual elements developed in the 
literature review will be used followed by a detailing of contextual elements 
specific to the cases to be studied. Fourth, using the knowledge and 
understanding developed through the specification process above a general and 
case specific definition of the structure of the system of interest will be
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developed. Discussion will also follow of the interrelationships between system 
structural elements themselves as well as with the outside environment.
Fifth, in later chapters, in order to remain within the scope of this 
investigation portions of the developed structural definition will be selected for 
validation by developing protocol for selecting and studying specific cases of 
control centers functioning within crisis environments. Sixth and finally the 
understanding gained from the case analysis will be applied, iteratively, to update 
the theoretical framework as its being developed. The resulting framework can 
then be used to support future study, analysis, tools, assessment methods, 
doctrines, and implementation methodologies relating to control centers 
functioning in crisis environments: the original motivation for this research.
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Figure 3.2: Viable System Model Application Methodology
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DC5 Development: System of Interest General Specification
In general the system of interest for this research is the system 
established within an organizational control center to facilitate cognition of the 
outside environment. As described in Chapters I and II, control centers 
functioning in dynamic, complex environments necessarily are characterized by 
diverse, specialized personnel, leadership personnel, technological subsystems, 
and other artifacts making the cognitive process a distributed one. In terms of 
providing a general physical bounding, the facility housing the control center 
could be thought of as serving the purpose. Examples of such control centers 
include aircraft cockpits, 911 call centers, fire department alarm rooms, military 
control centers, shipboard navigational control centers, and mobile incident 
response centers. Given advances in information technology perhaps some 
organizations would attempt to disperse or to allow dispersal of the personnel 
and subsystems composing the essential functions of the control center. 
Considerations of advantages and disadvantages to such setups aside, a topic to 
be discussed in system contextual specification, the bounding by facility skin 
becomes less useful in such situations. In these cases it would simply involve 
those involved in centralizing information flow, constructing organizational 
representational understanding, decision-making, and action planning. The 
bounding is presented here in general terms because a central assumption of 
this work is that the basic concepts involved in describing and framing distributed 
cognition in control centers is generally universal with analogous constructs in a 
variety of settings. As such, understanding gained in one setting is assumed, if
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contextual and environmental factors are appropriately accounted for, to have 
external validity or transferability to other settings. A rigorous specification of the 
settings of the specific cases to be studied will be provided in Chapter IV.
DC5 Development: Crisis Environment Specification
Before proceeding with a general specification of the relevant environment 
for this research a general reservation should be noted. Keating (2000) suggests 
that the,
“linkage between the system structure and environment is in 
constant flux. Therefore it is unrealistic, particularly where 
environments are complex and turbulent to assume that the 
environment will remain stable once identified. Throughout the 
analysis as new discoveries and understanding of the environment 
emerge, the environmental ‘model’ must be constantly updated” (p.
188).
With this in mind the following specification is approached with the 
understanding 1) that it must capture the complexity and dynamism of the 
expected crisis environment and 2) that as part of this research effort an iterative 
process of updating the environmental specification must be undertaken.
As developed in the Literature Review, a crisis environment can be 
defined those, (a) with potential for significant negative organizational outcomes 
(note: from a pessimistic perspective, crisis outcomes, even those that may be 
potentially tremendously positive, can be thought of as negative, a dominant 
theme in the literature review, because such outcomes represent great 
opportunities that might be missed, i.e. failing to get a new product to market on 
time and capturing the subsequent market share and financial windfall) and (b) of
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a significantly greater level of complexity than organizations are usually prepared 
for and as a result of either or both of these elements (c) can cause significant 
internal organizational stress. In general terms “level of complexity” can be 
expanded to encompass as Carlisle and Rebentisch (2003) suggest 1) the 
amount of novelty introduced by the environment into to the control center, 2) the 
demands of the environment on the control center in terms of the amount of 
dependence between specialized sources of knowledge required to develop 
successful responses, and 3) the demands of the environment on the control 
center in terms of the amount or type of specialization required to successfully 
respond. This characterization of complexity and its demand on organizational 
learning entities is reflective of the discussions of specialization, integration, 
horizon of visibility, and intersubjectivity discussed in the literature review. The 
novelty side of complexity itself can further be characterized by the sheer number 
of entities involved, the pace of events, and high degrees of uncertainty 
(Jackson, 1991; Beer, 1979). Figure 3.3 captures this general specification of 
the crisis environment. Once a contextual specification of the system of interest 
and its structural definition is completed, this relevant environment specification 
can be used to inform a discussion of the impacts of a crisis environment on 
control center distributed cognition phenomena. As before, a case specific 
relevant environment specification will be undertaken in the next chapter.
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Figure 3.3: General Specification of the Crisis Environment
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DC5 Development: Contextual Identification
Contextual identification, perhaps more than the other portions of this 
methodology, is the most highly setting-dependent factor for consideration. 
Specific local enabling and constraining contextual factors have the potential to 
have significant impact positively or negatively on the performance of control 
centers and their cognition processes. Furthermore the variety of such 
contextual factors represents a challenge to the transferability of this research to 
control center settings different than those cases selected for actual analysis in 
Chapters IV and V. Therefore it is imperative that setting specific contextual 
factors be made explicit so that they may be taken into account when 
generalizing about results.
The literature review however, did identify several general 
characterizations of factors influencing distributed cognition phenomena that 
would be considered contextual rather than structural. Such emergent properties 
that can significantly impact control center system performance include staff 
competence, leadership, intersubjectivity, horizon of information visibility, 
flexibility, and redundancy. Any investigation into control center performance 
must take the competence of the personnel and their ability to function as a team 
into account. As documented in the literature review several authors cite this 
contextual factor key analyzing control center performance. Somewhat related to 
staff competence but somewhat lightly addressed within the reviewed literature is 
the idea of leadership within an organization influencing cognition performance.
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Perhaps because it is a highly subjective term and difficult to apply 
quantitative measure to, and perhaps because it can be included under the 
overarching heading of staff competence, many authors do not directly cite it as a 
property influencing performance, but it does seem obvious that good 
organizational leadership would directly impact performance. Quality of 
leadership within an organization is a contextual property that must be suspected 
of having a direct bearing on cognition system performance and as a minimum 
on some level a subjective characterization must be attempted in order to at least 
document it as confounding factor impacting other analyses.
A variety of authors discussed the impact of intersubjectivity on system 
performance by noting how the capability to appreciate another players place 
within the system resolves errors quickly and distributes assistance quickly, 
allowing representations to be sharpened and actions to be coordinated (Decortis 
et al 2000, Vidaillet 2000,). For intersubjectivity to play a role in influencing the 
propagation of representations through a distributed cognition system, potential 
sympathetic players must be in a position to know what is occurring to other 
players. In general terms an investigatory approach into distributed cognition 
must attempt to capture the level of intersubjectivity at which the sub-systems 
and players within a control center are operating.
Similarly horizon of visibility is also a defining contextual characteristic of a 
control center. By making information flow visible to many players with 
intersubjective understandings of one another, representations can be molded 
and adjusted quicker and with less iteration. A variety of authors in the literature
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review identified horizon of visibility as playing a large role in performance. 
Intersubjectivity and horizon of visibility correspond directly to the nature of the 
complexity within a crisis environment discussed in the previous section, in that 
they directly impact the organization’s ability to meet the demands of integrating 
the knowledge of specialized subsystems in interdependent situations to 
construct and adjust cognitive representations. A research design must attempt 
to capture and detail a characterization of these contextual elements in order to 
understand their impact on control center cognitive performance.
Two additional contextual properties that obviously would be suspected of 
impacting system performance are redundancy and integratability. Redundancy 
in communications, information storage, computational ability, visual 
representations, observations, and in other subsystems is cited by numerous 
authors as increasing a system’s ability to detect errors and calibrate responses 
(Hutchins 1994, 1996, Decortis et al 2000, Fields et al 1999, Tamuz 2000). 
Similarly, subsystems must accept, process, and produce representations in 
such a manner that they can be used and understood by other subsystems and 
players. Integrateability or flexibility is key if representations are to propagate 
accurately across subsystems and must be designed into distributed cognition 
systems (Hutchins 1994, 1996, Fields et al 1999). These characterizations 
similarly directly impact the ability of control centers to respond to complex 
environments demanding the integration of specialized knowledge bases to 
support successful response.
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These general contextual characterizations of control center cognition will 
be integrated directly into the actual structural definition of the process in the 
following section.
DC5 Development: Structural Definition
The purpose of this portion of the methodology is to use the VSM in 
conjunction with the knowledge gained in the literature review, to develop a 
theoretical, conceptual framework of the distributed cognition phenomena 
occurring within crisis control centers. Again, the major motivations for using the 
VSM are 1) to provide a more rigorous description of the structure of the 
phenomena specific to the setting of control centers than present frameworks 
and 2) to provide a means of identifying relationships between a crisis 
environment and the developed structural framework. Figure 3.4, DC5 
Theoretical Framework, attempts to capture 1) the existing proposed structures 
discussed in the literature review within a VSM framework, 2) contextual 
elements influencing distributed cognition processes, and 3) the relationship of 
environmental complexity to the cognition structure.
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Figure 3.4: DC5 Theoretical Framework
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Discussion of Internal DC5 Structure
System 1: Autonomous Units
System 1 in the internal structure of the DC5 structure is composed of the 
individual autonomous sub-systems making up the control center’s distributed 
cognition system. Such systems would include the personnel and systems 
responsible for receiving inputs from the outside environment and transmitting 
that information around the control center accordingly, the experts representing a 
variety of specialized knowledge bases, and sub-system artifacts responsible for 
storing, retrieving, and presenting data and representation. While each of these 
units has its own specialized purpose, the general base level functions of 
observing, storing, presenting, retrieving, and transmitting information as 
discussed in the literature review occur here (Boyd from Coram, 2002; Argyris 
and Schon, 1996; Ocasio, 2000; Crossan et al. 1995). The autonomous units 
are controlled and monitored by System 3 to regulate performance.
System 2: Coordination
System 2 plays a very important role in the DC5 framework. As a key 
characterization of the crisis environment is the integration of dependent 
specialized knowledge bases to construct and maintain representations leading 
to continued successful responses, coordination of such expertises is vital. This 
function of the system is controlled by System 3 when it instructs specialized 
subsystems to work together to generate knowledge. Close coordination is key
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
115
in these respects to ensure that the entire system does not oscillate back and 
forth as cycles through the process of learning lead to actions and subsequent 
reactions based on serial uncoordinated knowledge creation, decision, and 
action (Carlisle, 2003). Boyd’s (in Coram, 2002) constructs of feed forward 
expectations and implicit guidance represent the systems instruction to its 
autonomous units of what to expect from a set of actions based on the present 
representation of the outside environment. On a simplistic level an example of 
coordination in an aircraft cockpit would be a pilot discussing a loss of power with 
a first officer monitoring instruments indicating loss of fuel pressure to an engine. 
Working together they are able to create a picture of the trouble with the aircraft.
System 3: Control and System 3*: Monitoring
The control system within the DC5 framework corresponds to 1) the 
continuous operational control of the center itself as well as 2) basic single loop 
(Argyris and Schon, 1996) or experiential learning. The basic control functions 
of monitoring and auditing subsystem performance are the same as in other 
systems not specific to distributed cognition; additionally, the control function in 
this respect takes care of basic planning, equipping, and training as well as 
implementing actions based on representations, decisions, and policies flowing 
from the remainder of the system. Crossan’s (1995) “institutionalization” of 
learning is the ground responsibility of the control function. Base level learning, 
what Argyris and Schon (1996) describe as single loop learning and Dhar (2000) 
describes as experiential learning are placed here because they generally are
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composed of the system acting on a given representation that is not being 
adjusted or is not perceived to need to be adjusted; the system is reacting based 
on its internal picture of the outside environment, gaining experience, but not 
having to adjust its perspective.
System 4: Intelligence
While System 2, Coordination, is responsible for ensuring the right 
specialized sub-systems are brought together and work in concert to develop and 
adjust representations, the actual act of creating new knowledge is structural 
function of Intelligence. This is where observed information, converted from data 
by autonomous units, is brought together and oriented (Boyd in Coram 2002), 
compared to existing representations (Argyris and Schon, 1996), interpreted 
(Dhar, 2000), information converted into knowledge (Ackoff, 1989), and 
representations selected or enacted (Ocasio, 2000; Weick, 1979).
Similarly expectations of response acts are developed based on 
constructed representations (Argyris and Schon, 1996). These are compared 
with information flowing back to the control center after responses have been 
implemented and representations iteratively adjusted accordingly. The natural 
tension Beer (1984) describes between the Control system and Intelligence 
System is reflective of 1) March’s (2000) suggested balance a learning system 
must maintain between exploitation and more exploration and Argyris and 
Schon’s (1996) comparison between observations and expectations. Double loop 
learning occurs when the tension between these systems reveals a gap in the
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implemented responses and the forecasted expectations and subsequently 
representations are adjusted accordingly.
A couple notes revisiting the process of system of interest specification 
and definition are necessary here. First, it can be pointed out that the VSM 
intelligence function of a control center could be thought of from two 
perspectives. One being the functional act of creating knowledge from incoming 
information as discussed here and the other being that this functional subsystem 
represents the collective intelligence of the control center itself as it tries to 
forecast and plan only for the control center’s continuing operations in the outside 
environment, rather than that of assembling and adjusting representations and 
plans of action for the outside organization as a whole. The literature on this 
work implicitly assumes that such a function of creating knowledge and courses 
of action is part of cognition. Thus for purposes of this work this intelligence 
function within the DC5 framework will be assumed to cover both functions: 1) 
the primary job of creating knowledge for actionable response for the outside 
organization as well as 2) the additional job of focusing on the future job of the 
distributed cognition system of the control center itself. As will be seen in the 
discussion of System 5, an analogous issue with specification and definition also 
exists.
A second issue of fine specification and definition must be discussed with 
regard to the difference between coordination and intelligence as it applies 
specifically to a distributed cognition system. As was seen in the literature review 
a key aspect of distributed cognition systems is that they require the integration
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of diverse specialized expert knowledge bases in order to create knowledge from 
the information flowing into the system; i.e. it may easy to blur the actual creation 
of knowledge across both Systems 2 and 4. For purposes of this work 
coordination will be viewed as the work of bringing the right expert subsystems 
together at the right time given a set of inflowing data and the actual creation of 
knowledge or representations once those expert subsystems are together is the 
act of intelligence.
System 5: Identity
The identity of the DC5 system is bound up in its intended purpose to 
facilitate distributed cognition for the organization. Closely tied to this identity is 
the overall purpose of the organization (i.e. putting out fires for the fire 
department alarm room or successfully flying the aircraft for an aircraft cockpit). 
Some mention here should be made of system thinking with regards to system 
purpose, which can be thought of as irrelevant to intended purpose. Expressed 
simply a system’s purpose “is what it does” (Beer, 1979); the system can only 
accomplish what its structure allows it to accomplish; to the extent the structure is 
inadequate the system for the environment in which it functions the system will 
not accomplish its intended purpose. System 5 is where the heart of learning 
takes place when broad strategic decisions (Boyd in Coram, 2002; Argyris and 
Schon, 1996) based on constructed representations are made. In addition to 
occurring at the ground level within System 3, Crossan’s (1995) institutionalizing 
of representations begins at this policy level. This function also monitors the
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natural tension between Systems 3 and 4 ensuring, providing guidance, and 
breaking ties between demands for more exploration and more action.
As was discussed with regard to System 4, System 5 also recursive set of 
perspectives to address. The identity of the distributed cognition system of a 
control center may be viewed as referring to the identity, policy level, or senior 
leadership of the outside organization the control center supports as well as the 
identity of the control center itself. Again, using the dominant paradigm 
developed in the literature review, this work will take the primary function of 
System 5 to be the central identity of the outside organization the control center 
is supporting while recognizing that secondarily it also represents that of the 
control center itself. As was discussed in the literature review crisis 
environments tend to directly impact the heart of an organization driving these 
functions into convergence as crisis intensity increases.
Discussion of Interactions between the Crisis Environment and the Internal 
DC5 Framework
The purpose of using the VSM to capture the structure of distributed 
cognition processes in control centers was to be able to identify and systemically 
understand how various characteristics of a crisis environment structurally impact 
those processes. Table 3.1 and the following discussion detail the 
interrelationships identified in the DC5 framework.
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Table 3.1: Crisis Environment Effects on DC5 Subsystem Performance
S1. Autonomous 
Units
S2. Coordination S3. Control S3*. Monitoring S4. Intelligence S5. Identity Context
Real Crisis 
Pressure 
(Potential for 
adverse 
organization 
outcomes + 
inducement 
of stress)
- System self-doubt 
might increase
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-Focus changes
-  Differences 
amplified
-  Acquiesce to 
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consensus
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provide more 
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process more 
information
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handling 
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right
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goes to the 
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so balance is less 
routine
- Increase focus/ pressure 
may cause H O V to be 
ignored
- Increase pressure on 
individual systems may 
cause loss of IS with other 
systems
- Staff competence directly 
impacted
- Leadership directly 
impacted
Complexity: 
Demand For 
High Levels 
Of
Specialized
Expertise
- Ability to correctly 
inquire about data 
increasingly 
challenged
- Possible 
increased 
demand between 
systems
- Must ascertain when  
S1 has become 
overwhelmed
- Must ascertain 
when S1 is no 
longer up to 
environmental 
demands
- Ability to 
interpret data 
increasingly 
challenged
- Required to ad­
just decision 
making approach 
based on known 
lack of knowledge
- Staff competence up to 
the task
- Leadership increasing S1 
performance
Complexity: 
Demand for 
Integrated 
Expertise
- Ability to correctly 
inquire about data 
increasingly 
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- Challenged with 
knowing who 
needs to be 
involved in 
processing 
information
- Must ensure 
coordination is 
functional
- Must ascertain 
if S2 is no longer 
capable of 
meeting 
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interpret data 
increasingly 
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- Required to adjust 
decision making 
approach based on 
known lack of 
knowledge
- H O V and IS crucial
- SC and Leadership also 
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Complexity-
Novelty
Unknow-
ability
- Ability to correctly 
inquire about data 
increasingly 
challenged
- Can recognize when 
more data collection 
is fruitless
- Can recognize 
when more data 
collection is 
fruitless
- Required to adjust 
decision making 
approach based on 
known lack of 
knowledge
Complexity- 
Novelty- 
Number of 
entities
- Ability to track and 
process data 
challenged because 
of volume
- Ability to 
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ate data 
challenged 
because of 
volume
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systems becoming 
overwhelmed
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if S 1 ’s and S2 up 
to task/ 
replaceable
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interpret data 
increasingly 
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- Required to adjust 
decision making 
approach based on 
known lack of 
knowledge
- Flexibility key
- Redundancy m ay prevent 
processing errors
Complexity- 
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Pace of 
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- Ability to receive 
and process data 
challenged
- Ability to 
process data 
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- Increase demand for 
a timely plan of action
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if S1's and S2 up 
to task/ 
replaceable
- Ability to 
interpret data 
increasingly 
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- Senses need to 
act quickly
- Redundancy m ay prevent 
processing errors
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General System Wide Impact of Crisis Pressure
Two of the three portions of the crisis environment definition developed in 
the literature review have system wide effects on the framework, impacting every 
one of the structural subsystems in the framework, impacting the identity of the 
system, and impacting the general context in which the overall system operates. 
In order for an environment to fulfill the definition developed in the literature 
review for a crisis, it must have potential for negative organizational outcomes.
As human beings in the organization become aware of this potential, stress is 
induced as the gravity of the situation begins to weigh on the actions of those 
personnel. This organizational stress can lead to poor performance as task 
focus is distracted by thoughts of the negative outcomes.
Because crises have the potential for significant negative organizational 
consequences they strike at the heart, System 5, of any organizational system. 
For distributed cognition systems this can occur in three ways: the overarching 
strategies the system employs to facilitate the construction of representations 
and responses come under more pressure, the pressure to successfully manage 
the tension between Systems 3 and 4 is increased, and the actual decisions 
themselves also come under greater pressure. First, in order to comprehend the 
outside environment distributed systems are constructed to receive information 
and construct meaning. The methods used to accomplish this task represent 
strategic deployments of assets and capabilities for distributed cognition 
systems. The responsibility for successfully adapting these strategies over time 
to a dynamic crisis environment weighs heavier because of that environment
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 2 2
itself. Second, as the negativity of potential outcomes of a crisis rises, it is 
expected that System 3 will demand increasingly more accurate and timely 
updates of representations, expectations, and alternatives for implementation 
from System 4. Similarly, System 4 will demand that System 3 generate more 
data and information from the autonomous units. This tension can be expected 
to grow as the pressure of a crisis environment rises on the human beings 
functioning in such systems; System 5 bears the responsibility of managing this 
tension and balancing the need for more understanding with the need for timely, 
implementable, actionable alternatives. Third and finally, the nature of the actual 
decision-making-the decisions themselves carry more weight in terms of 
organizational outcomes.
As was discussed above, the pressure of a crisis situation impacts the 
tension between Systems 3 and 4, but it also strikes at the specific internal 
functions of all the DC5 subsystems. System 4 has the responsibility to generate 
and maintain representations that become increasingly crucial to the future 
viability of the organization and the DC5 system itself. System 3 has the 
responsibility of generating accurate and precise data and information on the 
outside environment so that System 4 can fulfill its function. System 3 also must 
ensure information is transmitted around the control room, presented, stored, and 
retrieved successfully. The impact of errors in these functions is heightened by 
the pressure of the crisis situation. System 3 also bears the responsibility for 
monitoring the performance of the human beings and sub-systems functioning in 
the crisis situation and deciding when action must be taken if performance does
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not meet standards. System 1, autonomous units, namely functional specialized 
expert human beings, will fill the pressure of the crisis as they bear the individual 
responsibility for applying their expertise to get data and information and provide 
initial alternatives. Because an inherent aspect of crisis complexity may involve 
the need for coordinated interpretation of information, System 2 will also bear the 
weight of bringing the right subsystems together to generate understanding; 
crisis pressure will impact system accordingly.
Because it strikes at the functional responsibilities of all DC5 subsystems, 
crisis pressure may be thought of as being inherently contextual. Additionally, 
however, the pressure of a crisis environment impacts some of the general 
contextual characterizations developed in the literature review. Staff competence 
and leadership play a key role in responding to the pressure of a crisis situation. 
The difference in level of performance between inexperienced, poorly trained, 
less competent, or poorly led personnel and their opposites can be expected to 
increase as the pressure of a crisis environment is increased. Error and failure 
rates can be expected to rise accordingly. System artifacts being used by such 
personnel to facilitate the control centers distributed cognition processes will 
become less useful as the personnel begin to fail.
The potential for negative outcomes and the awareness of that potential 
raise the pressure on the human beings making up a DC5 system. As such all 
subsystems of the DC5 system, the heart of the DC5 system, and some 
contextual characterizations of the DC5 system are impacted.
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The General System Wide Impact of Crisis Complexity
Similar to the potential for negative outcomes and in a general way, 
complexity can also raise the pressure on all DC5 subsystems. The knowledge 
that the relevant environment is complex, difficult, hard to predict, or unknowable 
stresses the human beings involved in attempting to understand it. As such the 
pressure for performance on all DC5 subsystems is raised. Complexity when 
broken down as in the literature review also has specific impacts on various 
individual DC5 subsystems and contextual characterizations.
The Specific Challenges of Complexity for the DC5 Framework: Integrating 
Specialized Knowledge Bases
Complex environments may demand the integration of more than one or 
perhaps several diverse specialized expert knowledge bases in order for 
actionable, accurate representations to be constructed by a distributed cognition 
system (Carlisle, 2003). This aspect of complexity impacts the subsystems of 
the DC5 framework in specific ways: coordination, System 2, becomes the key in 
developing an understanding of the environment and as actual understanding is 
pursued by coordinated work, intelligence, System 4 is impacted as meaningful 
representations are successfully or unsuccessfully formed. Complex 
environments may require diverse expertises to be both understood and 
successfully acted within. As such it becomes imperative that the right 
personnel, subsystems, and artifacts are brought together to develop 
representations and actionable alternatives. The intuition to look at initial 
information and make and educated guess about what knowledge is necessary
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to apply to the information to create understanding is a function of System 4, 
intelligence. Maintaining the specialized knowledge bases and the systems 
required to bring them together to create understanding is the province of System 
3. Once knowledge is created by coordinated expert systems, System 4 is 
fulfilling its intended system purpose.
In addition, to the DC5 subsystems impacted by the demands for 
integration of specialized knowledge bases, contextual characterizations of the 
control center play a key role in responding to such demands. The extent of the 
horizon of visibility within a distributed condition system and the degree of 
intersubjectivity amongst personnel and subsystems play a key role in 
constraining or enabling the diverse coordination of specialized knowledge 
bases. If the information flowing in, through, and out of a control center has a 
high degree of visibility to personnel and subsystems within the center, then the 
likelihood of timely coordination of knowledge assets is increased. The ability to 
monitor the chatter of other players doing their functional jobs, status boards and 
maps, slide presentations, read files and reports, and access to databases are 
examples of such visibility enablers. To the extent they are used and monitored 
they increase the likelihood of successful coordination. If personnel within a 
control center operate in hushed tones, are stationed so they do not look at each 
other or interact, do not access stored data, or have it easily presented then the 
coordinating ability is inherently constrained. Similarly, intersubjectivity is a key 
contextual enabler or constrainer in coordinating knowledge bases. To the 
extent that personnel within a control center are familiar with each other, have
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practiced their functions together as a team with little turnover and know enough 
of each other’s function and knowledge base to empathize with their portion of 
the organizational mission then the likelihood of successful coordination is 
enabled. If control centers are assembled with players who have not worked 
together before and have little knowledge or appreciation for each other’s 
specialty area then the likelihood of successful coordination is constrained.
The Specific Challenges of Complexity for the DC5 Framework: The 
Specialized Knowledge Bases Themselves
A crisis environment may challenge a distributed cognition system by 
demanding a degree, amount, or type of specialized knowledge base to which 
the existing system would be challenged to meet internally (Carlisle, 2003). As 
such autonomous units, System 1, would be pushed near or perhaps beyond 
their abilities to derive meaning from inflowing information. In such cases the 
purposeful learning, as defined by Rulke and Zaheer (2000) accomplished prior 
to crisis by the autonomous specialized expert becomes of lesser value and 
relational learning, that is knowing where information can be obtained becomes 
more important. The knowledge base of the specialized expert autonomous unit 
must be conceived to encompass such relational knowledge. As will be 
discussed in a later section, pace of events may significantly inhibit the ability to 
retrieve knowledge outside of expertise housed within the control center.
System 3 is also impacted by this potential characteristic of crisis 
complexity as it holds the responsibility for staffing personnel and maintaining 
systems housing such knowledge. A crisis environment can quickly exceed the
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ability of System 3 to perform these functions. Additionally System 4 is impacted 
because the ability to create representations is inhibited by the constraints of the 
lack of expertise of the autonomous units. Finally in terms of contextual 
interrelationships, staff competence captures the degree of ability of the 
autonomous units to do their job. Crisis demands for specialized knowledge 
impact distributed cognition systems directly and simply because they demand, 
or can create requirements for, knowledge that does not exist within the 
distributed cognition system or is beyond the ability of the system to provide.
The Specific Challenges of Complexity for the DC5 Framework: Novelty
Carlisle (2003) develops three aspects of the novelty of complexity, 
separate from the two aspects of complexity and their relationships to the DC5 
structure already discussed, which challenge organizational learning: the 
unknowability of complex environments, the number of entities involved in 
complex environments, and the pace of events. These aspects are novel in that 
they represent changes from the norm for which the organization is postured. To 
some extent the organizations DC5 systems can be postured for increased 
degrees of novelty in these areas but these too can be exceeded.
Distinct from the sheer requirement for a greater extent of specialized 
knowledge than a DC5 system can provide, is the unknowability of a complex 
environment. Unknowability refers to the idea that the environment may simply 
be unpredictable or even if the relational knowledge sourced could be reached in 
a timely manner to raise knowledge levels, the effort would still be fruitless. As
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such, unknowability impacts the autonomous specialized expert within a 
distributed cognition system because he may be rendered helpless to develop 
representations and work with others. Coordination is limited to the extent 
unknowable aspects of a problem cannot be used to help augment knowable 
aspects into actionable representations, thus Intelligence, System 4’s ability to 
create representations, is impacted. In unpredictable environments System 4 is 
unable to provide System 3 with alternatives or future expectations. System 5 
must posture itself for the fact that such environments do exist and seek to 
develop strategies of action, and representation construction that allow the 
unknowable portions of problems to be isolated so that action alternatives can be 
developed leveraging the knowable portion of the environment and hedging the 
unknowable portion.
The contextual descriptors that interplay with unknowability are the 
flexibility of the subsystems within the distributed cognition system and the staff 
competence and leadership of the personnel in the control center. To the extent 
that the subsystems and personnel composing a control center can handle new, 
unforeseen environments, deal with the fact that portions of the problem will be 
unknowable, and isolate them accordingly, then cognitive performance can still 
be increased in the face of the tremendous challenges of unknowable 
complexity.
Autonomous specialized expert units individually or in coordination with 
each other may have it within their knowledge base to construct an actionable 
representation of an environment and generate alternative response; however,
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the sheer number of entities or scale of the problem may exceed their ability to 
process the information and produce required products. The scale of incoming 
information may lead to errors in the basic control functions of receiving, 
transmitting, storing, retrieving, tracking, and presenting information. As 
autonomous units become overwhelmed in the deluge of information the ability to 
monitor all their actions and performance may also be impaired. Contextually, 
the horizon of visibility subsystems have on the information flow through the 
control system may become cluttered with the abundance of information. Also in 
a contextual sense, redundant systems for tracking, storing, and retrieving 
information may serve to help catch and reduce errors caused by the scale of 
inflowing information.
In a similar way to the scale of complexity in terms of the number of 
entities that must be understood in order to develop accurate actionable 
representations, the pace of events can also overwhelm the subsystems of the 
DC5 framework. Autonomous units, coordination of those units, control of 
operations, and the ability to generate representations rising from these 
foundations may well be within the capability of a distributed cognition system in 
developing an understanding of a single event. If, however, the pace of events 
begins to increase, autonomous units can be overwhelmed, availability for 
coordinated work will not be timely and system stability will be compromised, 
representations will not be timely, and System 3 will be demanding better 
understanding and forecasts and not getting them, raising the tension between
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System 3 and System 4. System 5 will be forced to impose strategic limits to 
what they system can adequately handle and performance will be degraded.
Contextually, staff competence, leadership, horizon of visibility and 
intersubjectivity can all be harnessed to enable faster processing of inflowing 
information. Additionally, redundant systems can reduce errors or mitigate their 
impact.
Criticism of Viable System Model and Its Use in this Context
As Beer’s Viable System Model serves is key to the framework central to 
this research, scholarly criticism of the VSM must be reviewed and discussed in 
terms of its practical impacts in this context. The criticism reviewed by the 
researcher seems to coalesce around three main themes: 1) a supposed, 
hierarchical rigidity implicit to the VSM, 2) a supposed implicit assumption in the 
VSM of unity of effort, particularly in the area of information flows, amongst the 
individuals bounded within a system of interest, and 3) it is difficult for some 
practitioners to understand and apply. These topic areas will be discussed first, 
in terms of the substance of the criticism, and second, in terms of the practical 
implication it has on this research context. Additionally, some of Beer’s 
consistent themes present in his development of the VSM are less prevalent in 
use in this work; this lack of complete intersection must also be delineated. 
Specifically, these themes include, 4) Beer’s focus on recursion as central to his 
perception of systemic functional structure, and 5) Beer’s description of 
environmental interaction with system structure. These themes will be presented
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and complemented with a discussion of how they are subsumed within in the 
DC5 framework.
The first major theme of criticism of the VSM noted by the researcher is 
the notion that model implies a hierarchy amongst its functional components, i.e. 
the autonomous sub-units, S1, are controlled by S3, led by S4 by being provided 
with intelligence and environmental expectations, and in turn S3 and S4 and the 
tension between the two are managed by S5 the identity of the organization most 
likely embodied by its senior leadership (Jackson, 1986; McEwan, 2001). As a 
result, some organizations, that may exist without any explicit or implicit hierarchy 
established, may prove difficult for applying VSM to as a tool (Andersson, 1998).
Beer’s response to such criticism would be two fold. Superficially, Beer 
would argue that over the longer-term time all systems develop some form of 
hierarchy driven by the need for concentration of responsibility (Beer, 1984).
More deeply though, this criticism may represent a misunderstanding in applying 
the VSM to an organization as practitioners may simply try to fit VSM functional 
components to hierarchical organizational charts. This is not Beer’s intention 
(Beer, 1984; Espejo, 1996; Keating 2002). Beer would point out that over the 
long term organizations develop an identity and institute policies to govern their 
actions. They also necessarily must control and coordinate their processes in 
order to exist or be viable in the outside environment. Any individual or sub­
grouping in an organization may serve as an autonomous unit, a controlling unit, 
a coordinating unit, may develop environmental intelligence, a my draft or 
implement policy. The key is in understanding that the VSM is a structural
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breakdown of the functions of a system, not necessarily a guide for organizing a 
particular system.
For purposes of this work the criticism does not apply on the superficial 
basis because the system being observed has been established, it has matured, 
and it exists within the hierarchical context of a military control room; i.e. the 
system of interest is hierarchical in nature so such critics could not argue that the 
VSM would not be applicable. On the deeper level, in developing and applying a 
framework for observing, describing, and critiquing control center performance it 
is understood such actions must be interpreted on functional system basis and 
not necessarily on a charted organizational basis.
The second major noted area of criticism stems from the notion that 
because the VSM is derived from set theory and intended to specify the 
functional structure of any system occurring in nature, biological, machine, 
organizational, etc. that it implicitly assumes that all functional sub-elements work 
in unity toward system goals (Checkland, 1980; McEwan, 2001). As a result, the 
fact that individuals may act in their own self-interest, disrupting processes and 
information flows, rather than in the interests of the system, is difficult to 
contemplate using VSM constructs. Beer would argue that his ‘S3’ control 
function implicitly acknowledges incorrect sub-element action outside of system 
interest and works to counter it and would further counter that even within 
biological systems, sub-structures require regulation; tired muscles screaming for 
rest are still used to accomplish an athlete’s goals and cancerous cells may be 
attacked by immunity systems. Implicit in Beer’s Viable System Model is the
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coercive power of systems over sub-elements to act with system interests in 
mind. In the crisis control center setting being researched in this work, the 
example of stressed personnel acting to relieve their own stress rather than 
focusing on mission requirements springs readily to mind. This criticism provides 
a deeper understanding for the VSM practitioner who must understand the idea 
of diverse motivations, account for them, identify them, and attempt to explain 
them through the control systems of the VSM. Any framework and methodology 
built on VSM must be cognizant of such potential.
The third major area of criticism of the VSM reviewed in the literature 
focuses on its difficult nature to comprehend and understand. Such critics point 
out that Beer’s use of set theory, cybernetics language, and systems knowledge 
make it difficult to understand and apply (Checkland, 1980, 1981; Andersson, 
1998; Malik, 2002; Keating 2002). One must first understand systemic ideas of 
recursiveness, minimum critical specification, variety, requisite variety, and 
holism, homeostasis, and complexity to understand VSM and, as discussed 
above, the practitioner must be careful to avoid the pitfall of overlaying the VSM 
onto the organizational chart.
In the researcher’s view this is a valid criticism of the VSM. For the 
immediate purposes of this work it does not present a problem, as the researcher 
is thoroughly familiar with both Beer’s work and its critics. For longer term 
however if the proposed DC5 framework is to serve as a basis for developing 
organizational wide approaches to assessment and design then individuals in
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those organizations will need to be educated accordingly. Without such 
knowledge the benefits of using DC5 would be limited.
Beer (1984) points out that in addition to considering interactions between 
the system in focus and the exterior environment, the VSM practitioner should 
also consider that viable systems are inherently recursive; that is, they reside 
within larger viable systems and are composed of smaller viable systems. Beer 
suggests that the practitioner must consider and comprehend the setting of the 
viable system of interest by understanding where it resides within, at least, one 
level of recursion greater than itself and one level of recursion less than itself, in 
other words, the viable systems of which it is composed. In the case of the 
system of interest of this work, the Air Force control center, this viable system 
resides within the larger Air Force unit being observed, an Air Force Wing 
survival recovery center functioning within the larger context of the entire Wing. 
The survival recovery center primarily exists to control the defensive, ground- 
response operations of the wing and to lesser extent to facilitate coordination 
between outside wing functions, to monitor performance of those functions, and 
in some cases to house and express the identity of the wing as contained in its 
senior leadership. Similarly, going down one layer of recursion, the center is 
composed of the individual humans staffing the center, each his or her own 
viable system interacting with the same environment. Also the center is 
composed of sets of individuals and artifacts serving functional purposes, for 
example the processing of casualties by communications systems, medical 
systems, and personnel systems. In term of distributed cognition, the cognitive
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functions of each of these bounded systems, the Air Force Wing, the human 
individuals in the control center, and the sub-functions of the control center are 
also recursively in play processing incoming information and being impacted by 
crisis elements at their own respective levels. This recursion described here is 
not made explicit in the diagrams and tables specifying the DC5 development 
that follows, as they are limited to the system level of interest, but the researcher 
tacitly acknowledges there existence.
Beer (1984) also develops the connections between the outside 
environment and the operational, non-management structure of a viable system. 
Specifically, he highlights the fact, that viable systems are structured for the 
management of complexity within an external environment. Beers measure of 
such complexity is the systems concept of variety. Systems deal with the level 
of variety in their environments by managing it in relation to their own internal 
capability’s limits to manage variety. If they do not have the requisite variety 
internally to interpret data streams flowing from the environment they are forced 
to attenuate the inflowing information into something more manageable. If the 
inflowing information they are being provided is not specific enough for an 
acceptable level of regulated response then viable systems attempt to amplify 
the existing variety and obtain greater detail. In the development that follows the 
DC5 tacitly captures these notions by characterizing the level of complexity in the 
crisis environment. In terms of information that must be processed and turned 
into usable knowledge through distributed cognition such ideas are captured by 
characterizing the crisis environment by its pace of events, scale of events,
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unknowability, demand for high degrees of specialized expertise, and demand for 
high degrees of integrated expertise. This research is limited by its attempt to 
broadly conceptualize and frame distributed cognition phenomena as a whole; 
further study into the specifics by which control centers amplify and attenuate 
incoming information, based upon this work, could be promising for future 
research.
Finally Table 3.2, Incorporation of Viable System Model Themes, is a 
listing of these and other themes from Beer’s Viable System Model as 
condensed from his Diagnosing the System for Organizations (1984) coupled 
with a description of the extent to which the particular theme is reflected in the 
DC5 framework just developed. The Table is reflective of the detail in the Viable 
System Model as well as the initial broad generalness of the DC5 framework. 
Future research could build upon this work to further refine and deepen the DC5 
framework.
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Table 3.2: Incorporation o : Viable System Model Themes
Viable System Model 
Theme (as presented by 
Beer, 1984)
Status of Incorporation In DC5 Framework
Recursion Captured in discussion above one level of recursion 
above and below the system of interest: the control 
center. Not made explicit in DC5 figures and 
Tables.
Self Reference Implicitly captured in discussion of system wide 
impacts of general crisis pressure and stress. 
Not explicitly used in DC5 figures and Tables.
Homeostasis- internal 
system stability
Implicitly captured in describing the internal tension 
between S4 (DC5 System Intelligence) and S3 (DC5 
System Control). Not explicitly used in DC5 figures 
and Tables.
Invariance Not used/referenced in DC5 Framework.
Environment, Requisite 
Variety, Attenuation, and 
Amplification
Captured in discussion above. Tacitly recognized in 
characterizing complexity in the crisis environment. 
Not directly used in DC5 Figures and Tables.
Channel Capacity Implicitly captured in discussion of horizon of 
visibility, and characterization of complexity.
Transducer Not used/referenced in DC5 Framework.
Oscillation Captured in discussion of DC5 Framework System 2
Comparator Not used/referenced in DC5 framework
Feedback Captured throughout discussion of DC5 framework
Convergence Not captured as defined/developed by Beer in the 
DC5 framework
Autonomous Subsystems Captured in the S1 systems of the DC5 framework
Algedonic Responses Captured in discussion of DC5 framework above
Coordination Subsystems Captured in the S2 systems of the DC5 framework
Metasystems Captured in discussion of recursion above
Control Subsystems Captured in the S3 systems of the DC5 framework
Monitoring/Audit
Subsystems
Captured in the S3* systems of the DC5 framework
Cohesion Implicitly captured in discussion of recursion above 
and in discussion of general crisis pressure/stress in 
the DC5 framework
Intelligence Captured in the S4 systems of the DC5 framework
Identity Captured in the S5 systems of the DC5 framework
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In Summary: Usefulness of the DC5 Theoretical Framework:
Understanding Capability and Performance
The DC5 framework will be useful because it synthesizes the constructs of 
other authors covered in the literature review capturing the structure of a 
distributed cognition system, the structure provides a means to trace the impacts 
of crisis environments to their effects on distributed cognition systems, it captures 
contextual enablers and constraints inherent in any control room, and most 
importantly it provides a systemic means of theoretically framing the problem. If 
the validity of the framework can be established through study of distributed 
cognition in actual real-world control centers functioning in crisis environments, 
then the framework can serve as a foundational doctrine that (1) could aid in the 
implementation of new strategies, designs, methodologies, and technologies in 
crisis control centers for complex, technically oriented organizations, (2) could 
improve the systemic design of and confidence in the assessment of 
mechanisms and subsystems designed to facilitate distributed cognition within 
organizations, (3) could improve the general understanding of how distributed 
cognition takes place within organizational control centers, and (4) could lead to 
a better understanding of the systemic effects crisis conditions have on the 
structures within control centers designed to facilitate distributed cognition. 
Additionally, (5) the framework could also be transferable to distributed cognition 
systems, other than those of control centers, functioning in crisis environments.
In order to validate the framework it is proposed that a control center 
described in the literature review be analyzed in context as it functions in a crisis 
environment, a formal air force exercise or inspection, using exploratory case
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study techniques. In order to fit within the scope of this work, the research 
design and validation effort will focus on an open case study exploration of a 
control center functioning in three of a specific Air Force Wing’s operational 
readiness exercises as it prepares specifically for a formal outside operational 
readiness inspection. During the initial exercise the focus of the case study will 
be on using the developed DC5 framework 1) to generally understand the 
distributed cognition phenomena occurring in a control center to see if does 
indeed provide a useable basis for framing issues and 2) to develop a distributed 
cognition system fitness assessment. This assessment will be a detailed 
descriptive characterization of the strengths and weaknesses of the control 
center’s distributed cognition using the DC5 framework. One of the challenges 
facing an Air Force Wing preparing itself for a formal operational readiness 
inspection is to develop scripted scenarios within its preparatory operational 
readiness exercises that will prepare the various wing organizations to perform at 
a high level during the inspection. The usefulness and validity of the DC5 
framework could be shown if the assessment method described above could 
then in turn be used to develop specific crisis environments within scripted 
scenarios designed to suitably stress a control center’s distributed cognition 
system in order to train the individuals and involved subsystems for better 
performance. The focus of two remaining AF Wing operational readiness 
exercises will be just that; the deployment of scripted scenarios based on the 
initial fitness assessment designed to stress and subsequently train the system 
and improve system performance.
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The analogy of a college freshman athlete and a track coach helps explain 
this second approach which also informs a greater understanding of the 
framework itself. The coach will typically run his or her new athlete through a 
battery of tests or trial runs to gain an initial measure or characterization of 
various attributes of the runner. In the world of track athletes, such attributes 
may include useable oxygen intake, the ability to process and dispose of lactic 
acid in the athlete’s muscles, the athlete’s heart rate, the athlete’s stride 
characteristics, and the athlete’s body structure and composition. The coach’s 
job is then to design and implement a training regime to suitably stress these 
various areas so that improvements can be gained. Certain types of running, 
training approaches, and even diets induce certain physiological improvements.
A key constraint on coaches is that there is only so much time or mileage that 
runner can actually accomplish before injury or burn out. Thus the coach must 
optimize the training regimen for a specific upcoming race or track meet. The 
athlete’s performance is a reflection of the coach’s training regimen and even the 
underlying theory used to design it.
Stepping aside from the coach and athlete analogy to put this concept in 
more rigorous academic terms, the DC5 framework could be used by an 
observer to characterize a given crisis scenario as it impacts a distributed 
cognition system. Let [CE], full of descriptions and characterization of the 
various aspects of the scenario based on the crisis environment specification 
detailed in the DC5 framework represent the framework’s formal capture of a 
given scenario. Let (DC5F), full of descriptions and characterizations of the
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various structural subsystems detailed in the DC5 framework represent the 
framework’s formal capture of the capability or fitness level of a given control 
center.
The DC5 framework implies that given specific knowledge about a crisis 
environment and given specific knowledge about a distributed cognition system’s 
fitness [DC5F], predictions can be made as to the systems performance, i.e.
[P] = [CE][DC5F]
If a measure of system performance, [P] can be gained objectively as 
possible, then an initial measure or characterization of DC5 fitness can be 
obtained, i.e.
[P]/[CE] = [DC5F]
This initial assessment can the in turn be used to design scenarios, i.e. 
[CEj’s, to further train the distributed cognition system for other crisis 
environments it will face.
Returning to the real world, the challenge, to assert that the DC5 
framework is useful and has validity, then becomes one of finding a suitable 
means of measuring, capturing, describing, or characterizing system 
performance or [P], Returning to the analogy of the track athlete this 
performance is captured in a raw form in his or her elapsed time in an event.
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The corresponding raw measure of a control center’s performance is the rating 
assigned by evaluating expert judges using long-established criteria. This 
further discussion and development of this research approach further informs the 
development of the DC5 framework. Figure 3.5, DC5 Theoretical Framework 
Adjusted to Capture Fitness Capability and Performance, captures this further 
refinement of the framework.
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Figure 3.5: DC5 Theoretical Framework Adjusted to Capture Fitness Capability and Performance
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Second, addressing the idea of the uncertainty principle -  that is 
measuring or assessing any system necessarily also alters the system to some 
degree; for example, control center systems or members may change their 
approach if they know they are being measured for such purposes. Also using a 
crisis scenario as an initial means to capture [DC5F] necessarily trains the 
system itself, positively or negatively for subsequent scenarios. Third, a training 
regime is constrained by the amount of scenarios a control center can suitably 
work through given the constraints of an individual operational readiness 
exercise itself as well as the limited number or scheduling of exercises a wing 
may conduct before a formal inspection. Fourth, the idealistic, mathematical 
conception of,
[P] = [CE][DC5F]
described above and the analogy of the objective measures a track coach may 
use, i.e. timed events, heart rate, lung capacity, are not realizeable in the 
complex world of characterizing environments, distributed cognition system 
fitness, and performance. Thus the researcher is inherently limited to 
qualitatively attempting to reach such characterizations or assessments. As such 
qualitative techniques, specifically those of the case study are best suited to such 
efforts.
The first three of these challenges will be addressed in Chapter IV, 
research design. The fourth, using qualitative, exploratory, case study
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techniques is central to the soundness of this research thus a formal review of 
such methodologies is undertaken next.
Case Study Research
Due to the initial development of the DC5 theoretical framework in the 
preceding section as well as its specific focus on both control centers and crisis 
environments, any investigation into its validity is necessarily initial and 
exploratory. Yin (1994) suggests case study methodologies are ideally suited for 
such problems. Before proceeding with the development of an actual case study 
research design, the actual capabilities and weaknesses of such an approach 
must be weighed. To inform the process of the actual case study research 
design to follow in Chapter IV, first a general critique of such methodologies is 
undertaken; second, because case data is expected to be both quantitative and 
qualitative in nature the inherent challenges in using differing means of 
measurement is discussed; third, the limitations of sample space on using 
inferential statistics in the proposed research design are discussed; and fourth, 
potential criticisms associated with researcher closeness to cases researched, a 
potential are of bias for this research, are discussed.
A Critique of Case Study Research
Within the study of organizational behavior, case study is just one of many 
general methods for accomplishing research. Surveys, histories, grounded 
theory, simulation, and controlled experimentation are other approaches. When
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selecting a general approach as a research basis for subsequent development 
into a methodology, researchers 1) must determine which approach is best 
suited to the subject matter being investigated and 2) must develop a thorough, 
sophisticated, scholarly understanding of that approach in order to ensure the 
soundness of the research. The goal of this section is to present just such a 
scholarly critique of case study research which can then eventually be used to 1) 
defend its selection as a research approach for certain topics as well as to 2) 
establish it as a basis for developing a specific detailed, methodological research 
design.
To meet this goal, (1) the philosophical and “canons of science” 
underpinnings of case study research are presented followed by a (2) description 
of the types of research inquiries it is best suited too as well as those to which it 
is not. This description is then amplified by (3) pointing out the important 
distinctions between case study research and other research designs 
accompanied by a (4) detailing of the strengths weaknesses, assumptions, and 
limitations of case study research. (5) The scholarly criticisms most prevalent in 
literature and most likely to be encountered by case study researchers are then 
detailed. (6) These criticisms are then traced into four goals relating to the 
nature of validity and reliability specific to case study design and strategies and 
safeguards for addressing these design goals are discussed.
The Philosophical and Scientific Foundations for Case Study Research
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The variety of methodologies available to the researcher focusing on a 
particular topic or set of research questions can be divided into two primary 
categorizations: quantitative approaches and qualitative approaches (Creswell, 
1994; Yin, 2003). The dichotomy that exists between these typologies is driven 
by the underlying paradigm or operational worldview of the researcher with 
regard to his or her topic (Patton, 1991; Creswell, 1994). These paradigms 
spring from general philosophical perspectives the researcher holds of the topic 
area that can be characterized by the basic ontological, epistemological, and 
methodological assumptions made by the researcher (Guba, 1990). As a basis 
for critiquing case study research, generally a qualitative approach to research 
although it may also contain quantitative elements, its ontological and 
epistemological underpinnings should be contrasted with those of strictly 
quantitative approaches. Additionally, the methodological means by which case 
study research approaches and addresses accepted canons of scientific inquiry 
must also be understood.
Ontology is concerned with the question of what is the nature of what 
exists (Guba, 1990; Patton, 1991; Potter, 1996). The quantitative approaches 
dominant in the natural sciences assume that the fundamental reality of the world 
consists of physical objects and processes that exist independent of the 
observer. Also referred to as positivism, this view when applied to the study of 
human behavior holds that social facts exist in an “objective reality apart from the 
beliefs of individual persons” (Patton, 1991, pp 390); natural and human 
processes and outcomes can be reduced and traced to physical, causal
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antecedents in a Newtonian fashion. Alternatively, qualitative approaches rest 
on the ontological view that the world exists within the mental conceptions of 
individuals and groups (Patton, 1991; Potter, 1996; Bonoma, 1985). This 
assumption focuses the qualitative researcher on determining what is that people 
believe and the constructs they apply in their world.
Epistemology is concerned with the question of how do we know what is 
that we know or how do we arrive at conclusions about our world (Guba, 1990; 
Patton, 1991; Potter, 1996). For those with a positivistic view of the world, 
quantitative research approaches ensure that the researcher maintains 
objectivity and does not interfere with that which is being studied. Theories are 
developed and compared to observable facts, which are assumed to exist 
independently, and scientific knowledge is created. Epistemologically, qualitative 
approaches assume a constructionist view of nature in which meaning is 
developed by viewing what is “presented and...worked by [the observer] into a 
re-presentation” (Baldano, 1955 as quoted in Patton, 1991). As a result 
qualitative researchers select and develop methodologies suited 1) to describing 
the processes and constructs people use to create meaning in their world as well 
as 2) to allowing the researchers to actively interpret the world for themselves.
A few caveats and comments are in order on these philosophical 
underpinnings of the research methodology selection and development process. 
First, the importance to the researcher of understanding the ontological and 
epistemological bases of paradigms is that it ensures logical consistency is 
maintained throughout their work and places logical limits on the conclusions that
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can be postulated (Guba, 1990). Case study researchers must acknowledge the 
subjectivity of the work and the fact that it is limited to the interpretations and 
mental representations of the humans involved in the research. They must 
develop their methodologies accordingly to ensure that such limits are 
acknowledged and addressed. Second, these paradigms of the world are 
presented here as dichotomously for purpose of explanation. In reality a 
spectrum of worldviews exists between the two extremes (Potter, 1996; Guba 
1990). The case study researcher finds himself more on the relativistic and 
constructionist side of these philosophical continuums, but acknowledges the 
need to minimize subjectivity springing from the more positivistic assumptions.
Third, what drives case study researchers to the paradigm of qualitative 
research are assumptions about human behavior. Where natural scientists may 
view nature as separate and reducible and can maintain objectivity, social 
scientists assume that humans are inherently complex; their actions and 
thoughts are describable but not mechanistically reducible to basic physical laws 
and causes; their actions can only be understood through the lenses of other 
humans (Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv, and Sanders, 1990). Thus, qualitative 
methods may be more suited to developing an understanding of certain human 
behavioral phenomena.
In order for qualitative research, in general, to be methodologically sound 
it must ensure that the basic canons of scientific investigation are addressed. 
The traditional canons of science include the concepts of significance, theory- 
observation compatibility, generalizability, consistency, reproducibility, precision,
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and verification (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Douglas, 
2004). Significance and theory observation compatibility are applicable to all 
kinds of research; the research must not merely restate what is obvious to 
everyone and what is proposed as theory must correlate to what is observed 
(Weick, 1974).
The remaining canons listed above have become operationalized within 
the natural sciences into the terms internal validity, external validity, reliability, 
and objectivity. Because these traditional terms evolved from the positivist view, 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) have suggested analogous constructs, expounded 
upon by others (Douglas, 2004; Marshall and Rossman, 1995), specifically to 
guide qualitative research. 1) Analogous to internal validity, the validity of 
inferences about the relationship of dependent variables to independent 
variables, is credibility, the accurate inferring of relationships within the collected 
case data. 2) Analogous to external validity, the generalizability of the research 
propositions to other settings and contexts, is transferability, the applicability of 
the research to similar contexts; Stake (1978) refers to the similar concept of 
natural generalization and Patton (1991) uses the term extrapolation. Because 
the qualitative researcher’s paradigm of human behavior is not positivistic, it 
assumes context to be of significant importance in developing an understanding 
of human behavior, thus the generalizability to other contexts sought after in the 
natural science is implicitly limited for social science researchers (Yin, 2003; 
Douglas, 2004). 3) Analogous to reliability, the assurance that if done in the 
same way and manner multiple repetitions will lead to the same results, is
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dependability, the taking into account and detailing of the dynamic conditions 
inherent to each human situation under study. 4) Lastly, analogous to objectivity, 
the researcher’s goal to remain separate and not influence what is being studied, 
is confirmability, the idea that another researcher reviewing his data would agree 
that it was arrived at as proposed. Because the qualitative researcher frontally 
acknowledges his own human limitations in interacting with his subject matter, 
objectivity, in the positivist sense is not realizable. Rather, the method such a 
researcher uses to collect data through interaction if adequately described should 
be auditable by others.
Because assumptions about human behavior drive a qualitative 
researcher to a different philosophical paradigm than a natural scientist to his 
research interest, the methodologies each chooses to accomplish their research 
must be inherently different. Logical consistency lies at the base of sound 
research; a thorough understanding of the ontological and epistemological bases 
for a methodology allows a researcher to understand the advantages and 
limitations of that methodology and develop logical conclusions. The differing 
worldviews of the qualitative and quantitative researcher lead them to different 
understandings of the canons of science. These understandings must be made 
explicit in order to know the capabilities and limits of the methodology they 
support. Lastly, 1) more specific discussion of case study research, 2) the nature 
of its relation to the traditional scientific canon constructs of reliability and validity 
and 3) techniques for addressing them, will follow later in this critique. First,
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though, is a more descriptive characterization of which research questions are 
suited to case study research.
Appropriate and Inappropriate Research Questions for the Case Study Design
Yin (2003) takes issue with a common view (Isaac and Michael, 1981; 
Shavelston and Townes, 2002) within social science circles, that case study 
research is most suited to initial exploratory inquiry into a subject area when little 
is known about a given behavioral phenomena. This common view supposes 
that as research into a subject area matures into a descriptive phase, that 
surveys or histories, become more appropriate, and further investigation into 
explanatory or causal inquiry is best suited to controlled experimentation. Yin 
(2003, p 3) questions this hierarchical view of preferred research strategies by 
citing several famous examples of case studies that were explanatory or 
descriptive in nature and also points that controlled experiments are readily 
adaptable to exploratory inquiry. He alternatively argues for a more pluralistic 
view of research strategy selection based on three other conditions: 1) the type 
of research question being posed, 2) the extent of control an investigator has 
over actual events, and 3) the degree of focus on contemporary events.
Research inquiries focused on answering “what” in terms of what may be 
initially learned about a subject area are indeed asking the exploratory questions 
that some consider case study research ideally suited for. Whereas questions 
regarding what outcomes might have occurred as a result of something else may 
be best suited to surveys or archival research. Similarly questions of “who”,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
153
“where”, and “when” in terms of observed outcomes are more suited to 
experimentation or surveys. If, however, these same questions desire to know 
“how” or “why” such outcomes occurred then explanation is being sought and a 
variety of methods may be best suited.
The remaining two of Yin’s conditions, extent of control and 
contemporariness of events, further guide the researcher in considering case 
studies in these instances. If little control exists over the context within which the 
phenomena is being studied, boundaries between the two are not evident, and 
events are happening concurrently as they are being studied, then case studies 
become much more suitable. If the events have already occurred and 
participants are unavailable then histories are preferred. If some element of 
control exists and contextual variables can be separated then field or laboratory 
experimentation is better.
Mintzberg (1979) suggests that the best way to know how a manager 
spends their time is simply to sit down and talk with them and observe them over 
time. He cites several examples from literature that managers are poor 
estimators of time allocation and surveys may be impacted as a result. Douglas 
(2004, p64) similarly suggests that concerns regarding “complexity, context, 
opaqueness, interdependencies, time frames...necessitates applying research 
methods that elucidate interpretive understanding.” If these issues can be 
eliminated then the researcher has other means available, but the “case study 
method allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics 
of real life events” (Yin, 2003). The lack of control the researcher has on these
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real life events and the fact that they may be occurring concurrently with the 
research is what suits them to case study research.
Assumptions, Limitations. Strengths and Weaknesses of Case Study Research 
Designs
The inherent assumptions, limitations, strengths, and weaknesses of case 
study research can be categorized into the three main theme groups: those 
relating to the researcher himself, those related to the researcher’s perspective of 
the subject matter, and those related to the data being collected by the case 
study researcher. Before discussing these in detail a note is in order; practical 
weaknesses will be presented in this section while more general weaknesses 
frequently cited in scholarly literature will be discussed in a later section.
Inductive analysis, personal contact and insight, design flexibility, and 
empathetic neutrality are all general themes relating to qualitative research 
(Patton 1990) that play particular roles in characterizing case study research 
because they relate to the researcher himself. Inherent in these themes are the 
ontological and epistemological assumptions the researcher has about the topic 
being studied. Further assumptions involved in case study research relate to 
researcher himself. The case study researcher assumes that he has the skills 
and knowledge to conduct case research, a frequent mistake according to Yin 
(1981, 2003) and Mintzberg (1979). The extent of the case study researcher’s 
competency enhances and limits the quality of the research. Case study allows 
good researchers to bring their familiarity with the case to bear (Yin 2003, 
Mintzberg, 1979; Eisenhardt 1989). It permits them to conduct inductive
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reasoning, allowing them to explore in search of patterns and causes in open 
analysis; observations can be generalized to underlying causes by the 
researcher’s own expertise as well as the effort he or she puts into soliciting the 
expertise of those involved in the case (Patton, 1990; Whitt, 1991). 
Methodologies, case selection, and research focus can adapt and change as the 
researcher uncovers previously unidentified trails of inquiry (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Dyer and Wilkins).
Similarly, case study research is inherently limited by the researcher’s 
qualities. The biases and influences on the case of the researcher inherently 
limit the quality of the case study (Yin, 2003; Poplin, 1987) if not accounted for 
and designed for properly (Yin, 2003). The open-endedness of case study 
research, cited as an advantage above, also can prove a difficulty as there may 
no “clear-cut rules on how to proceed” (Patton, 1980, p 389) and the researcher 
is required to use his own judgment and intuition. Yin (2003) cites length of 
documentation as a frequent and valid complaint about case study research as 
leads may have to be followed endlessly and accounted for in detail. Poor 
interviewing, note taking, and data collecting skill also directly limit case study 
quality (Yin, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989).
Patton’s (1990) general themes of naturalistic inquiry, holistic perspective, 
case uniqueness, and context sensitivity also relate to the basic ontological 
assumptions and epistemological assumptions the researcher has about his topic 
areas. Because the nature of topics may be complex, highly dependent upon 
and highly inseparable from context, it is assumed that quantitative methods may
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not capture these complexities. Case study research does not require the 
isolation of the laboratory (Mintzberg, 1979). It allows organizations and people 
to be studied concurrently with ongoing events (Yin, 2003; Patton, 1990). 
Because case study research can provide thorough documentation of context it 
provides for generalizability to underlying theory (Eisenhardt, 1990).
The context dependency and uniqueness of individual cases also results 
in a lack of generalizability frequently complained about (Isaac and Michael, 
1981) and provided by other methods. As stated above the richness of detail 
provided by case studies (Dyer and Wilkins, 1989) also may lead to difficulty with 
time and length research constraints.
Finally, the theme of qualitative data (Patton, 1990) itself characterizes 
case study research. As previously stated richness of data has both advantages 
in terms of capturing context and disadvantages, length and time commitment. 
The researcher assumes that he can capture data wholly and interpret it 
accurately to support the soundness of the research. Case studies, in particular, 
allow for the collection of a variety of data types (Yin, 2003, Dyer and Wilkins, 
1989) and allow them to be used together to triangulate and reach conclusions. 
Yin (2003) also points to the strength of case studies in holistically capturing 
context in data noting that the method is suited to situations where many more 
variables exist than data points. Because case data may be highly qualitative or 
categorical it is not amenable to the objectivity and verifiability of traditional 
quantitative methods (Kerlinger 1986).
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The purpose of this section was to present the practical limitations, 
strengths, and weaknesses that flow inherently from case study methods and 
their underlying assumptions. A more thorough discussion of some of the 
frequent scholarly criticisms and more general weaknesses of case study 
research will follow but first is a description of what distinguishes case study 
research from other approaches.
Distinctions from Other Research Designs
Case study research differs from traditional quantitative methods in terms 
of its overall goal, its assumptions about researcher interaction, and the differing 
aspects of breadth each form sees as ideal. Case study also differs from other 
qualitative methods in its focus on contemporaneous research and again on 
research purpose.
Quantitative methods attempt to bring explanation to observed 
phenomena by measuring it relative to controllable variables. Case study 
researchers are interested in developing an understanding of behavior by 
observing it, capturing and understanding the perspectives of others, and 
developing their own perspectives (Yin, 2003). Experimenters seek to remove 
themselves as much as possible from the subject matter under inquiry, so they 
can claim with confidence that they themselves did not influence the outcomes or 
supply their own interpretations. Case study researchers believe that the best 
way of achieving an understanding of human behavior is to get up close with the 
actual humans; case study researchers accept the limitations associated with
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their interaction as a cost of developing such an understanding (Patton, 1990; 
Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Quantitative researchers seek breadth in terms of 
sampling logic; if they focus only on specific variables, isolate them, and sample 
them across a variety of contexts, logically then they can generalize their findings 
broadly. Case study researchers are focused on issues that may involve many 
dependent and independent variables, which may not be isolatable from 
interacting with each other or from surrounding context. As a result, case 
researchers seek depth within limited cases in order to develop rich 
understandings of issues and generalize their data to theory. They acknowledge 
the lack of generalizability to other contexts and strive instead after replicability 
by thoroughly documenting their efforts.
As Yin (2003) points out, case study distinguishes itself from other 
qualitative methods in that it can focus on events as they unfold. Histories gain 
their data from archival research or begin to overlap with case study methods 
when they focus on more recent or current events. Case study differs from social 
experimentation and field trials in acknowledging its subject matter’s 
uncontrollability and not attempting to establish such control. Finally, case study 
differs from ethnography, the goal of which is primarily description, in that it 
assumes more explanatory value can be created. To the extent case studies 
seek to be solely descriptive or ethnographies begin to search for causal links the 
forms begin to overlap (Yin, 2003).
Scholarly Criticisms of Case Study Research Designs
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The distinctions of case study from other designs, particularly from 
traditional quantitative approaches, frequently give rise to a set of scholarly 
criticisms of the method. These criticisms can generally be grouped into two 
broad categories: those concerned with the generalizability of scientific research 
and those concerned with the rigor of scientific research.
Scholars generally complain that case studies are too narrow in focus and 
therefore not useful or significant (Patton, 1990). They argue that case study 
results and findings cannot be applied or reproduced in other cases (Shavelson 
and Townes, 2002) or in other contexts (Isaac and Michael, 1981; Mintzberg, 
1979). These criticisms are valid and to the extent case study researchers 
attempt to promote their achievement in terms of sampling rigor much deserved. 
The case study researcher must acknowledge this as an inherent limitation of his 
work. Case study researchers respond to such arguments by questioning 
whether anything can be learned at all from their study of complex, human, highly 
contextually dependent cases and answer yes (Mintzberg, 1979; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Dyer and Wilkins, 1989; Patton, 1990) citing the many advantages of case 
study. They point out that generalizability while important is not at the core of 
explanatory scientific inquiry, but the process of developing and refuting 
“plausible-rival-hypotheses” is (Campbell in Yin, 2003 p. ix; Poplin, 1987). As 
has been previously discussed, to address these valid criticisms some (Lincoln 
and Guba, 1985; Yin 2003) have sought to redefine the traditional scientific 
canon of generalizability by stressing replication logic as an alternative construct 
or by pointing out that generalizability to theory by adding weight to accepted
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propositions is still possible. These concepts as they are operationalized into 
case study design will be discussed in greater depth in a later section. In final 
summary though, the generalizability a quantitative researcher gains through 
sampling rigor cannot be matched by case study methods.
Remaining scholarly criticism of case studies seems to fall into the 
category of discomfort with the lack of scientific rigor assumed to be inherent in 
the method. Quantitative variables, on some scale whether it be categorical, 
ordinal, rational, can be assigned numeric value removing subjectivity by opening 
up the statistical tool box (Kerlinger, 1986). Qualitative constructs do not have 
this advantage, although even quantitative methods of coding and measure imply 
some level of subjectivity too. Scholars point out that the removal of numerical 
methods opens the research up to the bias of the researcher; divergent data sets 
can easily be twisted, perhaps subconsciously, by the researcher (Whitt, 1991) to 
fit preconceptions. The required judgment of the researcher for case study 
cannot but introduce subjectivity into the process (Yin, 2003; Stake, 1978). The 
response given by case researchers to these criticisms of lack of rigor is that 
while these concerns do have merit and must be acknowledged, their downsides 
can be mitigated by effective case research design.
Case Study Research Design Strategies and Safeguards
As was previously discussed, some of the traditional canons of science 
have been operationalized within quantitative research into objectivity, internal 
validity, external validity, and reliability. Additionally, as has been discussed,
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qualitative researchers have proposed analogous alternatives to these terms 
specifically to guide their specific efforts (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990). This focus on definition has led to specific design goals for those 
developing case study methodologies. These goals in turn have led to specific 
strategies and safeguards that should be incorporated into case study designs to 
ensure such objectives are met. Table 1, Validity and Reliability in Case Studies, 
synthesizes the work of Lincoln and Guba (1987) and Yin (2003) in detailing 
these goals and the respective tactics a researcher may employ to meet them.
Table 3.3: Validity and Reliability in Case Studies (Lincoln and Guba 1985, 
Yin 2003)_____________ ______________________ _____________________
Traditional Research 
Goal
Qualitative Research 
Goal
Case Study Design 
Tactics
Construct Validity (also 
referred to as objectivity)
Confirmability - Detail Researcher 
Background
- Detail Access 
Requirements
- Triangulate
- Establish Chain of 
Evidence
- Informant Review
Internal Validity Credibility - Pattern Matching
- Explanation Building
- Address Rival 
Explanations
- Use Logic Models
- Multiple Reviewers
External Validity Transferability - Generalize to Theory
- Seek Replication
Reliability Dependability - Develop and Use Case 
Protocol
- Develop and Maintain 
Case Database
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Construct validity refers to the idea that the quantitative researcher should 
attempt to be objective with regard to the variables in question (Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985; Yin, 2003; Voss, Tsikriktsis, and Frolich, 2002). The means by 
which he measures variables should be as accurate and precise as possible. 
Scholarly criticism with regard to case studies stresses the bias, subjectivity, and 
weaknesses of the human researcher. Case study researchers acknowledge 
this as a potential pitfall and attempt to mitigate its effects by 1) thoroughly 
detailing the background, demographic and experiential, of the researcher so that 
the audience can assess his potential biases as well as familiarity with case 
issues, 2) thoroughly detailing the means by which access to case data sources 
was gained, again for the purpose of allowing reviewers to assess potential 
biases 3) triangulating data and conclusions by seeking confirmation from 
multiple sources of evidence within the case, 4) establishing a chain of evidence 
that a reviewer can follow to determine what support a given finding had, and 5) 
having the actual informants review the descriptions and conclusions of the 
researcher (Yin, 2003; Eisenhardt ,1989; Patton, 1990; Creswell, 1994, Marshall 
and Rossman, 1995). These steps allow the researcher to provide the audience 
with a means of confirming the work’s findings and conclusions.
Internal validity is the notion that the quantitative researcher should be 
separate from the variables being studied in order that his interaction does not 
create unintended effects. Additionally, the variables should be isolated from 
their surrounding context and their interactions with other variable minimized so 
that the logic supporting inferences regarding interrelationships is not misguided.
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Scholarly criticism of case studied points to the interaction of the researcher with 
the subject matter and the inability to remove context from the situation. Case 
study researchers acknowledge the potential weakness and try to address it by 
1) identifying recurring patterns within cases to trace causality, 2) using their 
expertise and that of their informants to build explanations for observations, 3) 
identifying, detailing, and addressing rival explanations for observations, 4) using 
logic models or attempting to fit collected data to proposed rival cause-event 
chains (Yin 2003, Patton 1990) and 5) using multiple reviewers or case analysts 
to confirm each others work and conclusions. These efforts allow the researcher 
to ensure his findings are credibly based on the data collected.
External validity is the notion within quantitative research methods that the 
research is significant because it is generalizable to a broad set of contexts 
outside that of the existing study. As previously discussed, towards this criticism, 
case studies do not have a valid answer. Case study researchers must 
acknowledge that sampling logic is outside of their grasp given the contextual 
depth of their work on small numbers of cases. Rather it has been proposed that 
case study findings can be generalized to existing theory (Yin 2003; Eisenhardt, 
1989). Additional case studies may allow for replication of the findings to add 
weight to theoretical propositions (Yin, 2003). The findings of the case study 
should be transferable to other similar contexts.
Finally, reliability refers to the notion within traditional quantitative research 
that experiments may be followed and repeated and results should be 
reproducible. Again because of the dependence of case studies on contextual
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depth they’re inherently limited in their ability to be reproduced in other settings. 
This too is acknowledged by the case study researcher who offers in return the 
ability to audit his results by developing and using a rigorous case protocol and 
maintaining a case database so that other researchers can agree that had they 
done the research the same findings would have been reached (Yin, 2003; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). In this sense the case study becomes dependable from an 
academic research point of view (Lincoln and Guba, 1987).
The traditional scholarly criticisms of case study research flow from the 
operationalized notions of the traditional canons of good scientific inquiry. With 
one exception, case study researchers can acknowledge these criticisms and 
attempt to address these concerns through a variety of strategies and establish 
rigor in their designs. Generalizability outside of case context to broader 
samples is not a feature of case study research; however, for inquiries into 
context-rich, contemporary, real-world environments involving humans and highly 
interactive variable sets, case study may be the method most suited to the 
problem.
Critique Conclusion
The goal of this section was to present a scholarly critique of case study 
research which can then eventually be used to defend its selection as a research 
approach for certain topics as well as to establish it as a basis for developing a 
specific detailed, methodological research design. Understanding the 
philosophical underpinnings of case study research, its basis in the canons of 
science, its inherent strengths and weaknesses, what distinguishes it from other
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research methods, and its means for addressing the frequent scholarly criticisms 
it encounters, allows the case study researcher to develop his design from an 
informed perspective and helps to ensure the soundness of his research.
Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Data in Case Study Research
One of the advantages of case study research is that it allows the 
researcher to use both quantitative and qualitative measures to assemble data 
(Yin, 1981, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989). This characteristic open-endedness of the 
method enables the corroboration of observations and findings and thus supports 
construct validity (Yin, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Patton, 1990; Creswell, 1994, 
Marshall and Rossman, 1995; Sieber, 1973). Yet integrating qualitative and 
quantitative measures also brings a set of challenges to the data analysis effort. 
The purpose of this section is to detail the data analysis implications associated 
with using different scales of measurement and to describe methods available to 
the researcher to address these challenges.
Implications of Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Methods
Mintzberg capture’s the motivation of the researcher who decides to mix
both qualitative and quantitative methods in his research design:
“Theory building seems to require rich description, the richness that 
comes from anecdote. We uncover all kinds of relationships in our 
“hard” data, but it is only through the use of this “soft” data that we 
are able to explain them, and explanation is, of course, the purpose 
of research” (1979, p 587).
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Rossman and Wilson (1985) present three primary reasons for 
endeavoring to capture both types of data: corroboration, elaboration, and 
initiation. Corroboration refers to the triangulation of findings by relying on more 
than one method. Elaboration focuses on establishing greater depth to findings 
developed primarily from another data set. Using another form of data also 
prompts initiation, which allows the researcher to develop new explanations for 
observations or to counter existing explanations adding rigor and 
comprehensiveness to the research. Similarly, in their review of 57 mixed- 
method research designs, Greene, Caracelli, and Graham (1989) distilled five 
major purposes behind mixing qualitative and quantitative analysis: 1) 
triangulation, 2) complementarity, analogous to elaboration, 3) development, the 
iterative use of one design after another to develop and test theory, 4) initiation, 
and 5) expansion, seeking to extend the breadth and range of existing inquiry. 
Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv, and Sanders (1990) used in depth interviews to “get a 
qualitative feel for the gestalt of [an organization’s] culture,” then used that 
information to follow with successive phases of surveys to continue developing 
and demonstrating their conclusions.
The additional validity gained by using both qualitative and quantitative 
data within a research design enhances the completeness and soundness of the 
research; however, incorporating both types of data comes with challenges to the 
researcher also. These challenges include 1) the fact that research approaches 
are driven by different philosophical underpinnings or paradigms (Creswell, 1994; 
Rossman and Wilson, 1985) 2) the practical constraints of time, funds, and
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researcher ability limitations to take on the additional burdens of analyzing more 
than one type of data (Creswell, 1994, Morse, 1991) and 3) the practical 
problems arising with analyzing different data sets.
Rossman and Wilson (1985) describe three perspectives with regard to 
mixing qualitative and quantitative approaches in a research design. Purists 
focus on the differences and paradigms supporting the research approaches and 
argue that using mixed designs is logically inconsistent. Situationalists, tolerate 
the use of both approaches in a study, but believe that certain situations call for 
certain methods. Neither of these first two perspectives “foster” (Rossman and 
Wilson 1985, p.85) the integration of methods; however, a pragmatic perspective 
also exists. These researchers choose not to focus on the “false dichotomies” 
(Denzin, 1970, p 119) of the different types of research but choose instead to 
attempt to capture the strengths of each approach; that is because these 
differences are based on strongly held philosophical differences, that are in 
essence a given for scholars reviewing their work, the pragmatic researcher can 
do little to assuage such concerns other than to understand them and recognize 
the limits they place on the research.
On the practical side numerous authors, (Yin, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Patton, 1990; Creswell, 1994, Marshall and Rossman, 1995; Sieber, 1973), point 
out that adding a different methodology to a research design also adds work. 
Mixed designs require the researcher to become adept at both methodologies, 
thus the impact of the researcher’s own abilities weighs on the design (Sieber, 
1973; Greene et al 1989; Yin, 2003). The study can be expected to take longer
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as both designs must be implemented and both data sets analyzed according to 
different regimes (Sieber, 1973; Greene et al 1989; Yin, 2003, Creswell, 1994). 
Finally adding a methodology also adds cost; the researcher must be both 
funded and given the access to accomplish both portions of the design (Mitchell, 
1986; Morse, 1991). Again, to these implications, the researcher has little 
response other than be sure he has the capabilities and assets to accomplish the 
design he develops. Sieber (1973) and Greene et al (1989) suggest that 
researchers attempting to implement mixed-method designs have limited 
numbers of cases that are well-bounded, with manageable amounts of 
participants.
A final area, and focus of the remaining of this section, is the practical side 
of analyzing the multiple data sets generated by mixed designs. Once a 
researcher has collected both sets of data he is faced with integrating his 
analysis of them. Frequent problems cited within the literature include: 1) the 
difficulty of merging numeric and textual data, 2) the interpretation of divergent 
results, 3) the lack of delineation, or oppositely, the incorrect merging together of 
concepts and 4) the weighing of information from different data sources in 
reaching conclusions (Mitchell, 1986). The researcher must recognize these 
pitfalls and develop his research design accordingly.
Addressing Data Analysis Challenges through Research Design
To the problem of combining textual and numeric data, two alternatives 
are available to mixed-design researcher, both relating to converting one type
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into the other (Mitchell, 1986). In order to give raw text numeric meaning the 
researcher is left with development of coding and frequency techniques (Mitchell 
1986, Denzin 1970). Statistically, then the problem becomes one of applying 
multivariate statistical analysis techniques including multiple regression, cross­
classification analysis, and multiple analysis of variance (Mitchell, 1986) to the 
larger, combined data sets; the researcher must ensure, in this case, that the 
variables in question are rigorously delineated and their intercorrelation is not 
significant.
Alternatively, the researcher can attempt to conceptually integrate all 
available data in a confirmatory approach. Such an approach involves searching 
for logical causal trails, building explanations, and pattern matching in an attempt 
to develop a richer conceptual understanding of the subject matter (Yin, 2003; 
Mitchell, 1986; Morse, 1991; Sieber 1973). Tactics that support this analysis 
strategy include constructing displays of data that facilitate the researcher’s 
ability to detect patterns and links. Such displays include event sequences, 
arrays based on dimensions suggested by informants or literature, critical 
incident charts tracing causes, networks detailing linkages between informants 
and systems, taxonomies, and time ordered matrices tracking information flow 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2003; Voss, Tsikritsis, and Frolich, 2002).
Each of these tactics can incorporate both qualitative and quantitative data. The 
objective is to become familiar with the case as it stands alone and to allow its 
patterns to emerge to support the development of findings and conclusions 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).
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Mitchell’s (1986) problems of divergent results and overlapping of 
constructs are not so much problems of combined research designs as they are 
problems with the underlying theoretical framework which are now being 
highlighted by the combined design. To the extent that divergent results exist the 
researcher must attempt to rationalize them or change or discard the underlying 
theoretical constructs, assumptions, and propositions, or reconstruct and more 
accurately delineate variables and propositions. Greene et al (1989) cite such 
divergence as a strength encouraging the initiation of new conceptual constructs 
and relationships.
Lastly, the weighing of importance of data sources, as opposed to 
confronting divergent results, in reaching conclusions is a fact of mixed designs 
and a point of valid criticism. To this problem the researcher is left only with the 
hard work of interpreting findings within the context of present knowledge;
“...it is not accomplished using a mathematical formula to weigh the 
findings from each method, rather it is an informed thought process, 
involving judgment, wisdom, creativity, and insight and includes the 
privilege of creating or modifying theory. It is an exciting part of 
every research project...” (Morse, 1991, p122).
The researcher must be aware of these limitations and the opening to 
criticism in this area. Some guidance for the weighing of results is given within 
the literature.
Greene et al (1989) use the five purposes they identified in the their study 
of mixed-designs to develop corresponding design objectives. If the primary 
purpose of pursuing a mixed design was to gain triangulation of observations and
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findings, methods should be should be different from one another in terms of 
their biases: methods designed to uncover or discover patterns and trends 
should be countered by those seeking to disprove such correlation or logical 
relation. Then the methods should b applied to the same research questions. 
Applying them to different sets of research questions does nothing to enhance 
triangulation. In this case it is suggested the qualitative and quantitative portions 
of the research are weighed equally (Greene et al, 1989; Creswell, 1994; Sieber, 
1973, Rossman and Wilson, 1985).
If the pursuit of a mixed design is motivated by an attempt to enhance 
complementarity, then some overlap of the methods to examine different facets 
of a single phenomenon is in order (Green et al, 1989; Rossman and Wilson, 
1985). It is further suggested that the two research methods be accomplished 
simultaneously rather than in sequence so that results are more truly 
complementary and not gained through prior bias (Green et al, 1989; Creswell,
1994).
The primary design guidance flowing from the motivation to pursue 
development is the sequential implementation of the different methods (Greene 
et al, 1989; Creswell, 1994). This was precisely the goal of Hofstede et al (1990) 
in conducting long interviews to develop a feel for understanding organizational 
culture constructs and people’s perspectives before incorporating their results 
into successive surveying phases. As with triangulating designs, methods should 
be dissimilar and of equal weight (Greene et al, 1989).
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The aim of designing for initiation is uncover paradox and divergence. 
Contradiction is valuable in that it can produce learning by motivating the 
rejection of misguided conceptualizations, the development of a means to explain 
divergence, or the suggestion for further analysis. In this case research based 
on stricter positivist paradigms, controlled experiment, should be pursued to 
counter stricter relativist paradigm bases and produce conflicts (Greene et al, 
1989; Rossman and Wilson, 1985).
Mixed method research designs seeking to provide expansion on existing 
theory and constructs tend to be more wide open in terms of weighting and type 
of method. In many cases the researcher is attempting to add 
comprehensiveness or breadth to his work and supplementing a dominant 
method with a less dominant one (Greene et al, 1989; Creswell, 1994). Green et 
al (1989) also found that expansion was frequently one of multiple design goals 
usually complementing attempts to achieve triangulation or complementarity.
Conclusion
The open-endedness of case study research provides the researcher with 
a means to incorporate multiple research methodologies in pursuit of improving 
the validity and soundness of his work. Mixed method designs do come with a 
variety of challenges associated with criticism of using different philosophical 
paradigms, practical additional workload constraints, and practical data analysis 
challenges. The researcher selecting such methods must be aware of their
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inherent limitations and the problems associated with data analysis and then 
develop his research design accordingly.
The Limits of Statistical Approaches for this Research Setting
Researchers seeking to develop an understanding of how an 
institutionalized organizational control center expediently learns about and acts 
within in its environment, may find that research methods similar to that of the 
case study are well-suited to the constraints of the subject matter (Johannsen, 
Artman, and Waern 2001; Coombs 1999; and Vidaillet, 2001). If one seeks to 
further understand the relationships between 1) conceptual learning constructs 
based on academic literature and 2) performance measures of control centers 
within specified crisis environments, the strengths of case study method may be 
even more attractive. Such strengths include 1) the likelihood of building novel 
theory as the researcher must capture and analyze the various perspectives of 
participant informants in comparison with conceptions based on literature, 2) the 
capability of developing and following up on emergent theory patterns as they 
may reveal itself during the data collection process, and 3) the inherent theory 
building process in case-study methods driven by the researcher’s search for 
patterns, linkages, and causality, and 4) the capability to holistically capture the 
richness of contextual information (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin 2003; Creswell, 1994; 
Dyer and Wilkins, 1989; Mintzberg, 1979).
The case study researcher may seek to add breadth, comprehensiveness, 
and additional rigor to the work by augmenting the qualitative data collected with
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
174
quantitative data and with quantitative analysis (Greene, Carricelli, and Graham, 
1989; Creswell, 1994). Relating control center performance variables, that is the 
likely dependent variables in such a study, statistically to constructs developed 
from the literature, the likely independent variables in the study, within the 
confines of a small number of individual cases also has an inherent set of 
problems. The contextual focus of case study work, seen as a strength to 
researcher, also holds within it the potential effects of a large number of potential 
independent variables that may or may not be captured by the researcher. The 
purpose of this section is to discuss such problems, discuss the statistical 
approaches available to the researcher to uncover the relationships between 
such variables, and to discuss the implications such approaches may have on 
the selection of cases for study.
Before proceeding with this discussion, it is important for the researcher to 
explicitly call attention to a key practical underlying assumption regarding the 
nature and limitations of the subject matter proposed for study by the researcher. 
In the cases proposed for study, control centers functioning in crisis 
environments, the specific control centers in question are typically composed of 
no more than 10 personnel on a given time shift; this is in congruence with 
control centers studied thus far in the literature (Johannsen, Artman, and Waern 
2001; Coombs 1999; and Vidaillet, 2001). Completely surveying both night and 
day shifts and possibly overseeing commanders and even possibly formal 
organizational evaluators will lead to a sample size no greater than 30 
respondents, even assuming 100% response. Furthermore the number of cases
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to be studied is expected to range somewhere between two and seven at the 
absolute extremes. For both within-case and cross-case analysis this inherent 
sample size limitation, in terms of number of respondents and cases respectively, 
has profound ramifications on the type of statistical approaches, descriptive 
versus inferential, suitable for analytic use. These ramifications apply particularly 
to establishing relationships between independent variables and formally 
assessed measures of what is essentially team performance. This issue will be 
discussed further in the section that follows. It should be said at this point that 
there still remain key methodological design objectives that can be drawn from 
traditional quantitative statistical perspectives to guide the process of case 
selection; this issue will also be addressed in the discussion that follows.
Challenges Associated with Extracting Information from Case Studies
The problems associated with extracting information from the specific 
case studies in question to determine the effects of independent variables on 
dependent variables can be grouped into three main categories: 1) problems 
associated with sample size requirements for quantitative statistical inference, 
and 2) problems associated with the expected large number of potential 
independent, contextual, and interacting variables on qualitative inference and 3) 
the resulting problems arising from subjectivity inherent in coding qualitative data 
from the cases.
Quantitative statistical analysis offers a variety of tools that the analyst can 
use to infer relationships between variables. In order to quantitatively draw
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statistical inference about the effects of independent variables on dependent 
variables, particularly in cases with potential large numbers of independent 
variables, requisite sample sizes are in order. Widely used rules of thumb 
include: 1) for surveys in general 51 respondents plus the number of variables 
specified in the model being researched, 2) for exploratory factor analysis at least 
150 data points are required 3) and for confirmatory factor analysis at least 200 
are required (Guadagnoli and Velicer, 1988; Hoelter, 1983). Similarly, small 
samples impact the measures of confidence, measures of fit and measures of 
interaction involved in other multivariate analysis techniques including 
correlation, regression, and analysis of variance (Kachigan, 1991, Nachmias and 
Nachmias, 1976). As previously described and also encountered in similar 
research (McFadden, 2000) such inferential statistical methods cannot be 
applied to case study approaches involving limited numbers of participants or 
limited numbers of cases themselves.
With specific regard to an organization’s formal performance assessments 
of its control centers during an operational exercise and inspection scenario, the 
resulting metrics will be limited to a few characterizations of that performance 
rolled up into a single data point. This operational conflict, between the sample 
sizes involved in case study research and the use of inferential statistical 
methods to determine relationships between variables, is reflective of conceptual 
paradigms supporting the suitability of case study methods to qualitatively induce 
patterns and linkages within case data. This discussion however does not 
preclude the use of descriptive statistics to enhance the qualitative portion of the
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research design in a dominant-less dominant mixed method design (Creswell, 
1994; Greene et al, 1989).
A second problem for the researcher involved in a highly, contextually 
dependent case study is the large potential of independent variables that could 
influence other variables of interest. Traditional quantitative statistics captures 
this notion by classifying four types of variables, 1) the explanatory variables, 
those dependent and independent variables in which the researcher wishes to 
find relationship, 2) extraneous controlled variables, those which the researcher 
seeks to control in order to limit their effects on the dependent variables 3) 
extraneous uncontrolled variables which may confound relationships between 
explanatory variables, and 4) extraneous uncontrollable variables or noise, the 
effects of which the researcher attempts to control through random sampling of 
sufficient size (Kish, 1959; Creswell, 1994). Additionally, the researcher may 
also expect interaction between any and all of these variable types (Kish, 1959; 
Cresswell, 1994). The subjectivity involved 1) in the qualitative definition of 
constructs in terms of construct validity and 2) in qualitative inference in terms of 
internal validity is another problem associated with the high volume of expected 
independent variables in a contextually rich case. While inferential statistics may 
not be applicable to some qualitative inquiries, the basis of quantitative methods 
can aid in understanding and addressing the problems of ascertaining 
relationships between variables. This application shall be discussed in a later 
section.
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Approaches from Quantitative Statistical Analysis for Analyzing Effects of 
Independent Variables on Dependent Variables
While the transformation of qualitative data into quantitative forms for 
purposes of using inferential statistical methods is inhibited by sample size 
constraints, descriptive statistics can be used to supplement the qualitative 
development of constructs as well as the qualitative development of inferences of 
relationships between variables. Such methods include the familiar mean, 
median, standard deviation, and range. These can be used to augment 
qualitative data regarding informants’ perspectives and for characterizing 
informants experientially and demographically. Additionally, frequency counts 
associated with words spoken in control centers and artifacts repetitively used in 
control centers can provide valuable quantitative data.
Perhaps an even greater strength associated with using statistical 
methods is the sharpening of constructs involved in the coding of qualitative data 
into quantitative information. This conversion process can address some of the 
concerns relating to the interaction of variable types that was cited as a problem 
in the previous section. Mixed method researchers (Mitchell, 1986; Morse, 1991) 
suggest that delineation of separate concepts, and oppositely, the merging of 
concepts is a significant challenge of the work. Focusing on the types of pitfalls 
specified by the definitions of variable types, as detailed in the previous section, 
will help to force the researcher to enhance construct and internal validity. This 
enhancement will come from expecting the interaction of variable types as coding 
is accomplished. Use of textual coding methods and Likert scale survey 
methodologies will provide more precision in definition of constructs, as well as
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the development of ordinal levels for quantifying constructs (Nachmias and 
Nachmias, 1976). The quantification of qualitative data can serve to enhance 
construct validity; the use of descriptive statistics can augment the qualitative 
inference of variable relationships. Additionally, the researcher familiar with 
quantitative approaches can be wary of the pitfalls associated with interacting 
variables and develop his constructs accordingly. The traditional perspective of 
quantitative statistical approaches also has implications in case selection for the 
qualitative researcher.
Implications of Statistical Approaches on Case Selection
The approach statistical analysis takes with regard to understanding 
variable types can guide the case study researcher in his case selection process. 
In reviewing the literature and developing frameworks and constructs, the 
researcher should be cognizant of the variety of variable types that may be 
encountered. Accordingly, type 2 or so called “extraneous but controllable” 
variables (Kish, 1959, p 329; Creswell 1994, p 63) should be identified by the 
researcher prior to data collection. To the extent case selection can eliminate or 
mitigate the impact of such variables on the work it should be done (Pettigrew, 
1988), for example, a control center that for one reason or another will 
experience a high degree of personnel turnover just prior to data collection efforts 
may introduce confounding factors into the work. As such the researcher may 
want to eliminate such a case from consideration. Alternatively, a specific case’s 
characteristics may present an opportunity to observe a key variation in a
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explanatory independent variable or perhaps an interaction in explanatory 
independent variables (Pettigrew, 1988). Such cases represent a chance at 
initiating the further development of existing conceptualizations or the 
construction of new ones (Greene et al, 1989; Eisenhardt, 1989).
Conclusion
Quantitative approaches can be useful in designing approaches for case 
studies involving smaller amounts of participants as well as limited numbers of 
cases. While the small sample size of participants and cases involved in 
studying crisis control centers precludes the use of inferential statistics, 
descriptive statistics can serve to augment the qualitative measurement of 
constructs and the qualitative inference of relationships. The perspective of 
traditional statistics with regard to defining variable types can also guide the case 
researcher in these areas as well as in case selection.
Addressing the Challenge of Researcher Closeness
One of the advantages of case study research is that it allows the 
researcher to bring his personal expertise and familiarity to the subject matter 
(Yin 2003; Creswell, 1994; Hofstede, 1990; Dalton 1959). Such researchers may 
have years of experience in working in their case settings, may be familiar with 
the jargon in use, may themselves have previously studied such settings, may 
have unique access for collecting case data, and may be familiar with the 
dominant aspects of organizational history and culture in such settings. Such
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assets may enhance the researcher’s ability to develop and test propositions and 
hypotheses. This degree of closeness to the phenomena under study, however, 
opens the case researcher to a variety of scholarly criticisms. The purpose of 
this section is to detail the scholarly criticisms associated with such familiarity as 
well as to describe methodological design strategies that can be employed to 
address such criticisms.
Scholarly Criticisms Associated With Researcher Closeness to Subject 
Matter
Scholarly criticisms focused on the researcher tend to be concerned with 
the validity and reliability of the work. The traditional canons of science include 
the concepts of significance, theory-observation compatibility, generalizability, 
consistency, reproducibility, precision, and verification (Strauss and Corbin,
1990; Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Douglas, 2004). Significance and theory 
observation compatibility are applicable to all kinds of research; the research 
must not merely restate what is obvious to everyone and what is proposed as 
theory must correlate to what is observed (Weick, 1974). In pursuit of 
incorporating rigor into scientific research, the remaining canons have become 
operationalized into constructs of validity and reliability (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; 
Douglas, 2004; Marshall and Rossman, 1995). When the researcher is very 
close to the material and human behavior being studied as was described in the 
introductory paragraph to this section they should be prepared for scholarly 
criticisms to stem from these bases.
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Criticism towards a researcher that is close to inquiry subject matter 
springs from the notions of construct validity, internal validity, and reliability, 
Construct validity refers to the notion that a sufficient operational set of 
measuring tools must be employed to ensure subjective judgments are not being 
made during data collection (Yin, 2003; Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Voss,
Tsikriktsis, and Frolich, 2002). Criticisms in this area tend to be of researcher 
bias in collecting data; the ’’close” researcher has preconceived notions of the 
nature of the subject matter and may consciously or unconsciously impose his 
subjective judgment in collecting and interpreting data. Furthermore the data 
collection process may be skewed because the researcher has had to gain 
access to the case participants and material; such access may result in 
participants telling the researcher what he wants to hear (Cresswell, 1994).
Internal validity refers to the notion that relationships that researcher 
concludes exist within collected data are correctly inferred (Yin, 2003; Lincoln 
and Guba, 1985; Voss, Tsikriktsis, and Frolich; 2002 Marshall and Rossman, 
1995). Again, scholarly criticism stemming from this underlying basis, focuses on 
the inherent bias of the researcher that may be too familiar with his subject 
matter. Biased researchers may consciously or unconsciously reach conclusions 
based on their preconceived notions. They may assign more weight to data 
confirming their conclusions and less or none to data not confirming their 
conclusions. They may choose to ignore altogether or not seek out disconfirming 
evidence. Because they have not conceived of other types of causal
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explanations they may not structure their research designs to uncover such 
explanations (Yin, 2003; Creswell, 1994).
Lastly, reliability refers to the notion that research results should be 
reproducible; later researchers should be able to duplicate original findings (Yin, 
2003; Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Voss, Tsikriktsis, and Frolich, 2002; Douglas 
2004). From this basis of perspective, perhaps the harshest critics maintain that 
the “close” researcher merely goes through the case data looking for evidence to 
fit his working, pre-conceived framing of the problem. As a result of such 
problems stemming from issues of construct and internal validity, the work will 
not be reproducible by other researchers (Yin, 2003; Creswell, 2004).
Tracing these frequent criticisms to their underlying bases within the 
traditional canons of science improves the depth of understanding of the 
criticisms. Furthermore, it allows such a researcher to take such criticisms into 
account by creating objectives to guide the methodology design process. These 
objectives in turn lead to the development of specific design strategies to address 
these problems.
Design Strategies to Address Concerns Regarding Researcher Closeness
First and foremost, the case study researcher who has an intimate 
familiarity with his cases, must recognize the validity of the criticism regarding 
closeness to the subject matter. To this extent, the researcher must ensure he 
has the skills required for good case study. Yin (2003, p 59) describes these as 
1) being able to “ask good questions and interpret” the answers in a meaningful
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and unbiased manner, 2) being a “good listener and to not be trapped by 
preconceptions”, 3) being “adaptive and flexible so that unexpected observations 
are seen as opportunities and not threats” and 4) being “unbiased by 
preconceived notions” that may exist by being “sensitive and responsive to 
contradictory evidence.” To the extent that critics may not be convinced by the 
altruistic intent of the “close” researcher other tactics exist which can enhance 
the validity and reliability of the research design.
Qualitative researchers have proposed and expounded on analogous 
constructs to the traditional notions of validity and reliability (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985; Douglas, 2004; Marshall and Rossman,1995; Voss, Tsikriktsis, and 
Frolich, 2002; Rubin and Rubin, 1995). To the idea of construct validity they offer 
the notion of confirmability or transparency (Rubin and Rubin, 1995), the ideas 
that another researcher reviewing case data would agree that the correct 
observations were made when the case study process took place. Now as a 
design objective the researcher can pursue confirmability by 1) using multiple 
sources of evidence to triangulate observations, 2) establishing chains of 
evidence to support specified observations, 3) having informants review drafts of 
case data and case report and documenting their subsequent comments 4) 
documenting the demographic and experiential background of the researcher so 
that a reviewer can judge if bias was involved in data collection and 5) 
documenting the steps required to gain access to the case material and 
informants again so the reviewer can assess possible biases and 6) commenting 
about sensitive issues such as confidentiality of data and anonymity of
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informants (Yin, 2003; Voss, Tsikriktsis, and Frolich, 2002; Rubin and Rubin, 
1995; Creswell, 1994). Incorporating these tactics into research design will allow 
the researcher to respond to the criticisms of bias in data collection.
With respect to the idea of internal validity, qualitative researchers have 
offered the analogous notion of credibility, the accurate inferring of relationships 
within the collected case data (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Douglas, 2004; Marshall 
and Rossman,1995; Voss, Tsikriktsis, and Frolich, 2002; Rubin and Rubin,
1995). As a design objective a number of strategies can be employed to 
enhance credibility within the research: 1) identifying recurring patterns within 
cases to trace causality, 2) using their expertise and that of their informants to 
build explanations for observations, 3) identifying, detailing, and addressing rival 
explanations for observations, 4) using logic models or attempting to fit empirical 
data to proposed rival cause-event chains and 5) using multiple reviewers or 
case analysts to confirm each others work and conclusions (Yin 2003, Patton 
1990; Voss, Tsikriktsis, and Frolich, 2002; Rubin and Rubin, 1995; Creswell, 
1994). Incorporating these measures into research design will provide the 
researcher who has a close familiarity with the research subject matter to 
address accusations of bias in the conclusions and findings he reaches from 
analyzing the case data.
With respect to the idea of reliability, qualitative researchers have offered 
the analogous notion of dependability, the taking into account and detailing of the 
dynamic conditions inherent to each human situation so that a reviewer may 
audit the researcher’s work and conclude that had the work been done someone
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else the same conclusions would have been reached (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; 
Douglas, 2004; Marshall and Rossman, 1995; Voss, Tsikriktsis, and Frolich,
2002; Rubin and Rubin, 1995). With dependability as a design objective the 
case study researcher can 1) develop and use a rigorous case protocol and 2) 
maintain a detailed case database (Yin 2003, Voss, Tsikriktsis, and Frolich,
2002; Creswell, 1994). These tactics will allow the case study researcher to 
counter criticism that his work is not repeatable because his preconceptions and 
bias lead him to skew data; the establishment and use of a rigorous case 
protocol helps in ensuring that credibility and confirmability is maintained, that 
another researcher can trace conclusions by following the processes developed 
by the original investigator. Maintaining a case database allows another 
researcher the opportunity to view the manner in which the protocol was applied 
in the case.
Conclusion
A researcher who is very familiar with and close to the issues involved in 
the subject matter of the research and subsequently endeavors to pursue a case 
study will doubtless be exposed to criticisms focused on his preconceptions and 
biases regarding those issues. The researcher must acknowledge these 
criticisms as valid concerns, endeavor not to allow his experiences and 
preconceptions to influence his work, and design strategies, detailed in the 
literature, into his research methodology to address these criticisms accordingly.
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Framework, Model, or Theory?
A brief discussion is necessary explaining why the term theoretical 
framework is applied to the work at the beginning of this chapter and prepared for 
partial validation in the next. The selection of the term theoretical framework as 
opposed to others might be considered somewhat arbitrary but some rigor 
applied to defining this term was fruitful to understanding what DC5 proposes to 
be. The terms framework, model, and theory, very frequently chosen to be in the 
titles of research documents from a variety of fields, are used interchangeably 
and without rigorous definition (Sutton and Straw, 1995; Heals, Jean, and 
Gibson, 1992; Bacharach, 1989; Adam, 1985). As Sutton and Straw (1989, p 
371) put it,
“There is lack of agreement about whether a model and a theory 
can be distinguished, whether a typology is properly labeled a 
theory or not.”
Freese (1989, p 189) in seeking to define and describe formal theorizing 
described,
“an incredible anarchy of language, conceptions, proposals, 
interpretations, and results of formal theorizing.”
Finally, Homans (in Weick, 1989, p 517) makes the complaint,
“ ...much official sociological theory consists of concepts and their 
definitions; it provides the dictionary of a language that possesses 
no sentences.”
The purpose of this section is to develop some working definitions of the terms 
framework, model, and theory that can be used to guide the researcher to ensure
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that he is speaking in complete “sentences”, or at the least is aware of when he 
is not.
Theories, Models, and Frameworks: Definitions and Distinctions
As suggested by the introduction, common use of the terms framework, 
model, and theory overlaps significantly, thus any set of definitions should be 
treated as operational. The motivation for pursuing such working definitions is to 
guide the researcher in development of methodology for confirming the idea he 
has developed and to ensure that he does not suggest that the idea is anything 
more than what he has actually shown.
As each of these terms is focused on the construction of meaning about 
the world it is informative to understand conceptions about how individuals create 
meaning within their world. First, distinction must be made between what 
constitutes data, information, knowledge, and perhaps intelligence. Ackoff (1989) 
develops a hierarchy of these concepts: data is nothing more than raw symbols 
differentiating various states of the universe; information is data processed into a 
useful form with some level of meaning answering the basic questions “who”, 
“what”, “when,” and “where”; knowledge represents information applied to begin 
answering “how”. Ackoff goes on to define understanding as the appreciation of 
knowledge when one begins answering “why” and compares the distinction 
between knowledge and understanding to the distinction between memorizing 
and learning. Finally, Ackoff, defines wisdom separately from the other four
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concepts, which are focused upon the past. Wisdom is the ability to project 
understanding for predictive purposes.
An individual’s first act in learning about the world involves perceiving 
data; the five senses take care of this act. The next step in creating meaning is 
in defining what it is that has been observed. This is the act of framing the data 
by asking and answering the key questions of “who", “what”, “when,” and 
“where.” Heals, Jean, and Gibson (1992) citing Chauncey and Miller suggest 
that frameworks accomplish such acts by providing their users with language 
specific to characterizing what has been observed; framing includes the acts of 
definition and assumption. For purposes of an operational definition, frameworks 
are the key definitions a researcher constructs regarding to his subject matter. 
For example, Newton had framed his work on the basics of physics by 
developing the constructs of gravity and force to use in concert with those 
familiar to humans in general, time, distance, and speed. Frameworks involve 
the development of constructs for understanding phenomena.
In moving on to higher levels of meaning the next question the individual 
must ask is “how." In this sense constructs must be linked, describing through 
abstraction the sequences of events, or the order in which constructs are 
observed. In order to mentally capture such events for further development, the 
researcher must limit the amount of constructs he considers and thus bounds his 
conceptualization of the subject matter. In the classical science sense, Galileo 
acted in such a manner when he developed what came to be known as the 
heliocentric model of the solar system describing the orbits of the planets around
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the sun; creating a model or perspective in which to view observed constructs. 
For purposes of operational definition, models are abstract linkages of observed 
constructs that describe how a phenomenon is taking place.
It should be noted within the literature that some make no distinction 
between models and theory (Whetten, 1989; Dubin, 1976). Descriptive models 
can be used for predictive purposes and they can identify interactions between 
constructs. For others (Sutton and Staw 1995; Freese (1980); Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Creswell, 1994; Yin, 2003; Adam, 1985) the key distinction is that theories 
explain why relationships exist. Newton advanced the heliocentric model by 
postulating the theory of gravity.
It should be noted that as constructed here these terms represent a 
hierarchy of meaning. Researchers must first frame constructs, describe 
interactions amongst them, and then logically suggest a reason why this 
interaction is observed. Thus all theories as defined here are both models and 
frameworks; models are frameworks themselves. Some frameworks, such as 
taxonomies, and listings of variables are not models or theories and some 
models such as diagrams and flowcharts, in and of themselves, are not theories 
(Sutton and Staw, 1995).
A note should be added here about where the subject matter of this work 
distributed cognition in the specified setting fits in the larger scheme of relatively 
new field of cognitive engineering. A review of literature relating to cognitive 
engineering shows that it is focused on developing a variety of disparate systems 
addressing the various critical processes involved in learning about an outside
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environment. In a sense these efforts represent the engineering or application of 
scientific principles, in this case those related to cognition. Engineers proceed 
with their design based on these principles that are sometimes grouped together 
into overarching perspectives or frameworks of the outside environment. This 
work is focused on constructing such a framework of diverse principles. Its intent 
is to frame the existing science so that future engineered applications can be 
made while using it.
It should also be mentioned again, that in terms of common usage 
researchers have used these terms interchangeably. As a result such a 
construction of these concepts may find dispute. But it does provide the 
researcher with a means of understanding to what extent he has created 
meaning with his work. In the case of DC5 the term theoretical was chosen 
because interrelationships are proposed and described and explanation is given 
to why they exist. Framework is added because the researcher acknowledges 
that the DC5 construction was the construction of a perspective for which a 
complementarity of views may exist. Validating, at least partially, the DC5 
theoretical perspective is the focus of the next chapter.
Conclusions on Methodology
This chapter had three main purposes. First, using a systems approach, A 
theoretical framework was developed that 1) synthesized the information 
developed in the literature review, 2) described the systemic structure of 
distributed cognition occurring in control centers, and 3) captured the effects of
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changing crisis intensity on the distributed cognition occurring in control centers. 
Second, the appropriateness and suitability of using exploratory case study 
methodology to validate a portion of the constructed framework was reviewed in 
detail. Finally, a brief discussion was presented to explain why the term 
“theoretical framework” is used to describe the central product that is presented 
in this chapter and that is to be validated using the research design in the next 
chapter. Chapter IV, Research Design, will follow where the specific design of the 
case study protocols and database will be made explicit.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
193
CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Purpose and Organization of Chapter
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a means for validating the DC5 
framework developed in Chapter III. As discussed in Chapter III, this validation 
will be sought by two general approaches guiding the efforts of this research 
design. First, cases will be explored to find out the degree to which DC5 indeed 
does provide a general overall means of framing an understanding of observed 
distributed cognition phenomena. To this end, collected data will be synthesized 
to comprehend if the constructs and interactions of the DC5 framework are 
readily apparent in the data and lead to a deeper understanding of the 
phenomena. To the extent that the data is readily interpreted by the DC5 
framework constructs these portions of the framework will be considered to be 
partially validated. To the extent that various constructs are not readily 
identifiable in the data or new constructs may be inferred from the data the 
framework will be adjusted accordingly on an iterative basis between the three 
Operational Readiness Exercises and one Operational Readiness Inspection.
The second general approach to seek validation of the framework will be 
to observe if the framework can serve as a basis for an initial assessment of the 
fitness of a crisis control center’s distributed cognition system and subsequently 
as a basis for devising and implementing a training plan for a control center. To 
the extent performance increases in subsequent iterations of action in the case
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studied the framework will be considered validated. To the extent performance 
improvements are slow to be seen or are not seen at all the framework will be 
adjusted accordingly again on iterative basis between the operational readiness 
exercises and inspection.
As discussed in Chapter III, four primary challenges are inherent in the 
general approach described above. First, a sound means of measuring or 
characterizing control center performance must be developed. Second, similar 
sound means, using qualitative case study methods, must be employed to 
characterize the nature of a given scenario within an exercise or inspection in 
terms of the crisis environment. The characterizations of these constructs and 
their sub-elements can be no more than categorical or perhaps ordinal in nature 
and more likely just descriptive. Consequently, convergence from multiple data 
sources must be sought. The third challenge described previously is to design a 
training regimen of future exercise scenarios within the constraints that exist that 
will facilitate the performance improvement of the control center. A fourth 
challenge also discussed in Chapter III is that of general case study 
methodological soundness.
To meet these objectives, approaches, and challenges this chapter will 
develop and discuss a case study protocol guiding the overall case data 
collection and analysis effort. The protocol itself is presented in outline form in 
Appendix III where the research design is broken down into its various elements. 
A significant sub-portion of the case study protocol presented here will be the 
development of the individual data collection instruments supporting the
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subsequent analysis. The functions and objectives of these instruments will be 
presented in this chapter while the actual instruments themselves are presented 
in Appendix III. In broad terms, the research will be accomplished over two case 
data sets. The first case is an Air Force unit conducting two internal operational 
readiness exercises in preparation for a final formal external operational 
readiness inspection. This first case involves three data collection opportunities. 
Additionally, this case presents the chance to intervene, as described previously, 
by developing a performance assessment from the first iteration and using it to in 
turn support the development of an exercise script for the second exercise. The 
second case data set will be collected during a formal operational readiness 
inspection involving another unit. Figure 4.1 Research Design Approach 
summarizes the discussion above. Figure 4.2, Iterative Approach, condenses 
the presentation in Figure 4.1 and stresses the iterative design of the research in 
which successive updates, after analysis of collected data from each ORE and 
the ORI, are made to the DC5 framework and if necessary the protocol, data 
collection instruments, and data analysis approach themselves.
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Figure 4.1: Research Design Approach
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Figure 4.2: Research Design Approach
ORE #1
ORI
(Case 1)
Data
Analysis
Data
Analysis
Data
Collection
Data
Analysis
Data
Collection
Data
Collection
Initial DC5 
Framework
Data
Collection
Instruments
Data
Collection
Instruments
Data
Collection
Instruments
Validation 
Approaches and 
Research Design 
Challenges:
Validation 
Approaches and 
Research Design 
Challenges:
Validation 
Approaches and 
Research Design 
Challenges:
Interim
Adjusted
DC5
Framework
Interim
Adjusted
DC5
Framework
Interim
Adjusted
DC5
Framework
Interim
Adjusted
DC5
Framework 
#1 and 
Intervention
Interim
Adjusted
DC5
Framework 
#1 and 
Intervention
Case Data 
Collection and 
Analysis Protocol
Case Data 
Collection and 
Analysis Protocol
Case Data 
Collection and 
Analysis Protocol
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
198
ORI
(Case 2)
Data
Analysis
Data
Collection
Data
Collection
Instruments
Validation 
Approaches and 
Research Design 
Challenges:
Final
Adjusted
DC5
Framework
Interim
Adjusted
DC5
Framework
Case Data 
Collection and 
Analysis Protocol
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
199
Organization of Data Collection and Analysis Protocol
Following the prescriptions of Yin (2003) and Creswell (1994) in order to 
address Research Design Challenge 4, first, general research soundness, and 
as previously discussed in Chapter III, the general case requirements, suitability, 
and selection methods must be made explicit. Second, also addressing the 
same design challenge, general access requirements, availability requirements, 
and any existing rules of engagement with case data sources requirements must 
also be made explicit. Third, a general description of the available data sources 
must be accomplished to serve as a basis for development of the subsequent 
data collection instruments. Fourth, integrating the described research design 
challenges with the available case data sources will serve as a basis for design 
guidance for developing the data collection instruments. Fifth, a discussion of 
how collected data will be analyzed and employed to validate or adjust the 
framework will be presented.
Case Requirements, Suitability, and Selection
The two most important general requirements to support framework 
validation are 1) that the case be that of a control center in which distributed 
cognition, as has been defined in Chapter II, occurs, and 2) during the period of 
observation the control center experiences and is challenged by a crisis 
environment, again as defined in Chapter II. In order to meet the first 
requirement, control centers 1) must be staffed by people with variety of 
expertise’s, 2) must experience scenarios and environments that sometimes
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require these people to integrate their knowledge in order to develop and adjust 
representations of that external environment, and 3) must be equipped with some 
variety of artifacts, again as described in Chapter II, which are used to facilitate 
distributed cognition.
In order to meet the second requirement of a crisis environment, a 
scripted test or drill is most suited to this type of research. A key component of a 
crisis environment is unpredictability. Thus researchers trying to ensure they are 
on site (i.e. control center) to observe a case and collect data in a real world 
situation that fits the developed definition may find that they are waiting 
interminably for such an ideal crisis to be reported into the control center. To 
observe a real world situation that fits the developed definition would be desirable 
from the research point of view of capturing data reflecting the true stresses of 
such scenarios. Additionally, access to scripted events meeting the developed 
crisis environment definition, allows the researcher to know what is coming, thus 
enhancing the ability to capture relevant data in the control center. Furthermore, 
formalized scripted events, if developed through some institutionalized process, 
provide some standardization that facilitates comparison across sets of events 
and across control center cases. Lastly, institutionalized drills are generally 
followed by formalized, institutionalized processes focused on building an 
assessment of the performance of the control center based on the opinions of 
institutional observers and experts. Access to the thoughts, opinions, and 
discussions of such experts could serve to enhance the analysis of data collected 
from such cases.
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Thus in order to meet the requirements for this research a case must 
involve a control center staffed by a diverse group of functional experts who have 
to integrate their knowledge as well as use control center artifacts to construct 
and maintain representations of the environment and should involve a control 
center being examined through a formalized test, exercise, or drill simulating a 
crisis.
Additionally, there are other desirable case attributes that can serve to 
enhance the research. Control centers developed in order to function in crisis 
environments generally require and facilitate the rapid flow of information through 
the use of specialized systems, artifacts, jargon, language, institutionalized 
processes, methods, and cultures. While familiarity with and closeness to 
subject matter is an area of concern for the researcher, as discussed in Chapter 
III, it is essential that the researcher be able to understand and comprehend the 
flow of information and the construction of the resulting representations, as well 
as, to keep up with such flows to capture case data for analysis. Thus, cases 
suitable for research must be ones for which the researcher has the experience 
and capability to collect and analyze data.
Further desirable characteristics for cases suitable for this research 
include 1) a documentable, or scripted, variation in crisis intensity that the 
researcher can access, 2) the scripted variations of the crisis intensity includes a 
variety of different crisis scenarios that are repeated over time, 3) the case 
occurs over of a limited amount of time allowing the case data to be processed 
and analyzed within a suitable amount of time thereafter.
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The cases of Unit Control Centers (UCC) functioning during Air Force 
Operational Readiness Exercises and Inspections (ORE and ORI) described in 
the literature review in Chapter II meet these requirements and have the 
described desirable characteristics as well. They are staffed by anywhere from 6 
to 15 personnel of a variety of expertise’s from various base organizations (for 
example; engineers, security forces, transportation, medical services, explosive 
ordnance disposal, flying squadrons, personnel systems, fire department, 
chemical weapons detection, etc.) who have to integrate their efforts, as well as, 
utilize their systems and tools to understand and act within their environment. 
ORIs are rigorous, standardized, institutionalized, scripted events designed to 
test the unit being inspected against established, institutionalized assessment 
criteria. The event scripts meet the requirements of implementing crisis 
conditions as described in the DC5 framework. Additionally, the functional 
expertise and experience coupled with the inspecting experience of the 
inspection team provide standardization and rigor to the process. As described 
previously, the researcher is familiar with the format, jargon, processes, and 
systems used in such inspections having experienced approximately 20 OREs 
both as a player and inspector. With the appropriate caveats discussed in the 
previous chapter regarding researcher closeness to subject matter, these cases 
are suited to the research in question.
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Research Soundness and Data Sources
The case study design strategies reviewed in Chapter III (see Table 3.1) 
serve to guide the development of this protocol as do the research design 
challenges discussed in the first part of this chapter. The primary objectives of 
the protocol will be to satisfactorily address the research goals, in terms of rigor, 
namely: confirmability, credibility, transferability, and dependability. The purpose 
of the data collection and analysis protocol is to answer the research questions 
developed in the previous chapters and to confirm the validity of the developed 
DC5 framework. The protocol accomplishes these tasks by developing specific 
guidance for selecting, collecting, and analyzing case data. The data types 
available surrounding a Unit Control Center (UCC) in an Operational Readiness 
Exercise (ORE) include: 1) pre-ORE interviews with UCC players, 2) ORE scripts 
that allow the researcher to characterize the crisis nature of the UCC 
environment, 3) Detailed researcher field notes capturing the unfolding 
interaction of players and UCC artifacts, 4) Post-ORE interviews with UCC 
players, 5) Post-ORE interviews with evaluators, and 6) ORE reports and ratings 
of UCCs inspected.
It should be noted here that the use of surveys was precluded because 
the number of personnel involved in manning the control centers and evaluating 
the control centers was small, no more than a dozen total. Thus, it was assumed 
that a direct capture of any survey questions could be accomplished through the 
interview process resulting in a higher return rate than the use of surveys. 
Furthermore, any statistical numeric data captured would necessarily be
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descriptive in nature rather than inferential given the small sample space of 
respondents.
The developed protocol will then serve to guide the process of collecting 
and assimilating the case data. Figure 4.2, adapted from both the nature of the 
case to be studied and Yin (1993), captures the multiple data sets available in 
the case of this research, which can be used to capture and analyze information, 
as the researcher seeks convergence around common themes and postulates 
from the framework. The formal iterative analysis discussion leading to 
successive adjustments to the framework will be accomplished in a prospective 
Chapter V, Case Analysis, once the data collection and analysis phase of the 
research begins.
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Figure 4.3: Data sets to be used for convergence
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Lastly, the goals of achieving research soundness and rigor specific to 
case study research, as discussed in the literature review, guide the research 
design development process in terms of data collection and analysis. Table 4.1, 
Case Study Tactics, adapted from Yin (2003) and Saunders (1998) captures 
these design strategies.
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Table 4.1: Case Study Design Tactics (adapted from Yin, 2003 and Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985)
Traditional Research 
Goal
Qualitative Research 
Goal
Case Study Design 
Tactics
Construct Validity or 
Objectivity
Confirmability - Detail Researcher 
Background
- Detail Access 
Requirements
- Triangulate
- Establish Chain of 
Evidence
- Informant Review
Internal Validity Credibility - Pattern Matching
- Explanation Building
- Address Rival 
Explanations
- Use Logic Models
- Multiple Reviewers
External Validity Transferability - Generalize to Theory
- Seek Replication
Reliability Dependability - Develop and Use Case 
Protocol
- Develop and Maintain 
Case Database
Of these tactics several can be addressed directly. The background of the 
researcher conducting this investigation can be found in Appendix IV, Supporting 
Documentation. Access requirements are detailed in the next section. Samples 
of correspondence relating to gaining case access are also provided in the 
Appendix IV with the full set of correspondence relating to access and rules of 
engagement provided in the case database. Samples of informant reviews will 
be provided in Appendix IV with the full set in the case database. Multiple 
outside observers and reviewers in addition to the researcher of this investigation 
were not allowed by the case agency in order to limit footprint on their exercises;
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however convergence can be sought on several objectives using the multiple 
data sources available. Generalization to theory (i.e. to the DC5 framework) is 
inherent to this research design. Finally, replication is gained by the fact that the 
research approach involves returning to the same case system three times to 
gauge improvement of the control center as it prepares through successive 
exercises.
Availability, Access, and Rules of Engagement
The initial portion of this research protocol is built around meeting the case 
study design goal of confirmability. Analogous to the traditional research goal of 
construct validity, the focus of this objective is to remove or mitigate the 
subjectivity, biases, and weaknesses of the researcher. Case study researchers 
acknowledge this pitfall and seek its mitigation by 1) thoroughly detailing the 
background, demographic and experiential, of the researcher so that the 
audience can assess his potential biases as well as familiarity with case issues,
2) thoroughly detailing the means by which access to case data sources was 
gained, again for the purpose of allowing reviewers to assess potential biases, 
and 3) having the actual informants review the descriptions and conclusions of 
the researcher (Yin, 2003; Eisenhardt ,1989; Patton, 1990; Creswell, 1994, 
Marshall and Rossman, 1995). These steps allow the researcher to provide the 
audience with a means of confirming the work’s findings and conclusions.
To support these objectives 1) the researcher’s military resume is included 
in the case database along with 2) detailing his experience in working in and
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running unit control centers in both operational readiness exercises and 
inspections, as well as, 3) his experience serving as an inspector on the Air 
Force’s Air Combat Command Inspector General’s (ACC/IG) Team evaluating 
such control centers. Additionally, all the correspondence, mainly email and 
staffing packages, involved in gaining access to the case data is included in the 
case database. Essentially in order to gain access to the control centers being 
evaluated by the ACC/IG team 1) the researcher agreed, as an exchange for the 
case access, to augment the team as a non-inspector supporting the team’s 
script implementation process on an inspection not used for purposes of this 
research, 2) the researcher developed a staffing package, provided in the case 
database, seeking and securing approval from the ACC/IG team leadership 
detailing the research objectives and approaches to be used, 3) the researcher 
developed a staffing package, provided in the case database, seeking and 
securing approval from leadership of the organization being inspected detailing 
the research objectives and approaches to be used and finally, 4) the researcher 
and the IG team developed rules of engagement, provided in Appendix IV 
governing the researchers conduct and interaction with inspectors and players 
while collecting case data. The ACC/IG team agreed to allow the researcher to 
conduct this research during four Operational Readiness Exercises and 
Inspections. This documentation is provided in the case database with samples 
in Appendix IV.
With regard to this last measure the rules of engagement were designed 
to support two main goals, 1) ensuring the soundness of the research as
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discussed in this section and secondly 2) complying Air Force regulation and 
policy interpretation regarding the release of inspection information. Essentially 
these rules of engagement are centered on establishing and maintaining 
anonymity for units and personnel being inspected, as well as, providing 
participants a chance to review collected case data, analysis, and conclusions; 
again both of these efforts are mutually supported by the desire for research 
soundness and the Air Force’s rules for information release.
Data Sources and Research Challenges
A critical task of this investigation is to incorporate these design objectives 
and constraints into a data collection and analysis protocol that also meets the 
remaining research design challenges that have been specified in Figure 4.1.
The remainder of the protocol with regards to the data sources thus becomes 
design guidance for developing the data collection instruments themselves, then 
and analyzing the resulting data. As described previously, the goals of the data 
collection efforts are, 1) to observe if the DC5 framework provides a means for 
framing the distributed cognition phenomena occurring in the control center, 2) to 
observe if the DC5 framework can serve as a basis for providing an initial 
assessment of distributed cognition fitness, 3) to observe if the DC5 framework 
can serve as a basis for developing training scenarios for future exercises that 
will improve performance, 4) to develop a means of characterizing performance 
of the distributed cognition system, 5) to develop a means of characterizing the
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crisis environment of a given scenario within an exercise and 6) to account for 
measurement influences on distributed cognition system fitness.
Table 4.2 serves to inform the development of the protocol design 
guidance for the data collection instruments by detailing which data sources can 
be used to address which research design objective. These subsequent 
intersections of data source and research design objective can in turn be used to 
develop specific interview questions as well as guidance to orient the researcher 
as he observes the UCC in action during exercises and inspections.
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Table 4.2: Data Sources vs. Design Objectives = Protocol Guidance for Data Collection Instruments
Data Sources
Research Design 
Objectives
A) Pre-O RE Player 
Interviews
B) ORE Scripts C ) Researcher 
Observations
D) Post-ORE Player 
Interviews
E) Post O R E  Evaluator 
interviews
F) ORE Performance 
Reports
1) Is DC5 a valid set of 
constructs for 
describing distributed 
cognition phenomena?
A1
- Capture contextual 
attributes of players
- Capture 
expectations of 
players, possibly in 
DC5 terms
- Capture 
preconceptions of 
players regarding 
DCOGF, possibly in 
terms of D C5
B1
- Can scenarios be 
characterized in terms 
of DC5, specifically 
Crisis Environment 
[CE]?
C1
- Can observations be 
coded readily into the 
constructs of DC5?
- Is further ordering and 
understanding of 
observation gained by 
using DC5?
D1
- Are failures or successes 
readily characterized in 
terms of DC5?
- Are scenarios readily 
characterized in terms of 
DC5?
E1
- Are failures or 
successes readily 
characterized in terms of 
DC5?
- Are scenarios readily 
characterized in terms of 
DC5?
F1
- Can formal write-ups 
be readily captured 
within DC5 constructs?
2) Can DC5 serve as a 
basis for providing an 
initial assessment of 
distributed cognition 
fitness?
A2
Not Applicable
B2
- Capturing [CE] in 
conjunction with 
Performance [P] is key 
to using DC5 to 
assess DCOGF
C2
- Can interpreting 
observations in terms of 
[P] and [CE] yield a 
good characterization of 
[DCOGF]?
D2
- Asking players for there 
own assessments of 
performance in light of 
crisis conditions. Are their 
answers readily 
interpretable in terms of 
DC5?
E2
- Asking evaluators for 
their assessments of 
performance in light of 
crisis conditions. Are 
their answers readily 
interpretable in terms of 
DC5?
F2
- Can formal write-ups 
be readily captured 
within DC5 constructs?
3) Can DC5 serve as a 
basis for developing 
training scenarios to 
facilitate improvement?
A3
- W hat kind of 
scenarios do players 
think they need to 
work on?
B3
- Use in developing 
scripts
C 3
- W hat kind of scenarios 
do observations indicate 
that require work?
D3
- W hat kind of scenarios do 
players think they need to 
work on?
E3
- W hat kind of scenarios 
do evaluators think they 
need to work on?
F3
- Do formal write-ups 
lead to scenario 
development for future 
training?
4) Can [P] be captured/ 
characterized?
A4
Not Applicable
B4
Not Applicable
C4
- Describe general 
feeling of how UCC  
performed? In light of 
fCEl
D4
- Capture feelings of how 
players thought their UCC  
performed in light of 
conditions
E4
- Capture feelings of 
how evaluators thought 
their U CC  performed in 
light of conditions
F4
- Capture formal write 
ups
Are they interpretable in 
light of [CE1?
5) Can [CE] be
captured/
characterized
A5
Not Applicable
B5
- Characterize scripted 
scenarios [CE] 
explicitly in terms of 
DC5
C 5
- Characterize scenarios 
as they occur [CE] 
explicitly in terms of DC5
D5
- Capture players view of 
scenarios
E5
- Capture evaluators 
view of scenarios
F5
- Capture any formal 
discussion of scenarios 
that may exist in report
6) Does resultant 
D CO G F account for 
measurement influence
A6
- Seek to determine if 
research is 
influencing player’s 
actions
B6
Not applicable
C6
- Seek to determine if 
researcher presence is 
influencing actions of 
players
D6
- Seek to determine if 
research is influencing 
player’s actions
E6
- Seek to determine if 
research is influencing 
evaluator’s actions
F6
Not applicable
Additionally, the constructs of the DC5 framework will guide the substantive 
matter involved in the questionnaires, observation guidance, and evaluation 
reports review.
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It should be noticed at this point that an additional design objective will be 
discussed and implemented also in Appendix III. The additional design objective 
is to incorporate practical design guidance relating to long-interview 
questionnaire development based on the experience of other researchers.
Data Collection and Analysis: Protocol’s Development to Support 
Determination of DC5 Suitability for Distributed Cognition Fitness 
Assessment
The primary challenge governing the development of the data collection 
instruments is that each instrument attempts to collect data in such a way that it 
lends itself to being processed easily into a formal assessment of the fitness of 
the distributed cognition system. The researcher will have to gauge if indeed the 
subsequent data collection effort is complete in capturing relevant data to the 
health of the system. To the extent that data observed does not lend itself to 
being readily assembled into the constructs of the DC5 framework, the 
framework will require adjustment. The primary data sources for this effort will be 
researcher observations, evaluator observations, and formal report write-ups. 
Additional triangulation, pattern matching, and evidence-chain supply may be 
found from pre- and post-player interviews by essentially asking them to explain 
how they think they performed after an exercise. A key facet of the DC5 
framework in this case, captured conceptually as [DCOGF] = [P]/[CE] in Chapter 
III, is interpreting performance in light of the given crisis conditions of a particular 
scenario. Thus observations will have to be geared for looking for such 
interpretations as will interview questions. To the extent observations and
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answers do not fit readily with this approach, the framework will have to be 
adjusted.
Data Collection and Analysis: Protocol’s Development to Support 
Determination of DC5 Suitability as a Basis for Developing Training 
Scenarios
Although data collection instruments, such as the evaluator interviews, 
player interviews, and researcher observations can be designed with this design 
objective in mind (i.e., to Support Determination of DC5 Suitability as a Basis for 
Developing Training Scenarios), the aim is primarily oriented to the analysis 
stage of the effort. Specifically, the assessment will identify areas of strengths 
and weakness within the control center. Scenarios with [CEj’s specific to these 
attributes can then be developed and scripted for the next operational readiness 
exercise which will stress the areas needing improvement. Assessments can 
then be made again to characterize improvement and validate the framework in 
terms of this objective. Given exercise constraints and limited time, scenarios 
will have to be prioritized to facilitate optimal performance improvement (i.e., the 
weak areas will have to be prioritized for training and iterative repetition).
Data Collection and Analysis: Protocol’s Development to Support 
Capturing Performance
This research design objective primarily impacts data collection. 
Performance is readily captured in report ratings, the interpretations of evaluators 
and the researcher, and can be triangulated by eliciting the thoughts of the
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players after an exercise. Of a practical note here is the 5-tier ordinal, 
categorical grading construct used in the Air Force: Outstanding, Excellent, 
Satisfactory, Marginal, and Unsatisfactory. The formal definition of these terms 
from Air Force regulations is supplied in Appendix I, but because they have been 
used recurrently for so long, and not just in operational readiness 
exercise/inspection setting, within the Air Force these terms have become 
institutional vocabulary. It will not be difficult to elicit responses from evaluators 
relating to performance. The key will be following up on such pronouncements 
by having personnel explain their assessments in the context of the crisis 
environment occurring at the time as DC5 suggests.
An additional and important means of descriptively characterizing 
performance will be by comparing the representations being used by the UCC 
over time to the true state of the outside environment, which the researcher will 
have by virtue of having the exercise script. To the extent that representations, 
the so-called heart of cognition discussed in the literature review, displayed, 
discussed, and acted upon deviate from the existing real world environment, 
performance can be descriptively characterized as degraded. It should be noted 
that defining performance in this way necessarily scopes out of consideration the 
decision and action portions of most of the reviewed frameworks. The reason for 
this scoping in the context of this research is one of simply bounding 
accomplishable work. Decision analysis and strategy development and 
implementation are sciences unto themselves and go beyond the scope of this 
research. Focusing on representations themselves allows for the simpler
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definition of performance. To the extent the other constructs, decision and action 
compromise performance even in the presence of well-maintained, accurate 
UCC representations the research will be complemented by the converging 
means of characterizing performance discussed in the previous paragraph.
Given this representational basis for capturing performance a key focus of the 
researcher will have to be on capturing the explicit and implicit representations 
used by the UCC and its individual players using converging data sources.
Data Collection and Analysis: Protocol’s Development to Support 
Capturing the Crisis Environment
The focus in this section will be on developing questionnaires and being 
prepared to observe and capture data in terms of the crisis environment specified 
in the DC5 framework. The script itself can be reviewed by both researcher and 
evaluators to gain a characterization of crisis intensity as proscribed by the 
framework. Player interviews after the fact can be used to triangulate such 
interpretations. Once [CE] is captured using the framework it can be used to 
interpret performance characterizations in terms of distributed cognition system 
fitness.
Data Collection and Analysis: Protocol’s Development to Ensure 
Distributed Cognition Fitness Assessment Does Not Lead to Measurement 
Influence
The key to meeting this objective, primarily one of data collection as 
opposed to data analysis, is for the researcher to follow practical guidelines
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based on the vast experience of other researchers in the development of 
questionnaires to ensure that measurement is as precise and accurate as 
possible. A review of such methods is undertaken in Appendix III where the 
questionnaires themselves are presented.
Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to develop a research design that will 
attempt to validate the proposed DC5 framework, specifically addressing focused 
objective 4 developed in Chapter I. To this end, a description of data sources 
was provided. They were subsequently integrated with specific case study 
design strategies developed to enhance research rigor and soundness. The net 
result was the development and presentation of a research design protocol 
detailing the guidance for developing and deploying design instruments that will 
be used to capture, consolidate, and analyze case data. The instruments 
themselves that flow from this research design and the resulting protocol are 
provided in Appendix III. A final note on data collection is in order. The case 
database will be maintained by the researcher on CD-ROM and, in the case of 
field notes, in a filing system.
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CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS 
Purpose and Organization of Chapter
The purpose of this chapter is to 1) present the data gained from the 
cases, and 2) to present a discussion of the data that leads to the validation or 
modification of the proposed DC5 framework. As discussed in Chapter IV, the 
research approach involved 1) a case study involving an Air Force unit 
conducting two successive operational readiness exercises in preparation for a 
final formal operational readiness inspection, for a total of three case data 
collection iterations, and 2) a second case involving an Air Force unit 
participating in a single operational readiness inspection. Each case and 
iteration presented the opportunity to validate or refine the DC5 framework in 
terms of its usefulness for understanding the distributed cognition phenomena 
occurring in the unit’s control center. Furthermore, the time between the 
successive operational readiness exercises in the first case presented the 
opportunity to further test the framework’s usefulness as a basis for intervention 
by developing an exercise script designed to train control center systems and 
personnel to improve the center’s performance.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 from the last chapter summarize the research design. 
The organization of this chapter will be 1) a brief overview of the case data from 
the first operational readiness exercise involving the first case, 2) a summary of 
findings based on this data, 3) the subsequent refinement of the DC5 framework,
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4) development of the intervening script for the second operational readiness 
inspection, 5) a brief overview of the case data from the second operational 
readiness exercise, 6) a summary of findings from this second exercise, 7) the 
subsequent refinement of the DC5 framework, 8) a brief overview of the case 
data from the operational readiness inspection for the second case, 9) the 
subsequent step of refining the DC5 framework, 10) a brief overview of the case 
data from the final operational readiness inspection for the first case, and 11) the 
subsequent and final iterative refinement of the DC5 framework. The second 
case is inserted between the second and third iterations of the first case in the 
discussion here because that is the position longitudinally in time in which the 
case occurred. The detailed results of the data collection instruments from the 
case iterations upon which the overview summaries presented in this chapter are 
based can be found in the case database.
In the brief overviews of case data for each Operational Readiness 
Exercise or Inspection suggested above, only the key raw findings from the data 
collection instruments relating to distributed cognition will be discussed. Many 
raw findings will have little to do with distributed cognition; for example, data from 
evaluators, participants, and other sources may converge showing that the unit 
being inspected has significant problems across personnel, even control center 
personnel, with safe handling and care of weapons. Such a finding has little to 
do with distributed cognition and will not be presented here. Alternatively, other 
findings will be initially listed and detailed in their raw form in these overviews 
because they represent emergent manifestations of underlying issues relating to
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distributed cognition. Explanation of why such raw findings relate to distributed 
cognition will be provided in the subsequent sections as their impact on the DC5 
framework is presented.
In addition to the narrative discussion that follows, after the review of each 
Operational Readiness Exercise or Operational Readiness Inspection, the 
iterative refinement of the DC5 framework will be captured by 1) rewriting Table
3.1, Crisis Environment Effects on DC5 Subsystem Performance and 2) 
redrawing Figure 3.4, DC5 Theoretical Framework. The former captures the 
specific impacts of the crisis environment on distributed cognition phenomena 
while the latter captures the interrelationships and definitions key to the 
framework’s development.
Finally, as the case data is analyzed and used to validate each individual 
cell within the progressively refined tables that follow, the researcher will provide 
a qualitative assessment regarding the degree to which the data converges with 
the proposed theory. The intent is to distinguish, only at the ordinal level, the 
degree of such convergence within the case database; it became apparent as 
analysis began, that in some instances such convergence was of a much greater 
degree than in others in which it was indeed still present, and in others still where 
little or no convergence was noted. This assessment will be based on the 1) 
degree to which the data converges itself; that is a variety of data sources concur 
that a finding is accurate and 2) the degree to which that finding confirms the 
impact of the crisis environment on distributed cognition phenomena as 
suggested by the DC5 framework. An assessment rating of “Considerable
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Convergence” will be given those cells in which 1) a large majority, that is at least 
2/3rds of informants who have insight into the particular issue, agree that a 
particular issue was noteworthy and 2) the noted effect aligns with that predicted 
by the DC5 framework. An assessment rating of “Notable Convergence” will be 
given those cells in which 1) a simple majority, that is more than 50% of 
informants having insight into an issue, find it noteworthy and 2) it aligns with 
some of the particular effect suggested by the DC5 framework but not all of it, in 
other word the data suggests some but not all predicted effects as well as some 
non-predicted effects. If the data suggest some non-predicted effects according 
the fractions of observing informants suggested above the appropriate level of 
convergence will be noted and appropriate modification to the DC5 framework 
will be presented. Finally, in many instances there may be no intersection 
between the predicted effects and the given case scenarios; a particular crisis 
element may not be experienced during the evaluation or inspection. In this case 
the provided assessment will be “no intersection with DC5 constructs.”
Overview of Data from Case 1 ,1st Operational Readiness Exercise
This overview of the case data from the first operational readiness 
exercise (ORE) will include 1) an introduction to the specific setting in which the 
ORE occurred and a description of the unit participating in the ORE, 2) a listing 
describing the key events of the ORE as seen by the researcher and other 
evaluators, 3) and a summary of the raw findings obtained after an analysis 
performed by the researcher and other evaluators. Afterwards, in subsequent
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analysis, this information will be analyzed as suggested by the research 
methodology and design.
The Setting of the First Case
In developing a schedule and plan of preparation for their April 2006 
formal Operational Readiness Inspection to be conducted by Air Combat 
Command’s (ACC) Inspector General (IG) team, the executive officer, who works 
directly for the wing commander -  the head of the unit to be inspected, was 
referred by members of the inspector general team to the researcher. The unit 
was seeking 1) someone who could aid in developing and implementing ORE 
scripts similar to those the IG would use in the formal inspection and 2) someone 
who could aid specifically in improving the performance of the wing’s Survival 
Recovery Center (SRC). The entire wing had originally been inspected in May 
2005 and two specific functional component performance areas were found to be 
below ACC standards, one of those being the performance of the survival 
recovery center. As a result, the deficient areas were scheduled for the re­
inspection in a limited (i.e., not the entire wing) ORI scenario by the IG in May 
2006.
With regard to the deficient performance of the SRC in the original May 
2005 ORI, the formal inspection report cites the following recommended areas 
for improvement: 1) the SRC did not have redundant procedures for sector chiefs 
during relocation operations causing a 1-hour and 30-minute delay in post attack 
reconnaissance team release, 2) Lack of status boards to track contaminated
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personnel and equipment did not allow a quick reference for the Wing Operating 
Center commander, 3) the SRC did not have all functional squadrons 
represented in the SRC halting critical post-attack assessments, 4) the SRC did 
not utilize appropriate functions during post-attack assessment to advise the 
commander, 5) Sector representatives in the SRC did not retrieve and report 
post-attack assessments to readiness representative, 6) the SRC did not 
prioritize facility damage IAW Base X-Plan priority list, 7) the SRC did not track 
Airfield Damage Repair or status of repairs on the airfield, 8) Unexploded 
Ordnance (UXO) prioritizing and plotting was confusing and took too much time, 
holding up the mission, 9) the Base went alarm green MOPP 2 general release 
without UXOs identified on the base grid map, 10) the SRC plotted one UXO four 
times and held up recovery operations, 11) the SRC was unaware of a cleared 
UXO until 9 hours after clearance, and 12) the SRC relied heavily on the base 
attack recovery tracking system (BARTS) computer message board not utilizing 
functional representatives in the SRC.
It was in light of these difficulties and the desire to correct them that the 
wing sought help from the IG as they prepared for their May 2006 re-inspection. 
Thus the researcher and the wing executive officer, acting in his position as head 
of the wing’s exercise evaluation team, met prior to the ORE in November 2005 
and scripted the exercise. After some discussion, it was decided that given the 
extent of the deficiencies in the SRC and another completely separate, functional 
area with problems cited by the IG, the primary focus of the script should be first, 
on allowing the wing to start slowly and begin to re-learn basic task-executional-
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proficiency in these areas and 2) provide enough intensity to gain a measure of 
where these areas stood in terms of performance that assessments and future 
training regimens could be established. To generalize, the operative analogous 
phrase used to describe this idea was “you have to walk before you can run.”
The Key Events of the First Case: The Script as Implemented
In terms of the intensity of the script, suggestive of the pace of events and 
scale of events of the DC5 framework developed in Chapter III, on the first day of 
the exercise this amounted to 1) a false alarm of an inbound enemy missile to 
allow the unit to begin slowly and gain a feel for executing wartime response 
procedures, 2) an inbound missile attack resulting in a broad range of differing 
impacts across the base play area, 3) a small narrowly focused small ground 
based aggressor attack with minimal damage 4) a focused missile attack 
resulting in extensive damage to a single building/organization while the rest of 
the base remained unscathed, and 5) relatively limited damage from a nighttime 
missile attack. On the second day of the exercise the script consisted of 1) one 
widely impacting missile impact, 2) one focused, limited missile attack and 3) one 
limited small ground attack by aggressors. It should be noted that after reaching 
a consensus with evaluators at the end of the first day, the evaluator team chief 
and the researcher scaled the script back even further as another area of unit 
performance outside of command and control was found to be significantly 
deficient in terms of performance as to require near remedial training by
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evaluators. Training which was determined could best be accomplished with a 
very light script intensity in terms of attack intensity.
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The Raw Results of the First Case -  First ORE
Drawing on the case data from the data collection instruments described 
in Chapter IV, specifically the interviews/discussions with players and evaluators, 
the final exercise report, and the researchers notes, convergence seemed to 
emerge around the following raw findings to be discussed in further detail below:
1) contextually, the deficient performance of a key area outside that of command 
and control, the focus of this research, limited to a degree the ability to stress the 
survival recovery center, 2) control and tracking of Post-Attack Reconnaissance 
(PAR) teams was weak and non-expeditious, 3) the unit’s implementation of an 
innovative computerized message board system greatly facilitated command and 
control while introducing some novel challenges to control center, 4) some 
improvement in the use of visual aids would facilitate a quicker processing of 
information by control center personnel and 5) distribution of imminent attack 
information could be improved. Further description and elaboration on these 
points is provided below in raw terms as they emerge from the collection 
instruments. Actual refined discussion of their interpretation in terms of the 
proposed DC5 framework will follow in the next section. A more exhaustive 
review of the data collected during the case and the degree, or lack of thereof, of 
data convergence on particular issues is presented in summary form in Appendix 
V, Case 1 Data Results using the questions of the data collection instruments as 
a means of presenting and summarizing the results of each individual data 
collection effort.
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As described in the discussion on the setting of the exercise, a key area of 
unit performance separate and outside that of the survival recovery center was 
found to be deficient during a formal inspection in May of 2005. As a result, 
when the terms of evaluation were negotiated for the re-inspection to take place 
in May of 2006, the vast majority of the unit’s functions that were found to meet 
or exceed Air Force standards were eliminated from the re-inspection. Therefore 
contextually, the value of the exercise to training the control center, and as result 
to this research was somewhat limited because 1) the amount of participants, 
organizations, buildings, and infrastructure involved in the exercise and therefore 
available to be damaged stressing command and control was limited and 2) the 
other deficient area referred to here required enough significant attention from 
senior leadership and evaluators that the ability to focus on the control center 
was limited. This point was 1) noted by the researcher throughout preparation 
and execution of the exercise, 2) was specifically cited by several players in the 
control center as well as senior leaders during the exercise in the course of 
conversation and during post-exercise interviews, 3) and was noted by several 
evaluators during and after the exercise. Convergence on this point is clear.
Following any type of attack on an air base, including missile, bomb, or 
mortar impact or physical or small arms ground attack by combatants, a post­
attack reconnaissance (PAR) sweep of the base land area and assets is 
conducted. In general, a PAR sweep involves the release of teams in sectors of 
the base who then sweep there area of responsibility looking for damage, 
casualties, accounting for personnel, unexploded ordnance and any other areas
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or causes for concern. As the PAR teams complete their sweeps and up- 
channel the information the SRC collects and assembles the information into 
displays, messages, and prioritized visual aids eventually assembling a picture of 
the base for senior leadership to act on in terms of returning some normalcy to 
operations. Both the researcher based on experience and senior evaluators 
agreed PAR information was 1) not being collected fast enough 2) not flowing to 
the control center fast enough and 3) the PAR teams were not being controlled or 
perhaps pushed or motivated to accomplish their tasks quickly and proficiently 
enough. The impact of this general slowness was that unit leadership was 
unable to return the unit to some sense of normal operations, or launching of 
aircraft, in an expeditious manner. The observations of the researcher and 
evaluators were made both during and following the exercise. Similar 
convergence on the issue was noted in the discussion of control center 
personnel as they waited for an extended period for information to flow. Some 
improvement was seen over the course of the exercise but the deficiency was 
significant enough to see the issue repeatedly cited in the final report.
The unit had developed a computerized message board system that 
allowed the survival recovery center, subordinate unit control centers, and indeed 
anyone with limited password-controlled access to the base network the ability to 
monitor any information being posted throughout the unit. Such information 
included attack damage, threat intelligence, recovery operations, unit status, 
personnel accountability, and other general information wing leadership or others 
wished to communicate. The speed with which the information was posted and
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read, in the judgment of the author, was much faster than typical verbal, phone 
and radio based communication and limited only by the speed and diligence by 
of the posters and readers. Convergence on the strength of this artifact of the 
unit’s command and control system was of lesser degree than other key findings 
cited here, primarily because other evaluators lacked the command and control 
evaluation experience to compare it to general standards of performance of other 
units and their systems. To the extent evaluators other than the researcher 
observed the system in action they were positive. Unit leadership was both 
happy with the capability of the system and its performance and considered its 
innovation and development a point of pride. It should be noted that when the 
survival recovery center was formally evaluated by the ACC IG team in May 
2005, some areas for improvement relating to the system were noted.
Specifically cited was an over-reliance on the system to the negation of using 
control room personnel to distribute, interpret, and analyze information. In the 
researcher’s opinion this observation, also noted in the November 2005 ORE, 
represents implementation issues associated with the system more than a lack of 
convergence on the attributes of the system as positively or negatively impacting 
performance. As more detailed discussion of the specific issues cited by the IG 
team lends itself to framing questions associated with the DC5 framework, it will 
be covered in the next section.
The control room visual aids could have been improved. Cited by both the 
researcher and the evaluation team chief, these included 1) adding a large base 
map in the survival recovery center with damage plotted by type for easy referral
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by unit leadership and control center personnel would have led to quicker more 
accurate understanding of events and reaction times and, 2) a visual aid with an 
easily readable listing of damage prioritized for response should have been used. 
While noted primarily by the researcher in his observations, some convergence 
on this point in discussions with control room personnel and wing leadership 
existed.
Finally, executing key command and control functions in disseminating 
essential imminent attack and threat information needed improvement. These 
mistakes in the execution included general slowness or ineptness in using 
information distribution systems to indicate changes in threat/alarm conditions 
from the control center to the unit at large. Specifically, outdoor loudspeakers 
were slow in passing on key timely information regarding attack, frequently the 
speaker stumbled on her words or misspoke, and use of flags to indicate threat 
condition was slow and incorrectly executed. The researcher’s notes, 
observations of other evaluators, the final exercise report, and to a lesser extent, 
discussion with control center and leadership personnel, all converged on the 
importance and accuracy of these observations.
Analysis of First Case Key Findings
The analysis of the case data from the first case will consist of three parts. 
As discussed in Chapter IV, the research design/analysis will follow two tracks: 1) 
the first being interpreting the emergent converging themes of the case data into 
those supporting the DC5 framework as the theory was developed in Chapter III
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and those supporting modification of or incongruity with the framework. This first 
track analysis will then be applied by modifying the DC5 framework accordingly.
2) The second track of the research design will involve using the DC5 framework 
and the case data to characterize the crisis environment in order to develop a 
fitness assessment based on the DC5 framework. This assessment in turn will 
be used to develop the crisis environment for the second ORE, for the unit in 
question with the hope that the framework will prove its usefulness by serving as 
training tool for such control centers.
Before either of these discussion tracks begins some critical reflection on 
expectations developed regarding the research versus the reality of what was 
found and the resulting impact on the research is in order and follows thusly.
Researcher Expectations vs. Case Realities
The gap seen by the researcher between prior expectations for the 
research and the reality of the first case after reflecting upon it, focus around the 
impact of the limitations of the ORE setting on the ability to completely apply the 
developed research design for validating the DC5 framework. As discussed in 
the previous section, the ACC/IG team inspected the unit that was the subject of 
the case in May of 2005 and two key areas of performance, one being the SRC, 
were rated as below standard and scheduled for re-inspection in May of 2006. 
This re-inspection would involve only those portions of the unit that had been 
rated poorly and as a result a significant fraction of the unit would not be playing 
in the retake. This scenario, which would also be used for the OREs conducted
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by the unit in preparation for the formal ORI, then necessarily impacted the ability 
to stress the SRC because a significant fraction of the information flow generated 
during the exercise would disappear or be greatly minimized by the lack of 
playing sub-units.
This lack of play impacted the research in three ways. 1) Because only 
one other significant section of the unit was playing in the ORE, the diversity of 
sources and disciplines generating information was limited. Specifically, this 
limited the ability to collect data relating 1) to the DC5 construct of coordination 
as a key system of the control center and 2) to the ability to create a crisis 
environment demanding the integration of diverse expertises in the control 
center. As a result, in the analysis that follows, relating to the interpretive 
research approach, track one, of the research design, interpretation in terms of 
DC5 constructs, little is postulated in this area. In addition to limiting the ability to 
create a crisis environment testing integration of diverse information flows, the 
limited size of the scenario, to a lesser extent, also limited the ability to stress the 
SRC with information overflow. Although the SRC was stressed and case data 
indicates such, this additional source of stress was not available. Finally, as a 
result of the scenario limitations, track 2 of the research design, developing a 
fitness assessment and subsequent training crisis environments, was also 
impacted.
Despite these limitations specifically detailed above and given that their 
impact upon the research is precisely cited, the case data and the research
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design remains viable for interpreting, testing, and validating the remainder of the 
DC5 framework as well as for proving the remainder’s usefulness.
Track 1: Interpretation of Case Data: Emergent Converging Themes and the 
DC5 Framework
The first track of the research design seeks to show the actual usefulness 
of the DC5 framework for interpreting the observed distributed cognition 
phenomena. To the extent emerging observations readily converge with 
suggested theory the framework has demonstrated its holistic (i.e., nomological) 
validity as well as its specific construct validity. To the extent emerging 
observations do not readily converge with the suggested theory then the 
framework has demonstrated the need for modification or further study. Table
5.1, mirroring Table 3.1, Crisis Environment Effects on DC5 Subsystem 
Performance, which described in detail the theoretical impacts of crisis conditions 
on distributed cognition phenomena, provides the organization for the detailed 
discussion which follows regarding: 1) the areas in which emergent observations 
from case 1 converged with suggested framework constructs and their 
interaction, 2) diverged from the suggested theory, 3) required modification to the 
suggested theory, or 3) remained ambiguous with regards to the suggested 
theory. Table 5.2, Case 1 Implications for DC5 Framework, based on the 
framework of Table 5.1 summarizes the researcher’s assessment of the case 
data and its implications for the DC5 framework. An exhaustive discussion of 
how these assessments were reached for each cell in Table 5.2 is provided in 
Appendix VI.
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Table 5.1: Crisis Environment Effects on DC5 Subsystem Performance (Reprint of Table 3.1)
S1. Autonomous 
Units
S2. Coordination S3. Control S3*. Monitoring S4. Intelligence S5. Identity Context
Real Crisis 
Pressure 
(Potential for 
adverse 
organization 
outcomes + 
inducement of 
stress)
- System self­
doubt might 
increase
- Sensitivities to 
stimulus 
increased
-Focus changes
- Differences amplified
- Acquiesce to 
consensus
- M ay not seek 
consensus
- Pressure S1 to 
provide more 
information and S2 
to process more 
information
- Increase 
demands on S4 for 
implementable 
solution
- Must determine if 
S 1 ’s are handling 
pressure 
appropriately
- Demand more 
information to get 
representation 
right
- Seek more 
confidence in 
representation before 
selecting alternatives
- Selection/
decision/action goes to 
the organization core 
so balance is less 
routine
- Increase 
focus/pressure 
may cause HOV  
to be ignored
- Increase 
pressure on 
individual systems 
may cause loss of 
IS with other 
systems
-S ta ff  
competence 
directly impacted
- Leadership 
directly impacted
Complexity: 
Demand For 
High Levels Of 
Specialized 
Expertise
- Ability to 
correctly inquire 
about data 
increasingly 
challenged
- Possible increased 
demand between 
systems
- Must ascertain 
when S1 has 
become 
overwhelmed
- Must ascertain 
when S1 is no 
longer up to 
environmental 
demands
- Ability to 
interpret data 
increasingly 
challenged
- Required to adjust 
decision making 
approach based on 
known lack of 
knowledge
-S ta ff
competence up to 
the task 
- Leadership 
increasing S1 
performance
Complexity: 
Demand for 
Integrated 
Expertise
- Ability to 
correctly inquire 
about data 
increasingly 
challenged
- Challenged with 
knowing who needs to be 
involved in processing 
information
- Must ensure 
coordination is 
functional
- Must ascertain if 
S2 is no longer 
capable of meeting 
requirements
- Ability to 
interpret data 
increasingly 
challenged
- Required to adjust 
decision making 
approach based on 
known lack of 
knowledge
- HO V and IS 
crucial
- SC  and 
Leadership also 
important
Complexity-
Novelty
unknowability
- Ability to 
correctly inquire 
about data 
increasingly 
challenged
- Can recognize 
when more data 
collection is 
fruitless
- Can recognize 
when more data 
collection is 
fruitless
- Required to adjust 
decision making 
approach based on 
known lack of 
knowledge
Complexity- 
Novelty 
number of 
entities
- Ability to track 
and process data 
challenged 
because of 
volume
- Ability to
coordinate/assimilate 
data challenged because 
of volume
- Can recognize 
when systems 
becoming 
overwhelmed
- Must ascertain if 
S 1’s and S2 up to 
task/replaceable
- Ability to 
interpret data 
increasingly 
challenged
- Required to adjust 
decision making 
approach based on 
known lack of 
knowledge
- Flexibility key
- Redundancy 
may prevent 
processing errors
Complexity- 
Novelty 
pace of events
- Ability to 
receive and 
process data 
challenged
- Ability to process data 
challenged
- Increase demand  
for a timely plan of 
action
- Must ascertain if 
S1's and S2 up to 
task/replaceable
- Ability to 
interpret data 
increasingly 
challenged
- Senses need to act 
quickly
- Redundancy 
may prevent 
processing errors
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Table 5.2: Case 1 Results: Convergence between DC5 Framework and Emergent Themes
S1.
Autonomous
Units
S2. Coordination S3. Control S3*. Monitoring S4. Intelligence S5. Identity Context
Real Crisis 
Pressure 
(Potential for 
adverse 
organization 
outcomes + 
inducement 
of stress)
Notable
Convergence
Insufficient Data Considerable
Convergence
Notable
Convergence and
Modification
needed
Considerable
Convergence
and
Modification
needed
Considerable
Convergence
Not Validated/
Insufficient
Data
Complexity: 
Demand For 
High Levels 
Of
Specialized
Expertise
Insufficient
Data
Insufficient Data Notable
Convergence
Notable
Convergence
and
Modification
needed
Insufficient Data Notable
Convergence
Notable
Convergence
Complexity: 
Demand for 
Integrated 
Expertise
Insufficient
Data
Insufficient Data Insufficient Data Insufficient Data Insufficient Data Insufficient
Data
Insufficient
Data
Complexity-
Novelty
unknowability
Insufficient
Data
Insufficient Data Insufficient Data Notable
Convergence
Complexity- 
Novelty: 
number of 
entities
Considerable
Convergence
Considerable
Convergence
Notable
Convergence
Notable
Convergence/
MODIFICATION
NEEDED
Notable
Convergence/
MODIFICATION
NEEDED
Notable
Convergence
Considerable
Convergence
Complexity- 
Novelty 
pace of 
events
Considerable
Convergence
Considerable
Convergence
Considerable
Convergence
Considerable
Convergence/
MODIFICATION
NEEDED
Considerable
Convergence
MODIFICATION
NEEDED
Considerable
Convergence
Considerable
Convergence
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Track 1, Case 1: Summary of Case Data versus DC5 Framework
The key points seen arising from the first case in terms of validating the 
DC5 framework are 1) the limitations of the narrowness of the scenario resulted 
in a significant portion of the framework not being able to be validated, as 
detailed in the discussion and Table 5.2, positively or negatively, 2) A significant 
portion of the framework was indeed validated; case data and key findings were 
readily interpretable by DC5 constructs and relationships, again as detailed in the 
discussion and in Table 5.2, 3) the case readily demonstrated that as crisis 
conditions intensified the ability for the S3 control sub-system to perform the 
audit, fire, and replace functions became less realistic of an option; because of 
the crisis constraints, the distributed cognition system is stuck with the 
subsystems it enters the crisis with to great extent, and finally 4) assessing the 
relative importance of incoming information, distinguishing signal from noise, is a 
vital part of the intelligence function, S4, of distributed cognition system functions 
in crisis conditions.
Table 5.3 captures the modifications suggested by the latter two points 
above as does Figure 5.4. The functions of S3* are reflected in S3 as they still 
represent real responsibility for S3 but as the ability to performed detailed audit 
like investigations become limited, the separate functional subsystem is 
eliminated. Additionally, the S4 system is updated emphasizing the importance 
of assessing the relative importance of incoming information as crisis conditions 
intensify.
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The next step in applying the research design will be initiating track 2, 
attempting to use the framework to characterize crisis environment, control 
center fitness, performance, and develop a script accordingly for the next ORE, 
all in an effort to demonstrate the usefulness of the DC5 framework.
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Table 5.3a: Crisis Environment Effects on DC5 Subsystem Performance - Modifications from Case 1, Track 1 - 
First ORE
S1. Autonomous Units S2. Coordination S3. Control S4. Intelligence S5. Identity Context
Real Crisis 
Pressure 
(Potential for 
adverse 
organization 
outcomes + 
inducement 
of stress)
- System self-doubt 
might increase
- Sensitivities to stimulus 
increased
- Focus changes
- Differences 
amplified
- Acquiesce to 
consensus
- May not seek 
consensus
- Pressure S1 to provide 
more information and S2 
to process more 
information
- Increase demands on 
S4 for implementable 
solution
- Must determine if S 1 ’s 
are handling pressure 
appropriately
- Demand more 
information to get 
representation right
- Heightened 
awareness of need 
to assess the 
relative importance 
of information
- Seek more 
confidence in 
representation before 
selecting alternatives
- Selection/ 
decision/action goes 
to the organization 
core so balance is 
less routine
- Increase focus/pressure 
may cause H O V  to be 
ignored
- Increase pressure on 
individual systems may cause 
loss of IS with other systems
- Staff competence directly 
impacted
- Leadership directly 
impacted
Complexity: 
Demand For 
High Levels 
Of
Specialized
Expertise
- Ability to correctly 
inquire about data 
increasingly challenged
- Possible 
increased demand  
between systems
- Must ascertain when 
S1 has become 
overwhelmed
- Must ascertain when 
S1 is no longer up to 
environmental demands
- Ability to interpret 
data increasingly 
challenged
- Required to adjust 
decision making 
approach based on 
known lack of 
knowledge
- Staff competence up to the 
task
- Leadership increasing S1 
performance
Complexity: 
Demand for 
Integrated 
Expertise
- Ability to correctly 
Inquire about data 
increasingly challenged
- Challenged with 
knowing who 
Needs to be 
involved in 
processing 
information
- Must ensure 
coordination is functional 
-Must ascertain if S2 is 
no longer capable of 
meeting requirements
- Ability to interpret 
data increasingly 
challenged
- Required to adjust 
decision making 
approach based on 
known lack of 
knowledge
- HO V and IS crucial
- SC  and Leadership also 
important
Complexity-
Novelty
unknowability
- Ability to correctly 
inquire about data 
increasingly challenged
- Can recognize when 
more data collection is 
fruitless
- Can recognize 
when more data 
collection is 
fruitless
- Required to adjust 
decision approach 
based on known lack 
of knowledge
Complexity- 
Novelty 
number of 
entities
- Ability to track and 
process data challenged 
because of volume
- Ability to 
coordinate/assimila 
te data challenged 
because of volume
- Can recognize when 
systems becoming 
overwhelmed
- Must ascertain if S1's 
and S2 up to 
task/replaceable
- Ability to interpret 
data increasingly 
challenged
- Heightened 
awareness of need 
to assess relative 
importance of 
information
- Required to adjust 
decision making 
approach based on 
known lack of 
knowledge
- Flexibility key
- Redundancy m ay prevent 
processing errors
Complexity- 
Novelty 
pace of 
events
- Ability to receive and 
process data challenged
- Ability to process 
data challenged
- Increase demand for a 
timely plan of action
- Must ascertain if S1 ’s 
and S2 up to 
task/replaceable
- Ability to interpret 
data increasingly 
challenged
- Heightened 
awareness of need 
to assess relative 
importance of 
information
- Senses need to act 
quickly
- Redundancy m ay prevent 
processing errors
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Figure 5.4a: Updated DC5 Theoretical Framework after Modifications from analysis of Case 1, Track 1 -  First ORE
[CE] * [DC5F]
A  t___________________________
Crisis Environment
Potential for Negative 
Outcomes
Induces Organizational 
Stress
Challenging Levels of 
Complexity:
Demand for integration 
of dependent m  
specialized gffe
knowledges ^
Demand for amount, 
type and degree of 
specialized knowledge
Novelty
o Unknowability 
o Number of 
entities 
o Pace of 
events
S y s t e m  o f  I n t e r e s t :  D i s t r i b u t e d  c o g n i t i o n  p r o c e s s e s  i n  c o n t r o l  c e n t e r s  f u n c t i o n i n g  i n  c r i s i s  
e n v i r o n m e n t s
s (see 
3.1)
n formation flow
5. Identity/Policy: Intended Purpose: 
facilitate construction of representations of 
outside environment in order to continuously 
respond successfully in meeting higher 
organizations purpose.
4. Intelligence: Intended Purpose: 
Develop/adapt representations. Assess 
relative importance of inflowing information.
t e n s i o n :  " e x p l o r a t i o n  v s .  e x p l o i t a t i o n ”, 
“m o r e  i n f o r m a t i o n  v s .  t i m e l y  a l t e r n a t i v e s ”, 
“r e s p o n s e / e x p e c t a t i o n s ”
3. Control: Intended Purpose: Operational 
control of control center
1. Autonomous Units: Specialized 
Expertises, Communicators, Technologies, 
Artifacts.
System
Context
Horizon of 
Visibility
Intersubjectivity
Staff
com petence
Leadership
Flexibility
Redundancy
Coordination
Bringing
together
diverse
incoming data
sets and
appropriate
expertises.
[p]
i
Results
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Track 2: Using the DC5 Framework for Training
Track 2 of the research design focuses on demonstrating the usefulness 
of the DC5 framework for developing training scripts over time for successive 
OREs to improve the performance of an SRC. Specifically a characterization of 
a scripted crisis environment, [CE], in DC5 terms can be drawn from an ORE 
script and compared to a characterization of the performance [P] of an SRC 
during that ORE and a DC5 fitness assessment [DC5F] can be generated. The 
DC5F in turn then can be used to develop the next script specifically targeting 
areas of the control center for improvement.
The analysis that follows is organized first, into characterizing the crisis 
environment from the script of the first ORE, second, around developing a 
characterization of the performance of the SRC observed in the ORE, third, 
around comparing these first two characterizations to develop the fitness 
assessment of the Case 1 SRC and lastly, into developing a script for the next 
ORE specifically designed to maximize the training value of the ORE to the SRC. 
If performance improvements are seen overtime in the unit’s final ORI, then 
some credit could be given to the use of DC5 framework for scripting purposes.
Before accomplishing this analysis and after reflecting upon the case data 
from the first case, the researcher believes a few critical comments are in order. 
First, this approach, similarly to Trackl is impacted significantly by the limitations 
of the setting and second and more generally, the merits of the criticism that the 
approach is overly sophisticated for the problem of developing training scripts.
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The narrowness of the overall ORE setting, specifically the large fraction 
of the unit not participating in the ORE, as previously discussed, limits the ability 
to develop scenarios fully testing the SRC. As such, any qualitative crisis 
environment [CE] characterization will be also be narrow and in turn comparison 
with performance [P] characterizations will lead to narrow fitness profiles [DC5F] 
and narrow successive ORE scripts. The two responses to such criticism are 1) 
that it is valid, but if such limitations are used in developing conclusions and 
modifications to the DC5, then the best that can be done with the given case is 
being done, and 2) the effort of going through the process suggested by Track 2 
should develop a more sophisticated and refined understanding of distributed 
cognition, the DC5 framework, and its implications. Further discussion along 
these lines and the researcher’s lessons learned regarding case selection are 
provided in Chapter VI.
More generally, some may argue that a degree of sophistication is being 
applied to a problem that doesn’t merit it or require it. A good script can be 
developed by an experienced evaluator simply by reviewing a previous exercise 
report and applying that experience rather than going through such steps. The 
researcher wholeheartedly agrees with this statement but argues that the 
process being applied tacitly by such an experienced evaluator, if made more 
explicit, essentially becomes the process of track 2. The sophistication being 
applied in articulating such a process allows for a better understanding of 
distributed cognition phenomena by more people and thus facilitates better script 
writing.
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Characterizing the Crisis Environment in the First Case
The crisis environment as specified in the DC5 framework is shown in 
Figure 5.5: Crisis Environment Specification. Qualitatively characterizing the 
crisis environment in the first case requires detailing the individual crisis 
scenarios according to the DC5 framework.
Figure 5.5: Crisis Environment Specification
Crisis Environment
Potential for Negative 
Outcomes/Induces 
Organizational 
Stress
Challenging Levels of 
Complexity:
Demand for integration 
of dependent 
specialized knowledge
Demand for amount, 
type and degree of 
specialized knowledge
Novelty
o Unknowability 
o Number of 
entities 
o Pace of 
events
As described in the section on the Case 1 ORE setting the script on the 
first day of the exercise amounted to: 1) a false alarm of an inbound enemy
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missile to allow the unit to begin slowly and gain a feel for executing wartime 
response procedures, 2) an inbound missile attack resulting in a broad range of 
differing impacts across the base play area, 3) a small narrowly focused ground 
based aggressor attack with minimal damage 4) a focused missile attack 
resulting in extensive damage to a single building/organization while the rest of 
the base remained unscathed, and 5) a relatively limited damage from a 
nighttime missile attack. On the second day of the exercise the script consisted 
of 1) one widely impacting missile impact, 2) one focused, limited missile attack 
and 3) one limited small ground attack by aggressors. As detailed in the setting 
description the second day’s script was altered mid-course as it was decided by 
the evaluating team chief and a consensus of evaluators that a deficient area of 
unit performance outside of command and control in the SRC required urgent 
attention and training time. Thus only the first day’s events will be characterized 
here.
In terms of potential for negative outcomes, the pressure was constant 
once an attack and recovery phase was underway. UCC personnel were aware 
that when an attack started, the potential for making errors that would lead the 
unit astray, disappoint leadership, or disappoint themselves was much more 
likely. As a result organizational stress was induced. In the larger in-depth and 
in-breadth attacks more such stress was induced due to awareness that the 
potential for error was higher than anticipated. Interpreting performance 
characterizations must be done in terms of the timing of the key events from non-
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stress inducing, to some stress inducing, to significant stress inducing in the 
script leading to the performance observations.
As detailed in the description of the setting of the ORE in Case 1, the 
demand for integration of multiple disciplines and the demand for a high degree 
of expertise in any single discipline were limited by the lack of unit sub­
organizations participating in the exercise. The SRC provided a means of 
processing scenarios that were rather simplistic for the control center personnel.
The complexity involved in the ORE however, was due to the pace of 
events involved in the exercise. The attacks in breadth proscribed by the ORE 
script relate well to the specification in the development of the DC5 framework of 
complexity due to pace of events. Essentially an attack, missile or ground threat, 
that struck in small measure across the play area led to a series of rapid fire 
phone calls being made to the SRC as organizations called in damage impacts 
and then called in resulting secondary events, casualties, fuel spills, etc. This in 
turn required the SRC to juggle the posting and understanding of more events 
and do it more rapidly. More stress was also generated as personnel had to 
focus stronger attention on assessing importance of inflowing information and 
notifying the wing commander accordingly.
Complexity also arose out of the scale of events involved in “in-depth” 
attacks. In these attacks, missile or ground, a single localized impact would be 
extensive, (i.e. resulting in fires, craters, casualties, unexploded ordnance, 
mission impacts aircraft damage, and local evacuations). As it was noted in the 
previous section, a key difference seen in the cognitive processing of these
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events, as opposed to those more characterized as being complex as result of 
the pace of events, is the required amount of sorting information out from 
overlapping reports as opposed to merely juggling issues and responses. In 
evaluating the coming characterization of DC5 performance, it must be specified 
which type of attack, pace dependent or scale dependent, was incurred.
As described in the previous discussion, no scenarios were provided by 
the scripted events that represented complexity characterized by unknowability; 
researcher and evaluators agreed all scenarios were imminently understandable 
given time and reasonable study given the exercise constraints. The unit 
personnel themselves generated some temporary unknowability for the 
leadership due to the slowness of the PAR teams.
Figure 5.7, Crisis Environment Characterization for Case 1, summarizes 
the characterization of the crisis environment from Case 1.
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Figure 5.7: Crisis Environment Characterization for Case 1
Crisis Environment
Potential for Negative Outcomes/Induces 
Organizational Stress: Generally, elevated stress 
throughout the exercise, due to stress of inspection 
training, previous poor results, and embarrassment that 
may result from errors
Challenging Levels of Complexity:
Demand for integration of dependent 
specialized knowledge: none
Demand for amount, type and degree of 
specialized knowledge: none to little
Novelty
o Unknowability: none to little 
o Number of entities: during in “in-depth” 
attacks
o Pace of events: during in “in-breadth 
attacks”
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Case 1 Performance Characterization
As it was previously discussed in the section on the raw findings of the 
first case, characterizations of SRC performance converge around four main 
points: 1) the message board system, BARTS, developed and implemented by 
the unit to transfer, present, and store information, proved valuable in allowing 
the unit to develop a timely understanding of post-attack environments while 
presenting interesting challenges to control center personnel, 2) control and 
tracking of Post-Attack Reconnaissance (PAR) teams was weak and non- 
expeditious and needed improvement, 3) use of visual displays in the SRC could 
use improvement, and 4) the expeditious and accurate distribution of imminent 
attack information needed improvement. Overall, evaluators, the researcher, and 
team members agreed the performance would have barely been satisfactory in 
the eyes of ACC’s inspector general team.
DC5 Fitness Assessment
The objective of this portion of the research design is to understand these 
responses in light of the crisis environment characterization to gain an overall 
assessment of the UCCs DC5 fitness. As such, each of the DC5 subsystems will 
be discussed in terms of the four raw findings and in terms of the crisis 
environment characterization.
Table 5.6, S1 DC5 Fitness Assessment, illustrates the assessment of the 
S1 subsystems in light of the crisis environment and observed findings. 
Specifically, future exercises will need to create environments that force the STs
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to aid in assessing the relative importance of information and environments that 
stress the specific S1’s that were cited for not performing proficiently.
Table 5.7, the S2 DC5 Fitness Assessment, illustrates the assessment of 
the S2 subsystem in light of the crisis environment and observed findings. 
Specifically, future exercises will need to create environments that motivate the 
SRC to build and maintain better displays of information facilitating coordinated 
understanding of and response to emerging circumstances. BARTS, in particular 
makes the actual act of coordinating much easier by ensuring the same post 
attack data is readily available to all responsible for understanding such data and 
acting on it.
Table 5.8, the S3 DC5 Fitness Assessment, illustrates the assessment of 
the S3 subsystem in light of the crisis environment and observed findings. 
Specifically, future exercises will need to create environments that force S3 to 
ensure information importance is being assessed, PAR teams are performing 
well, and better displays are being used.
Table 5.9, the S4 DC5 Fitness Assessment, illustrates the assessment of 
the S4 subsystem in light of the crisis environment and observed findings. 
Specifically, future exercises will need to create environments that force S4 to 
assess information importance, to insist on more timely response from PAR 
teams, and to insist on better displays.
Table 5.10, the S5 DC5 Fitness Assessment, illustrates the assessment of 
the S5 subsystem in light of the crisis environment and observed findings.
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Specifically, future exercises will need to create environments that force S5 to 
continue to pressure for better proficiency from S1’s.
Of interesting note, is that when a similar type of process of interpreting 
the raw performance findings to assess the performance of the DC5 system 
contextual factors in light of the particular crisis environment found in the case 1 
ORE was attempted, it was quickly seen that these attributes of the DC5 system 
being studied were subsumed in the assessment of the other subsystems. For 
example, the staff competence and leadership attributes are readily seen in the 
assessments of the S1 and S3 systems respectively. Similarly, flexibility and 
redundancy are captured in the assessment of the impact of BARTS in terms of 
coordinating responses. The lesson learned is that the contextual elements of 
the DC5 framework express themselves through the operation of the systemic 
functions of the framework.
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Table 5.6: S1 (Autonomous Units) DC5 Fitness Assessment
S1
CRISIS
ENVIRONMENT
KEY OBSERVATIONS REGARDING DISTRIBUTED COGNITION 
PERFORMANCE OF THE UNIT
Use of 
BARTS
Slow PAR 
teams
Need for Better 
Visual Displays
Poor
Communication 
of Alarm 
Condition
General Crisis 
Pressure
- Alleviated 
pressure by 
reducing 
data
processing
errors
- Raised 
pressure by 
presenting 
more
information
for
processing
- General 
slowness 
really not 
attributable to 
crisis 
pressure, 
teams were 
just weak in 
terms of 
competence
- Displays help 
manage the 
assessment of 
relative 
importance of 
information
- Without them 
such
assessment 
becomes more 
difficult
- General 
ineptness may be 
attributable to 
crisis pressure, 
second guessing 
of himself/herself 
by siren/giant 
voice operator
Number of 
Entities
-Allowed 
larger number 
of entities to 
be processed
- General 
slowness 
really not 
attributable to 
attack scale, 
teams were 
just weak in 
terms of 
competence
- Better displays 
would have 
allowed for 
broader 
understanding 
of post-attack 
information
- General 
ineptness really 
not attributable to 
attack scale, 
personnel were 
just weak in 
terms of 
competence
Pace of Events
- Allowed
processing
time of
information
bits to be
greatly
reduced
- General 
slowness 
really not 
attributable to 
pace of 
events, 
teams were 
just weak in 
terms of 
competence
- Better displays 
would have 
allowed for 
better paced 
understanding 
of post-attack 
information
- General 
ineptness really 
not attributable to 
attack scale, 
personnel were 
just weak in 
terms of 
competence
S1 Assessment:
- STs need continued training on aiding in assessing the relative 
importance of information
- Specific STs just need more practice at performing their basic 
function proficiently
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Table 5.7: S2 (Coordination) DC5 Fitness Assessment
S2
CRISIS
ENVIRONMENT
KEY OBSERVATIONS REGARDING DISTRIBUTED COGNITION 
PERFORMANCE OF THE UNIT
Use of 
BARTS
Slow PAR 
teams
Need for Better 
Visual Displays
Poor
Communication 
of Alarm 
Condition
General Crisis 
Pressure
- Increased 
HOV due to 
BARTS 
ensures all 
see the same 
data ensuring 
all act with the 
same data in 
mind.
Coordination 
much better
- No
interaction 
with S2
- Displays help 
manage the 
assessment of 
relative 
importance of 
information 
allowing 
different S1’s to 
coordinate 
responses
- No interaction 
with S2
Number of 
Entities
- Increased 
HOV allows 
for increased 
coordination 
in responding 
to larger scale 
attacks
- No
interaction 
with S2
- Better displays 
would have 
allowed for 
broader 
understanding 
of post-attack 
information and 
better
coordination of 
responses
- No interaction 
with S2
Pace of Events
- More timely 
HOV allows 
for increased 
coordination 
in responding 
to faster 
paced event 
streams
- No
interaction 
with S2
- Better displays 
would have 
allowed for 
better paced 
understanding 
of post-attack 
information and 
more timely 
coordination of 
responses
- No interaction 
with S2
S2 Assessment:
-S2 was generally satisfactory throughout the exercise. Event 
streams demanding better displays of information may make this 
deficiency more noticeable
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Table 5.8: S3 (Control) DC5 Fitness Assessment
S3
CRISIS
ENVIRONMENT
KEY OBSERVATIONS REGARDING DISTRIBUTED COGNITION 
PERFORMANCE OF THE UNIT
Use of 
BARTS
Slow PAR 
teams
Need for Better 
Visual Displays
Poor
Communication 
of Alarm 
Condition
General Crisis 
Pressure
- S3 must 
ensure that 
assessment 
of relevant 
importance of 
information is 
being
accomplished 
due to larger 
HOV
- S3 must do 
better job of 
tracking and 
pressuring 
PAR teams 
to perform to 
address 
pressure for 
information 
flowing from 
S4
- S3 must 
ensure better 
displays are 
built and 
maintained to 
eliminate error 
and ensure 
proficient 
responses
- No interaction 
with S3
specifically other 
than more 
pressure to get 
announcements 
done correctly
Number of 
Entities
- S3 must 
ensure that 
assessment 
of relevant 
importance of 
information is 
being
accomplished 
due to larger 
HOV
- No
interaction 
with S3
- S3 must 
ensure better 
displays are 
built and 
maintained to 
accommodate 
larger 
information 
flows
- No interaction 
with S3
specifically other 
than more 
pressure to get 
announcements 
done correctly
Pace of Events
- S3 must 
ensure that 
assessment 
of relevant 
importance of 
information is 
being
accomplished 
due to larger 
HOV
- No
interaction 
with S3
- S3 must 
ensure better 
displays are 
built and 
maintained to 
accommodate 
larger 
information 
flows
- No interaction 
with S3
specifically other 
than more 
pressure to get 
announcements 
done correctly
S3 Assessment:
- Scenarios should be designed which force S3 to ensure information 
importance is being assessed,
- PAR teams are performing well, and 
-Better displays are being used
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Table 5.9: S4 (Intelligence) DC5 Fitness Assessment
S4
CRISIS
ENVIRONMENT
KEY OBSERVATIONS REGA 
PERFORMA
RDING DISTRIBUTED COGNITION 
MCE OF THE UNIT
Use of 
BARTS
Slow PAR 
teams
Need for Better 
Visual Displays
Poor
Communication 
of Alarm 
Condition
General Crisis 
Pressure
- More 
pressure for 
intelligence to 
assess 
relevant 
importance of 
information 
due to larger 
HOV
- S4
pressures for 
more timely 
PAR
information
- S4 pressures 
S3 for better 
displays
- No interaction 
with S4
Number of 
Entities
- S4 must
assess
relevant
importance of
information
due to larger
HOV
- No
interaction 
with S4
- S4 for must 
pressure S3 for 
more detailed 
displays
- No interaction 
with S4
Pace of Events
- S4 must 
provide more 
timely assess 
relevant 
importance of 
information 
due to larger 
HOV
- S4 must 
pressure for 
more timely 
PAR
information
- S3 must 
pressure for 
more timely 
displays
- No interaction 
with S4
S4 Assessment:
- Scenarios should be designed which force S4 assess information 
importance, and which force S4 to insist on more timely response 
from PAR teams and insist on better displays
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Table 5.10: S5 (Identity/Policy) DC5 Fitness Assessment
S5
CRISIS
ENVIRONMENT
KEY OBSERVATIONS REGARDING DISTRIBUTED COGNITION 
PERFORMANCE OF THE UNIT
Use of 
BARTS
Slow PAR 
teams
Need for Better 
Visual Displays
Poor
Communication 
of Alarm 
Condition
General Crisis 
Pressure
- Greater
HOV due to
BARTS
provides
greater
confidence in
crucial
decision
making
- Balances 
pressure 
between S4 
and S3 to 
ensure more 
proficient 
action
- Balances 
pressure 
between S4 and 
S3 to ensure 
more proficient 
action
- Balances 
pressure 
between S4 and 
S3 to ensure 
more proficient 
action
Number of 
Entities
- Greater
HOV due to
BARTS
provides
greater
confidence in
crucial
decision
making
- No relation
between
constructs
- No relation
between
constructs
- No relation
between
constructs
Pace of Events
- Greater
HOV due to
BARTS
provides
greater
confidence in
crucial
decision
making
- No relation
between
constructs
- No relation
between
constructs
- No relation
between
constructs
S5 Assessment: Scenarios needed that require S5 to continue to pressure for better proficiency from STs
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Table 5.11: System Context DC5 Fitness Assessment
System Context
CRISIS
ENVIRONMENT
KEY OBSERVATIONS REGARDING DISTRIBUTED COGNITION 
PERFORMANCE OF THE UNIT
Use of 
BARTS
Slow PAR 
teams
Need for Better 
Visual Displays
Poor
Communication 
of Alarm 
Condition
General Crisis 
Pressure
Improves
HOV,
eliminates
processing
errors
Greater staff 
competence, 
intersubjectivity, 
and leadership 
needed
Greater staff 
competence 
needed
Greater staff 
competence 
needed
Number of 
Entities
Improves
HOV,
eliminates
processing
errors
No relation
between
constructs
No relation
between
constructs
No relation
between
constructs
Pace of Events
Improves
HOV,
eliminates
processing
errors
No relation
between
constructs
No relation
between
constructs
No relation
between
constructs
System Context: Need Scenarios which stress expeditious use of PAR teams and better displays and facilitate more practice for alarm condition announcers
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Summary of DC5 Fitness Assessment and Criticism of DC5 Fitness 
Assessment Research Design Track
In summary, consolidating the work above, the DC5 fitness assessment 
calls for the development of a crisis environment that exerts crisis pressure, with 
sufficient number of entities, and pace of events, so that 1) the need for 
assessing the relevant importance of information is stressed to all subsystems, 2) 
S1’s gain more practice at performing and becoming more proficient at their 
basic tasks and 3) other systems feel the need to pressure and help improve 
STs task proficiency.
These objectives, along with those generated by other portions of the post 
exercise unit evaluation report outside the scope of this work, were incorporated 
into the script for the February ’06 Operational Readiness Exercise. Specifically, 
1) attacks were scripted close to scheduled aircraft launch times so that the 
impact of PAR team slowness in returning the unit to a general, normal 
operational level is clearly seen, 2) several attacks were scripted close in the 
schedule so that alarm condition announcers would be stressed, and 3) attacks 
were designed to be of larger scale or greater depth to further stress the need for 
quick, reliable processing of information, assessment of its relative importance, 
interpretation and action.
In retrospect, after working through the second track of the research 
design described above, the researcher notes two areas of potential criticism 
applicable to using the approach: 1) it can be argued, in a general sense, that the 
approach is simply overly sophisticated for the problem of training a control
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center team, 2) the approach, in the more narrow sense of this particular case, is 
significantly limited by the case context.
After conducting the case study, the researcher to some degree feels the 
approach may be an overly sophisticated tool to use for the purposes of training 
Air Force control center staffs and systems. While the technique of analyzing 
performance in terms of crisis intensity and DC5 subsystem provides a holistic 
method of developing an assessment, indeed one more comprehensive and 
usable than current inspection criteria, the objective of precisely characterizing 
the crisis environment using qualitative means is difficult to reach. As a result, 
such imprecision, may be amplified as a DC5 fitness assessment is made and 
further amplified as future crisis environments are scripted to optimize their 
training value. It is difficult to argue that the resulting training value will be much 
better than the traditional approach of merely using seasoned evaluators to cite 
areas for improvement and to have players review their reports before the next 
exercise.
More narrowly, the approach is inherently limited by the restrictions of the 
case context. As discussed in the description of the case setting, a significant 
portion of the unit in the case was not participating in the exercise, thus the ability 
to script a variety of crisis environments and tailor them with any level of 
precision beyond simply attacks-in-breadth, attacks-in-depth, or high-paced- 
event-streams was very difficult.
In response to these valid criticisms some important points are worth 
noting. First, the relative newness, of this approach being applied in the general
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setting of developing a training system for Air Force control centers, necessarily 
means that first attempts will uncover difficulties not fully anticipated. Such 
difficulties are also lessons learned and can be used in further iterations of the 
research. Future work, methodologies, and designs can be deployed with these 
limitations in mind to better account for them. Further work can include focusing 
on development of a means to more precisely and rigorously characterize and 
specify crisis environments. Cases can be more rigorously selected and planned 
to ensure a broader range and more tailorable range of scenarios are achievable. 
Data collection instruments can then be better tailored to the specific scenario 
from which they wish to capture information regarding DC5 fitness.
Second, in terms of research value to understanding distributed cognition 
in crisis environments, the second track of the research design still retains 
significant value. It further highlights issues seen in track one’s interpretive 
approach to the case. Specifically, that assessment of the relative importance of 
information grows in importance, first, as information technologies increase the 
horizon of visibility and second as crisis intensity increases in terms of 
complexity. The second track approach more readily focused interpreting the 
relative importance of the S4 functions in terms of crisis intensity and added 
converging weight to this research theme. This reinforcing convergence with the 
results of track 1 is highlighted in Table 5.3b and Figure 5.4b on the next pages.
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Table 5.3b: 
First ORE
Crisis Environment Effects on DC5 Subsystem Performance - Modifications from Case 1, Track 2 -
S1. Autonomous Units S 2. Coordination S3. Control S4. Intelligence S5. Identity Context
Real Crisis 
Pressure 
(Potential for 
adverse 
organization 
outcomes + 
inducement of 
stress)
- System self-doubt 
might increase
- Sensitivities to stimulus 
increased
- Focus changes
- Differences 
amplified
- Acquiesce to 
consensus
- M ay not seek 
consensus
- Pressure S1 to provide 
more information and S2 
to process more 
information
- Increase demands on 
S4 for implementable 
solution
- Must determine if S 1 's 
are handling pressure 
appropriately
- Dem and more 
information to get 
representation right
- H eightened  
aw areness o f need  
to  assess the  
re lative im portance  
o f in form ation
- S eek more 
confidence in 
representation 
before selecting 
alternatives
- Selection/ 
decision/action 
goes to the 
organization core 
so balance is less 
routine
- Increase focus/pressure 
may cause H O V  to be 
ignored
- Increase pressure on 
individual systems may 
cause loss of IS with other 
systems
- Staff competence directly 
impacted
- Leadership directly 
impacted
Complexity: 
Demand For 
High Levels Of 
Specialized 
Expertise
- Ability to correctly 
inquire about data 
increasingly challenged
- Possible increased 
dem and between 
systems
- Must ascertain when 
S1 has become 
overwhelmed
- Must ascertain when 
S1 is no longer up to 
environmental demands
- Ability to interpret 
data increasingly 
challenged
- Required to adjust 
decision making 
approach based on 
known lack of 
knowledge
- Staff competence up to 
the task
- Leadership increasing S1 
performance
Complexity: 
Demand for 
Integrated 
Expertise
- Ability to correctly 
Inquire about data 
increasingly challenged
- Challenged with 
knowing who needs to 
be involved in proc­
essing information
- Must ensure 
coordination is functional 
-Must ascertain if S2 is 
no longer capable of 
meeting requirements
- Ability to interpret 
data increasingly 
challenged
- Required to adjust 
decision making 
approach based on 
known lack of 
knowledge
- H O V and IS crucial
- SC and Leadership also 
important
Complexity-
Novelty
unknowability
- Ability to correctly 
inquire about data 
increasingly challenged
- Can recognize when 
more data collection is 
fruitless
- Can recognize when 
more data collection 
is fruitless
- Required to adjust 
decision approach 
based on known 
lack of knowledge
Complexity- 
Novelty 
number of 
entities
- Ability to track and 
process data challenged 
because of volume
- Ability to
coordinate/assimilate 
data challenged 
because of volume
- Can recognize when 
systems becoming 
overwhelmed
- Must ascertain if S1's  
and S2 up to 
task/replaceable
- Ability to interpret 
data increasingly 
challenged
- H eightened  
aw areness of need  
to  assess the  
re lative im portance  
o f in form ation
- Required to adjust 
decision making 
approach based on 
known lack of 
knowledge
- Flexibility key
- Redundancy m ay prevent 
processing errors
Complexity- 
Novelty 
pace of events
- Ability to receive and 
process data challenged
- Ability to process 
data challenged
- Increase demand for a 
timely plan of action
- Must ascertain if S 1 ’s 
and S2 up to 
task/replaceable
- Ability to interpret 
data increasingly 
challenged
- H eightened  
aw areness o f need  
to  assess  the  
re lative im portance  
o f in form ation
- Senses need to 
act quickly
- Redundancy may prevent 
processing errors
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Figure 5.4b: Updated
[CE]
DC5 Theoretical Framework after Modifications from Case 1, Track 2 - First ORE
[DC5F]
_________________ t___________________________
Crisis Environment
Potential for Negative 
Outcomes
Induces Organizational 
Stress
Challenging Levels of 
Complexity:
Demand for integration 
of dependent m  
specialized
knowledges Tab
Demand for amount, 
type and degree of 
specialized knowledge
Novelty
o
o
Unknowability 
Number of 
entities 
Pace of 
events
S y s t e m  o f  I n t e r e s t :  D i s t r i b u t e d  c o g n i t i o n  p r o c e s s e s  i n  c o n t r o l  c e n t e r s  f u n c t i o n i n g  i n  c r i s i s  
e n v i r o n m e n t s
s (see 
3.1)
njfiormation flow
5. Identity/Policy: Intended Purpose: 
facilitate construction of representations of 
outside environment in order to continuously 
respond successfully in meeting higher 
organizations purpose.
4. Intelligence: Intended Purpose: 
Develop/adapt representations. Assess 
Relative importance of information.
t e n s i o n :  “e x p l o r a t i o n  v s .  e x p l o i t a t i o n ”, 
“m o r e  i n f o r m a t i o n  v s .  t i m e l y  a l t e r n a t i v e s ”, 
“r e s p o n s e / e x p e c t a t i o n s ”
3. Control: Intended Purpose: Operational 
control of control center
1. Autonomous Units: Specialized 
Expertises, Communicators, Technologies, 
Artifacts.
System
Context
Horizon of 
Visibility
Intersubjectivity
Staff
com petence
Leadership
Flexibility
Redundancy
Coordination
Bringing
together
diverse
incoming data
sets and
appropriate
expertises.
Resuts
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Overview of Data from Case 1, Operational Readiness Exercise No.2
This overview of the case data from the second operational readiness 
exercise (ORE) will include 1) an introduction to the specific setting in which the 
second ORE occurred, 2) a descriptional listing of the key events of the ORE as 
seen by the researcher and other evaluators, 3) and a summary of the raw 
evaluational findings of the researcher and other evaluators. Afterwards, in 
subsequent analysis, this information will be analyzed as suggested by the 
research methodology and design.
The Setting of the First Case—Second Operational Readiness Exercise
The second ORE observed as part of this research, involved the same 
subject unit from the first ORE. The general setting in terms of time of day, 
overall scenario, was all the same. In this iteration, before the actual exercise 
the researcher met with the evaluation team chief and other senior evaluators to 
develop a script for the ORE partially based on the analysis above. As in the 
previous ORE, the unit was training for upcoming ORI and hoping to improve 
upon the lessons learned and analysis form the first ORE. Also, as in the 
previous ORE, only those portions of the unit that had performed below 
standards in the prior year’s inspection were participating, thus a major portion of 
the unit was not involved. Finally, as previously noted, in addition to the need to 
evaluate and improve the performance of the SRC, a second major area of the 
unit’s performance outside the scope of this research was the focus of the 
exercise and the resulting script development.
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Though the evaluation team scripted out a complete two-day exercise, the 
entire second day of the actual exercise was pre-empted by a severe winter 
blizzard. The unit commander made the decision to cancel the remainder of the 
exercise in the early morning a few hours before the start of the second day’s 
events and notified the unit and evaluation team personnel by a telephone recall 
system. Thus the remainder of this script description and indeed the remainder 
of this analysis were limited to the activities of just the first day of the exercise.
There were four scripted attacks on the first day. The first, initiated right at 
the beginning of the exercise simulated a severe, multiple-missile impact attack 
with major damage to three facilities, one fire requiring complete evacuation, 
multiple wounded and killed casualties, and four unexploded warheads. As 
discussed in the previous discussion the severity of the attack was designed to 
generate substantial amounts of information forcing control center personnel to 
assess the relative importance of information, as well as stressing the basic S1 
response functions of the control center.
Although the second attack was a ground-mortar attack, it was also a 
severe multiple-impact attack designed for the same purposes as the first attack. 
Four unexploded ordnance responses were required, two buildings were left in 
flames requiring evacuation, and three wounded casualties required response.
The third attack was a small missile attack designed primarily to test a 
response area outside of the scope of this research although a single 
unexploded warhead inhibited a key delivery route for munitions requiring the 
control center to develop a workaround quickly.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
263
The final attack of the first day, and what turned out to be the entire 
exercise, as a result of the weather, was a ground attack involving several 
unexploded munitions inhibiting response and mission capability and requiring 
the development of alternative measures to return to mission operations. 
Additionally, horizon of visibility was purposefully severely restricted by jamming 
the radio networks of a key sub-unit organization.
The Raw Results of the First Case -  Second Operational Readiness Exercise
Drawing on the case data from the data collection instruments described 
in Chapter IV, specifically the interviews/discussions with players and evaluators, 
the final exercise report, and the researcher’s notes, convergence seemed to 
emerge around the following raw findings to be discussed in further detail below: 
1) as in the first ORE contextually, the deficient performance of a key area 
outside that of command and control, the focus of this research, limited, to a 
degree, the ability to stress the survival recovery center, 2) the unit incorporated 
lessons learned during the first ORE, specifically, a) PAR team execution, 
tracking, and control was improved, b) distribution of imminent attack information 
was improved, and c) use of more intuitive visual aids in the SRC facilitated 
representation construction, and 3) the unit improved in managing the increased 
horizon of visibility provided by the BARTS message board system. In general, 
the SRC performed exceedingly well. So well, in fact, that the research value of 
the second ORE is called into question. Specifically, the question arises if a 
crisis environment was ever attained.
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Detailed Analysis of First Case, Second Operational Readiness Exercise
The greatly improved performance of the control center coupled with the 
exercise scenario limitations, significantly constrained the ability to create and 
raise crisis intensity for the evaluators. This situation in turn, inherently limited 
the research value of the second ORE in terms of directly, iteratively, improving 
the DC5 framework as was done in the first ORE as part of track 1 of the 
research design. Similarly, track 2 was also limited some extent in terms of 
research value for DC5 iterative improvement. While iterative improvement at a 
subsystem level by either track was impacted by the results of the exercise, a 
generalist retrospective view yields some increased understanding of distributed 
cognition in the proscribed setting.
In general, during the limited duration of the exercise due to the winter 
storm, the unit performed well, errors were small S1-type mistakes, non-trending 
or noteworthy, and were quickly captured and corrected by control center 
personnel. In what the evaluators thought would be a very difficult time period, 
while the jamming of key radio networks was ongoing, the unit implemented 
work-around procedures proficiently and continued with very little impact to 
operations. In another case, designed to test control center capability to rapidly 
assess relative importance of information and then work together to develop a 
new workaround, all DC5 systems performed well. In this case, at nighttime as 
the beginning of the winter storm was setting-in, an impact crater in one location 
and unexploded ordnance in another location rendered vehicle haul routes for
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both jet fuel and munitions useless. Control center personnel realized the 
mission impact of these occurrences while information was still flowing in from 
observers and quickly developed and implemented one expedient work around 
for immediate use while developing another more permanent response for 
longer-term operations.
The unit had obviously learned from the previous exercise and 
incorporated feedback from the evaluation team. The limits of the exercise 
constrained the ability of the scripters to raise crisis intensity; indeed, two senior 
evaluators, several SRC players, and the researcher concurred that because of 
the improved performance of the control center it would have been difficult to call 
even the most intense of the attacks a crisis. Specifically, articulating in terms of 
the crisis definition proposed in this work, the scenarios, though full or potentially 
full of negative consequences for the unit, was not complex enough to confound 
the improved control center systems and thus did not generate significant stress 
levels in those systems. As a result, the step-by-step analysis used in track 1 of 
the research design for the first ORE will not be duplicated in this analysis. The 
SRC implemented the lessons they learned in the first exercise, incorporating the 
feedback of evaluators to such an extent that it is difficult to say a crisis even 
occurred from the perspective of the control center, rendering analysis for 
purposes of improving the DC5 framework dubious. Implications of this fact for 
the research and researcher are discussed in further detail in the upcoming 
section on lessons learned from the second ORE.
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Retrospectively, because of the limits to crisis intensity during the second 
ORE discussed above, it is also difficult to use track 2 of the research design to 
iteratively improve the DC5 framework. In the rigorous terms of the research 
design, the unit’s performance reflected a high degree of proficiency, a crisis 
environment was hardly realized, and thus a DC5 fitness assessment is 1) 
beyond the measuring capacity of the research design approach and, 2) yields 
little information to iteratively improve the DC5 framework on a detailed surface 
level. Returning to the analogy of the sophisticated track coach and the new 
athlete, the situation would be reflective of one in which the coach gives the 
athlete a performance test to measure the athlete’s fitness and the athlete finds 
the test so easy that nothing is gained in terms of measuring fitness. While track 
2, and track 1 as discussed previously, proved unfruitful in terms of iteratively 
improving the DC5 framework, some more general conclusions about the 
distributed cognition are still realizable and some important lessons were still 
learned by the researcher.
General Analysis of First Case, Second Operational Readiness Exercise
Though frustrating in terms of not providing the expected improvements to 
the DC5 framework, reflection on the second ORE, 1) highlights a key aspect at 
the center of this research, the crisis environment and 2) leads the researcher to 
a suspicion worthy of further research relating to the interaction of information 
technologies, increasing horizons of visibility, inter-subjectivity, and performance.
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The second ORE reinforced the notion that the DC5 framework is specific 
to the case of crisis environments. Without sufficient crisis intensity, the ideas 
postulated and framed by DC5 are not readily applicable to other situations. The 
constructs and interactions raised in Beer’s (1984) VSM are still applicable to 
normal environments, but the DC5 framework depends on a crisis environment to 
understand and gain insight into the distributed cognition phenomena occurring 
in control centers as expressed in Table 3.1.
As seen in track 1 of the research design and even more readily in track 2, 
the DC5 fitness level of the control center is inherently tied to the ability of 
different scenarios to raise crisis intensity. More specifically, the DC5 fitness of a 
control center is a key factor in terms of 1) what constitutes sufficient complexity 
or how complex a problem may be and 2) how stressed a control center may get. 
Indeed, it could be argued that when fitness rises to certain levels in terms of the 
ability to deal with complexity, the potential for negative outcomes either 
decreases or rises to levels where it stops introducing additional stress. For the 
DC5 framework then it can be said that the crisis environment does not exist 
independently of the control center but must be expressed in terms of the fitness 
level of the control center. A crisis environment is one in which 1) the potential 
for negative outcomes is beyond that of the one in which the control center is 
used to regularly operating, 2) the complexity exceeds that of the one in which 
the control center is used to regularly operating, and 3) in turn the environment 
produces additional stress in the control center.
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In terms of track 2, this notion of interaction between the state of fitness of 
the control center and what constitutes a crisis environment expresses itself in 
terms of measurement uncertainty. First, if the intensity in the environment is 
readily manageable by a fit control center then no crisis exists. Second, a given 
set of events may constitute different levels of crises for control centers of 
different fitness levels. Third, it’s not possible to gain insight into the DC5 fitness 
of a given control center without a crisis environment of sufficient intensity for that 
particular control center at that time. Finally, as discussed previously in Chapter 
III, and demonstrated by the improvement between the first and second OREs, 
the act of measuring the DC5 fitness level of a control center as proscribed in this 
work necessarily changes, in this case for the better, the fitness level of that 
control center.
One additional general area noted by the researcher and other evaluators 
in the second ORE was the continued success of the BARTS message board 
system. The unit readily used the system as an effective, alternative means of 
communication when key radio nets were jammed during the exercise. In 
discussions with other evaluators about the success of BARTS, converging 
agreement was reached that the resulting increase of horizon of visibility 
provided by the system alone wasn’t sufficient to explain the continued good 
performance of the command and control functions of the wing. The inter­
subjectivity control center personnel had with outside unit personnel was key to 
understanding, assessing, and interpreting the large information flow facilitated 
by BARTS. The unit in whole, beyond the SRC, was characterized by having a
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large fraction, relative to otherwise similar units, of personnel who had known 
and worked with each other over many years and through many exercises, 
enhancing the ability of control center personnel to understand nuances in 
communication and assess relative importance. While inter-subjectivity between 
control center personnel and personnel beyond the boundary of the control 
center is beyond the scope of this work, the researcher and other evaluators 
thought this attribute was of significant importance in wringing the additional 
benefit out of the increased horizon of visibility provided by the information 
technology.
Lessons Learned and Conclusion from Case Study 1—Second Operational 
Readiness Exercise
In conclusion, the limitations of the setting for the second ORE, specifically 
the lack of a scripted environment of sufficient crisis intensity and the unexpected 
shortening of the exercise due to inclement weather limited the value in terms of 
validating and modifying the DC5 framework. More generally, however, these 
same limitations raised awareness to the need for a key caveat to be introduced 
into the framework, the crisis definition proposed in Chapter II, and the specific 
detailing of the crisis environment in the DC5 framework. As discussed in the 
previous section, the crisis environment should be expressed and characterized 
in terms of the perceived fitness of the control center being studied. Finally, the 
lesson learned after the first ORE, regarding the importance of case selection to 
the work was once again reinforced. The limits of the case setting impacted the
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ability to stress the control center inhibiting the value of the research. Still both 
OREs and both research tracks applied during this case provided significant 
insights that led to key improvements in the DC5 framework, and turn into better 
understanding of distributed cognition phenomena.
Thus in summary Table 5.3c and Figure 5.4c capture the next iterative 
development of the framework, the qualification of what constitutes a crisis 
environment is relative to the distributed cognition fitness of the control center 
under study.
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Table 5.3c: Crisis Environment Effects on DC5 Subsystem Performance - Modifications from Case 1, Track 1 
Second ORE -  (Changes highlighted in bo d)
S1.
Autonomous
Units
S2. Coordination S3. Control S4. Intelligence S5. Identity Context
Real Crisis Pressure 
(Potential for 
adverse organization 
outcomes + 
inducement of 
stress) relative to 
the dcog fitness 
level of the control 
center (RTDF)
- System self­
doubt might 
increase
- Sensitivities to 
stimulus 
increased
- Focus changes
- Differences 
amplified
- Acquiesce to 
consensus
- May not seek 
consensus
- Pressure S1 to provide 
more information and S2 
to process more 
information
- Increase demands on 
S4 for implementable 
solution
- Must determine if S 1 ’s 
are handling pressure 
appropriately
- Demand more 
information to get 
representation right
- Heightened 
awareness of need 
to assess the 
relative importance 
of information 
(HANTARIi)
- Seek more 
confidence in 
representation before 
selecting alternatives
- Selection/ 
decision/action goes 
to the organization 
core so balance is 
less routine
- Increase focus/pressure 
m ay cause HO V to be 
ignored
- Increase pressure on 
individual systems may 
cause loss of IS with other 
systems
- Staff competence directly 
impacted
- Leadership directly 
impacted
Complexity:
Demand For High 
Levels Of
Specialized (RTDF)
- Ability to 
correctly inquire 
about data 
increasingly 
challenged
- Possible increased 
demand between 
systems
- Must ascertain when 
S1 has become 
overwhelmed
- Must ascertain when 
S1 is no longer up to 
environmental demands
- Ability to interpret 
data increasingly 
challenged
- Required to adjust 
decision making 
approach based on 
known lack of 
knowledge
- Staff competence up to 
the task
- Leadership increasing S1 
performance
Complexity: Demand 
for Integrated 
Expertise relative to 
the dcog fitness level 
of the control center
- Ability to 
correctly Inquire 
about data 
increasingly 
challenqed
- Challenged with 
knowing who Needs  
to be involved in 
processing 
information
- Must ensure 
coordination is functional 
-M ust ascertain if S2 is 
no longer capable of 
meeting requirements
- Ability to interpret 
data increasingly 
challenged
- Required to adjust 
decision making 
approach based on 
known lack of 
knowledge
- H O V  and IS crucial
- SC  and Leadership also 
important
Complexity-Novelty
unknowability
(RTDF)
- Ability to 
inquire about 
data increasingly 
challenqed
- Can recognize when 
more data collection is 
fruitless
- Can recognize when 
more data collection 
is fruitless
- Required to adjust 
decision approach 
based on known lack 
of knowledge
Complexity-Novelty 
number of entities 
(RTDF)
- Ability to track 
and process 
data challenged 
because of 
volume
- Ability to
coordinate/assimilate 
data challenged 
because of volume
- Can recognize when 
systems becoming 
overwhelmed
- Must ascertain if S 1’s 
and S2 up to 
task/replaceable
- Ability to interpret 
data increasingly 
challenged
- (HANTARII)
- Required to adjust 
decision making 
approach based on 
known lack of 
knowledge
- Flexibility key
- Redundancy may prevent 
processing errors
Complexity-Novelty 
pace of events 
(RTDF)
- Ability to 
receive and 
process data 
challenged
- Ability to process 
data challenged
- Increase demand for a 
timely plan of action
- Must ascertain if S1 ’s 
and S2 up to 
task/replaceable
- Ability to interpret 
data increasingly 
challenged
- (HANTARII)
- Senses need to act 
quickly
- Redundancy may prevent 
processing errors
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Figure 5.4c: Updated DC5 Theoretical Framework after Modifications from Case 1, Track 1 - Second ORE
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Overview of Data from Case 2, Operational Readiness Inspection
Longitudinally, the second case study, a formal operational readiness 
inspection of another Air Force unit separate and different than the subject unit of 
the first case study, occurred before the third and last iterative portion of the first 
case study and will be reviewed here. The second case was limited to a track-1 
approach, seeking to validate and enhance the interpretive value of the DC 
framework. As discussed in the research design and specified in the research 
protocol the same data collection instruments were used here as were used in 
the first case. This overview of the case data from the formal ORI will include 1) 
an introduction to the specific setting in which the ORI occurred and a description 
of the unit participating in the ORI, 2) a descriptional listing of the key events of 
the ORI as seen by the researcher and ACC/IG inspector, 3) and a summary of 
the raw inspection findings of the researcher and the inspectors. Afterwards, in 
subsequent analysis, this information will be analyzed as suggested by the 
research methodology and design.
The Setting of the Second Case
The researcher contacted members of the IG team and the unit to be 
inspected and requested permission to collect data as specified in the research 
protocol. Both organizations agreed and granted the researcher the additional 
access to players and inspectors as requested. As opposed to the two OREs 
composing the portion of the first case discussed thus far, the second case was 
composed of just one formal ORI being conducted by the IG team. While the first
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case involved a flying wing training during OREs for an eventual ORI, the subject 
unit of the ORI in the second case was a heavy construction/engineering unit 
consisting of 400 personnel commanded by an Air Force Colonel with a 
complement of 10 officers participating in the inspection. The unit had prepared 
for the ORI by conducting two OREs itself.
The overarching scenario involved the simulated air transported 
deployment of the unit to a forward point of debarkation, followed by actual over- 
the-road convoy to an austere location, where the unit bedded itself down and 
established operations. The actual location could be described as field-like 
terrain with wooded perimeters, dirt roads, with little-to-no improvements, and 
clearings designated to be future expedient construction sites. No utilities of any 
kind were physically available; the unit had to demonstrate established levels of 
self-sufficiency by bringing in and constructing all of its own supporting 
infrastructure (i.e. the power generator, mobile communications, and field 
plumbing). The unit had to demonstrate the ability to internally respond to an 
established ground threat level thus all troops were supplied with appropriate 
small-arms weaponry with a small complement of heavier arms. Ground threat 
engagements were simulated by firing blanks and responses were evaluated by 
IG security forces inspectors. As the actual location was austere, facilities 
consisted of expedient shelters known as “TemporTents” approximately 
30x20x10 ft in size. The unit provided its own organic sleeping and dining 
arrangements. The unit arrived with a complement of 42 vehicles, 30-day food 
supply, 5-day fuel supply, and 5-day water supply. Contact with theater higher
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headquarters was simulated by mobile communication technologies with IG 
personnel.
The unit’s mission during the ORI was multi-faceted: among other 
directives, 1) it was required to establish self-sufficient organic operations, 2) 
demonstrate the ability to produce its potable water from a non-potable source,
3) establish secure perimeters and defend itself against an established ground 
threat level, 4) protect itself during missile attacks, and 5) accomplish the design 
and construction of several expedient construction projects. Such projects 
included the repair of cratered runway, road construction, power line installation, 
hard wall expedient facility construction, small-bridge construction, concrete pad 
installation, aircraft revetment construction, and various earthwork projects. 
Additionally the unit was required to provide engineering designs, siting, and 
logistical planning for a variety of other projects including the complete beddown 
of an Air Force wing of 4000 personnel and 100 aircraft at a hypothetical austere 
bare forward base presently consisting of only an airfield and a potable source of 
water.
The phase II, or deployed-wartime, scripted activities of the inspection 
took place over 4 days. Seven hours each night were reserved as no-play time 
as proscribed by Air Force regulation applicable to such exercises. The focus of 
the research was on the unit control center (UCC) that oversaw the operations 
and responses of the unit. The UCC consisted of a single tent, with an alternate 
back-up, manned by nine personnel including the acting commander and 
executive officer, a log keeper and alarm announcer, a plotter for the visual aids,
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the units senior non-commissioned officer, a representative of the units 
engineering section, a representative of its operations section, one of its logistics 
section, and one of its support and admin section. The layout of this UCC tent is 
provided in the appendices.
The Key Events of the Second Case: The Script as Implemented
The script for the first day of the inspection, actually called transition day 
when inspecting units of this type, involved no outside attack. The unit merely 
had to convoy to the austere site establish operations as described previously. 
Command and control was established, the UCC tent was erected, equipped, 
and manned but because no hostile action was simulated and therefore no crisis 
environment existed. Transition day was ruled out as a source for observational 
data by the researcher for purposes of this work.
The first actual day of hostile action play began with scripted instructions 
for the unit to begin design and construction of 8 projects while the scripted 
events included 1) a scenario involving a defector with a white flag trying to enter 
the units primary cantonment area, 2) a false alarm of an inbound missile, 3) a 
mortar attack resulting in cantonment area generator damage, 4) a non­
impacting sniper attack, 5) a potentially chemically armed missile attack requiring 
the 30 minute wear of gas mask and chemical gear until the presence of no­
chemicals was verified, 6) and a second non-impacting sniper attack.
In addition to the projects ordered the first day, 3 more construction 
projects were ordered on the second day. Hostile action on the second day
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consisted of, 1) a mortar attack involving more generator damage, vehicle 
damage, and unexploded ordnance left in the cantonment area, 2) another non­
impacting sniper attack, 3) a mortar attack resulting in three casualties, air 
conditioner loss for cold storage, a vehicle workcenter being destroyed, 4) a low 
intensity ground engagement resulting in the capture and detainment of an 
enemy prisoner of war 5) a mortar attack resulting in no damage, and 6) a 
chemical missile attack requiring wear of gas mask and chemical ensemble by 
personnel for two hours but no further damage.
The scripted events of the third day of the exercise involved a single 
chemical missile attack requiring wear of mask and chemical ensemble for two 
hours, causing two casualties, enflaming the UCC tent and requiring UCC 
relocation to an alternate tent, missing personnel.
Researcher’s General Thoughts on the Second Case
Some general notes are worthy of discussion before proceeding with the 
detailed analysis that follows. First, in comparison with the script for the subject 
unit in the first case study, this script was much more challenging for the UCC 
because all reporting parties were playing in the exercise, thus stressing all S1 
systems in the UCC. Second, the scenario called for wear of chemical mask and 
suit, which inhibits movement, breathability, communication, vision, and is 
generally hot and uncomfortable. Capturing the impact of this burden on UCC 
personnel in terms of the DC5 framework was a key to the interpretive value of 
the case to this research. Third, while the scenarios were more intense for the
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UCC, as will be seen in the discussion of the case results, the UCC in the eyes of 
inspectors, the researcher, and even some players performed poorly. This weak 
level of performance limits the value of the case for the research; performance 
was poor regardless of crisis intensity so some impacts of crisis environment 
upon distributed cognition phenomena are difficult to interpret in terms of the 
DC5 framework. These will be discussed in further detail in the analysis of the 
case.
The Raw Results of the Second Case
Drawing on the case data from the data collection instruments described 
in Chapter IV, specifically the interviews/discussions with players and inspectors, 
the final inspection report, and the researcher’s notes, convergence seemed to 
emerge around specific raw findings to be discussed in further detail next.
Further description and elaboration on these points is provided ahead in raw 
terms as they emerged from the collection instruments. Actual refined discussion 
of their interpretation in terms of the proposed DC5 framework will follow in the 
next section. A more exhaustive review of the data collected during the case and 
the degree, or lack of thereof, of data convergence on particular issues is 
presented in summary form in Appendix V-Case 2 Data Results. The questions 
of the data collection instruments were used as a means of presenting and 
summarizing the results of each individual data collection effort.
The key findings upon which considerable convergence was seen 
between data sources, including the players themselves, the four inspectors
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evaluating UCC performance, and the researcher regarding UCC performance 
noted during the exercise were 1) the UCC failed to engage and reallocate 
manpower and resources when a variety of real-world and exercise inputs 
brought certain projects to a halt, 2) simple procedures for backing up information 
in redundant locations and ensuring congruity in information sets were not 
implemented resulting in confusion, 3) simple procedures for accounting for 
personnel, vehicles, and equipment were not implemented, 4) project status 
boards were not used or updated in a timely fashion, 5) rigorous facility 
evacuation procedures were not established or followed resulting in significant 
information loss, 6) untimely, inaccurate, or no alarm/attack notification during 
every attack, and 7) poor, untimely PAR team performance.
As previously discussed, these findings represent poor performance below 
written standards. Indeed, the unit received a rating reflective of this fact from the 
IG team. Given how far behind the unit was throughout the exercise, it is difficult 
to draw conclusions on how a crisis environment may have impacted 
performance that was already sufficiently poor in situations of what were 
considered prior to the inspection to be of little to no crisis intensity. Still, 
interpreting these findings in terms of DC5 constructs and interactions as follows 
is to some extent beneficial for this investigation.
Additionally, attempting to interpret the impact of the wear of the chemical 
mask and ensemble on distributed cognition phenomena in terms of the DC5 
framework also serves to enlighten the analysis and will be undertaken in the 
next section.
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Key Findings in the Analysis of the Second Case -  Operational Readiness 
Inspection
As in the track 1 interpretive analysis of the first case’s first ORE the 
objective will be to interpret the emergent converging themes of the case data 
using the constructs and interactions specified by the DC5 framework validating 
the framework where possible and modifying it if necessary. As discussed in 
analysis of the first case, to the extent emerging observations readily converge 
with the suggested theory, then the framework has demonstrated its holistic 
validity as well as its specific construct validity. To the extent emerging 
observations do not readily converge with the suggested theory then the 
framework has demonstrated the need for modification or further study. Table 
5.4, mirroring Table 3.1, Crisis Environment Effects on DC5 Subsystem 
Performance, which described in detail the theoretical impacts of crisis conditions 
on distributed cognition phenomena, provides the organization for the detailed 
discussion which follows regarding the areas in which emergent observations 
from case two converged with suggested framework constructs and their 
interaction, diverged from the suggested theory, or remained ambiguous with 
regards to the suggested theory. Again, as described in the previous section, the 
general overall poor performance of the UCC is an overarching theme that 
significantly limits the value of the data for interpreting crisis environment effects 
upon control center cognition. This fact is reflected in the large portion of Table 
5.4 detailed as not validated by the insufficient case data. Table 5.3d and Figure 
5.4d, summarize the case data and its implications for the DC5 framework. An
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exhaustive analysis of the case data based on Table 5.4 on a cell-by-cell basis is 
provided in Appendix VII.
As mentioned in the previous section, of particular interest in this case 
was the wear of the chemical protective gear by participants in the unit control 
center; in the first case the control center was simulated-chemically-protected 
and thus wear of chemical defense gear was not required. Air Force personnel 
are familiar with the varieties of degradation in performance at a variety of tasks 
resulting from wear of this gear. Capturing and articulating the impact of such 
effects upon control center distributed cognition using DC5 constructs can also 
demonstrate its usefulness as working framework.
Personnel chemical gear, formally known as the Mission Operating 
Personal Protective (MOPP) ensemble, consists of rubber overboots, a charcoal 
lined over suit composed of paints and jacket, rubber gloves and glove liners, 
and a rubber hooded gas mask. After receiving notice of possible impending 
chemical attack or the possible presence of chemical agents, the user must don 
the mask first, ideally within eight seconds, and then the remainder of the 
ensemble, ideally within two minutes. The immediate personal physical effects of 
the suit are 1) it does not breathe, causing the user’s perspiration to condense 
onto the skin causing discomfort, 2) it is extremely insulating causing the user to 
become hot and perspire even more, 3) the gas mask greatly reduces visibility, 
especially to the periphery, creating a sense of Closter phobia in most users 
anecdotally, 4) the gas mask muffles the ability to annunciate clearly as well as 
listen to others speaking and greatly reduces the ability to use telephone and
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radio communication devices, and lastly 5) other normal bodily functions cannot 
be undertaken while the suit is on.
In terms of DC5 constructs, the ensemble primarily impacts distributed 
cognition phenomena contextually in terms of horizon of visibility and 
intersubjectivity. Because sounds are muffled and vision is impaired, the horizon 
of visibility previously available to control center personnel is greatly reduced. 
Personnel in Case 2 were observed becoming significantly more focused on their 
immediate tasks of processing information flowing into them and less able to 
monitor the background chatter of the room and the updating of artifacts such as 
status boards. Additionally, since the ensemble isolates the wearer from his or 
her fellow control center workers, intersubjectivity is greatly reduced; the ability to 
monitor personal cues that amplify communicative capability amongst 
participants that have grown together as a team over time is greatly reduced. As 
a result timeliness of responses and processing of information was delayed 
significantly in the control room greatly increasing the susceptibility of the control 
center to crises involving increasing paces of events or larger scale events. 
Additionally the ability to respond to scenarios requiring integrating expert 
knowledge bases was also reduced. Finally, in terms of primary effects the 
discomfort of the suit and the knowledge of its impacts on performance further 
stress the control center participants. Secondary interactions relating to 
ensemble wear seemed to impact on a contextual basis also. First, more 
experienced personnel, “staff competence” as captured in the DC5 framework, 
seemed to be impacted less by the discomfort of the suit and as is generally
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thought in Air Force, and demonstrated in the case, leadership could act to 
mitigate some of the impact of the suit on performance and motivate personnel to 
press on with their duties. Wear of the ensemble represents an opportunity for 
further in-depth research into the impacts of changing levels of horizons of 
visibility and intersubjectivity directly upon distributed cognition performance 
potentially using a variety of methodologies, but such work is beyond the scope 
of this research and would require further study of cases involving such setting 
specifics.
Case 2: Summary of Case Data versus DC5 Framework
The key points seen arising from the second case in terms of validating 
the DC5 framework are 1) the limitations of the case, in terms of research value, 
due to the general overall poor performance of the UCC in all respects, 2) a small 
portion of the framework was moderately validated; case data and key findings 
were interpretable by DC5 constructs and relationships, again as detailed in the 
discussion and in Table 5.4, and 3) the case readily demonstrated the opposing 
response to the key conclusion generated from the second ORE in the first case. 
In that ORE the DC5 fitness of the SRC was of such degree to render the 
scripted environment a mere series of non-crisis events. In the second case, the 
DC5 fitness level of the UCC was so inadequate it turned any scenario involving 
minimal information processing into a crisis. This aspect of the case reiterated 
the notion that in characterizing the crisis intensity of a given set of events for a
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control center, one must take that the DC5 fitness level of that control center into 
account.
Table 5.3d captures the modifications suggested by the last two points 
above as does Figure 5.4d on the following pages.
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Table 5.3d: Crisis Environment Effects on DC5 Subsystem Performance - After Case 2 (reinforcing convergence
S1. Autonomous Units S2.
Coordination
S3. Control S4. Intelligence S5. Identity Context
Real Crisis 
Pressure 
(Potential for 
adverse 
organization 
outcomes + 
inducement of 
stress) relative  
to  the dcog  
fitness level o f 
the control 
center (RTDF)
- System self-doubt 
might increase
- Sensitivities to stimulus 
increased
-Focus changes
- Differences 
amplified
- Acquiesce to 
consensus
- May not seek 
consensus
- Pressure S1 to provide 
more information and S2 
to process more 
information
- Increase dem ands on 
S4 for implementable 
solution
- Must determine if S1 's 
are handling pressure 
appropriately
- Demand more 
information to get 
representation 
right
- Heightened  
aw areness of 
need to assess  
the relative  
im portance o f 
in form ation  
(H A N TA R II)
- Seek more confidence in 
representation before selecting 
alternatives
- Selection/ decision/action 
goes to the organization core 
so balance is less routine
- Increase focus/pressure 
may cause H O V to be 
ignored
- Increase pressure on 
individual systems may 
cause loss of IS with other 
systems
- Staff competence directly 
impacted
- Leadership directly 
impacted
Complexity: 
Demand For 
High Levels Of 
Specialized 
Expertise -  
(RTDF)
- Ability to correctly 
inquire about data  
increasingly challenged
- Possible
increased
demand
between
systems
- M ust ascerta in  w hen  
S1 has becom e  
overw helm ed
- M ust ascerta in  w hen  
S1 is no lo nger up to  
environm enta l 
dem ands
- Ability to 
interpret data 
increasingly 
challenged
- R equired to  ad ju s t decision  
m aking ap proach  based on 
know n lack o f know ledge
- S taff co m p etence up to 
the task
- Leadersh ip  increasing  
S1 perform ance
Complexity: 
Demand for 
Integrated 
Expertise - 
(RTDF)
- Ability to correctly 
inquire about data  
increasingly challenged
- Challenged 
with knowing 
who needs to be 
involved in 
processing 
information
- Must ensure 
coordination is functional
- Must ascertain if S2 is 
no longer capable of 
meeting requirements
- Ability to 
interpret data 
increasingly 
challenged
- Required to adjust decision 
making approach based on 
known lack of knowledge
- H O V and IS crucial
- SC and Leadership also 
important
Complexity-
Novelty
Unknowability - 
(RTDF)
- Ability to correctly 
inquire about data  
increasingly challenged
- Can recognize when 
more data collection is 
fruitless
- Can recognize 
when more data 
collection is 
fruitless
- Required to adjust decision 
making approach based on 
known lack of knowledge
Complexity- 
Novelty 
number of 
entities- (RTDF)
-A b ility  to track and  
process data  
challenged becau se o f 
volum e
- A b ility  to  
co ord in ate /ass­
im ilate data 
challenged  
because of 
volum e
- Can reco gn ize  w hen  
system s becom in g  
overw helm ed
- M ust ascerta in  if S1 ’s 
and S2 up to  
task /rep laceab le
-A b ility  to 
in terpret data  
increasingly  
challenged  
- (H A NTAR II)
- R equired to  ad ju s t decision  
m aking ap proach  based on 
know n lack o f kn ow ledge
- F lex ib ility  key
- R edundancy m ay  
prevent processing  
errors
Complexity-
Novelty
pace of events - 
(R TDF)
- A bility to receive and  
process data  
challenged
- A b ility  to  
process data  
challenged
- Increase dem and  fo r  
a tim ely  plan o f action
- M ust ascerta in  if S1 ’s 
and S2 up  to  
task /rep laceab le
-A b ility  to 
in terpret data 
increasingly  
challenged  
- (H A NTAR II)
- Senses need to  ac t qu ick ly - R edundancy m ay  
prevent processing  
errors
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Figure 5.4d: DC5 Theoretical
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Overview of Data from Case 1, Final Operational Readiness Inspection
The third and final portion of the first case was the subject unit’s formal 
ORI conducted by ACC/IG inspectors. In terms of this research the data 
collection effort relating to this ORI occurred longitudinally after the second case 
which involved one, single ORI of an Air Force heavy construction unit. This 
portion of the case was limited to the track 1, interpretive research design 
approach. The applied research of track 2 could not be undertaken because the 
researcher did not have input into script production for the ORI, which was 
closely held by the IG team and not released to the researcher until after the ORI 
was conducted. Additionally as no subsequent, exercise was scheduled 
following the ORI little use in terms of training value for subsequent scripting 
could be gained by undertaking the applied research approach. This overview of 
the case data from the formal ORI will include 1) a descriptional listing of the key 
events of the ORI as seen by the researcher and ACC/IG inspector, and 2) a 
summary of the raw inspection findings of the researcher and the inspectors. 
Afterwards, in subsequent analysis, this information will be analyzed as 
suggested by the research methodology and design.
It should be noted that a description of the setting of the ORI is not 
provided here as it matches that used in both previous OREs. In this case the IG 
team developed and implemented the script. The researcher stood out of the 
way in the control center for the duration of inspection and compiled 
observations.
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The Key Events of the First Case. Final Operational Readiness Inspection: The 
Script as Implemented
The script called for two twelve-hour days of hostile play for purposes of 
the inspection. The first days activities consisted of 1) two false-alarms of 
inbound missiles, 2) three separate individual ground aggressor attacks, 3) a 
ground-based mortar attack resulting in the relocation of the unit’s fuel storage 
control center, damage to bulk fuel storage tanks, fire in an aircraft maintenance 
shop, two instances of unexploded ordnance, and three casualties, 4) another 
ground based mortar attack resulting in damage to an aircraft maintenance 
control center and a communication antenna and 5) an additional ground based 
mortar attack coupled with three aggressors infiltrating the flightline area resulting 
in one instance of unexploded ordnance.
The second days scripted activities consisted of 1) the offline loss of the 
BARTS message board communication system for eight hours during which, 2) a 
missile attack occurred resulting in relocation of a maintenance operations 
control center due to building damage and damage to a key refueling vehicle, 3) 
two separate ground aggressor attacks occurred resulting in three friendly 
casualties, and 4) a ground based mortar attack occurred in concert with an 
attack by a vehicle-borne suicide bomber resulting in damage to two aircraft 
maintenance shop buildings and three casualties. After BARTS was restored 
another 5) ground based mortar attack occurred in concert with a sniper attack 
resulting in two casualties and two instances of unexploded ordnance and finally 
6) a false alarm of a missile attack occurred.
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Researcher’s General Thoughts on the First Case. Final Operational Readiness 
Inspection
As presented in the previous discussion of the OREs associated with the 
first case study, the limits of the setting of the ORI inherently extend to the value 
of the research. Specifically, the limited amount of playing sub-units in the 
organization inherently limited the ability of the IG team to stress the unit as a 
whole and subsequently the SRC. In contrast to the motivation behind script 
construction for the ORE evaluators, the IG had no goal of giving the poorly 
performing unit subarea outside of the UCC a chance to improve. The IG merely 
wished to see if this separate subarea met standards. Thus, script intensity, 
specifically in terms of pace of events, was slightly greater for the ORI than the 
OREs. The researcher and evaluation team had strived to develop scenarios to 
both maximize training value to the unit, as well as, mimic what we thought the 
IG team would provide in its script. Generally, the ORE scripts and ORI scripts 
were close in terms of intensity though the IG tended to have a few more attacks 
per day of lesser intensity than those orchestrated by the evaluators during the 
OREs.
The Raw Results of the First Case. Final Operational Readiness Inspection
Drawing on the case data from the data collection instruments described 
in Chapter IV, specifically the interviews/discussions with players and evaluators, 
the final inspection report, and the researcher’s notes, convergence seemed to 
emerge around specific raw findings to be discussed in further detail below.
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Actual refined discussion of their interpretation in terms of the proposed DC5 
framework also follows in the next section.
The key findings upon which considerable convergence was seen 
between data sources, including the players themselves, the two inspectors 
evaluating SRC performance, and the researcher regarding SRC performance 
noted during the exercise were 1) the generally superior performance of the SRC 
characterized by “smooth, accurate, and timely communications” facilitating 
“quick reaction” (quoted from the final inspection report) by senior leadership to a 
rapidly changing environment, 2) the successful implementation of BARTS into 
all command and control functions and its subsequent rewards, and 3) two small 
S1 type errors involving use of the wrong facility priority list by some SRC 
personnel during two attacks and lack of rigorous adherence to checklists by two 
SRC personnel on the first day of the inspection. The inspection was a success 
as far as the SRC was concerned. The inspection received a rating of Excellent 
by the IG. One of the SRC inspectors commented that he would have even 
considered awarding the rarely used Outstanding rating had the scenario not 
been so limited. This inspector also commented that “I’ve thrown everything I can 
at them, including taking down BARTS, and it doesn’t phase them.”
After the inspection, the researcher and ORE evaluators were gratified to 
see that their assessment following the second ORE, that the fitness of the SRC 
was simply beyond the ability of the environmental setting to generate a crisis, 
was validated by the inspection team during the ORI when it counted. As with 
the second ORE, it is of little use to conduct the stepwise analysis through the
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DC framework because a crisis environment from the perspective of the SRC 
was simply not realized. The IG assessment reiterates the importance of 
characterizing crisis intensity in terms of DC5 fitness. What constitutes a crisis 
for one UCC does not necessarily constitute a crisis for another UCC.
The S1 miscues noted by the IG and detailed above were corrected during 
the inspection after the S3 function engaged and ensured proper artifacts were 
used. Senior leadership also engaged and motivated SRC members to refocus 
for the remainder of the exercise. It is also important to note that IG inspectors 
captured the UCC’s ability to facilitate rapid reaction following attack by senior 
unit leadership. This implies accurate representation construction on the part of 
the SRC.
Unfortunately the success of the SRC in the ORI and second ORE limits 
the value of the data for the research somewhat. As discussed, crisis intensities 
were not reached because of the proficiency of the SRC. Thus, further iterative 
development of the DC5 framework is not possible and it remains as captured in 
Table 5.3e and Figure 5.4e on the following pages.
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Table 5.3e: Crisis Environment Effects on DC5 Subsystem Performance - After Case 1, ORI (reinforcing
S1. Autonomous Units S2. Coordination S3. Control S4. Intelligence S5. Identity Context
Real Crisis 
Pressure 
(Potential for 
adverse 
organization 
outcomes + 
inducement of 
stress) relative  
to the dcog  
fitness level o f 
the control 
center (RTDF)
- System self-doubt 
might increase
- Sensitivities to stimulus 
increased
-Focus changes
- Differences 
amplified
- Acquiesce to 
consensus
- May not seek 
consensus
- Pressure S1 to provide 
more information and S2 
to process more 
information
- Increase demands on 
S4 for implementable 
solution
- Must determine if S 1 ’s 
are handling pressure 
appropriately
- Dem and more 
information to 
get
representation
right
-  Heightened 
awareness of 
need to assess 
the relative 
importance of 
information 
(H A N TAR Il)
- Seek more confidence 
in representation before 
selecting alternatives
- Selection/
decision/action goes to 
the organization core so 
balance is less routine
- Increase focus/pressure 
may cause HO V to be 
ignored
- Increase pressure on 
individual systems may cause 
loss of IS with other systems
- Staff competence directly 
impacted
- Leadership directly 
impacted
Complexity: 
Demand For 
High Levels Of 
Specialized 
Expertise -  
(RTDF)
- Ability to correctly 
inquire about data 
increasingly challenged
- Possible 
increased demand 
between systems
- Must ascertain when 
S1 has become 
overwhelmed
- Must ascertain when 
S1 is no longer up to 
environmental demands
- Ability to 
interpret data 
increasingly 
challenged
- Required to adjust 
decision making 
approach based on 
known lack of 
knowledge
- Staff competence up to the 
task
- Leadership increasing S1 
performance
Complexity: 
Demand for 
Integrated 
Expertise - 
(RTDF)
- Ability to correctly 
inquire about data 
increasingly challenged
- Challenged with 
knowing who 
needs to be 
involved in 
processing 
information
- Must ensure 
coordination is functional
- Must ascertain if S2 is 
no longer capable of 
meeting requirements
- Ability to 
interpret data 
increasingly 
challenged
- Required to adjust 
decision making 
approach based on 
known lack of 
knowledge
- H O V  and IS crucial
- SC  and Leadership also 
important
Complexity-
Novelty
Unknowability - 
(RTDF)
- Ability to correctly 
inquire about data 
increasingly challenged
- Can recognize when 
more data collection is 
fruitless
- Can recognize 
when more data 
collection is 
fruitless
- Required to adjust 
decision making 
approach based on 
known lack of 
knowledge
Complexity- 
Novelty 
number of 
entities- (RTDF)
- Ability to track and 
process data challenged 
because of volume
- Ability to 
coordinate/assimila 
te data challenged 
because of volume
- Can recognize when 
systems becoming 
overwhelmed
- Must ascertain if S 1 ’s 
and S2 up to 
task/replaceable
- Ability to 
interpret data 
increasingly 
challenged
- (H A NTA R Il)
- Required to adjust 
decision making 
approach based on 
known lack of 
knowledge
- Flexibility key
- Redundancy m ay prevent 
processing errors
Complexity-
Novelty
pace of events - 
(RTDF)
- Ability to receive and 
process data challenged
- Ability to process 
data challenged
- Increase demand for a 
timely plan of action
- Must ascertain if S 1 ’s 
and S2 up to 
task/replaceable
- Ability to 
interpret data 
increasingly 
challenged
- (H A N TA R Il)
- Senses need to act 
quickly
- Redundancy may prevent 
processing errors
Reproduced 
with 
perm
ission 
of the 
copyright owner. 
Further reproduction 
prohibited 
without perm
ission.
294
Figure 5.4e: DC5 Theoretical Framework with Modifications after Case 1, ORI
[CE] * [DC5F]
Crisis Environment 
(characterize relative to 
DC5F of control center)
Potential for Negative 
Outcomes
Induces Organizational 
Stress
Challenging Levels of 
Complexity:
Demand for integration 
of dependent _  
specialized 
knowledges
Tab
Demand for amount, 
type and degree of 
specialized knowledge
Novelty
Unknowability 
Number of 
entities 
Pace of 
events
S y s t e m  o f  I n t e r e s t :  
e n v i r o n m e n t s
D i s t r i b u t e d  c o g n i t i o n  p r o c e s s e s  i n  c o n t r o l  c e n t e r s  f u n c t i o n i n g  i n  c r i s i s
s (see 
3.1)
5. Identity/Policy: Intended Purpose: 
facilitate construction of representations of 
outside environment in order to continuously 
respond successfully in meeting higher 
organizations purpose.
4. Intelligence: Intended Purpose: 
Develop/adapt representations. Assess 
Relative importance of information.
t e n s i o n :  “e x p l o r a t i o n  v s .  e x p l o i t a t i o n ”, 
“m o r e  i n f o r m a t i o n  vs. t i m e l y  a l t e r n a t i v e s ”, 
“r e s p o n s e / e x p e c t a t i o n s ”
3. Control: Intended Purpose: Operational 
control of control center
1. Autonomous Units: Specialized 
Expert'^es, Communicators, Technologies, 
Artifacts.
n formation flow
System
Context
Horizon of 
Visibility
Intersubjectivity
Staff
com petence
Leadership
Flexibility
R edundancy
Coordination
Bringing
together
diverse
incoming data
sets and
appropriate
expertises.
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Summary of Framework Analysis
In summary, the track 1 interpretive analysis of the first case, first ORE 
validated a significant portion of the DC5 framework. It also resulted in the 
removal of S3* from the DC5 framework. Data showed that as crisis intensity 
increased, the S3 function simply did not have the time or capital to invest in 
detailed monitoring or auditing of S1 performance. Judgment had to be made 
quickly and firing and training replacements became less of a viable option. The 
control center was stuck with the competence of the staff with which it entered 
the crisis. In a minor adjustment to the framework, this ORE also highlighted the 
differing impacts of pace of events and scale of events. The first seemed to 
generally result in the control center’s S4 or intelligence function struggling to put 
pieces together to assemble an accurate representation of the outside 
environment. The latter seemed to result more in the S4 function deconflicting 
multiple information streams regarding the same event stream. Finally, the first 
case highlighted the fact that as information technologies greatly increased the 
control centers horizon of visibility it became an increasingly important function of 
the S4~the intelligence function of the control center to assess the relative 
importance of the incoming information.
The applied research, or track 2 approach to evaluating the first case’s 
data from the first ORE, reiterated the finding from track 1 that assessing the 
relative importance of information became a much greater portion of S4’s 
systemic functions as horizon of visibility increased. Substantial improvement 
was seen between the first and second OREs in the first case. This assessment
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of improved performance was reinforced by the data from the final ORI in this 
case. While it’s tempting to try to point to track 2 as having some responsibility 
for this improvement, this point cannot be sustained. The impact of track 2 would 
not have been seen until the ORI, as it was first really applied in scripting the 
second ORE. The SRC learned and improved as a result of the script of the first 
ORE. To the extent that planning track 2 and applying the constructs and ideas 
of the DC5 framework played a role in the scripting of this first exercise, then 
some credit may be taken. It should be noted, however, that 1) the mere practice 
value for personnel in the first ORE, 2) the use of the highly enabling BARTS 
message board system, 3) unit leadership, and 4) SRC personnel competence 
could also explain the increase in performance.
The first case’s second ORE proved of little value to iterative internal 
framework validation and adjustment because the UCC’s performance was so 
brilliant. It did however, highlight the importance of expressing crisis intensity in 
terms of the DC5 fitness level of the control center under study. The importance 
of this relative interaction between fitness and crisis definition was highlighted by 
the opposite extreme in the second case when the most basic of control center 
information processing proved to be a crisis for that particular control center.
' The second case did serve to further validate a portion of the DC5 
framework as basic information processing requirements rose to crisis levels for 
the subject UCC and some convergence with the framework was noted in terms 
of the interaction between pace and scale of events and DC5 subsystem 
impacts.
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Finally, the final ORI in the first case again reinforced the notion of the 
relationship between DC5 fitness of a particular control center and 
characterization of crisis intensity. As in the second ORE however, the superior 
fitness of the SRC exceeded the ability of the environment to be viewed as a 
crisis. Table 5.3e and Figure 5.4e represent the final iteration of the DC5 
framework for purposes of this research.
The researcher has other significant conclusions, criticisms, reflections, 
and lessons learned to discuss, specifically with regard to case selection and the 
limits of research into distributed cognition but these will appear in Chapter VI, 
along with discussions about the impact and potential benefits of the research 
and potential for future research.
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
Organization of Conclusion
This final chapter of the dissertation will be organized around the primary 
research question, motivations, and focused objectives presented in Chapter I. 
Figure 6.1, Research Approach Overview is a reprint of Figure 1.3 and will serve 
to guide the majority of this final discussion, specifically the degree to which the 
work addressed the primary research questions and the resulting focused 
objectives as well as the early motivations for the research. Additionally, the 
researcher will also summarize his reflections, criticisms, and lessons learned 
following the research effort and will follow up by discussing subject matter 
relating to the research that may serve as a fruitful area of future research 
inquiry. Lastly, one final summary of the key conclusions resulting from the 
research will be provided as well as the researcher’s assessment of the 
research’s key contribution to the body of knowledge relating to the subject 
matter.
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Figure 6.1: Research Approach Overview
Motivations for Research
(1) Aid in implementation of 
new strategies and 
methodologies in crisis 
control centers
(2) Improve systemic design 
of and confidence in the 
assessment of distributed 
cognition systems,
(3)lmprove general 
understanding of dcog within 
control centers
(4) Better understanding of 
systemic effects crisis 
conditions have on the 
structures within control 
centers
(5) Generalizeablility to other 
dcog systems.
Case
Analysis
Primary Research 
Questions
1. What are key dcog 
constructs and their 
interrelationships?
2. What are the structural 
impacts of crises on dcog 
in control centers?
T T
Focused Objectives
1) To develop a set of general themes and characterizations 
relating to dcog and to understand how these are developed into 
existing conceptual frameworks
2) To determine the general themes and characterizations within 
crisis management literature relating to the impact crisis 
conditions have on organizations
3) To develop a conceptual framework capturing the impact of 
crisis conditions on distributed cognition phenomena within 
control centers
4) To use an exploratory case study methodology in conjunction 
with the framework to determine if it aids in understanding the 
functions/interactions of subsystems within a distributed cognition 
system functioning in periods of crisis.
5) To partially validate the framework by using it to assess a dcog 
system’s fitness characterization and using it to design a training 
plan to improve performance.
6) To implement the training plan in F05 and assess the 
improvement in performance of the distributed cognition system
▲ A
Iterative Feedback
Applications
Framework
Development
Field
work: case 
data
collection
~ T
Research Design: 
Case Data Collection 
Protocol
Case Selection
Literature Review
1. Distributed Cognition: 
definitions, constructs, 
concepts, frameworks, 
models.
2. Crisis Management: 
definitions, concepts, 
constructs
Case Studv Methodoloev Literature Review
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Addressing the Primary Research Questions and Focused Objectives of 
the Research
The first primary research question sought to determine the key constructs 
and interrelationships one must understand to build a coherent, holistic 
understanding of distributed cognition phenomena. Chapter II, a) reviewed 
several existing frameworks (see Figure 2.3) in the literature identifying the key 
functions of organizational learning phenomena seen by other authors and b) 
attempted to distill out the common themes of focus from the literature (Figure 
2.2). In so doing the focused objectives detailed in Chapter I were met: 1) an 
understanding of the general themes and constructs relating to distributed 
cognition in the existing literature was reached as was an understanding of how 
these issues had been conceptually framed by other authors, 2) the general 
themes and constructs of what constitutes crisis environments were distilled out 
of existing literature, and 3) these were integrated to produce the DC5 structure.
Chapter III sought to provide this structure by capturing these constructs 
and their interrelationships and by grouping them and then adapting them to 
Beer’s (1979, 1984) viable system model. Once the first primary research 
question was answered, the next primary research question’s motivation was to 
see if this emergent structure of constructs, themes, and interrelationships 
served to provide additional knowledge.
The structure provided by Beer’s VSM was sought by the researcher 
because it was difficult to articulate the impact of a growing crisis environment on 
distributed cognition phenomena. For example, how would a sudden increase in
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the pace of events outside a control center impact its ability to construct an 
understanding of that outside environment? Such issues were the focus of the 
second primary research question: developing a systemic understanding of the 
impact of crisis conditions on distributed cognition systems. Chapter III 
speculated on what such affects may be by developing and articulating the initial 
DC5 framework (Figure 3.4 and Table 3.1) and Chapter V provided validation or 
modification to a substantial part of the framework resulting in the final framework 
at the time of research completion (Table 5.3e and Figure 5.4e). While the 
selected cases did little to validate a key portion of the framework (i.e. the nature 
of a crisis environment’s demands for the application and integration of 
specialized expertise sets on distributed cognition in control centers) other major 
portions of the framework were validated or improved, substantially answering 
the second primary research questions. The interpretive, exploratory research 
approaches, track 1, to the cases demonstrated the value of the framework as a 
basis for understanding distributed cognition phenomena. The applied research 
approach, track 2, similarly proved valuable by enhancing the understanding of 
the phenomena and setting, indeed validating the need to modify the framework 
by identifying the importance of assessing the relative significance of information 
by the intelligence functions of a distributed cognition system as horizon of 
visibility grows. Due, however, to the unanticipated improvement in the first case 
in performance in the SRC between the first and second OREs it is difficult to 
gauge the validating impact of this research design approach on the final 
performance during the ORI and therefore on the framework. Further discussion
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of this shortfall can be found in the upcoming section on the researcher’s 
reflections and criticisms. In general though, the primary research questions and 
resulting focused objectives of the research introduced in Chapter I were 
addressed.
The Potential Benefits of the Research
Chapter I introduced 5 potential benefits, PB1 -  PB5 in Table 1.1, of the 
research. PB3 and PB4 were clearly met through the conduct of the research. 
The research did indeed provide for a better understanding of distributed 
cognition phenomena in the systems within control centers (PB3). The research 
provided a better understanding of the systemic effects of crisis conditions on 
control center distributed cognition (PB4). The remaining benefits identified in 
Chapter I require further explanation.
One of the anticipated benefits of the research (PB1) was that it would 
provide a basis for better development of implementation strategies for adapting 
new methodologies and technologies to support control centers. While the 
researcher believes that full scale development and deployment of such 
methodologies and technologies are good examples of future areas of research 
inquiry based on this work, the track 2 research method is a key example of this 
benefit.
Typically, training for an ORI involves an Air Force unit internally running 
three to four successive OREs in preparation for the final test. Usually these 
OREs are planned and evaluated by senior, experienced personnel within the
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unit who do not play in the ORE. The planning of these OREs, specifically the 
scripting of events, is usually done with the unit’s key functions, such as 
operating and maintaining aircraft, securing base perimeters, maintaining base 
infrastructure, and other such functions in mind. In turn these events cascade up 
and serve as the events that will generate information for the control center to 
process. This bottoms-up approach to exercise scripting does not allow for 
control centers to necessarily be hit with scenarios ideal to enhancing heir 
effectiveness.
The applied research portion of this work, track 2, as developed in 
Chapter IV is an example of an implementation strategy based on the DC5 
framework. By using an early ORE to assess the existing fitness level of a 
control center in a detailed, systemic manner based on the DC5 framework, an 
ORE evaluation team can prepare a script specifically designed to train that 
particular control center. Such focused design should prove more useful than the 
more traditional method of repeating the same script over and over again with 
minor changes to maintain surprise. The fact that it is difficult to gauge the 
impact of this approach in the given case in which it was used is discussed in a 
later section as is the prospect for using this approach in future research.
The paragraphs above identified potential benefits in using the DC5 
framework in planning exercises, but it can also be of benefit in assessing (PB2) 
the performance of control centers after such exercises. Specifically, using the 
framework, as a basis for such assessment can yield much more useful 
information than typical criteria. Typically, following an exercise, evaluators will
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use existing established Air Force criteria to evaluate a UCCs performance (see 
Appendix 1). As evaluation reports are read and reviewed by players they 
merely see their emergent errors identified, for example: “weak use of checklists 
and visual aids,” and the players in turn focus on more rigorously using checklists 
and visual aids in the next ORE. The track 2 approach, alternatively, allows a 
reader to review an assessment in light of the specific environment that created it 
and understand its impact on the UCCs mission of constructing and acting upon 
representations. Again, using this approach to evaluating performance needs to 
be further tested and could be the subject matter of future research.
The last potential benefit identified in Chapter I, is the notion that the 
increased understanding provided by this research relating to distributed 
cognition and crisis environments may find application outside the setting of Air 
Force control centers. As was detailed extensively in Chapter Ill’s discussion of 
qualitative case study research methodologies, the generalizability outside the 
studied sample that is typically gained from strictly quantitative approaches is not 
realizable. As Yin (1984) concludes however, case study data is generalizable to 
theory. Chapters I and II identified many settings outside of those at the focus of 
this work in which distributed cognition takes place: academic spheres, political 
spheres, and organizational settings to name a few. These settings also 
occasionally experience crisis environments in which learning must take place in 
stressful periods. It is hoped that the increased understanding provided by this 
work of crisis environment impacts on such learning and information processing 
can provoke similar areas of interests and increase focus upon such phenomena.
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Further limits to such transferability are reflective of the limits of the selected 
cases with respect to validating the DC5 framework as shall be discussed in the 
next section.
Limitations
In retrospect, in viewing this work as a whole, four major limiting issues 
are worthy of reflection. 1) The subject matter of the work was necessarily broad 
impacting the results and the extent of its contribution to the body of knowledge; 
2) while intuitively obvious, it should be said that the cases selected for study 
necessarily limit the impact of the research; 3) as discussed in Chapter III, the 
case study approach used here as means of validating the DC5 framework 
inherently limits the validity of the research and 4) lastly, some argue that the 
work represents application of a level of sophistication beyond that of the 
problem it seeks to address. This section addresses these limiting factors and 
potential criticisms.
The subject matter of this research, specifically framing distributed 
cognition in crisis environments, was relatively broad in scope and coping with 
this breadth was a key challenge to the research. Attempting to develop an 
entire new framework meant not only the study and mastery of existing 
frameworks relating to distributed cognition but the study and development of 
systemic methods to be used in providing such a framework. Additionally, the 
focus of the research lies at the intersection of two separate focus areas of 
research, distributed cognition and crisis management, requiring the extensive
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literature review to support the framework’s development. Finally, a rigorous 
review of case study methods, also added to the work required to support the 
research.
The resulting DC5 framework was necessarily broad in the set of 
circumstances covered, as demonstrated by the extent of detail in Table 5.13 
and in the exhaustive cell-by-cell analysis discussions relating to this Table in 
Chapter V. One may argue that such breadth yields little in the way of deep 
insight and as will be addressed in the next few paragraphs makes validation 
difficult to achieve in a holistic sense. Such criticism is valid but one must also 
ask if such research should in turn be avoided altogether because of the issue of 
breadth. The researcher found it difficult to apply the varieties of settings within a 
crisis environment to the existing frameworks and understand their impact 
explicitly on distributed cognition phenomena. Thus, necessarily in order to 
proceed, a new structured perspective had to be developed and fielded. It is 
hoped that future research can and will succeed in validating and sharpening the 
framework and improve its usefulness and thereby the depth of the validity of the 
work. Because little other work could be found addressing the research focus 
area, a large initial increment of research had to be attempted before further 
refinement could take place.
The primary weakness of the research in the researcher’s opinion is the 
limited validation of the DC5 framework, specifically the lack of validation of the 
DC5 framework in the areas of understanding the impact of a crisis environments 
demands for specialized and integrated expertise on distributed cognition
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phenomena. The research necessarily required a rigorously observable crisis 
environment. The researcher saw the analogy between crisis environments and 
lightning strikes as expressed in a popular movie: “the problem is you never 
know when and where lightning is going to strike.” Similarly, the strength of the 
case category, Air Force OREs and ORIs, from a research perspective was that 
the researcher would have access to a controlled, scripted, manipulatable, 
observable crisis environment with performance being graded by experienced 
personnel using established criteria. Such rigor was exceedingly rare in the 
cases or stories frequently reviewed in the literature.
The limits of such cases, however necessarily limit the validating capability 
they can provide to the framework being tested. In the case of the AF OREs and 
ORIs, the researcher realized upon observing the first ORE in the first case that 
they only require a surface level of learning or information processing. The 
deeper or double loop learning referred to by Argyris and Schon (1978, 1996) 
just wasn’t called for in such settings; indeed all the different types of scenarios 
involved in the exercise and inspection scripts are scenarios that are often 
discussed and even separately trained for repeatedly in Air Force settings. While 
such settings require the application of specialized expertise and require 
integrated, interdisciplinary responses from Air Force personnel, little on the spot, 
in-crisis deeper learning is called for that causes subjects to reevaluate or 
abandon basic underlying assumptions and foundations. Thus, a large portion of 
the framework, specifically those rows of Table 5.13 relating to specialized and
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integrated expertise remains un-validated. Further discussion in this respect will 
follow in the next section on future research focus areas.
The cases studied necessarily limited the impact of the research also in 
the way the control centers performed relative to their environment. The DC5 
framework necessarily defines itself as one in which a crisis is taking place. 
Implicit in this definition is the assumption that it will be applied to a control center 
functioning in such an environment. Upon reflection, this represents a narrow 
envelope where the framework is applicable, that is when the proposed 
distributed cognition fitness level of control center is just being exceeded by the 
environment in which it is functioning. In iterations where the control center’s 
proficiency is far beyond that of the environment, little validating effect can be 
found. Similarly, in cases where the environment swamps what little proficiency 
the control center does have only moderate validating value can be found. The 
researcher speculates that even had he been aware of this issue of fitness- 
environment relevance to the degree these cases raised such awareness 
beforehand, it would have been difficult to predict the suitability of the cases to 
validating the framework. This suggests that it would have been difficult to predict 
the fitness-environment relevance until after each control center had been seen 
in action. Future work in this area may have to factor eliminating such cases into 
the completion timelines for such research as well as the likelihood of finding 
cases that fit the envelope for study.
Thirdly, as discussed in Chapter III, case study research necessarily limits 
the validity of the work. The five steps cited in the literature in Chapter III to
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address construct validity or the problem of researcher objectivity were, to 
review, 1) thoroughly detailing the background, demographic and experiential, of 
the researcher so that the audience can assess his potential biases as well as 
familiarity with case issues, 2) thoroughly detailing the means by which access to 
case data sources was gained, again for the purpose of allowing reviewers to 
assess potential biases 3) triangulating data and conclusions by seeking 
confirmation from multiple sources of evidence within the case, 4) establishing a 
chain of evidence that a reviewer can follow to determine what support a given 
finding had, and 5) having the actual informants review the descriptions and 
conclusions of the researcher. Such steps were taken in this research. Similarly, 
3 prescribed steps from the case study methodology literature review were taken 
to address internal validity or the problem of researcher interaction, those being 
1) identifying recurring patterns within cases to trace causality, 2) using other 
experts and informants to build explanations for observations, and 3) identifying, 
detailing, and addressing rival explanations for observations. External validity is 
the notion within quantitative research methods that the research is significant 
because it is generalizable to a broad set of contexts outside that of the existing 
study. As previously discussed, towards this criticism, case studies do not have 
a valid answer. The researcher acknowledges that sampling logic is outside of 
the grasp of the work given the contextual depth and small number of cases. 
Rather it has been proposed that case study findings can be generalized to 
existing theory (Yin 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989). Adding the separate study of case 
two and the second track methodology for case 1 adds weight to the theoretical
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propositions of the DC5 framework (Yin, 2003). The findings of the case study 
should be transferable to other similar contexts but the work is inherently limited 
only to the context of Air Force Control Centers and not generalizeable to other 
settings. Pressing this notion even further, the generalizability of the research is 
also limited by the artificialities of associated with exercises and inspections 
relative to real-world Air Force crisis events. As documented in the case 
description, operational readiness exercises and inspections are high-stress 
events but casualties, material damage, and mission impacts are simulated and 
at the end of a participant’s shift they return to their own homes or hotel rooms. 
Such limitations are just that, limitations, the cases still represent quite an 
opportunity for research not crisis environments as long as the limitations are 
captured contextually.
Finally, reliability refers to the notion within traditional quantitative research 
that experiments may be followed and repeated and results should be 
reproducible. Again because of the dependence of case studies on contextual 
depth they’re inherently limited in their ability to be reproduced in other settings. 
This too is acknowledged by the case study researcher who offers in return the 
ability to audit his results by developing and using a rigorous case protocol and 
maintaining a case database, as was done in this work so that other researchers 
can agree that had they done the research the same findings would have been 
reached (Yin, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989).
Finally, some may argue that a degree of sophistication is being applied to 
a problem that doesn’t merit it or require it. A good script can be developed by
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an experienced evaluator simply by reviewing a previous exercise report and 
applying that experience rather than going through the process of rigorously and 
explicitly understanding distributed cognition and applying it as in track 2 of the 
research design, to training a control center to become more proficient. The 
researcher wholeheartedly agrees that such experienced and talented 
professionals exist that can provide such levels of expertise for training control 
centers but argues that the process being applied tacitly by such and 
experienced evaluator if made more explicit essentially becomes the process of 
Track 2. The sophistication being applied in articulating such a process allows 
for a better understanding of distributed cognition phenomena by more people 
and thus facilitates better script writing, better performance, and better 
assessments of performance.
Recommendations for Further Research
As suggested in the previous section the focus of this research was 
necessarily broad because little could be found in the literature regarding the 
interrelationship between distributed cognition phenomena and crisis 
environments. It is hoped that the framework proposed here and validated to 
some extent san serve as basis for outlining and mapping this focus area for 
further research. The breadth of the DC5 framework leaves lots of room for 
further validation, modification, or rejection of individual propositions of the 
framework or categorical reframing of the subject matter itself. The researcher 
sees four major areas of focus that might be immediately used in the next
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iteration of academic inquiry into the subject matter: 1) Portions of the DC5 
framework can be isolated for further more extensive study and in-depth 
validation and study; 2) cases can be more rigorously selected for study to avoid 
some of the limitations in this work or accepted for study for just the portion of the 
framework to which they have validating, modifying, rejecting, or impacting 
content; 3) the applied research design of track 2 can be refined and applied over 
several iterations to see if it indeed has validity as a training paradigm, and 4) 
perhaps other settings in which distributed cognition occurs in crisis situations 
can use the holistic, systemic approach used here to gain understanding of the 
subject matter.
Future work could avoid the challenges of this work associated with the 
breadth of establishing a new framework by focusing on specific portions of the 
framework itself. Specifically, research into control centers implementing new 
technologies like BARTS, might yield insights analogous to those seen here 
where increased horizon of visibility increases demands on intelligence forming 
systems. The impacts of sudden changes in horizons of visibility on various 
performance measures may prove interesting. Measurements of intersubjectivity 
may be applicable to performance metrics. Finally, the general approach tried 
here of broad validation could be repeated to add weight to the theory.
As case characteristics were identified as a key limiting factor on the 
research, it is recommended that future research that may use the DC5 
framework, seek 1) to immediately rule out cases where the fitness-environment 
relevance is not suited to the framework’s envelope and avoid spending precious
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research capital in such areas, 2) accept cases for their strengths as its difficult 
to predict the individual attributes of a control center and validate the portions of 
the framework they apply to, and 3) try if possible to seek out cases with 
attributes that may validate un-validated portions of the framework or add weight 
where its necessary.
Of particular interest to the researcher is utilizing applied research along 
the lines of the track 2 training methodology proposed here to refine the 
framework. The researcher supposes that if access can be gained to an Air 
Force unit in the initial stages of training for an ORI before any exercises have 
been conducted then more rigorous, thorough, and complete application of the 
methodology can be attempted. Environment characterization, fitness 
characterization, and performance characterization can be refined into a 
sophisticated training paradigm that can be validated or can gain weight if it leads 
to improvements in performance.
Finally, as the work was ongoing the researcher began to view many of 
the ongoing stories in the news and in his area of academic interest through the 
prism of the research. Distributed cognition takes place throughout our world, in 
markets, in politics, in diplomatic and military affairs, in history, and in science. 
Occasionally, it takes place in crisis environments. Sporadically, the deeper 
learning of Argyris and Schon (1978, 1006) only takes place in crisis 
environments. A key weakness of the cases used in this research is that they 
didn’t present the opportunity for such learning to take place. While the 
difficulties associated with knowing when a crisis may happen and capturing data
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in a rigorous manner will have to be overcome or addressed in studying such 
matters the variety of contexts for gaining insight into how distributed cognition 
can be improved in such circumstances is engaging.
Summary and Final Overview of Conclusions and Contribution the Body of 
Knowledge
This work sought to develop an understanding of the impact of crisis 
conditions on distributed cognition phenomena. To this end an extensive review 
of both key focus areas of subject matter, crisis management and distributed 
cognition, was undertaken. The key themes and constructs of both fields were 
condensed into characterizing elements and sub-functions. The researcher 
concluded that existing frameworks describing organizational learning and 
distributed cognition proved unfruitful for articulating the impact of crisis 
conditions on distributed cognition phenomena. To address this challenge the 
researcher applied Beer’s Viable System Model to create a systemic, holistic, 
structured framework out of the constructs and interrelationships of distributed 
cognition research which could in turn be used to understand the impacts of a 
variety of crisis conditions upon distributed cognition phenomena. This effort 
produced the DC5 framework at the center of this work.
Two research methodologies were then proposed to attempt to validate 
the framework. The first, an interpretive approach, involved using the framework 
as a means of understanding case study observations. The second, an applied 
research approach, involved using the framework as a means of assessing the
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distributed cognition fitness level of a control center and designing training 
environments to maximize their performance enhancing value. Two case 
studies, one involving three units of analysis and the other just a single unit of 
analysis, were undertaken to apply these methodologies. The case studies 
provided initial validation for a substantial portion of the DC5 framework. Repeat 
case studies in future research can add further validating weight to the 
framework and could potentially address those areas of the DC5 framework 
unaddressed by the selected cases in this work.
The primary benefits of this research to the body of knowledge fall into 
three main categories, that is, its contributions in terms of 1) synthesizing existing 
literature, 2) theory, 3) methodology, and 4) in practice. First, in terms of the 
literature, this work reviewed the existing constructs and frameworks as well as 
general themes from two usually separate, non-intersecting areas of study, 
distributed cognition and crisis management. It then further studied these 
literature sets through the lens of systems analysis developing a structured 
review of the literature and citing a gap existing in the literature. Second, this 
work goes beyond existing theory by, 1) developing a systemic structured 
framing of distributed cognition phenomena not found in the existing literature, 2) 
using existing literary constructs to develop a theoretical means of characterizing 
a crisis environment, and 3) integrating these two innovations into a single 
overarching new framework capturing the systemic impacts of a crisis 
environment upon distributed cognition phenomena. Third, the use of the 
framework as a means of relating raw control center performance assessments
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to characterizations of control center fitness and crisis environments represents 
an innovative approach the methodologically applying the developed theoretical 
framework. Fourth, the application in the first case, involving this methodology of 
interpreting performance in terms of crisis environment and distributed cognition 
fitness levels, to develop first and assessment and second an intervention, in the 
form of a script, represents an innovation in terms of applied practice. These four 
innovations represent the sum of the contribution of this work to the body of 
knowledge and lay a broad, promising foundation for future more focused, in 
depth research which can further, more rigorously 1) validate and refine the DC5 
framework and 2) comprehend the phenomena at the center of the work.
In terms of guidance for practitioners, specifically Air Force personnel 
involved in manning, training, and evaluating unit control centers, track two of the 
research design represents a practical means of employing the theory developed 
here. The assessment approach involved in this work provides more depth than 
existing methods and lays the basis for more rigorous development of training 
plans and script development. The key lessons for practitioners from this work 
are 1) that crises come in different varieties which can be characterized by the 
DC5 framework, 2) the cognition that occurs in control centers should be viewed 
as a system of interacting constructs, 3) environmental impacts to the control 
center affect its cognitive abilities systemically and the DC5 framework provides 
a means for anticipating, understanding, and planning for these impacts, 4) 
control center performance should be interpreted in light of this systemic view
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and 5) assessment and training regimens should be deployed with such a 
framework in mind.
In terms of future research more specifically, this work provides a 
structured framework for understanding the impacts of a crisis environment on 
distributed cognition phenomena in the setting of control centers, the framework 
could serve as a basis for developing strategies for integrating new technologies 
or methodologies into control center operations. The framework can also serve 
as a basis for developing new means of assessing control center performance 
improving the precision and usability of such assessments of control center 
performance. Finally and hopefully, though limited in its own inherent 
generalizability, this work can spur thought and future work and research into 
both similar settings and different settings in which distributed cognition takes 
place under the stress of crisis conditions.
Lastly, in terms of contributions to the field of Engineering Management, 1) 
the work represents an innovative application of Systems Engineering concepts 
to a problem for which the researcher could not find a previous application. 2) 
The subject matter involves the management of complex, technical infrastructure 
and highly skilled engineers and technologists, under relatively unstudied 
circumstances. 3) Finally, the work synthesizes and combines themes, crisis 
stress and organizational learning, from the field of organizational behavior, a key 
area of study within Engineering Management research. For Engineering 
Managers the work represents an advancement of the field.
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APPENDIX I
SAMPLE OF EXISTING UCC INSPECTION CRITERIA 
FROM AIR COMBAT COMMAND INSTRUCTION 90-201, ADDENDUM F
The following is the section of criteria used by the Air Force’s Air Combat 
Command Inspection Team to evaluate and grade the Unit Control Center of a 
squadron (in this case a RED HORSE, or heavy construction squadron of 400 
personnel) during an Operational Readiness Inspection. One goal of this work 
was to develop criteria based on an underlying, validated framework that would 
provide for a more robust, comprehensive assessment of unit control center 
performance during Operational Readiness Inspections:
5.2. Subarea-Command and Control. Unit command and control will be 
evaluated to determine if appropriate actions were taken by command and 
leadership to sustain, defend, survive, and recover.
5.2.1. Rated Items-Command and Control. The following items will determine 
the overall rating for Command and Control:
5.2.1.1. Plans and Procedures.
5.2.1.2. Local Alarm System.
5.2.1.3. Execution.
5.2.2. Subarea Rating-Command and Control:
5.2.2.1. OUTSTANDING. Plans and Procedures and Execution 
OUTSTANDING with Local Alarm System at least EXCELLENT.
5.2.2.2. EXCELLENT. Plans and Procedures and Execution at least 
EXCELLENT with Local Alarm System at least SATISFACTORY.
5.2.2.3. SATISFACTORY. Plans and Procedures and Execution at least 
SATISFACTORY with Local Alarm System at least MARGINAL.
5.2.2.4. MARGINAL. Plans and Procedures and Execution at least 
MARGINAL.
5.2.2.5. UNSATISFACTORY. Does not meet other criteria.
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5.2.3. Item--Plans and Procedures. Evaluate integration, coordination, and 
effectiveness of pre-, trans-, and post-attack measures and adequacy of 
command and control systems. Evaluate the availability of charts, maps, 
checklists, directives, information boards and reference documents necessary to 
execute war, contingency response plans and unit emergency action taskings. 
Evaluate unit’s ability to activate an alternate command center to ensure mission 
continuation in the event of an evacuation/relocation.
5.2.4. Item-Local Alarm System. Evaluated for redundancy, appropriateness, 
and effectiveness during conventional and Nuclear, Biological and Chemical 
(NBC) attack situations. Units must utilize the alarm signals specified by the host 
theater. Units must be capable of implementing timely alarm notifications 
through more than one medium.
5.2.5. Item-Execution. Ability to collect, display, report, and disseminate attack 
data through clear lines of authority, rapid communication of data, unity of 
command, and liaison with appropriate support agencies will be evaluated. 
Additionally, the ability to track and manage non-attack data and information and 
properly manage resources and priorities to accomplish taskings will be 
evaluated. Prioritization of mission tasking to ensure the highest priority tasking 
is met before lower priority tasking.
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APPENDIX II
GLOSSARY OF TERMS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND ACRONYMS
Crisis Control Center: an organization’s centralized establishment for 
facilitating distributed cognition in the event the organization encounters a crisis 
environment (p.81)
CE: abbreviation used in this work for crisis environment.
Crisis Environment: crisis environments are those with potential for 
significantly more negative organizational outcomes and of a significantly greater 
level of complexity than organizations are usually prepared for and in turn cause 
significant internal organizational stress
Dcog: abbreviation used in this work for distributed cognition
Distributed Cognition: the ongoing accumulation, distribution, and synthesis of 
knowledge across time, amongst personnel and systems, and at all levels within 
a bounded organization, which leads to the development, adjustment, and 
sometimes tearing down of shared mental representations of the outside world 
within which the organization is trying to pursue its goals (p. 11, 33)
Distributed Cognition System: a system designed or used by organizations for 
the intended purpose of facilitating distributed cognition as described above, (p. 
33).
Distributed Cognition System Fitness: a qualitative characterization of the 
fitness of a given distributed cognition system based on the DC5 framework.
(p. 130)
DC5: Abbreviation for the Distributed Cognition in Control Centers in Crisis 
Conditions Framework developed in this research
DC5F: Abbreviation for DC5 Fitness
Organizational Cognition: a term used somewhat interchangeably throughout 
the literature having the same general meaning as distributed cognition although 
perhaps more focused around the occurrence of the phenomena in the context of 
organizations as opposed to groups in general (p. 33).
UCC: Abbreviation for an Air Force Unit Control Center
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Unit Control Center: An Air Force specific term for crisis control centers for 
various echelons within a typical wing organization functioning in wartime 
environments or simulated wartime environments for exercise or inspection 
purposes (p. 82)
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APPENDIX III
CASE PROTOCOL AND DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS 
Case Protocol Organization
This protocol is presented in outline form. Its purpose is to serve as a 
potentially auditable resource explaining how research data, analysis, and results 
were developed. As such each protocol element is presented along with 
development and discussion, or reference to where that development may be 
found discussion may be found elsewhere in this text. The elements composing 
this protocol are: 1) the overall research design, 2) case requirements, suitability, 
and selection, 3) available case data sources, 4) case access and rules of 
engagement
Case Protocol
I. Overall Research Design
a) Discussion and Development: See Chapter IV, Figures 4.1 and 4.2
II. Case Requirements, Suitability, and Selection
a) Discussion and Development: See Chapter IV
b) Correspondence with ACC/IG and Inspected Unit: See Appendix IV
III. Available Case Data Sources
a) Discussion and Development: See Chapter IV, Figure 4.3
IV. Case Study Design Tactics
a) Discussion and Development: See Chapter IV, Table 4.1
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V. Case Access and Rules of Engagement
a) Discussion and Development: See Chapter IV
b) Supporting Correspondence: See Appendix IV
c) Researcher Rules of Engagement: See Appendix IV, Table 4.1
VI. Research Challenges for Data Collection Instruments
a) Discussion and Development: See Chapter IV, Table 4.2
b) Data Collection Instruments: See later in this Appendix (III), Tables 
A3.1 thru A3.6.
VII. Procedures for Analysis
a) Discussion and Development by element: See Chapter IV
b) Data Analysis Summaries: To be accomplished on an iterative basis in 
prospective Chapter V, Case Analysis
VIII. Supporting Documentation
a) Researcher’s Resume: See Appendix IV
b) Researcher’s Background Narrative: See Appendix IV
c) Samples of supporting correspondence: See Appendix IV
d) Researcher subject verification and validation of data collection 
instruments, analysis, and conclusions: To be included in Chapter IV.
VIII. Case Database
a) Discussion and Development: See Chapter IV
b) All data sourcing correspondence, data itself collected from the 
instruments, supporting documentation, and data summaries to be
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maintained on CD-ROM by researcher and, in the case of field notes,
maintained in a filing system.
Data Collection Instruments
The data collection instruments that follow are derived from the protocol 
guidance developed in Chapter IV, expressed in Table 4.2. The constructs of the 
DC5 framework guide the breakdown of questions and observation guidance 
while the research challenges captured in Table 4.2 are detailed according to the 
intersecting cell labels provided there. As the protocol suggests the data 
collection instruments are geared to seek both convergence and triangulation as 
well as rival explanation and divergence, thus many of the questions that follow 
are repetitive seeking to focus responses from the interviewee to confirm or 
reject various DC5 framework constructs.
The data gained from these six instruments along with the other materials 
detailed in the protocol, researcher background, access correspondence, rules of 
engagement regarding researcher/unit/evaluator interaction, and interviewee 
follow-up correspondence, will comprise the case database. For each of the 
three exercises and one inspection which are being observed, the researcher 
expects 6 to 10 UCC participant pre- and post-exercise questionnaire responses, 
two to four, one set of researcher observations, and one evaluation report for 
review. This database may be made available by contacting the researcher.
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Table A3.1: Pre-Exercise Questionnaire for UCC Participants
# DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus
Table 4.2 
Cell
References
Question
1 General 
discussion in 
their terms
A1, A3 What are your expectations of the upcoming exercise? 
What is your position in the organization? How do think 
you’ll do? In what areas do you think the UCC will excel 
in, do poorly in?
2 Potential for
negative
outcomes
A1, A3 How do you feel about the fact that you are being 
evaluated? For having things go badly in the exercise?
4 Induces
Organizational
Stress
A1, A3 What are you expecting in terms of stress in the 
exercise?
5 Demand for 
Specialized 
Expertise
A1, A3 What do you think of your expertise/qualifications to 
respond to scenarios?
6 Demand for 
Integration of 
Expertise
A1, A3 What do you think of the UCC’s expertise/qualifications 
to respond to scenarios?
8 Novelty: Number 
of Entities/Pace 
of Events
A1, A3 Do you feel you’ll be able to handle the amount of 
information required and processed during the exercise?
10 Context: HOV A1, A3 Any thoughts on layout/general functioning of UCC? Are 
you able to monitor information outside just the portion 
you are focused upon?
11 Context: IS A1, A3 How well do you know your fellow UCC personnel, their 
jobs. How long have you worked together in a UCC?
12 Context: 
Leadership and 
Staff
Competence
A1, A3 Any observations relating to the apparent observed 
Leadership and Staff Competence?
14 System 1 A1, A3 Can you describe the jobs of the various people in the 
UCC? The purpose of the systems/artifacts?
15 System 2 A1, A3 How well do you think the UCC team will interact and 
coordinate their action?
17 System 3 A1, A3 What did you think of the general operational control of 
the UCC? Are personnel and systems being provided 
with tools to accomplish their function? How is 
performance being routinely monitored and feedback 
being provided?
18 Demographics NA Age, rank, gender, race, time in service, time in career 
field, experience in UCCs
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Table A3.2: Post-Exercise Questionnaire for UCC Participants
# DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus
Table 4.2 Cell 
References
Question
1 G eneral
discussion in their 
terms
D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
How did you think the U C C  perform ed? Rating. Relative to 
others you’ve seen. Scenario  specific? H ow  would explain the  
perform ance successes/lapses/failures?
2 Representations D 1 , D2, D3, 
D4, D5
Can you identify tim es during the exercise w hen working 
representations departed significantly from  the real world? If 
so why do you think they occurred?
3 Potential for 
negative outcom es
D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
Did you perceive knowledge on the potential for negative  
outcomes, grade-re lated  and scenario related, impacting 
perform ance of the U C C ?  Specifically, w here?
4 Induces
Organizational
Stress
D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
W here/how  did you detect signs of stress impacting you, other, 
personnel and system s in the U C C ? Scenario  Specific.
5 D em and for 
Specialized  
Expertise
D 1, D2, D3, 
D 4, D5
Did you feel any lack of perform ance/errors w ere  due to the  
C E ’s dem ands for more specialized expertise than existed in 
the U C C ? Scenario  specific.
6 D em and for 
Integration of 
Expertise
D1, D2, D3, 
D 4, D5
Did you feel any lack of perform ance/errors w ere  due to the  
C E ’s dem ands for m ore integrated expertise than existed in 
the U C C ? Scenario  specific.
7 Novelty:
Unknowability
D1, D2, D3, 
D 4, D5
Did you feel any lack of perform ance/errors w ere  due to the  
fact that C E  w as simply unknowable? Scenario  specific.
8 Novelty: N um ber 
of Entities
D1, D2, D3. 
D 4, D5
Did you feel any lack of perform ance/errors w ere  due to the 
num ber of entities having to be processed by the U C C ?  
Scenario specific.
9 Novelty: P ace of 
Events
D1, D2, D3, 
D 4, D 5
Did you feel any lack of perform ance/errors w ere  due to the 
pace of events having to be processed by the U C C ?  Scenario  
specific.
10 Context: H O V D1, D2, D3, 
D 4, D5
Did you think layout/general functioning of U C C  impacted  
operations? If so, how?
11 Context: IS D 1 , D2, D3, 
D 4, D5
W hat did you think about team  m em ber interactions? W hat 
motivated them ? H ow  did they affect perform ance
12 System  1 D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
W hat did you think of the personnel functions? And system  
functions within the U C C ?  H ow  did they relate to 
perform ance?
13 System  2 D1, D2, D3, 
D 4, D5
Any thoughts on the coordination of actions am ongst U C C  
elements?
14 System  3 D1, D2, D3, 
D 4, D5
W hat did you think of the general operational control of the  
U C C ? Are personnel and system s being provided with tools to 
accomplish their function? How  is perform ance being routinely 
monitored and feedback being provided?
15 System  3 D1, D 2, D3, 
D 4, D 5
Did you observe any tension relating to the need for more 
information versus the need for im plem entable action? 
Scenario specific.
16 System  5 D 1 ,D 2 , D3, 
D 4, D5
Any thoughts on issues/challenges that w ent to the core of the  
organization, senior leadership, basic policies governing  
conduct, actions, and work, addressing any tension existing 
between U C C  elem ents?
17 R esearcher
Interaction
D6 W hat effect, if any, did you think the presence of the  
researcher had on the actions of the U C C ?
18 Dem ographic
Information
NA Age, rank, gender, race, tim e in service, tim e evaluating, 
experience in U C C s
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Table A3.3: Post-Exercise Questionnaire for UCC Evaluators
# DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus
Table 4.2 Cell 
References
Question
1 G eneral
discussion in their 
terms
E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
How  did you think the U C C  perform ed? Rating. Relative to 
others you’ve seen. Scenario  specific? H ow  would explain the  
perform ance successes/lapses/failures?
2 Representations E 1 .E 2 , E3. 
E4, E5
C an you identify times during the exercise w hen working 
representations departed significantly from the real world? If 
so w hy do you think they occurred?
3 Potential for 
negative outcom es
E 1 , E2, E3, 
E 4, E5
Did you perceive the knowledge on the potential for negative  
outcom es, grade-related and scenario related, impacting  
perform ance of the U C C ?  Specifically, where?
4 Induces O rgan­
ization Stress
E 1, E2, E3, 
E4, E 5
W here /how  did you detect signs of stress impacting personnel 
and system s in the U C C ? Scenario  Specific.
5 Dem and for 
Specialized  
Expertise
E 1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Did you feel any lack of perform ance/errors w ere  due to the  
C E ’s dem ands for more specialized expertise than existed in 
the U C C ?  Scenario  specific.
6 Dem and for 
Integration of 
Expertise
E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Did you feel any lack of perform ance/errors w ere  due to the  
C E ’s dem ands for more integrated expertise than existed in 
the U C C ? Scenario specific.
7 Novelty:
Unknowability
E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Did you feel any lack of perform ance/errors w ere  due to the  
fact that C E  was simply unknowable? Scenario  specific.
8 Novelty: N um ber 
of Entities
E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Did you feel any lack of perform ance/errors w ere  due to the 
num ber of entities having to be processed by the U C C ?  
Scenario  specific.
9 Novelty: P ace of 
Events
E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Did you feel any lack of perform ance/errors w ere  due to the 
pace of events having to be processed by the U C C ?  Scenario  
specific.
10 Context: H O V E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Did you think layout/general functioning of U C C  impacted  
operations? If so, how?
11 Context: IS E 1 , E2, E3, 
E4, E5
W hat did you think about team  m em ber interactions? W hat 
motivated them ? How  did they affect perform ance
12 Context: 
Leadership and  
Staff C om petence
E 1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Any observations relating to the apparent observed Leadership  
and S taff Com petence?
13 Context: Flexibility E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Any description of U C C  actions dem onstrating flexibility or lack 
thereof?
14 System  1 E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
W hat did you think of the personnel functions? And system  
functions within the U C C ?  How  did they relate to 
perform ance?
15 System  2 E1, E2, E3, 
E 4, E5
Any thoughts on the coordination of actions am ongst U C C  
elem ents?
17 System  3 E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
W h at did you think of the general operational control of the 
U C C ? Are personnel and system s being provided with tools to 
accom plish their function? How is perform ance being routinely 
monitored and feedback provided?
18 System  3 E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Did you observe any tension relating to the need for more  
information versus the need for im plem entable action?  
Scenario  specific.
19 System  4 E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
NA -  covered by question 2
20 System  5 E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Any thoughts on issues/challenges that w ent to the core of the  
organization, senior leadership, basic policies governing  
conduct, actions, and work, addressing any tension existing 
betw een U C C  elem ents?
21 R esearcher
Interaction
E6 W h at effect, if any, did you think the presence of the  
researcher had on the actions of the UC C ?
22 Evaluator
Dem ographic
Information
NA A ge, rank, gender, race, tim e in service, time evaluating, 
experience in U C C s
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Exercise Script and Exercise Script Review
The purpose of the script review is to evaluate the scenarios in terms of 
the DC5 framework. As the script represents the environment in which the UCC 
will be functioning, the CE attributes detailed in the DC5 framework should be 
applied to the scripted scenarios in order to develop a descriptive 
characterization in such terms for each scenario. This will facilitate further 
discussion post-exercise to describing the impacts of the crisis environment on 
the distributed cognition phenomena occurring in the control center. Additionally, 
part of the descriptive characterization of each scenario will include a concise 
statement describing the state of the outside environment. This will serve the 
purpose of guiding the research observations as the control center builds and 
maintains its representation of that environment. Two data documents will be 
supplied to the case database for each exercise from this data source, the script 
itself and the descriptive characterization.
The specific questions, flowing from the CE portion of the DC5 framework, 
guiding the researcher in capturing the descriptive characterization of the outside 
environment are:
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Table A3.4: Exercise Script and Exercise Script Review
# DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus
Table 4.2 
Cell
References
Question
1 Potential for
negative
outcomes
B1, B2, B3, 
B5
Outside of the exercise environment itself, are there 
specific elements of the scenario that have the potential 
for outcomes potentially more negative than usual for 
the UCC or for the Wing organization?
2 Induces
Organizational
Stress
B1, B2, B3, 
B5
Are there attributes from the scenario that would be 
expected induce stress into the UCC?
3 Demand for 
Specialized 
Expertise
B1, B2, B3, 
B5
To what degree does the scenario require a specialized 
expert understanding to develop a suitable response?
4 Demand for 
Integration of 
Expertise
B1, B2, B3, 
B5
To what degree does the scenario require a specialized 
expert understanding to develop a suitable response?
5 Novelty:
Unknowability
B1, B2, B3, 
B5
Does the scenario present an unknowable challenge to 
the UCC? Describe.
6 Novelty: Number 
of Entities
B1, B2, B3, 
B5
Does the scenario present a challenge to the UCC in 
terms of the number entities that must be understood in 
order to develop and maintain representations?
7 Novelty: Pace of 
Events
B1, B2, B3, 
B5
Does the scenario present a challenge to the UCC in 
terms of the pace of events that must be processed in 
order to develop and maintain representations?
8 Representation B1, B2, B3, 
B5
Provide description (representation) of the specified 
environment the scenario entails to compare with 
observations made during the exercise.
9 DC5F impact B1, B2, B3, 
B5
Detail, by Systems 1 through 5, which portions of the 
DC5F may be expected to be impacted by the scenario
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Table A3.5: Researcher Observation Guidance
The purpose of this table is to give the researcher guidance on what to 
look for in terms of validating DC5 as he takes notes. There may be key
observations outside of those anticipated here, however.
# DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus
Table 4.2 
Cell
References
Question
1 Context: HOV C1, C2, C3, 
C4, C5, C6
Provide description of UCC layout and systems 
interaction within that layout
2 Context: IS C1.C2, C3, 
C4, C5
Monitor and provide description of how IS or lack thereof 
impacts P
3 Context: 
Leadership and 
Staff
Competence
C1, C2, C3, 
C4, C5
Describe observations relating to the apparent observed 
Leadership and Staff Competence.
4 Context:
Flexibility
C1, C2, C3, 
C4, C5
Provide description of UCC actions demonstrating 
flexibility or lack thereof
5 System 1 C1 Capture and describe the various personnel functions 
and system artifacts being used to process information 
flowing through the UCC.
6 System 1 C1,C2, C3, 
C4, C5
Describe the actions/performance at System 1 level
7 System 2 C1, C2, C3, 
C4, C5
Capture and describe any actions relating to the 
coordination of actions amongst UCC elements. What 
precipitated the coordination? Its follow-through? Its 
end?
8 System 3 C1, C2, C3, 
C4, C5
Capture any actions relating to the ongoing control of the 
UCC. Are personnel and systems being provided with 
tools to accomplish their function? How is performance 
being routinely monitored and feedback being provided?
9 System 3 C1, C2, C3, 
C4, C5
Capture the interaction and any tension between this 
function and S4 relating to the need for more information 
versus the need for implementable action
10 System 4 C1, C2, C3, 
C4, C5
Detail the ongoing processing of representations as they 
are discussed, displayed, and eventually acted on.
11 System 5 C1, C2, C3, 
C4, C5
Detail interactions in the UCC that approach or address 
the identity of the organization. When does senior 
leadership become involved? What basic policies exist 
governing conduct, actions, and work? If a tension 
exists between S4 and S3, how is addressed?
12 Rival
Explanations
C1,C2, C3, 
C4, C5
In capturing events as they unfold do other unifying 
constructs present themselves?
13 Researcher
Interaction
C6 Capture and describe any actual or perceived 
interactions or issues relating to the researcher’s 
presence
14 CE C1, C2, C3, 
C4, C5
In addition to and in conjunction with the scenario 
characterization of the CE, capture information as it 
actually flows in and impacts systems.
15 Representations C1, C2, C3, 
C4, C5
Capture representations as they are processed, 
discussed, displayed, and acted upon. Compare and
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contrast with actual state of the environment from script. 
The difference here represents P.
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Table A3.6: Exercise Evaluation Report Guidance
For purposes of this report the goal of reviewing the formal exercise 
reports is to capture any official judgments and supporting interpretations relating 
to UCC performance. As such, basically this guidance involves seeking to apply 
the DC5 framework to the report to see if convergence exists or if perhaps rival
explanations exist.
# DC5 Construct 
Focus
Table 4.2 
Cell
References
Question
1 Context: HOV F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
Does the report discuss this issue/construct?
2 Context: IS F1.F2, F3, 
F4, F5
Does the report discuss this issue/construct?
3 Context: 
Leadership and 
Staff
Competence
F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
Does the report discuss this issue/construct?
4 Context:
Flexibility
F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
Does the report discuss this issue/construct?
5 System 1 F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
Does the report discuss this issue/construct?
6 System 2 F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
Does the report discuss this issue/construct?
7 System 3 F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
Does the report discuss this issue/construct?
8 System 3 F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
Does the report discuss this issue/construct?
9 System 4 F1.F2, F3, 
F4, F5
Does the report discuss this issue/construct?
10 System 5 F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
Does the report discuss this issue/construct?
11 Rival
Explanations
F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
Does the report discuss this issue/construct?
12 Representations F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
Does the report discuss this issue/construct?
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APPENDIX IV 
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION
This appendix provides some of the supporting documentation discussed 
in the text. Specifically the following documentation is provided: 1) the 
researcher’s resume is provided as a means of disclosing his personal 
background, 2) also provided as a means of disclosing the researcher’s 
background is a brief narrative containing the researcher’s demographics as well 
as his experience relating specifically to the institutional processes used as a 
data source in the research, (3) samples of the correspondence between the 
researcher and the Air Combat Command Inspection Team, as well as, the wings 
to be inspected, involved in securing access, to the case data resources, 4) the 
proposed rules of engagement (RoE) governing conduct of the research and 
interaction with the ACC/IG and inspected wing organizations and 5) samples of 
correspondence with informants indicating their review of the researchers notes 
and conclusions.
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Researcher Resume
CHRISTOPHER J. WEST
MAJ, USAF Military Resume
AFIT/CIS SSN: 243-35-4795
253 Mill Point Drive 
Hampton, VA 23669 
(757) 329-9044 
email: chrisiwest@yahoo.com
DOR: 20Aug 2002
Age: 36
Marital Status: Single
Clearance: Secret
SERVICE HISTORY
Doctoral Student in Engineering Management and Systems Engineering, Old Dominion University, 
Norfolk, VA, sponsored by Air Force Institute o f  Technology Faculty Pipeline Program: Aug 02 -  
Present.
Civil Engineer Inspector; Headquarters A ir Combat Command Inspector General Squadron, Langley 
AFB, VA: Jan 0 0 -A u g  02.
Inspects ACC Civil Engineer and RED HORSE squadrons during Operational Readiness Inspections, Unit 
Compliance Inspections, and Nuclear Surety Inspections documenting performance for ACC/CE staff, 
providing command-wide crosstell on program implementation, and educating personnel on wartime and 
peacetime procedures and methods. Additionally, ensures security o f Nuclear Weapons through inspection 
o f facilities and other supporting systems. Acted as effective CE Inspection Section Chief supervising 10 
inspectors during 6-month position vacancy.
Readiness Flight Commander; 34 7 Civil Engineer Squadron, Moody AFB, GA; Oct 98  -  Jan 00.
Managed 36 Civil Engineer, Support Group, and Wing Operational Response Plans and managed chemical 
warfare defense training for 4000 base personnel in a composite wing o f A-lO’s, F-16’s, HC-130’s, and 
HH-60’s. Directed the Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force posturing and training, air base operability, 
and disaster response programs. Supervises 8 personnel. Moved to this position in preparation for the first 
wing ORI at Moody in nine years. Implemented Wing CC’s idea o f integrating AEF concept into Phase II 
Exercises. 347 CES received a grade o f “Excellent”. Cited by ACC/IG as a Wing Superior Performer for 
developing bare base beddown plan in response to IG input in addition to serving as Survival Recovery 
Center Commander.
Deployed Maintenance Engineering Flight Commander, 363 Expeditionary Civil Engineer Squadron, 
Prince Sultan A ir Base, Kingdom o f  Saudi Arabia; Jun 99 -  Oct 99.
Managed 4-person work order planning shop, 3-person service contract quality assurance evaluator shop, 
and 23-person service contractor force protection escort shop. Directed the planning o f  $125,000 in CE in- 
house accomplished work orders at Prince Sultan Air Base. Developed and implemented 15 new base 
service contracts worth annual value o f over $4 million including potable water supply, sewage removal, 
refuse removal, grounds maintenance, alarms and suppression, etc).
Environmental Flight Commander; 347 Civil Engineer Squadron, Moody AFB, GA; Jan 97  -  Oct 98.
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Led 13 personnel in overall management o f wing environmental programs valued at over $10.5M including 
the largest base Installation Restoration Program, $9.3M, and Pollution Prevention Program, $ 186K, in Air 
Combat Command. Negotiated with regulators on policies, permits, and procedures. Ensured 
Environmental Impact Analysis Process was completed on all major base actions including two separate 
base mission changes and beddown of new rescue mission. Partnered with federal, state, local, and civic 
organizations to establish the Grand Bay/Banks Lake Council Ecosystem Management Cooperative and the 
Georgia/DoD Pollution Prevention Partnership, the second of its kind in the US. Managed the base 
Environmental Compliance Assessment Management Program (ECAMP) including development of 
corrective action plans for follow up with MAJCOM and base agencies. Facilitated all aspects o f the wing 
Environmental Protection Committee.
Graduate Student, Engineering and Environmental Management; A ir Force Institute o f  Technology; 
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH; Apr 95  -  Jan 97
Project Engineer; 554 RED HORSE Squadron, Osan AB, Republic o f  Korea; Apr 94 -  Apr 95
Responsible for construction project design development and review, development o f  accurate bills of 
material, coordination o f pre-construction meetings with applicable agencies, creation o f construction 
schedules and served as on-site commander at all deployed locations. Chief RED HORSE Engineer on 
contingency projects totaling S1.5M in one year including S160K dining hall renovation, S280K Army 
storage facility, and $110K aircraft parking ramp. On short notice designed then deployed as leader o f 25- 
man crew to accomplish 4 projects worth $392,000 at remote Korean air base in response to rising threat 
conditions on the peninsula.
Maintenance Engineer; 27 Civil Engineer Squadron, Cannon AFB, NM; Nov 92 -  Apr 94
Responsible for developing and managing long term infrastructure maintenance programs for the CE 
Operations Flight relating to the base electrical distribution system, natural gas distribution system, facility 
generators, roads and airfield, water distribution system, and sanitary and storm sewer systems. Managed 
$1.5M Natural Gas account ensuring Cannon purchased the cheapest gas available at spot market prices 
saving the base over $200K in costs.
Project Engineer; 27 Civil Engineer Squadron, Cannon AFB, NM; Feb 92 -  Nov 92
Designed, advised, and provided contractor oversight on base electrical projects including SIM  installation 
o f new base communication system and $60K facility power system renovation.
EDUCATION
PME: Squadron Officers School, Resident Air University
Civilian: Master of Science in Engineering and Environmental Management, Air
Force Institute of Technology, 1996 
Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering, Auburn University, 1991
AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
2000 -  ACC/IG Company Grade Officer o f the Year
1999 - 363rd Wing Company Grade Officer o f the Month
1999 - 347th Wing Operational Readiness Inspection Superior Performer
1998 - 347th Support Group Company Grade Officer o f the Year
1998 - 347th Wing Company Grade Officer o f the Quarter
1997 -  347th Civil Engineer Officer o f the Quarter
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1996 - George K. Dimitroff Award for Best AF1T Master’s Thesis Supporting Air Force Civil Engineering
Meritorious Service Medal
Air Force Commendation Medal (3 OLC)
National Defense Service Medal
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS
Institute o f  Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
American Society o f Engineering Managers 
Society o f  American Military Engineers 
Auburn University Electrical Engineer Alumni Association
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Researcher Background Narrative
The researcher is a 36 yr old, white male, born in Charlotte, North 
Carolina and raised both in North Carolina and Alabama. He is single and has 
not married. He presently lives in Hampton, Virginia. As described in the 
preceding resume he is an US Air Force Officer with the rank of Major, with 14 
yrs of experience on active duty in the Air Force’s Civil Engineering career field.
The researcher’s experiential relationship to the subject matter of this 
research, specifically unit control centers functioning in crisis condition, stems 
from two main sources. First, throughout his career, with the exception of his 
education assignments, he has been assigned to Air Force bases that regularly 
train for their wartime mission and operational readiness inspections by 
conducting operational readiness exercises. Generally, these exercises occurred 
on a quarterly basis, although two sets of four exercises each, were done on a 
monthly basis in preparation for operational readiness inspections, both of which 
the researcher participated in as a player. In these exercises and inspections, 
the researcher served as: an assistant engineering officer in an engineering 
control center, the officer in charge of an engineering control center, an 
engineering representative in a base’s overall control center, and as officer in 
charge of the base’s control center. The researcher estimates that he must have 
participated in at least 15 operational readiness exercises as a player. He 
participated in two operational readiness inspections as a player.
During his assignment on Air Combat Command’s Inspector General 
team, the researcher served as both an assistant, as well as, lead engineering
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officer responsible for planning inspections, developing and implementing scripts, 
and evaluating unit performance. During these inspections the researcher was 
specifically responsible for evaluating the performance, based on published Air 
Force regulation, policy, and doctrine of a variety of different types of unit control 
centers. The researcher served as an inspector on 15 of these inspections.
Case Access Correspondence
This first set of email threads represents follow-ups to telephone 
conversations with personnel representing a wing preparing for an operational 
readiness inspection by conducting three operational readiness exercises. For 
reasons discussed in the proposed rules of engagement for the research, which 
follows later in this section, names and unit specific information has been deleted 
or in some cases replaced by explanatory titles which have been underlined in 
the text.
Date: Wed, 9 Nov 2005 11:28:39 -0800 (PST)
"Christopher West" <chrisjwest@yahoo.com> View Contact Details Add Mobile
From:
Alert
Subject:Re: ORE preparation
To: _________________
CC:
M aj________________________
Just got off the phone with Lt C o l____________ ,he agreed that a drive up Monday and return
after the ORE (I believe the 19th) is doable. Could you please send fund cite to cover gas and 
motel or billeting. I've done the drive to several times and takes me around 5 hrs. If the wing 
thinks it better for me to fly and rent a car I can do that too no problem. Will forward the fund cite
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to my supporting office at AFIT (Wright Patt) for orders and keep you in the loop and make sure 
you get hard copies of orders when I arrive. Pis don't hesitate to write or call if you have any 
questions.
-chris
wrote:
Hi Chris,
It's getting close to the ORE. We need get together to discuss scenarios. 
Can you call me this afternoon? I'll be back in the office after 1400.
Work is. Or you can call my cell after 1200 at
Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld
CHRISTOPHER J. WEST, Maj, USAF 
AFIT/CI PhD Student 
chrisjwest@yahoo.com 
757 329-9044
Do You Yahoo!?
Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around 
http://mail.yahoo.com
From: Inspected Wing Commanding Officer
To: '"chrisjwest@yahoo.com"' <chrisjwest@yahoo.com>
CC: Other Inspected Wing Leadership Personnel
Subject: FW ORI - Warlord
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 2005 16:07:13 -0400
Thanks again Chris...It'll be great having you onboard to help guide us through the inspection.
The EET Team Chief Lead Inspected Wing Officer. His phone number is ________ or
_______ . He is putting together the EET members and developing a tailored scenario to meet
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our unique ORI focus - Maintenance Centric, Conventional Only War. I am including a few 
attachments (maps, briefing slides, minutes, ORI Report, etc.) to get you somewhat indoctrinated 
into what we have already done to prepare for this re-inspection. Please feel free to call me at 
any time if you have any question. Again, thanks for volunteering to help support our efforts.
Signed by Inspected Wing Commanding Officer
Date: Wed, 19 Oct 2005 09:01:13 -0700 (PDT)
"Christopher West" <chrisjwest@yahoo.com> View Contact Details Add Mobile
From:
Alert
Subject:
To:
Looking forward to it too, sir. My info's below. I have to finish up some work for 
my dissertation committee today and tomorrow morning but I'll talk to my IG contacts and then 
put some together some details explaining what I'm working on. As I said, I can keep the 
research's footprint very small relative to your ORE's. Basically it involves designing/scripting 
scenarios designed to maximize improvement/training value in UCC's and UCC’s - which should 
fall in line with your wing's purposes of bringing me on board for script help and warlord duties.
As discussed, 1st week in November works great for me to get up there an meet with you guys in 
person if necessary. Working via email also works great for me too.
-chris
Inspected Wing Exercise Officer mote: 
Hi Chris,
Looking forward to working with you on the OREs and ORI. Per our conversation this 
morning, here’s my info:
Contact Info for Inspected Wing Exercise Officer follows
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The following email threads are samples of the correspondence with Air 
Combat Command Inspector General personnel involved in gaining access to the 
case data. As discussed in Chapter IV, the researcher agreed to serve as an 
inspector on an ORI to meet an IG manpower shortage requirement in exchange 
to access to case data later. The ORI in which the researcher served as an 
augmenting inspector was not used for data collection for purposes of this 
research however the experience was used by the researcher to plan for the 
research design involved in this work. For confidentiality purposes, names and 
personal information have been masked and replaced with position titles. Such 
alterations of the email text are underlined here.
Subject: Package for IG Access
Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2005 08:41:20 -0400
From: ACC/IG Engineering Inspector Officer
To: "Christopher West" <chrisjwest@yahoo.com>
Chris,
I talked to one of the two Support Branch Chiefs. He says to put a package together addressing 
the key areas: what you are doing, how you will collect data, what you will do with the data, level 
of access required, trips you are interested, your status on those trips (i.e. permissive tdy or TDY 
from AFIT), disclosure info, and anything else you think an 0-6 needs to know to grant you 
access. I would also recommend a bio mentioning that you are a former IG member. The 
suggested items are suggested, I am sure you have protocols that state how to approach 
research subjects/gain access to data.
Address package to, the Inspection Squadron Commander.
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E-mail is ok. Send E-mail to me, which I will send to IG Branch Chief. His masters was AFIT/CI 
and he will put a blurb on how important it is to have an AF related topic and access to data. He 
will then forward up.
IG Branch Chief, wasn’t sure how well it would be received higher up. A lot depends on initial 
presentation and he thinks concerns will be what data is collected, how data is used, who needs 
to agree, etc. His other concern is that attending 110 FW may be a stretch; depending on how 
well it is received.
My suggestions about how to approach the leadership are just my suggestions. If your training 
and experience says otherwise, I am not offended. Let me know how I can help.
Signed ACC IG Engineering Inspector
From: Christopher West [mailto:chrisjwest@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, June 30, 2005 7:56 AM 
To: ACC IG Engineering Inspector
Subject: RE: Fomer IG Officer augmentee services in exchange for SRC/DCC Phase II 
performance data for research
ACC IG Engineering Inspector.
Got your message - will work up a staff package explaining/asking permission with 
attachments, talking paper etc. Proposal I'm working on for my prof is taking longer than 
expected but should have staff package ready later this quarter.
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-chris
Sub'ect- ^omer Officer augmentee services in exchange for SRC/DCC Phase II 
performance data for research 
Date: Fri, 24 Jun 2005 01:16:28-0400
From: ACC IG Engineering Inspector Officer 
To: "Christopher West" <chrisjwest@yahoo.com>
Chris,
Good to talk to you today. First I will discuss upcoming unit to be inspected then your 
research.
upcoming unit to be inspected -  8-18 Aug 05
I am looking for a warlord and greatly appreciate you volunteering. ACC/IG Branch Chief 
Officer, the former CE section chief, left last week. His replacement, ACC/IG Branch Chief 
Officer, does not arrive until the week before the ORI and we are not sure if he will be attending. 
The Deputy IG, (his undergrad was CE), will be the team chief. For core CE IG officers, there is 
myself and a new ACC/IG Engineering Inspector. He will have inspected only two NSIs and 
two ORIs when we get to upcoming unit to be inspected. He is too green to be warlord. I 
could be RH warlord, but since I will be lead CE, or number 2 but 1st IG trip for ACC/IG Branch 
Chief Officer. I would rather be out and about. I have a couple of RH experienced officers as 
auggies, but I do not want an auggie to be warlord because they do not have the full IG 
background. You will be perfect. You have been warlord on RH before, know IG, etc. We will 
have to bring you up to speed on some changes over the last couple of years, but it should be a 
smooth transition. ACC/IG Engineering Inspector, suggested your name a couple of days ago 
and when I told him you said yes, he gave a big thumbs up. Again thanks. Of course this trip will 
be paid for by IG.
Research Trips
I do not have a big need for officer auggies in the next couple of months, but can always use 
experienced help. I would be willing to take you as an auggie, with IG funding, as long as your 
primary focus was being an inspector. I also would have no problem with you being with the 
team during inspections and having full IG access to planning sessions, IG meetings, IG 
discussions, etc. in support of you research. In the latter case, you would not have to focus on 
being an inspector and would be free to focus on what you need to. I say I have no problem, but, 
of course, I would have to run it up the chain. Funding on the other hand may be issue. Money is 
tight for the rest of the fiscal year. ACC has cut 40% of its flying hours from 1 Jun to 1 Oct and a
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Guard ORI scheduled for Aug has been moved to the new FY. I will inquire about you coming 
along for research at IG expense, but I can not make any promises.
I will be back in town next week and I will discuss more. Your research sounds exciting and you 
have my support. Attached is the Form 117 required for auggies and our current inspection 
schedule. The inspection scheduled is official for the rest of this calendar year. 2006 is not 
official yet, is not visible outside the IG (most units know dates or at least window), and is subject 
to change, especially the latter half of the year.
« F o rm  117 - Maj W est.doc»
«C urrent Inspections 2 .m ht»
Your name is very familiar, but also not sure why. I know we have not been stationed together, 
but may have crossed paths somewhere. Below is where I have been....
Thanks,
Signed ACC/IG Engineering Inspector.
From: Christopher West fmai I to : ch risiwest@va hoo .coml 
Sent: Thursday, June 23, 2005 3:17 PM 
To: ACC/IG Engineering Inspector.
Subject: Fomer IG Officer augmentee services in exchange for SRC/DCC Phase II  performance 
data for research
Your name is ringing the CE officer bells in my head but I'm not sure we've met. My name is 
Chris West - 1 was your CE predecessor one or two iterations ago (2000-2002) on the IG team - 
you may have seen my name floating around some of the old paperwork there in the Harbor 
Center.
I went from the IG team to working on a PhD for AFIT at Old Dominion University. My research is 
focused on how control centers perform in crisis environments. I can provide much more 
specific/excruciating detail to you or whomever else may need it at a later time but basically 
UCC’s and or DCC's in Phase ll's represent potential data sources for my work.
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To get to the point, I would like to offer my services as an augmentee inspector (when I was on 
th e  te a m  w e  w e 're  a lw a y s  lo o k in g  fo r  s u ita b le  o ffic ers  - k n o w le d g e  o f C E  c rite ria , IG  
methods/policies/procedures, etc. - it was a challenge) in exchange for the opportunity to 
"observe" (at this point I'm still defining/negotiating what that means with my research committee - 
ranging from copious note-taking and interviewing/surveying players to possibly transcribing 
video taped sessions) a few (3 to 5) UCC’s or DCC's in action in Phase M's. Attending these 
events as a Wing hosted "observer" is another potential route for me take but I think I'd prefer to 
do it under IG auspices (and potentially travel funding) if possible - in order to be exposed to 
inspector discussions (another data source) of performance as ratings are determined. Willing to 
offer my augmentation services on any inspections you may need - even outside potential resea! 
rch cases and am willing to travel as soon as you may need.
Again, this is a preliminary float of the basic idea to see if you or the team might potentially be 
interested - 1 can provide much more information on the research, the approach/acceptability to 
getting/using data, discuss possible funding issues/options, augmentation requirements etc. I 
talked to your office today on the phone and I understand you're on the road. If you would like to 
discuss via phone please send a commercial number and a convenient time to call (I recall those 
hours we used to work on the road) or I can wait to your back in Hampton Roads to discuss.
-Maj Chris West
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Rules of Engagement for Researcher interaction with Inspected Wing, and 
Inspector General Team
These rules of engagement serve to delineate what can be expected of 
the researcher 1) as he collects data while the inspected wing prepares for an 
operational readiness inspection by conducting three internal operational 
readiness exercises and 2) as he collects data during the actual research 
inspection. The researcher realizes his objective of collecting sound research 
data to support his work must be subordinate to the institutional needs of the Air 
Force, specifically the objective of the inspected wing to perform as well as 
possible in the upcoming ORI and the objective of the ACC/IG team to properly 
assess the performance of the inspected wing. These objectives of proper 
assessment, strong wing performance, and the collection of sound research data 
govern these rules of engagement. All three entities agree that the focus of the 
research is in the Air Force interest and can be accommodated if the rules are 
followed.
The researcher has identified six sources from which to collect data during 
each of three internal wing operational readiness exercises and one formal 
operational readiness inspection. These data sources in conjunction with the 
objectives described above form the foundation of the rules of engagement which 
follow.
Inspected Wing Operational Readiness Inspections 
Data Source -  Pre-Exercise Interviews:
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1) Inspected wing will allow researcher access to UCC players. Interviews 
will be no longer than 30 minutes in length and will be based on questionnaires 
submitted by researcher to unit for approval.
2) Interview notes and summaries will be submitted to players for review 
and comment
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Table A4.1: Researcher-Inspected Wing-IG Rules of Engagement
Objectives
ORE/ORI Data Sources and other 
issues
ACC/IG: Proper 
Assessment of Unit 
Performance
Inspected Wing: 
Maximize Performance 
During ORI
Researcher: Data 
Collection and Research 
Soundness
Internal Wing Operational 
Readiness Exercises
General ACC/IG has no interaction 
with inspected wing other 
than to agree to general 
ground rules/planning 
items relating to the 
inspection.
ACC/IG and the 
researcher will have no 
interaction relating to unit 
training and performance.
Unit coordinates with IG to 
ensure basic inspection 
planning items are agreed 
upon so that OREs will 
mirror ORIs.
Inspected wing seeks to 
maximize ORI 
performance by soliciting 
researcher advice, review, 
and recommendations 
based on his research 
constructs.
Inspected unit will have 
access to all data 
collection notes/summaries 
and the right to remove 
portions as necessary to 
retain confidentiality for 
institutional purposes.
Inspected unit will have 
access to all research 
analysis and conclusions 
and any comments will be 
incorporated in the case 
database.
Researcher has no 
interaction with IG 
regarding unit training and 
performance during OREs.
Researcher seeks to gain 
data from data sources 
discussed below as well as 
work with wing to devise 
ORE scripts suited to 
train/improve UCC 
performance based on 
research constructs.
Researcher will remove all 
references in edditted 
collect case data to the 
specific unit, as well as, to 
specific personnel to retain 
confidentiality for Air Force 
purposes and anonymity 
for research soundness
Internal Wing Operational 
Readiness Exercises
Pre-ORE Player Interviews ACC/IG will have no 
interaction at this level.
Unit will make players 
available for interviews
Researcher will submit 
interview questions to unit
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Objectives
ORE/ORI Data Sources and other 
issues
ACC/IG: Proper 
Assessment of Unit 
Performance
Inspected Wing: 
Maximize Performance 
During ORI
Researcher: Data 
Collection and Research 
Soundness
based on questionnaires. leadership for review and 
conduct interviews as 
discussed in data 
collection instrument 
guidelines.
Researcher will submit 
interview summaries to 
players for review and 
comment following 
interview. Comments will 
be incorporated in case 
database.
Internal Wing Operational 
Readiness Exercises
Internal Wing Exercise 
Scripts
ACC/IG will have no 
interaction at this level.
Researcher will work with 
unit to develop initial ORE 
script based on experience 
with what constitutes good 
scenarios.
Researcher and Unit will 
work together to develop 
subsequent ORE scripts 
based on research 
framework constructs -  
seeking to improve 
performance.
Researcher will work with 
unit to develop initial ORE 
script based on experience 
with what constitutes good 
scenarios.
Researcher and Unit will 
work together to develop 
subsequent ORE scripts 
based on research 
framework constructs -  
seeking to improve 
performance.
Researcher may keep 
scripts for documentation 
and analysis purposes.
Internal Wing Operational 
Readiness Exercises
Researcher Notes ACC/IG will have no 
interaction at this level.
Researcher shall have 
access to UCC during 
OREs.
Researcher will remove all 
reference to specific 
personnel/organizations
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Objectives
ORE/ORI Data Sources and other 
issues
ACC/IG: Proper 
Assessment of Unit 
Performance
Inspected Wing: 
Maximize Performance 
During ORI
Researcher: Data 
Collection and Research 
Soundness
Unit will have opportunity 
to review notes and 
summaries and comment 
accordingly. Comments 
will be incorporated in the 
case database.
from notes for
confidentiality/anonymity
purposes.
Internal Wing Operational 
Readiness Inspections
Post-ORE Player 
Interviews
ACC/IG will have no 
interaction at this level.
Unit will make players 
available for interviews 
based on questionnaires.
Researcher will submit 
interview questions to unit 
leadership for review and 
conduct interviews as 
discussed in data 
collection instrument 
guidelines.
Researcher will submit 
interview summaries to 
players for review and 
comment following 
interview. Comments will 
be incorporated in case 
database.
Internal Wing Operational 
Readiness Exercises
Post-ORE Evaluator 
Interviews
ACC/IG will have no 
interaction at this level.
Unit will make evaluators 
available for interviews 
based on questionnaires.
Researcher will submit 
interview questions to unit 
leadership for review and 
conduct interviews as 
discussed in data 
collection instrument 
guidelines
Researcher will submit 
interview summaries to 
evaluators for review and
Reproduced 
with 
perm
ission 
of the 
copyright owner. 
Further reproduction 
prohibited 
without perm
ission.
351
Objectives
ORE/ORI Data Sources and other 
issues
ACC/IG: Proper 
Assessment of Unit 
Performance
Inspected Wing: 
Maximize Performance 
During ORI
Researcher: Data 
Collection and Research 
Soundness
comment following 
interview. Comments will 
be incorporated in case 
database.
Internal Wing Operational 
Readiness Exercises
Post ORE Evaluation 
Report
ACC/IG will have no 
interaction at this level.
Unit will provide report to 
researcher.
Researcher will 
incorporate report into 
database.
Formal Wing Operational 
Readiness Inspection
General Researcher shall be able 
to observe inspector 
discussion during and 
following inspection. 
Researcher will keep all 
comments regarding 
performance and 
inspection to himself until 
report is written to support 
unbiased inspection.
Researcher shall not 
interact with inspected unit 
other than to observe 
performance and will not 
interfere with inspection in 
anyway.
IG will have access to all 
data collection 
notes/summaries and the 
right to remove portions as 
necessary to retain 
confidentiality for 
institutional purposes.
Inspected unit will have 
access to all data 
collection notes/summaries 
and the right to remove 
portions as necessary to 
retain confidentiality for 
institutional purposes.
Inspected unit will have 
access to all research 
analysis and conclusions 
and any comments will be 
incorporated in the case 
database.
Researcher has no 
interaction with IG 
regarding unit performance 
during ORI prior to report 
writing completion other 
than to observe discussion
Researcher will remove all 
references in editted 
collect case data to the 
specific unit, as well as, to 
specific personnel to retain 
confidentiality for Air Force 
purposes and anonymity 
for research soundness
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Objectives
ORE/ORI Data Sources and other 
issues
ACC/IG: Proper 
Assessment of Unit 
Performance
Inspected Wing: 
Maximize Performance 
During ORI
Researcher: Data 
Collection and Research 
Soundness
IG will have access to all 
research analysis and 
conclusions and any 
comments will be 
incorporated in the case 
database.
Formal Wing Operational 
Readiness Inspection
Pre-ORI Player Interviews ACC/IG will have no 
interaction at this level.
Unit will make players 
available for interviews 
based on questionnaires.
Researcher will submit 
interview questions to unit 
leadership for review and 
conduct interviews as 
discussed in data 
collection instrument 
guidelines.
Researcher will submit 
interview summaries to 
players for review and 
comment following 
interview. Comments will 
be incorporated in case 
database.
Formal Wing Operational 
Readiness Inspection
ORI Exercise Script Researcher shall not have 
access to script until after 
ORI has ended.
IG shall provide copy of 
script to researcher for 
research analysis 
purposes following ORI.
Unit has no interaction at 
this level.
Researcher may keep 
scripts for documentation 
and analysis purposes.
Formal Wing Operational 
Readiness Inspection
Researcher Notes Researcher shall confine 
himself to no interaction 
with inspected unit other
Researcher shall have 
access to UCC during ORI.
Researcher will remove all 
reference to specific 
personnel/organizations
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Objectives
ORE/ORI Data Sources and other 
issues
ACC/IG: Proper 
Assessment of Unit 
Performance
Inspected Wing: 
Maximize Performance 
During ORI
Researcher: Data 
Collection and Research 
Soundness
than to take notes.
IG shall have access to all 
researcher notes and 
review/comment 
accordingly. Comments 
will be incorporated in case 
database.
Unit will have opportunity 
to review notes and 
summaries and comment 
accordingly after ORI has 
ended. Comments will be 
incorporated in the case 
database.
from notes for
confidentiality/anonymity
purposes.
Formal Wing Operational 
Readiness Inspection
Post-ORI Player Interviews ACC/IG will have no 
interaction at this level.
Unit will make players 
available for interviews 
based on questionnaires.
Researcher will submit 
interview questions to unit 
leadership for review and 
conduct interviews as 
discussed in data 
collection instrument 
guidelines.
Researcher will submit 
interview summaries to 
players for review and 
comment following 
interview. Comments will 
be incorporated in case 
database.
Formal Wing Operational 
Readiness Inspection
Post-ORI Inspector 
Interviews
Inspectors involved in 
evaluating UCC will be 
available for interview 
according to questionnaire.
Unit has no interaction at 
this level.
Researcher will submit 
interview questions to IG 
leadership for review and 
conduct interviews as 
discussed in data 
collection instrument 
guidelines
Researcher will submit 
interview summaries to
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Objectives
ORE/ORI Data Sources and other 
issues
ACC/IG: Proper 
Assessment of Unit 
Performance
Inspected Wing: 
Maximize Performance 
During ORI
Researcher: Data 
Collection and Research 
Soundness
inspector for review and 
comment following 
interview. Comments will 
be incorporated in case 
database.
Formal Wing Operational 
Readiness Inspection
ORI Report ACC/IG will make report 
available to researcher 
following completion.
Unit has no interaction at 
this level.
Researcher will 
incorporate report into 
database.
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Samples of Correspondence relating to Informant Reviews of Field Notes 
from Interviews
Below are two samples of email correspondence with informants 
regarding their review of the author’s notes relating to the data collection 
interviews. Additionally, the first sample highlights previous telephone discussion 
of the researcher’s conclusions following the first case-first ORE as well as 
formally solidifying the rest of the research plan as it related to the unit’s 
subsequent OREs and ORI; the plan had not been formally reviewed/accepted 
by unit leadership at that point; verbal approval had been given at lower levels of 
leadership prior to the first ORE.
From: <Officer from Case 1 First ORE> Q View Contact Details f lAdd Mobile Alert
To: "'Christopher West"' <chrisjwest@yahoo.com>
Subject: RE: Nov ORE -  Informant Review
Date: Fri, 17 Nov 2005 06:45:41 -0500
Hi Chris,
(Please call m e________ )
My apologies if you’ve been trying to call my cell phone. Comm gave me a “new and improved” 
phone. Enough said there. I have not been able to check voicemail for about a week.
1. I agree with your notes on the interview. Your comments <for inclusion on the unit’s 
internal ORE report> are great. I will send you a copy of the ORE Report. There is a 
problem locating the Fuels information. It is not where it is supposed to be and both of 
our fuels inspectors (from Maryland) are TDY.
2. List is being finalized for <another unit officer> to take to the IG
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3. As I mentioned at our last discussion at the base -  most definitely! Yes, please start 
scripting. I have already invited the same inspectors back for Feb. I will need to have 
one two of the maintenance EET personnel come in ahead of time to give scripting for 
the maintenance arena since neither you or I have that strength and we will need to 
stress them with more complex maintenance issues (load config changes, simulated 
problems, etc.)
P.S. Comm just called and said that my cell phone should be working so I guess I’m “back on 
the air”
If I don’t get a chance to talk to you before hand, I hope you and your family will have a great 
holiday weekend!
<sig block>
From: Christopher West [mailto:chrisjwest@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, November 16, 2005 1:42 PM 
To: <Qfficer from Case 1 First ORE>
Subject: Nov ORE -  Informant Review
Sir,
Tried to call a couple times and I assume you're pretty busy. Was trying to follow up and 
touch base before Thanksgiving -
1) Hope you found my notes on the Nov. exercise/interview satisfactory. If you do, 
could you please send an email indicating such as we discussed for filing in my database. 
I would also like to get a copy o f your final ORE report if  possible for my research 
purposes. I will delete all names/unit references for purposes o f the research records - we 
can discuss further if  you like.
2) Was wondering if  you (or others) had contacted the IG on the issues we discussed 
requiring further clarification (i.e.: flightline aggressor artificiality, offline tasking o f the 
SRC)
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3) I would like to return for further help if  possible in your subsequent exercises (and for 
more data collection for my purposes), any possible other ORI specific training the wing 
may be doing, and for the ORI. I will use my notes, the Nov script, and your report to 
start working on script planning for the next ORE if  you like.
Please let me know if  you might need further info.
Thx,
Chris
CHRISTOPHER J. WEST, Maj, USAF 
AFIT/CI PhD Student 
chrisjwest@yahoo.com
From: "<Enqineerinq Officer from Case 2> BPView Contact Details I  Add Mobile Alert
To: '"Christopher West"' <chrisjwest@yahoo.com>
Subject: RE: Need Review Acknowledgment for ORI notes 
Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2006 08:23:49 -0600
Chris,
I have read Major’s West’s notes re: our discussions during the ORI and they’re accurate.
H o w ’s th a t?
You're on the list. Stay out of the bars and finish your dissertation :)
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<sig block>
From: Christopher West [mailto:chrisjwest@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, March 10, 2006 2:53 PM 
To: "<Enqineerinq Officer from Case 2>
Subject: ORI observer request
H i ,
Good talking to you this afternoon. Hope you’ve had a chance to review my notes from the ORI 
interviews. As we talked about-for my research files, can you please reply with an 
acknowledgment that they are inline with what we discussed?
-chris
CHRISTOPHER J. WEST, Maj, USAF 
AFIT/CI PhD Student 
chrisjwest@yahoo.com
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APPENDIX V 
RAW DATA COLLECTION SUMMARY
The purpose of this section is to summarize the data in the case database 
by case. The tool used to present this summary is the data collection instrument 
tables presented Appendix III. The tables here represent the researcher’s 
summary by instrument type of the individual data collection instruments 
themselves. Where considerable convergence was seen that it’s verbally 
indicated. On questions where less of a degree of convergence or no 
convergence is seen that is also verbally indicated. In some cases individual 
questions associated with the data collection instruments proved unfruitful in 
gaining data as open interviews were conducted and that is also indicated. As 
noted in the text, the second ORE in the first case resulted in limited data 
collection due to partial cancellation of the exercise due to inclement weather and 
more importantly due to the limited crisis environment relative to the fitness 
increases gained by the unit; since that data is more generally discussed in the 
text it is not included here. The tables and figures are labeled according to the 
case they were associated with, i.e. the second numerical digit in the table or 
figure represents the case number observed.
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Case 1- 1st ORE Raw Data Summary
Table A5.1.1.1: Data Summary for Pre-Exercise Questionnaire for UCC 
Participants
# DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus
Table 4.2 
Cell
References
Question
1 General 
discussion in 
their terms
A1, A3 8 personnel interviewed. Most expected to do better in 
terms of performance than they had in the May ’05 ORI. 
Most thought the IG inspectors were somewhat biased 
against their reliance on the new electronic BARTS 
system for message posting exercise information. A 
smaller minority (two or three) weren’t sure how they 
would perform in the ORE
2 Potential for
negative
outcomes
A1, A3 Most expressed the desire to not have their performance 
rated substandard again. All expressed their knowledge 
of unit leaderships desire to see performance improve.
4 Induces
Organizational
Stress
A1, A3 All expressed a desire to have the exercises and ORI 
over with.
5 Demand for 
Specialized 
Expertise
A1, A3 All thought they were experts in their respective career 
field. A minority expressed reservations about applying 
their expertise in a control room setting.
6 Demand for 
Integration of 
Expertise
A1, A3 Most thought the group could work well together to apply 
their disciplines. A minority were unsure because of the 
May ’05 inspection.
8 Novelty: Number 
of Entities/Pace 
of Events
A1, A3 Most were unsure how they would perform. One 
thought it would be too hard.
10 Context: HOV A1, A3 All liked BARTS. Two thought layout was good. Majority 
had not considered layout.
11 Context: IS A1, A3 All new each other for more than a year. Most had prior 
experience working together in the SRC. Three had not 
worked in an SRC before the Nov ORE
12 Context: 
Leadership and 
Staff
Competence
A1, A3 None expressed reservations about leadership. All felt 
competent with other personnel.
14 System 1 A1, A3 All could describe purpose of SRC displays, BARTS, 
and jobs of other personnel.
15 System 2 A1, A3 All thought coordination would go well.
17 System 3 A1, A3 All thought they would function well, and would be ably 
led.
18 Demographics NA All were Caucasian. 3 were female. 2 in 30’s. 4 in 40’s. 
2 in 50’s. 5 enlisted: E5+. 3 Officer: 0-4, 0-5, 0-6.
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Table A5.1.1.2: Post-Exercise Questionnaire for UCC Participants
# DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus
Table 4.2 
Cell
References
Question
1 General 
discussion in 
their terms
D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
4 thought poorly. 3 thought satisfactory. 1 thought well.
2 Representations D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
None thought representations departed greatly from real 
world in terms of accuracy. All thought time to gaining 
accuracy could be improved.
3 Potential for
negative
outcomes
D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
All acknowledged pressure to perform with each attack, 
especially initial attacks of the exercise. All said this 
pressure lightened as the exercise continued -  they got 
used to executing during attacks. Three said prior 
mistakes/slowness led to increased pressure to perform.
4 Induces
Organizational
Stress
D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
Most said they felt stress after errors/slowness in PAR 
sweeps were reported by them to senior leadership, and 
keeping up with incoming data. Two felt little stress other 
than that of being in an exercise.
5 Demand for 
Specialized 
Expertise
D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
No concerns we’re voiced in this area.
6 Demand for 
Integration of 
Expertise
D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
No concerns we’re voiced in this area.
7 Novelty:
Unknowability
D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
No concerns we’re voiced in this area.
8 Novelty: Number 
of Entities
D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
Most reported the breadth of the second attack was 
daunting.
9 Novelty: Pace of 
Events
D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
Most reported significant stress in managing the pace of 
events associated with the MOC relocation exercise.
10 Context: HOV D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
All felt BARTS helped tremendously and facilitated the 
quick distribution of information across career fields.
11 Context: IS D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
All said nature of attack required interaction i.e.: 
aggressors required security response and maintenance 
response
12 System 1 D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
Giant Voice and Flag indications were slow and errant. 
All reported stress as a result of such errors and impact
13 System 2 D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
Inconclusive responses
14 System 3 D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
Most thought SRC director did a good job of directing 
efforts. Some thought tendency to become over focused 
was present.
15 System 3 D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
All noted leadership’s dissatisfaction with slowness of 
PAR information and the need to go to general release.
16 System 5 D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
All noted the stress all felt as a result of the previous 
inspection report
17 Researcher
Interaction
D6 No participants expressed concerns in this area
18 Demographic
Information
NA See previous questionnaire
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Table A5.1.1.3: Post-Exercise Questionnaire for UCC Evaluators
# DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus
Table 4.2 Cell 
References
Question
1 G eneral
discussion in their 
terms
E 1 , E2, E3, 
E4, E5
T he researcher and the eval team  chief w ere the only eval 
team  m em bers evaluating the S R C  thus the com m ents below  
are those of the T eam  Chief
2 Representations E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Recurringly, only due to slowness in P A R  team  
com munication. In a couple case due to locating errors 
associated with U X O s
3 Potential for 
negative outcomes
E 1, E2, E3, 
E 4, E5
Perceived stress associated with negative M ay 0 5  inspection  
report. Also with slowness of general release do to P A R  team  
slowness
4 Induces
O rganizational
Stress
E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E 5
S e e  above.
5 D em and for 
Specialized  
Expertise
E 1 , E2, E3, 
E4, E5
None perceived.
6 D em and for 
Integration of 
Expertise
E 1 , E2, E3, 
E4, E 5
None perceived.
7 Novelty:
Unknowability
E 1 , E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Non-perceived.
8 Novelty: Num ber 
of Entities
E 1 , E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Extensive M O C  attack/relocation m ade keeping up with 
information difficult and stressful.
9 Novelty: Pace of 
Events
E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Extensive M O C  attack/relocation m ade keeping up with 
information difficult and stressful.
10 Context: H O V E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Felt B A R TS  helped facilitated the quick distribution of 
information across career fields but agreed with IG  
assessm ent that it limits chatter in the S R C .
11 Context: IS E1, E 2 , E3, 
E4, E5
Did not think exercise w as intense enough to m ake the effects 
of good IS visible in perform ance
12 Context: 
Leadership and  
Staff Com petence
E 1 , E2, E3, 
E4, E 5
No information volunteered.
13 Context: Flexibility E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Not really.
14 System  1 E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
R epeated concerns with G iant Voice and P A R  team s seen  
elsew here
15 System  2 E1, E2, E3, 
E 4, E 5
Not Really.
17 System  3 E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
T endency to get over focused on problem s beneath their level 
of m anagem ent
18 System  3 E 1 , E2, E3, 
E4, E 5
R epeated  concerns with P A R  team s seen  elsew here
19 System  4 E 1 , E 2 , E3, 
E 4, E 5
NA -  covered by question 2
20 System  5 E1, E2, E3, 
E 4, E5
Cited general stress associated with previous inspection 
failure.
21 R esearcher
Interaction
E6 None.
22 Evaluator
Dem ographic
Information
NA T eam  C hief is white male, 4 0  yr old, 0 -5 .
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Table A5.1.1.4: Exercise Scrip and Exercise Script Review
# DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus
Table 4.2 
Cell
References
Question
1 Potential for
negative
outcomes
B1, B2, B3, 
B5
First attack was designed to have breadth second to 
have depth, designed to stress both unit and control 
center.
2 Induces
Organizational
Stress
B1, B2, B3, 
B5
Same as above.
3 Demand for 
Specialized 
Expertise
B1, B2, B3, 
B5
Not really in terms of command and control.
4 Demand for 
Integration of 
Expertise
B1, B2, B3, 
B5
Not so much expertise as information.
5 Novelty:
Unknowability
B1, B2, B3, 
B5
Not really.
6 Novelty: Number 
of Entities
B1, B2, B3, 
B5
MOC relocation attack represents an attempt to 
challenge the processing limits of the SRC.
7 Novelty: Pace of 
Events
B1, B2, B3, 
B5
Breadth attack represents an attempt to challenge the 
processing limits of the SRC.
8 Representation B1, B2, B3, 
B5
See script in case database
9 DC5F impact B1, B2, B3, 
B5
See discussion Ch. 5
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Table A5.1.1.5: Researcher Observation Guidance
F DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus
Table 4.2 Cell 
References
Question
1 Context: H O V C 1, C 2 , C3, 
C 4, C 5 , C6
The S R C  sat in front o f and below a screened off battlestaff 
room for senior leadership. Four displays w ere projected onto 
screens readable by 8 S R C  staff as well as battlestaff. The  
staff consisted of a director, a logkeeper/B A R TS updater, an 
engineering representative, a medical representative, a security 
forces representative, a com munications representative, a 
m aintenance representative, a logistics representative, and a 
senior enlisted chief. Personnel w ere  seated at a long 
w raparound desk with laptops, phones, and radio 
com m unications. Displays included priority lists of facilities, 
actions, reconnaissance sweeps, and B A R TS  information (see  
Figure A 5.1 , layout).
2 Context: IS C 1, C2, C3, 
C 4, C 5
IS w as good because all players knew  each other as local A N G  
m em bers but negative in that only 4  had worked together in the 
M ay '05  O R I. In the researcher’s opinion script did not stress 
S R C  personnel enough to note the impact of good or poor IS.
3 Context: 
Leadership and  
S taff Com petence
C 1, C 2 , C3, 
C 4, C 5
W orkers (S 1 ) w ere  com petent in job knowledge. Som ew hat 
w eek in interaction due to lack of S R C  work together. Criticism: 
S R C  leadership and multiple workers tended to becom e over 
focused on solving singular, relatively minor issues in 
com parison, to the exclusion of other issues.
4 Context:
Flexibility
C 1, C 2, C3, 
C 4, C 5
Not much in this area  to observe although S R C  responded very  
well to loss of B A R TS  operation.
5 System  1 C1 S ee  S R C  layout description above and discussion of B A R TS  in 
C hapter V.
6 System  1 C 1, C 2, C3, 
C 4, C 5
S e e  S R C  layout description above and discussion of B A R TS  in 
C hapter V . O ne  criticism is perform ance of tracking PA R  team s  
and com m unicating alarm  signals discussed in ch. 5. 
Accountability checks should have been more regular.
7 System  2 C 1, C 2, C3, 
C 4, C 5
Coordination greatly facilitated by B A R TS, almost becoming  
mindless.
8 System  3 C 1, C 2, C 3, 
C 4, C 5
Not much of observational note other than the need to apply 
m ore pressure for com pletion of P A R  sweeps.
9 System  3 C 1, C 2, C 3, 
C 4, C 5
S e e  discussion of slow P A R  sw eeps in Ch. 5
10 System  4 C 1 .C 2 , C 3, 
C 4, C 5
S R C  for the most part accurately captured and displayed the 
varieties of attack dam age, impact, prioritization. Script did not 
significantly test the m ental construction of representations as 
most w ere straightforward. A  m ap display would have helped  
processing o f incoming data, and action developm ent in 
response.
11 System  5 C 1, C 2, C 3, 
C 4, C 5
Senior leadership’s significant interaction with S R C  during the  
O R E  w as to insist upon quicker P A R  sweeps.
12 Rival
Explanations
C 1, C 2, C3, 
C 4, C 5
Easiness o f script did not lead to observations in this area.
13 Researcher
Interaction
C 6 None observed.
14 C E C 1, C 2, C 3, 
C 4, C 5
S e e  discussion in Ch. 5
15 Representations C 1, C 2, C 3, 
C 4, C 5
S e e  discussion in Ch. 5
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Figure A5.1: UCC Layout
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Table A5.1.1.6: Exercise Evaluation Report Guidance
# DC5 Construct 
Focus
Table 4.2 
Cell
References
Question
1 Context: HOV F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
Yes in terms of BARTS. Provides wider view of actions 
relatively quickly and retains messages improving HOV. 
But tends to decrease chatter allowing for simultaneous 
monitoring of issues.
2 Context: IS F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
NO
3 Context: 
Leadership and 
Staff
Competence
F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
NO
4 Context:
Flexibility
F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
Positively in terms of BARTS system loss response.
5 System 1 F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
Negatively in terms of PAR sweeps, and Giant Voice 
communication
6 System 2 F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
NO
7 System 3 F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
Negatively in terms of PAR sweep team motivation.
8 System 3 F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
Negatively in terms of PAR sweep team motivation
9 System 4 F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
Negatively in terms of PAR sweep team motivation
10 System 5 F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
No
11 Rival
Explanations
F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
No
12 Representations F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
Negatively in terms of PAR sweep team motivation
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Case 2 - ORI Raw Data Summary
Table A5.2.1: Data Summary for Pre-Exercise Questionnaire for UCC
Participants
# DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus
Table 4.2 
Cell
References
Question
1 General 
discussion in 
their terms
A1, A3 9 personnel interviewed. Most expected to perform 
satisfactory
2 Potential for
negative
outcomes
A1, A3 Most expressed the desire to do well. Most expressed 
their knowledge of unit leaderships desire do well.
4 Induces
Organizational
Stress
A1, A3 All expressed a desire to have the ORI over with.
5 Demand for 
Specialized 
Expertise
A1, A3 All thought they were experts in their respective career 
field.
6 Demand for 
Integration of 
Expertise
A1, A3 All thought the group could integrate their expertises.
8 Novelty: Number 
of Entities/Pace 
of Events
A1, A3 Most thought they would handle the intensity well. Two 
expressed reservations about not having enough 
practice.
10 Context: HOV A1, A3 Most thought the layout was good.
11 Context: IS A1, A3 All new each other for more than a year. Most had only 
worked together in the SRC in one exercise before the 
ORI.
12 Context: 
Leadership and 
Staff
Competence
A1, A3 None expressed reservations about leadership. Most 
felt competent with other personnel. Three thought 
more practice OREs would have been better
14 System 1 A1, A3 Most could generally describe purpose of SRC displays, 
and jobs of other personnel although articulation of basic 
procedures diverged significantly as more details were 
discussed
15 System 2 A1.A3 Most thought coordination would go well. Three thought 
it would be a challenge.
17 Systems 3, 4, 5 A1, A3 All thought they would function well, and would be ably 
led.
18 Demographics NA Eight were Caucasian. One was African-American. 3 
were female. 4 in 30’s. 3 in 40’s. 2 in 50’s. 6 enlisted: 1 
SNCO, 3 NCO, 2 Airman. 2 Officer: 0-4, 0-6.
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Table A5.2.2: Postt-Exercise Questionnaire for UCC Participants
# DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus
Tab le  4.2  
Cell
References
Q uestion
1 General 
discussion in 
their terms
D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
All thought poorly.
2 Representations D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
All thought timeliness of information flow impacted UCC 
direction of response actions.
3 Potential for
negative
outcomes
D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
All acknowledged pressure to perform with each attack, 
Most said that IG feedback (negative) increased 
pressure to perform.
4 Induces
Organizational
Stress
D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
Most acknowledged increased stress as a result of 
negative IG feedback.
5 Demand for 
Specialized 
Expertise
D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
Most thought the UCC team had the required expertise 
but lacked he practice of working with each other. Two 
were unsure.
6 Demand for 
Integration of 
Expertise
D 1 ,  D 2 ,  D 3 ,  
D 4 ,  D 5
Most thought the UCC team had the required expertise 
but lacked he practice of working with each other. Two 
were unsure.
7 Novelty:
Unknowability
D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
No concerns we’re voiced in this area.
8 Novelty: Number 
of Entities
D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
Most thought the attacks involved lots of damage.
9 Novelty: Pace of 
Events
D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
All reported significant stress in managing the pace of 
events throughout the exercise.
10 Context: HOV D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
All felt MOPP gear inhibited their ability to monitor 
information flows outside their own,.
11 Context: IS D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
Some said MOPP gear caused them to focus more on 
themselves and less on others.
12 System 1 D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
Flag indications were slow and errant. Status Board 
updates and accountability checks were untimely. 
Checklist use was minimal. Errors were openly 
acknowledged by most.
13 System 2 D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
All thought more practice was required to sharpen 
coordination skills.
1 4 System 3 D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
Inconclusive comments. No convergence of opinion.
15 System 3 D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
Inconclusive comments. No convergence of opinion.
16 System 5 D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D5
Inconclusive comments. No convergence of opinion.
17 Researcher
Interaction
D6 No participants expressed concerns in this area
18 Demographic
Information
NA See previous table.
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Table A5.2.3: Poslt-Exercise Questionnaire for UCC Inspectors
# DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus
Table 4.2 
Cell
References
Q uestion
1 General 
discussion in 
their terms
E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Inspectors agreed unanimously that all aspects of 
performance were poor.
2 Representations E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Untimely across the board leading to numerous errors.
3 Potential for
negative
outcomes
E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Perceived stress associated negative feedback but also 
thought lack of action/improvement indicated lack of 
stress.
4 Induces
Organizational
Stress
E1.E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Perceived stress associated negative feedback but also 
thought lack of action/improvement indicated lack of 
stress.
5 Demand for 
Specialized 
Expertise
E1.E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Inspectors agreed inspection script did not call for any 
group or single expertise not readily available to UCC 
personnel.
6 Demand for 
Integration of 
Expertise
E1.E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Inspectors agreed inspection script did not call for any 
group or single expertise not readily available to UCC 
personnel.
7 Novelty:
Unknowability
E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Inspectors agreed all scenarios were easily discernable.
8 Novelty: Number 
of Entities
E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
All Inspectors thought attacks were light in terms of 
depth of impact to operations.
9 Novelty: Pace of 
Events
E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Inspectors agreed the pace of events was demanding 
and constant except for the last day.
10 Context: HOV E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
At researcher’s prompting, inspectors agreed HOV was 
impacted by wear of chemical gear but thought 
performance was already low enough to be able to really 
comment on extent of impact.
11 Context: IS E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
At researcher’s prompting, inspectors agreed HOV was 
impacted by wear of chemical gear but thought 
performance was already low enough to be able to really 
comment on extent of impact.
12 Context: 
Leadership and 
Staff
Competence
E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Inspectors chose not to comment directly but thought 
more practice would have helped the unit
13 Context:
Flexibility
E1.E2, E3, 
E4, E5
No convergence in this area.
14 System 1 E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Flag indications were slow and errant. Status Board 
updates and accountability checks were untimely. 
Checklist use was minimal. No information backup 
procedures were used. Relocation procedures were not 
written down/were informal at best.
15 System 2 E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Coordination was weak.
17 System 3 E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Performance deficiencies were not cited or looked to for 
improvement.
19 System 4 E1.E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Severely limited representation construction due to 
untimely across the board processing of information 
leading to numerous errors.
20 System 5 E1, E2, E3, 
E4, E5
Inspectors chose not to comment in this area.
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21 Researcher
Interaction
E6 None.
22 Evaluator
Demographic
Information
NA All inspectors were white male officers, 2-40 yr old 0-5s, 
1-30yrold 0-4, 1 30yrold 0-3..
Table A5.2.4: Exercise Script and Exercise Script Review
# DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus
Table 4.2 
Cell
References
Question
1 Potential for
negative
outcomes
B1, B2, B3, 
B5
Generally in terms of inspection report impact. Attacks 
involved casualties and severe mission impact in terms 
of completing construction requirements.
2 Induces
Organizational
Stress
B1, B2, B3, 
B5
Pressure as described above.
3 Demand for 
Specialized 
Expertise
B1, B2, B3, 
B5
Not really required in terms of UCC personnel
4 Demand for 
Integration of 
Expertise
B1, B2, B3, 
B5
Not so much specialization/expertise as information 
processing/specialization
5 Novelty:
Unknowability
B1, B2, B3, 
B5
Not required.
6 Novelty: Number 
of Entities
B1, B2, B3, 
B5
Attacks were really not large in scale or deep in mission 
impact.
7 Novelty: Pace of 
Events
B1, B2, B3, 
B5
Event pace was challenging and constant except for last 
day.
8 Representation B1, B2, B3, 
B5
See script in case database
9 DC5F impact B1, B2, B3, 
B5
See discussion Ch. 5
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Table A5.2.5: Researcher Observation Guidance
# DC5
Construct/Issue
Focus
Table 4.2 
Cell
References
Question
1 Context: HOV C1, C2, C3, 
C4, C5, C6
The UCC consisted of a Temper Tent housing nine 
people and communication equipment. Four displays 
were projected onto screens readable by the staff. The 
staff consisted of the commander and executive officer, 
a logkeeper, a communications specialist, a plotter, a 
SrNCO, an engineering representative, a logistics 
representative, and an engineering representative. 
Personnel were seated at a long desks with laptops, 
field phones, and radio communications. Displays 
included priority lists of facilities and generators, project 
status, post attack actions, and accountability 
information (see Figure A5.2, layout).
2 Context: IS C1, C2, C3, 
C4, C5
IS was good because all players knew each other as 
local ANG members but negative in that they had 
practiced together only once.
3 Context: 
Leadership and 
Staff
Competence
C1, C2, C3, 
C4, C5
Workers (S1) were competent in job knowledge. Week 
in interaction due to lack of practice. Poor performance 
was not singled out and fixed.
4 Context:
Flexibility
C1, C2, C3, 
C4, C5
No observations other than to wonder if better 
procedures and implementation would have facilitated 
better attack responses.
5 System 1 C1 See SRC layout description above.
6 System 1 C1, C2, C3, 
C4, C5
See SRC layout description above. Accountability 
checks, status updates, alarm notification, basic 
procedures should have been more timely.
7 System 2 C1, C2, C3, 
C4, C5
Coordination week and untimely and accomplished only 
in reaction to events going wrong. Coordination 
severely inhibited by wear of chemical gear.
8 System 3 C1, C2, C3, 
C4, C5
Poor performance was not singled out for action, 
correction, or improvement.
10 System 4 C1, C2, C3, 
C4, C5
Lack of timely processing of information severely 
inhibited command and control of unit
11 System 5 C1, C2, C3, 
C4, C5
Senior leadership and unit were unsure of themselves 
and lacked confidence in the ORI setting -  most likely do 
to lack of practice.
12 Rival
Explanations
C1, C2, C3, 
C4, C5
General agreement amongst data sources that 
performance was poor.
13 Researcher
Interaction
C6 None observed.
14 CE C1, C2, C3, 
C4, C5
See discussion in Ch. 5
15 Representations C1, C2, C3, 
C4, C5
See discussion in Ch. 5
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
372
Figure A5.2: UCC Layout
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Table A5.2.6: Inspection Report Guidance
# DC5 Construct 
Focus
Table 4.2 
Cell
References
Question
1 Context: HOV F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
NO
2 Context: IS F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
NO
3 Context: 
Leadership and 
Staff
Competence
F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
NO
4 Context:
Flexibility
F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
Yes, in terms of lack of rigorous procedures for 
information back up and relocation inhibiting attack 
response
5 System 1 F1.F2, F3, 
F4, F5
Negatively in terms of PAR sweep management, Alarm 
Communication, Lack of established procedures and 
checklists, non-use or untimely use of status boards.
6 System 2 F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
NO
7 System 3 F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
Yes in terms of untimely response/reallocation of 
resources to mission impacting conditions
8 System 3 F1.F2, F3, 
F4, F5
No
9 System 4 F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
Yes in terms of untimely response/reallocation of 
resources to mission impacting conditions. Yes in terms 
of untimely updating of status boards
10 System 5 F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
No
11 Rival
Explanations
F1, F2, F3, 
F4, F5
No
12 Representations F1.F2, F3, 
F4, F5
Yes in terms of untimely updating of status boards
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APPENDIX VI
DETAILED ANALYSIS OF CASE DATA FOR CASE 1, FIRST OPERATIONAL
READINESS EXERCISE
The first track of the research design seeks to show the actual usefulness 
of the DC5 framework for interpreting the observed distributed cognition 
phenomena. To the extent emerging observations readily converge with 
suggested theory the framework has demonstrated its holistic (i.e., nomological) 
validity as well as its specific construct validity. To the extent emerging 
observations do not readily converge with the suggested theory then the 
framework has demonstrated the need for modification or further study. Table 
A6.1, mirroring Table 3.1, Crisis Environment Effects on DC5 Subsystem 
Performance, which described in detail the theoretical impacts of crisis conditions 
on distributed cognition phenomena, provides the organization for the detailed 
discussion which follows regarding: 1) the areas in which emergent observations 
from case 1 converged with suggested framework constructs and their 
interaction, 2) diverged from the suggested theory, 3) required modification to the 
suggested theory, or 3) remained ambiguous with regards to the suggested 
theory. Table A6.2, Convergence between DC5 Framework and Emergent 
Themes, based on the framework of Table A6.1 summarizes the researcher’s 
assessment of the case data and its implications for the DC5 framework. An 
exhaustive discussion of how these assessments were reached follows.
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Table A6.1: Crisis Environment Effects on DC5 Subsystem Performance (Reprint of Table 3.1)
S1. Autonomous 
Units
S 2. Coordination S3. Control S3*. Monitoring S4. Intelligence S5. Identity Context
Real Crisis 
Pressure 
(Potential for 
adverse 
organization
- System self­
doubt might 
increase
- Sensitivities to 
stimulus
- Differences amplified
-  Acquiesce to 
consensus
- M ay not seek 
consensus
- Pressure S1 to 
provide more 
information and S2 
to process more 
information
- Must determine if 
S 1 ’s are handling 
pressure 
appropriately
- Demand more 
information to get 
representation 
right
- Seek more 
confidence in 
representation before 
selecting alternatives
- Selection/decision/
- Increase 
focus/pressure 
may cause HOV  
to be ignored
- Increase
outcomes + 
inducement of 
stress)
increased 
-Focus changes
- Increase 
demands on S4 for 
implementable 
solution
action goes to the 
organization core so 
balance is less routine
pressure on 
individual systems 
may cause loss of 
IS with other 
systems 
-S ta ff  
competence 
directly impacted 
- Leadership 
directly impacted
Complexity: 
Demand For 
High Levels Of 
Specialized 
Expertise
- Ability to 
correctly inquire 
about data 
increasingly 
challenged
- Possible increased 
dem and between 
systems
- Must ascertain 
when S1 has 
become 
overwhelmed
- Must ascertain 
when S1 is no 
longer up to 
environmental 
demands
- Ability to 
interpret data 
increasingly 
challenged
- Required to adjust 
decision making 
approach based on 
known lack of 
knowledge
-S ta ff
competence up to 
the task 
- Leadership 
increasing S1 
performance
Complexity: 
Demand for 
Integrated 
Expertise
- Ability to 
correctly inquire 
about data 
increasingly 
challenged
- Challenged with 
knowing who needs to be 
involved in processing 
information
- Must ensure 
coordination is 
functional
- Must ascertain if 
S 2 is no longer 
capable of meeting 
requirements
- Ability to 
interpret data 
increasingly 
challenged
- Required to adjust 
decision making 
approach based on 
known lack of 
knowledge
- HOV and IS 
crucial
- SC and 
Leadership also 
important
Complexity-
Novelty
unknowability
- Ability to 
correctly inquire 
about data 
increasingly 
challenged
- Can recognize 
when more data 
collection is 
fruitless
- Can recognize 
when more data 
collection is 
fruitless
- Required to adjust 
decision making 
approach based on 
known lack of 
knowledge
Complexity- 
Novelty 
number of 
entities
- Ability to track 
and process data 
challenged 
because of 
volume
- Ability to
coordinate/assimilate 
data challenged because 
of volume
- Can recognize 
when systems 
becoming 
overwhelmed
- Must ascertain if 
S 1 ’s and S2 up to 
task/replaceable
- Ability to 
interpret data 
increasingly 
challenged
- Required to adjust 
decision making 
approach based on 
known lack of 
knowledge
- Flexibility key
- Redundancy 
may prevent 
processing errors
Complexity- 
Novelty 
pace of events
- Ability to 
receive and 
process data 
challenged
- Ability to process data 
challenged
- Increase demand 
for a timely plan of 
action
- Must ascertain if 
S 1 ’s and S2 up to 
task/replaceable
- Ability to 
interpret data 
increasingly 
challenged
- Senses need to act 
quickly
- Redundancy 
may prevent 
processing errors
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Table A6.2: Case 1 Resu ts: Convergence between DC5 Framework and Emergent Themes
S1.
Autonomous
Units
S2. Coordination S3. Control S3*. Monitoring S4. Intelligence S5. Identity Context
Real Crisis 
Pressure 
(Potential for 
adverse 
organization 
outcomes + 
inducement 
of stress)
Notable
Convergence
Insufficient Data Considerable
Convergence
Notable
Convergence and
Modification
needed
Considerable
Convergence
and
Modification
needed
Considerable
Convergence
Not Validated/
Insufficient
Data
Complexity: 
Demand For 
High Levels 
Of
Specialized
Expertise
Insufficient
Data
Insufficient Data Notable
Convergence
Notable
Convergence
and
Modification
needed
Insufficient Data Notable
Convergence
Notable
Convergence
Complexity: 
Demand for 
Integrated 
Expertise
Insufficient
Data
Insufficient Data Insufficient Data Insufficient Data Insufficient Data Insufficient
Data
Insufficient
Data
Complexity-
Novelty
unknowability
Insufficient
Data
Insufficient Data Insufficient Data Notable
Convergence
Complexity- 
Novelty: 
number of 
entities
Considerable
Convergence
Considerable
Convergence
Notable
Convergence
Notable
Convergence/
MODIFICATION
NEEDED
Notable
Convergence/
MODIFICATION
NEEDED
Notable
Convergence
Considerable
Convergence
Complexity- 
Novelty 
pace of 
events
Considerable
Convergence
Considerable
Convergence
Considerable
Convergence
Considerable
Convergence/
MODIFICATION
NEEDED
Considerable
Convergence
MODIFICATION
NEEDED
Considerable
Convergence
Considerable
Convergence
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The first row in Table 5.1 attempts to capture the general impact of crisis 
conditions on a control center’s distributed cognition. The first cell in this row 
suggests that the general pressure of a crisis may lead to basic mistakes by 
autonomous units as they question themselves more intently as they perform in a 
crisis, become more sensitive to outside stimulus, and focus on items relating 
primarily to the needs of the crisis. Case observations relating to S1 systems 
included the errors and slowness made by the alarm condition change 
notification systems and the slowness of the PAR teams. The former seemed 
fairly constant throughout the exercise and seemed to be the inadvertent 
mistakes of a single set of individuals, these seemed to occur both during periods 
of increased stress and periods of less stress. With regards to the latter, as the 
unit leadership, through the SRC director, and the S1 representatives in the SRC 
made clear its desire to speed up PAR team response and information, the 
response indeed got better. Multiple case sources agreed that this pressure 
resulted in better more focused performance and information. Thus, Case 1 
supports the notion suggested by the DC5 framework of crisis impacting S1 
focus and sensitivity to stimulus but provides little insight into its impact on 
second-guessing oneself. The lack of extreme stressful environment resulting 
from the limited ORE scenario provides little insight into a suggested fall off in 
performance in terms of focus and sensitivity following an initial increase as 
suggested by the framework. Notable convergence with the framework was 
noted in this area.
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The second cell in the first row of Table 5.1 suggests that crisis pressure 
impacts the ability of control center personnel and systems to coordinate the 
construction of representations and responses. As cited in the description of the 
ORE setting, the narrowness of the particular scenario in the case due to lack of 
participation by many sub-units limited the ability to generate scenarios requiring 
coordinated response and therefore interpretation in this portion of the 
framework. Thus, it is concluded that this portion is “not validated.”
The third cell of the first row of Table 5.1 captures the framework’s notion 
that crisis pressure impacts the S3 function of a control center by increasing the 
demands on the S1 systems to generate accurate, quick information and to 
quickly generate solutions. This reaction was readily seen in the case 1 data. 
Slow PAR team sweeps were responded to with demands and prompting for 
increasing speed. Similarly, communication errors in relaying alarm changes to 
the unit populace were met with demands to “get it right next time.” S3 serves as 
a conduit for transferring the pressure of the crisis impacting the organization as 
a whole or in framework terms, its identity (S5), to the S1 control systems. 
Considerable convergence between case data and framework postulates was 
seen in this area.
The fourth cell of Table 5.1 captures the audit function of the control 
function within a control center. While formalization on the level of an actual 
operational audit as Beer suggests with his VSM did not take place, there simply 
isn’t the time in a crisis for that degree of attention, much greater attention was 
paid to poorly performing S1 systems, the PAR teams and alarm notification
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systems. Notable convergence between case data and framework constructs in 
this area was noted. As suggested, the case data did illustrate the impossibility 
of audit level interaction during crisis conditions suggesting a need to modify the 
framework.
The fifth cell of the first row Table 5.3 suggests that crisis pressure will 
result in the demand for more timely and more accurate information. This 
construct is the raw expressed response of the intelligence function of a control 
center to crisis pressure. Considerable convergence was noted in this area.
The sixth cell of the first row of Table 5.3, suggests that the crisis pressure 
will directly impact the very identity of the control center in terms of balancing the 
need for intelligence and the need for response. This was readily seen in the 
case data as the unit leadership began to demand faster PAR team sweeps so 
that the unit could return to normal flying operations, that is, the mission or 
identity of the unit. Considerable convergence was noted in this area.
The last cell suggests the impact of crisis pressure on the contextual 
elements of a control center. The narrowness of the ORE scenario again 
impacted the ability to observe this construct; intersubjectivity breakdowns 
amongst control center personnel, and increasing incompetence were not 
observed. These relationships could not be validated using the case data.
The first and second cell of the second row of Table 5.3 suggests the 
notion that an increasingly complex scenario may impact the ability of S1 
systems to function as the demand for a single specialized expertise increases 
and that those demands may impact the ability to coordinate actions.
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Unfortunately again, the narrow setting in Case 1 did not provide scenarios in 
which such situations existed.
The third cell of the second row of Table 5.3 suggests the notion that the 
demands for specialized expertise resulting from an increasingly complex 
scenario may require the control function of the control center to determine when 
such expertise has been exceeded and act accordingly. Though, as stated 
above, scenarios did not exist in this ORE where “expertises” were exceeded, 
the initial dullness of the PAR teams was noted by the control function and steps 
were taken to improve their performance. Mild convergence was noted in this 
area. Again, as stated above and referencing the fourth cell of the second row of 
Table 5.3, a formal audit of individual PAR teams was impossible given the crisis 
constraints thus while some investigation was done by the S3 function, the case 
highlights that as crisis conditions intensify the S3*, audit function, must begin to 
evaporate and S3 must internalize this effort into more simplistic controls.
The sixth cell of the second row of Table 5.3 suggests that the crisis’s 
demands, in terms of specialized expertise to deal with the crisis’s complexity, 
pressure organizational leadership to make decisions based on less data than 
usual. While the scenarios in the case did not necessarily create situations in 
which demands for different specialized expertise were exceeded, they were 
challenged and PAR teams did not perform initially as they should have. In turn 
leadership felt the driving need to go to general release and begin flying again 
without having sweeps complete. Notable convergence between case data and 
framework postulate was noted here.
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Similarly, as referenced in the last cell of the second row of Table 5.3, in 
terms of system context, staff competence (again the PAR teams) was stressed 
by the scenario and leadership responded accordingly. Notable convergence 
was noted here.
With regard to the third row of Table 5.3, as discussed in the section on 
the ORE setting, the limited scenario did not generate crisis situations in which 
the demand for integration of disciplines was necessary therefore it was not 
possible to validate this portion of the framework.
In terms of the fourth row of Table 5.3, in the researcher’s judgment and 
that of other evaluators as well as the reflections of the participants afterwards, 
no scenarios were really presented to the SRC that would have represented 
crises because they were composed of simply unknowable events. All scripted 
scenarios were imminently knowable given the time and expertise involved.
Thus most of the postulates relating to unknowability cannot be validated 
positively or negatively by the case data. The exception being that when viewed 
in isolation the leadership of the unit was confronted with decision making while 
not knowing the full extent of the facts that should have been provided by the 
less than expeditious PAR teams and felt the pressure to act anyway (i.e., 
release personnel back to normal operations). Thus some notable convergence 
with the framework was noted here.
The first cell of the fifth row of Table 5.3 captures the framework’s 
notion that the volume of information flow from a large number of entities may 
challenge a control center’s ability to process the large amount information. The
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two “in- depth attacks” on a single facility described in the setting represent such 
a scenario. Stress was noted as the amount of discussion in the SRC increased 
immediately following the attacks and S1 units became hyper-focused on solving 
individual problems rather than assembling a base-wide picture; that is while 
each S1 unit may have been aware of the particular circumstances they were 
focused on at the time, they were not actively working together demonstrating 
cognition. Simply put, the amount of information generated by the scenario 
impacted the functional representatives in the SRC and their ability to perform. 
Considerable convergence was noted here.
In the second cell of the fifth row of Table 5.3, the notion that 
coordination is impacted by the scale of events is postulated. While the 
narrowness of the scenario limited the requirement for coordination, the scale of 
the attack resulted in multiple sources calling in the same damage to the SRC, 
creating the need for the SRC S1 and S4 systems to determine if reports 
overlapped in constructing representations of the outside environments. This is 
important in that the researcher suspected some convergence between the 
constructs of pace of events and scale of events, but this overlapping 
phenomena distinguishes the two constructs. Considerable convergence 
between framework and data was noted in this area.
The third cell of the fifth row of Table 5.3, captures the notion that 
the number of entities involved in a crisis will challenge a distributed cognition 
system’s S3 function’s to ensure that S1 functions are not being overwhelmed. 
While scenarios were limited by the setting of the ORE, the in-depth attacks did
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result in significant overlapping information flow and the case data reflects 
heightened awareness of the this fact as expressed by the SRC director and 
noted by the researcher. Notable convergence is noted in this area.
The fourth cell of the fifth row of Table 5.3, captures the notion that 
the control function of a distributed cognition system must occasionally audit S1 
systems in hopes of determining if they are up to the job at hand. What is again 
illustrated by the case data, is that in crisis there becomes less time as the crisis 
progresses to perform such auditing functions as well the ability to retrain, further 
train, or replace. While this pressure to perform auditing type action was is 
present in the control centers, and thus the notable convergence noted, 
elimination of the audit function becomes increasingly mandated.
The fifth cell of the fifth row of Table 5.3 suggests that the increasing 
number of entities that must be sorted through as a crisis intensifies, impacts the 
ability of a control center to make sense of them. As described previously the 
heightened sense of awareness noted immediately following the in-depth attacks 
is reflective of this pressure felt by control center personnel as they sorted out 
what happened, although the actual representation of what happened was 
developed pretty easily. Notable convergence between case data and the 
framework was noted here.
The sixth cell of the fifth row of Table 5.3 references the suggested impact 
of large-scale events upon the identity of the organization. Again, heightened 
awareness and increased stress levels were noted throughout the SRC and
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expressed by SRC leadership during the in depth attacks, so some convergence 
between framework and data is noted here.
The final cell of the fifth row of Table 5.3 captures the notion that 
redundancy of systems and visualization tools provide flexibility by making 
tracking of data easier and more reliable thereby increasing the useable horizon 
of visibility. It is in this area that the unit in the case demonstrated its strong point 
with the use of the Base Recovery After Attack System (BARTS) message 
posting network in the SRC and throughout the wing. BARTS put at the 
fingertips of every SRC person a reliable, recorded posting of raw data as it 
flowed and was refined and validated; turning it into usable information and 
knowledge quickly. Questions posed by S4 and S2 in deconflicting rival 
explanations of events were more readily researchable due to these systems. 
Also demonstrating the importance of these constructs within the framework but 
in an opposing fashion was the simple lack of a base map plotting damage and 
issues as they raw data flowed in. Such a tool would also help in processing the 
volume of data flowing from the in-depth attack. Considerable convergence 
between framework and data was noted here.
In the final row of Table 5.1 the notion that sub-systems in the control 
center may not be able to keep up with the rapid pace at which events are 
occurring is captured. The in-breadth attacks described in the setting discussion 
previously, resulted in rapid-fire updates being provided to the SRC. While the 
SRC performed admirably in these cases, the breadth of information that had to 
be “pieced-together”, rather than “sorted-out” after the in-depth attacks, resulted
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in heightened awareness across all subsystems. Repeating what’s been 
described previously, individual representatives felt the urgency to collect and 
verify information quickly before next set of data flowed in; what little coordination 
had to be accomplished was done quickly; pressure flowed from S5 and S4 
through S3 to motivate PAR teams to move faster, and finally, the positive impact 
of BARTS and negative impact of not having mappable displays available were 
noted. All construct interactions between system and crisis environment 
postulated by the framework considerably converged with case data.
Not specifically postulated by the framework but requiring some grounding 
in theoretical interpretation still, is the weakness noted by the IG in the May 2005 
ORI and also noted by the researcher in the unit’s use of the BARTS system, 
which is that it eliminated or reduced conversation in the SRC highlighting 
important information requiring response and thus slowing response and a sense 
of urgency by the SRC. Some discussion in terms of DC5 constructs presents 
the need to sharpen the construct of Intelligence or S4. BARTS provided such 
complete, easily accessible, readable, recordable, and redundant information 
processing that it significantly widened the horizon of visibility and facilitated S1 
actions to the point that human operators tended to sit back and let the system 
deliver information out to the unit itself. As much of the information contained in 
this widened horizon of visibility required simple actions that sub-units outside the 
SRC could take care of themselves, no action was required by the SRC and it 
could be easily lulled into a sense of ease. These simple, less important matters 
amount to noise. Still at some point, significant information will flow through
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BARTS as a crisis intensifies (i.e. more signal than noise). This function of 
distinguishing between signal to noise becomes of heightened importance as 
more noise is introduced through growing information horizons and is a key 
function of the intelligence, S4, subsystem not previously articulated to such 
extent in developing the DC5 framework. Thus, in addition to constructing 
representations a key portion of the S4 intelligence subsystem is distinguishing 
between signal and noise or assessing the relative importance of incoming 
information. To the extent the unit in the case was being lulled into a sense of 
complacency by the ease with which BARTS processed the lesser important 
items, then the S4 function was performing poorly. The case data suggests 
adding to the S4 function in the DC5 framework the importance of assessing the 
relative importance of information.
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APPENDIX VII 
DETAILED ANALYSIS OF CASE DATA FOR CASE 2
As in the track 1 interpretive analysis of the first case’s first ORE the 
objective will be to interpret the emergent converging themes of the case data 
using the constructs and interactions specified by the DC5 framework validating 
the framework where possible and modifying it if necessary. As discussed in 
analysis of the first case, to the extent emerging observations readily converge 
with the suggested theory, then the framework has demonstrated its holistic 
validity as well as its specific construct validity. To the extent emerging 
observations do not readily converge with the suggested theory then the 
framework has demonstrated the need for modification or further study. Table 
A7.1, mirroring Table 5.3c, Crisis Environment Effects on DC5 Subsystem 
Performance - Modifications from Case 1, Track 1 - Second ORE, which 
captured in detail the impacts of crisis conditions on distributed cognition 
phenomena according to the latest iteration of the DC5 framework , provides the 
organization for the detailed discussion which follows regarding the areas in 
which emergent observations from case two converged with suggested 
framework constructs and their interaction, diverged from the suggested theory, 
or remained ambiguous with regards to the suggested theory. Again, as 
described in the previous section, the general overall poor performance of the 
UCC is an overarching theme that significantly limits the value of the data for 
interpreting crisis environment effects upon control center cognition. This fact is
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reflected in the large portion of Table A7.2 detailed as not validated by the 
insufficient case data. Table A7.2 summarizes the case data and its implications 
for the DC5 framework.
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Table A7.1: Crisis Environment Effects on DC5 Subsystem Performance - Modifications from Case 1, Track 1 -
S1. Autonomous 
Units
S2. Coordination S3. Control S4. Intelligence S5. Identity Context
Real Crisis 
Pressure 
(Potential for 
adverse 
organization 
outcomes + 
inducement of 
stress) relative to 
the dcog fitness 
level of the 
control center 
(RTDF)
- System self-doubt 
might increase
- Sensitivities to 
stimulus increased
- Focus changes
- Differences 
amplified
- Acquiesce to 
consensus
- May not seek 
consensus
- Pressure S1 to provide 
more information and S2 
to process more 
information
- Increase demands on 
S4 for implementable 
solution
- Must determine if S 1 ’s 
are handling pressure 
appropriately
- Demand more 
information to get 
representation right
- Heightened 
awareness of need 
to assess the 
relative importance 
of information 
(HANTARII)
- S eek more 
confidence in 
representation 
before selecting 
alternatives
Selection/decision/ 
action goes to the 
organization core 
so balance is less 
routine
- Increase focus/pressure 
may cause HOV to be 
ignored
- Increase pressure on 
individual systems m ay cause 
loss of IS with other systems
- Staff competence directly 
impacted
- Leadership directly 
impacted
Complexity: 
Demand For High 
Levels Of 
Specialized 
Expertise (RTDF)
- Ability to correctly 
inquire about data 
increasingly 
challenged
- Possible increased 
demand between 
systems
- Must ascertain when 
S1 has become 
overwhelmed
- Must ascertain when 
S1 is no longer up to 
environmental demands
- Ability to interpret 
data increasingly 
challenged
- Required to adjust 
decision making 
approach based on 
known lack of 
knowledge
- Staff competence up to the 
task
- Leadership increasing S1 
performance
Complexity: 
Demand for 
Integrated 
Expertise (RTDF)
- Ability to correctly 
Inquire about data 
increasingly 
challenged
- Challenged with 
knowing who Needs  
to be involved in 
processing 
information
- Must ensure 
coordination is functional 
-M ust ascertain if S2 is 
no longer capable of 
meeting requirements
- Ability to interpret 
data increasingly 
challenged
- Required to adjust 
decision making 
approach based on 
known lack of 
knowledge
- HOV and IS crucial
- SC and Leadership also 
important
Complexity-
Novelty
unknowability
(RTDF)
- Ability to correctly 
inquire about data 
increasingly 
challenged
- Can recognize when 
more data collection is 
fruitless
- Can recognize when 
more data collection 
is fruitless
- Required to adjust 
decision making 
approach based on 
known lack of 
knowledge
Complexity-
Novelty
number of entities 
(RTDF)
- Ability to track 
and process data 
challenged 
because of volume
- Ability to
coordinate/assimilate 
data challenged 
because of volume
- Can recognize when 
systems becoming 
overwhelmed
- Must ascertain if S1 ’s 
and S2 up to 
task/replaceable
- Ability to interpret 
data increasingly 
challenged
- (HANTARII)
- Required to adjust 
decision making 
approach based on 
known lack of 
knowledge
- Flexibility key
- Redundancy may prevent 
processing errors
Complexity- 
Novelty 
pace of events 
(RTDF)
- Ability to receive 
and process data 
challenged
- Ability to process 
data challenged
- Increase demand for a 
timely plan of action
- Must ascertain if S 1’s 
and S2 up to 
task/replaceable
- Ability to interpret 
data increasingly 
challenged
- (HANTARII)
- Senses need to 
act quickly
- Redundancy may prevent 
processing errors
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Table A7.2: Case 2 Resull :s: Convergence between DC5 Framework and Emergent Themes
S1.
Autonomous
Units
S2. Coordination S3. Control S4.
Intelligence
S5. Identity Context
Real Crisis 
Pressure 
(Potential for 
adverse 
organization 
outcomes + 
inducement of 
stress)
Not
Validated/
Insufficient
Data
Not Validated 
/Insufficient Data
Not Validated/ 
Insufficient Data
Not
Validated/
Insufficient
Data
Not Validated/
Insufficient
Data
Not Validated/ 
Insufficient Data
Complexity: 
Demand For 
High Levels Of 
Specialized 
Expertise
Insufficient
Data
Insufficient Data Notable
Convergence
Insufficient
Data
Notable
Convergence
Notable
Convergence
Complexity: 
Demand for 
Integrated 
Expertise
Insufficient
Data
Insufficient Data Insufficient Data Insufficient
Data
Insufficient
Data
Insufficient Data
Complexity-
Novelty
unknowability
Insufficient
Data
Insufficient Data Insufficient
Data
Insufficient
Data
Complexity- 
Novelty: 
number of 
entities
Notable
Convergence
Notable
Convergence
Notable
Convergence
Notable
Convergence
Notable
Convergence
Notable
Convergence
Complexity- 
Novelty 
pace of events
Notable
Convergence
Notable
Convergence
Notable
Convergence
Notable
Convergence
Notable
Convergence
Notable
Convergence
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The first row in Table 5.4 attempts to capture the general impact of crisis 
conditions on a control center’s distributed cognition. The first cell in this row 
suggests that the general pressure of a crisis may lead to basic mistakes by 
autonomous units as they question themselves more intently as they perform in a 
crisis, become more sensitive to outside stimulus, and focus on items relating 
primarily to the needs of the crisis. Case 2 observations relating to S1 systems 
included the untimely processing of project progress information, attack damage 
information, untimely or inaccurate communication of attack and alarm 
notification made by the alarm condition change notification systems, and poor, 
untimely performance by PAR teams. The occurrences of these errors were 
frequent and constant regardless of scenario intensity levels. To reiterate the 
description provided in the previous section, basic competence was lacking in the 
UCC. It is thus difficult to tie a change in S1 performance to changes in the 
potential for negative outcomes. Similarly, it is difficult to tie changes in S1 
performance to stress levels and complexity changes. Thus, no convergence 
with the DC5 framework was seen in the first cell of the first three rows of Table 
5.4.
Similarly, coordination was seen as inadequate by both the researcher 
and the inspectors throughout the exercise and reflected thusly in the final report. 
Alarm changes impacting geographically separated construction sites were not 
communicated and their impacts on mission accomplishment not accounted for 
or anticipated. What coordination did exist was reactionary in both the 
researcher’s view and the inspectors view. Again though, because the general
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competence of the UCC team was so lacking in this area, it is difficult to attribute 
the coordination impacts to crisis intensity. Thus the second cell of the first three 
rows of table 5.4 also lacks sufficient data for validation.
As documented in the observer notes and in the inspector interviews little 
was specifically done in response to the slowness of the S1 systems or lack of 
coordination or even in response to inspector-provided feedback during the 
inspection. The control function was lacking. Similarly, the intelligence function 
within the UCC failed to understand the impact of high winds shutting down one 
project and in turn failed to reallocate resources to more readily constructible 
projects, effectively leaving a crew of a dozen people sitting around for two 
hours. Again, it is not possible to ascertain if this was a result of crisis pressure 
or just lack of UCC competence in general. This lack of competence became the 
identity of the command and control function of the unit. Finally, in terms of 
context, the inspection was characterized by a simple lack of competence on the 
part of the UCC team. It is difficult to attribute the lack of staff competence to 
crisis pressure though. Thus the remaining cells of the first row of Table 5.4 are 
all labeled as having not been validated by the second case.
The first and second cell of the second row of Table 5.3 suggests the 
notion that an increasingly complex scenario may impact the ability of S1 
systems to function as the demand for a single specialized expertise increases 
and that those demands may impact the ability to coordinate actions. As noted 
by both the researcher and the inspectors, the scripted scenarios did not require 
high degrees of expertise, whether they are individually specialized or broadly
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integrated and interdisciplinary. Mere processing of information and using local 
expertise to facilitate expedient interpretation was all that was required. Thus 
neither of these cells for the second or third rows of Table 5.4 can be considered 
validated by the second case’s data set.
As described in the setting, the UCC team did not succeed in following up 
on the identification of error or slowness with specific action. The control function 
was not to be found. Similarly, in terms of the intelligence function, scripted 
scenarios did not require extensive integration of knowledge bases or further 
development of specific specialized knowledge bases. Lastly, the identity and 
the context of the UCC remained unchanged despite scenario demands for 
expertise. No convergence with the DC5 framework was seen in these areas.
The third, fourth, and fifth cells in the second and third rows of Table 5.4 thus 
remain not validated.
In terms of the fourth row of Table 5.4, in the researcher’s judgment and 
that of the inspectors, as well as, the reflections of the participants afterwards, no 
scenarios were really presented to the SRC that would have represented crises 
because they were composed of simply unknowable events. All scripted 
scenarios were imminently knowable given the time and expertise involved.
Thus, most of the postulates relating to unknowability cannot be validated 
positively or negatively by the case data. Consequently, again no convergence 
with the framework was noted here.
The first cell of the fifth and sixth rows of Table 5.4 captures the 
framework’s notion that the volume of information flow from a large number of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
394
entities or quickly moving pace of events may challenge a control centers ability 
to process the large amount information. While, in the researcher’s judgment 
and that of the inspectors, the scripted attacks were hardly of sufficient scale in 
terms of mission impact to stress more usual UCC teams, this UCC team 
seemed overwhelmed by basic information processing. Both the researcher and 
the inspectors agreed that pace of events was intense during the first two days of 
the exercise and this could easily have explained some lack of performance from 
S1s, but it difficult given the low overall competence of the UCC to distinguish 
between these to aspects of complexity. To borrow from track 2 in the first case 
study, it could be argued that the level of DC5 fitness was so low that even small- 
scale impacts constituted a crisis environment to this particular UCC. Simply put, 
the amount of information generated by any scenario impacted the functional 
representatives, the STs, in the UCC and their ability to perform. Notable 
convergence was noted here.
In the second cell of the fifth and sixth row of Table 5.4, the notion that 
coordination is impacted by the scale of events is postulated. While little 
coordination existed in the UCC until events were growing out of control it could 
be said that the amount of information required to be processed exceeded the 
basic competence levels of the UCC to coordinate response leading to the errors 
captured by the raw findings. Notable convergence between framework and data 
was noted in this area.
The third cell of the fifth row of Table 5.4, captures the notion that the 
number of entities involved in a crisis will challenge a distributed cognition
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system’s S3 function’s to ensure that S1 functions are not being overwhelmed. 
Similar to discussion in the previous paragraphs, as little information flows, as 
was required by the scripted scenarios, it exceeded the competence of the S1 
functions and, as described previously, little specific action was taken to improve 
performance. Perhaps this is because the control function was overwhelmed by 
the information flow as it was. Notable convergence is noted in this area.
The fifth cell of the fifth and sixth rows of Table 5.4 suggests that the 
increasing volume of information flow that must be sorted through as a crisis 
intensifies impacts the ability of a control center to make sense of them. As 
described previously, little was done by the UCC to anticipate the mission impact 
of attacks and adjust accordingly; perhaps because the information flows as they 
were exceeded the S4 function’s ability to assimilate the information. Notable 
convergence between case data and the framework was noted here.
The sixth cell of the fifth and sixth rows of Table 5.4 references the 
suggested impact of such large-scale events upon the identity of the 
organization. Again general incompetence became the identity of this UCC. The 
very basic function of processing small information flows as a UCC constituted a 
crisis environment. Notable convergence with the DC5 framework was noted 
here.
The final cell of the fifth and sixth rows of Table 5.4 captures the notion 
that redundancy of systems and visualization tools provide flexibility by making 
tracking of data easier and more reliable thereby increasing the useable horizon 
of visibility. The unit again failed in this basic area by simply not establishing or
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following rigorous procedure. Thus key information was lost or forgotten and 
decisions that could have enhanced overall unit performance were simply not 
made. Again, any processing of information for this UCC constituted a crisis. 
Notable convergence was noted here.
The researcher additionally is drawn to assessing the impact of wearing 
chemical mask and ensemble on DC5 fitness. Not a part of the scenarios of 
case 1, use of the ensemble in this case motivated the need to articulate its 
impact in terms of DC5 constructs. As previously described, the ensemble and 
mask are severely hot and uncomfortable and inhibit hearing and vision. All data 
sources converged on the notion that it inhibited the UCC’s ability to process 
information. It could be said that the mask and ensemble suddenly reduces the 
horizon of visibility for all UCC personnel as they have difficulty managing basic 
breathing and job functions and cannot readily see or hear the flow of information 
through the SRC. Secondarily, inter-subjectivity is reduced amongst UCC 
players as they become distracted by their own discomfort. This directly impacts 
the ability to receive information, coordinate understanding, build 
representations, and construct response. Wear of the mask and gear effectively 
reduces the competence of all personnel to some degree. Such reduction can 
be offset by rigorous adherence to established procedure and training in the gear 
to minimize its affect. Additionally, as the researcher and inspectors attest, 
leadership in the form of motivation and demonstration of personal disregard for 
the discomfort of the gear can also offset the impacts on performance. 
Unfortunately, the general level of poor performance by the UCC made it
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impossible to characterize further degradation of performance and validate the 
suppositions; just detailed in terms of the DC5 constructs in Table 5.4.
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